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Abstract 
My research project focuses on Greek tragedy’s specific 
contribution to fifth-century debate on issues of theodicy and on 
theological questions concerning the existence and nature of the gods, and 
their role in human lives. The relationship between the human and the 
divine as represented and explored in Greek tragedy is discussed with 
special attention to the problems inherent in the different forms of contact 
between deities and mankind. The dissertation is structured thematically: 
each of the three chapters deals with a specific religious theme and focuses 
on the analysis of a couple of paradigmatic plays.  
This project starts by studying one of the closest forms of contact 
between gods and mortals depicted in Greek tragedy, namely the stories 
of sexual intercourse between a male deity and a mortal girl (Aeschylus’ 
Suppliants and Euripides’ Ion). The second chapter concerns the opposition 
between human and divine knowledge in Sophocles’ OT and Euripides’ 
Bacchae, whereas the third addresses the topic of divine intervention in 
human life by analyzing the dramatic portrayal of the gods on stage in 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Euripides’ Orestes. This research aims to show 
how religious exploration in ancient Greek tragedy is tied up with a 
number of competing discourses informed by advances in medicine as 
well as by contemporary philosophical and political questions. Each 
chapter follows a similar methodology of close reading of the plays 
connecting the linguistic and thematic analyses of emblematic passages to 
broader fifth-century theological concerns.  
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Impact Statement 
This research can have an impact in two main areas: 
1) Academic study on Greek tragedy: it aims to extend and deepen 
understanding of the function of Greek tragedy and of its interfaces 
with the contemporary world, with a specific focus on contemporary 
religious experience. More specifically, this study approaches the 
understanding of tragic plays through gathering evidence about their 
connection to the larger cultural and historical contexts as well as their 
engagement with contemporary religious anxieties, philosophical 
inquiry and socio-political concerns such as gender and civic 
definition. Drawing on the findings of my research, I have prepared 
some papers which have thus far been delivered orally at conferences 
and seminars intended for academic audiences: Lyceum Classics 
Community Seminar (UCL 16 November 2015); Departmental 
Research Seminar (UCL 18 November 2015); the Postgraduate 
Workshop ‘Euripide. Storia, testi, drammaturgia. Giornata di studi 
sulla tragedia greca’ (University of Padua, 13 September 2016); the 
Greek Drama V International Conference (University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, 5-8 July 2017). 
2) Teaching and learning of Ancient Greek Drama at secondary school. 
The findings of my research can be used to improve the educational 
experience of secondary students and to shape their thinking on the 
classical world and on how drama, arts and society influence each 
other. It redefines not only knowledge of this topic amongst secondary 
students, but also the ways in which they learn about Greek tragedy. I 
have given two presentations of my work targeted at secondary school 
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students in Italy (Liceo classico ‘J. Stellini’, Udine, 22 March 2016 and 4 
April 2018). Participants read and discussed selections from the tragic 
plays chosen for analysis and were asked to interpret the plays, 
comparing and contrasting tragic passages with other sources 
addressing or depicting the same topic (e.g. philosophical texts; 
Athenian vase-paintings). Such an inductive and interdisciplinary 
approach facilitates the students’ engagement with, and better insight 
into, ancient Greek drama and of its relevance to fifth-century 
Athenian life.   
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0. Introduction 
‘A crucial frontier defined by tragedy is that between 
man and god. […] The Athenian citizen distinguished 
himself by his earthly habitat and mortality from the 
immortals. But the citizen also emphatically distinguished 
himself, as an inhabitant of a πόλις, from the primitive 
peoples and wild beasts without thought or language who 
lived in the untamed countryside beyond the boundaries of 
civilisation and the laws of the civic community.’1 
This study discusses the relationship between gods and mortals as 
represented and explored in Greek tragedy, with special attention to the 
role played by the gods in human lives and to the problems inherent in the 
different forms of contact between deities and mankind. Fifth-century 
Athenian citizens defined themselves in opposition to both gods and 
beasts. Greek drama not only illustrates the various aspects of the 
hierarchical god – man – beast relationship that underlies the world order 
but also provides a space for addressing problems that may affect such a 
relationship. In fact, in tragic plays the world order is often overthrown or 
confused, and chaos threatens to erupt.2  
A first kind of disruption affecting the tragic world concerns the 
myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals. A terrifying 
confusion of boundaries between human and divine springs from 
excessive intimacy between a male god and a mortal heroine: as a result of 
such an excessively close contact with a deity, the mortal girl is often 
forced to regress to a bestial state, as is exemplified by Io’s transformation 
into a heifer (Aeschylus’ Suppliants – Euripides’ Ion). The tragic hero also 
dangerously crosses boundaries when either commits bestial crimes like 
                                                 
1 Hall (1997), 96-7.  
2 Segal (1986a), 58.  
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matricide or incest (e.g. the myths of Orestes and Oedipus respectively) or 
strives for some form of godlike power and honour (e.g. Agamemnon’s 
walking on the carpet in Aeschyus’ Agamemnon; the godlike honours paid 
to Oedipus in Sophocles’ OT; Orestes’ bold resolution to take the position 
usually  occupied by the deus ex machina in Euripides’ Orestes).3  
Chaos also threatens to intrude on human lives at the limits of 
human intellectual abiities, that is, when an extraordinary event 
challenges human cognitive capacity, and man finds no other way to make 
sense of that event but by resorting to explanations from religious and 
mythical thought. To give an example, catastrophic natural phenomena 
such as a plague (Sophocles’ OT) or an earthquake (Euripides’ Bacchae) can 
be interpreted on stage as evidence that the relationship between the gods 
and mortals has been perturbed in some way. Both plays investigate 
factors which may have caused a disruption in the communication 
between deities and men, and raise the question of how humans can gain 
true insight into divine will.  
Finally, in Geertz’ words, ‘another challenge to the proposition that 
life is comprehensible and that humans can, by taking thought, orient 
themselves effectively within it’ is a sort of ‘intractable ethical paradox’.4 
The most glaring example of an ‘ethical paradox’ found in Greek tragedy 
is the myth of Orestes and, especially, the paradoxical representation of 
the matricide both as a pious and righteous act carried out following 
Apollo’s command and as an impious and reprehensible crime which 
                                                 
3 Such crimes are defined as ‘bestial’ because they do not conform to the laws that 
separate man from beast, thus blurring the boundary between the human and the animal.  
4 Geertz (1973), 100.  
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must be punished by the Erinyes, the goddesses of vengeance and 
retribution (Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Euripides’ Orestes).  
The focus of this research is tragedy’s exploration of these 
manifestations of a disturbance in the relation between man and god. 
More particularly, this study is concerned with the representation on stage 
of human reactions to the inscrutability of the divine will and to the gods’ 
apparently unjust and uncaring behaviour towards their mortal protégés. 
In studying the ways in which Greek tragedy explores these religious 
issues, I shall not treat tragic plays as sources of evidence for either 
specific rituals or the actual beliefs of the playwrights and the Athenians. 
On the contrary, I am primarily concerned with the representation of the 
divine in the texts of the tragic plays and with the role played by the gods 
in the characters’ lives. However, I shall not study tragic plays as mere 
aesthetic objects; I will rather delve into the ways in which the narrative 
and the dramatic techniques of the plays are used to complicate the 
discussion of theological problems which represented real-life concerns 
for fifth-century audiences. 
As I shall now discuss in further detail, current research has seen a 
diversification of perspectives in the study of Greek tragedy and of its 
relationship with the larger cultural and religious contexts in which it was 
produced: there have been literary readings of the plays as well as studies 
which have put emphasis either on the political aspect of Greek drama or 
on its religious nature and ritual origins. This work is an attempt to adopt 
a broader and unifying perspective on the study of Greek tragedy with a 
specific focus on religious exploration. This study is not limited to the 
study of religion as represented in the plays; it rather explores the ways in 
which, in dramatic terms, tragedians engage with the religious concerns of 
20 
 
the audience on a broader level. My aim is to study how religious 
exploration in Greek tragedy interweaves with socio-political matters and 
philosophical questions, such as epistemological and ethical ones, and 
how these different themes are defined through this interplay. Thanks to 
this broader focus, the study of the divine in Greek drama will not be 
studied in isolation from the larger cultural, historical, and socio-political 
contexts. Furthermore, such a wider perspective will help us gain a better 
understanding of how, and to what extent, Greek tragedy problematizes 
the god-man relationship and, more specifically, divine behaviour, as I 
shall now show by an example drawn from Euripides’ Ion.  
Scholars are divided as to the meaning and function of Ion’s refusal 
to believe that he is of divine origin and that Apollo mated with a mortal 
girl (E. Ion. 338-341). Some critics interpret Ion’s scepticism as a dramatic 
representation of the fifth-century rationalizing tendency and argue that in 
the play the myth of Apollo’s union with Creusa is brought into question 
by means of reference to avant-garde philosophical speculation against 
divine anthropomorphism.5 Others, on the other hand, point out that the 
narrative itself rebuts Ion’s scepticism. For Athena eventually confirms 
Apollo’s paternity: it follows that Ion’s expressions of disbelief must not 
have been taken too seriously by the audience given that they are 
downplayed by the ignorance afflicting the hero.6 My argument, by 
contrast, is that these interpretations are both potentially misleading since 
they analyse the Ion from a narrow perspective. The first view fails to take 
into account the significance of the characters’ critical statements within 
                                                 
5 For the influence of contemporary philosophical investigation on Euripidean drama, see 
Conacher (1998); Ostwald (1999), 33-49; Allan (1999-2000), 145-56; Dillon (2004), 47-73; 
Susanetti (2007), 230; Whitmarsh (2014), 109-126.  
6 Cf. Burnett (1962); Lefkowitz (1987) and (1989); Mastronarde (2002) and (2010). 
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their dramatic contexts: are these expressions of doubt, complaint and 
criticism eventually resolved in the development of the plot, thanks to the 
way in which the events take place and end? The second interpretation, on 
the other hand, by focusing only on dramaturgical considerations that are 
internal to the play, runs the risk of giving a view of tragedy’s treatment of 
religious problems that is too reassuring.  
In the first chapter of this study I will argue that in the Ion the myth 
of Apollo’s sexual intercourse with a mortal girl is called into question not 
simply as a risible story in the wake of contemporary philosophical 
speculation against divine anthropomorphism but rather on a different 
and deeper level: by analysing how in the play religious exploration is 
strictly interwoven with broader socio-political inquiry, I will show that 
Apollo’s behaviour is criticized on several grounds, that is, not only for its 
negative impact on the heroine’s life but also because it negatively affects 
the order and harmony of the city of Athens. For instance, I will argue that 
Apollo’s behaviour undermines gender balance by inflicting a serious 
blow upon the authority of Xuthus, the head of the royal household, and it 
jeopardizes the Athenians’ claim to hegemony over other Greek cities by 
weakening the prestige of the royal dynasty of Athens.7 This is an example 
of how the nature and scope of tragedy’s religious problematization can 
be more deeply understood by analysing the extent to which religious 
problems (such as the danger of an excessively close contact with the 
deity) are interrelated with, and intensified by, social and political matters 
of public concern.  
                                                 
7 See infra, Chap. 1.  
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My research does not adopt a single approach to the study of 
religious exploration in Greek plays but rather an eclectic one, drawing 
from a range of different perspectives. I will now briefly look at the main 
approaches that have been taken by scholars to the study of Greek 
tragedy, and will outline what aspects of each of them I find most useful 
and effective.  
In scholarly literature on Greek drama there has always been 
broadly speaking a tension between formalism and historical 
anthropology: to quote Goldhill, ‘the studies that grow out of 
anthropologically based perceptions of theatre as social drama are often 
self-consciously and explicitly opposed to the traditions of criticism which 
place tragedy narrowly within the category “literature”.’8 
The focus of formalist critics is the text: in studying any work of 
literature, attention must be paid to the analysis of its themes and 
interpretative issues, and such analysis is to be carried out through close 
reading of the texts.9 In scholarly literature concerning Greek tragedy, 
those scholars who have drawn inspiration from the formalistic approach 
have therefore focused their studies on tone, verbal patterns and imagery 
with the aim of understanding the relation between the poetic language 
and the intellectual armature of tragic plays.10  
                                                 
8 Goldhill (1997), 336.  
9 Formalist critics exclude the author’s intention, the reader’s response and the historical 
and cultural background from their analysis. Many similarities have been detected 
between the methodological principles of formalist literary criticism in the Classics and 
those of New Criticism, an Anglo-American movement in literary theory which 
developed in the US in the mid-twentieth century: see Goldhill (1997), 324-331. On New 
Criticism, see Eagleton (1983), 17-53; Culler (1988), 3-40. 
10 Two examples are Knox (1957), Oedipus at Thebes. Sophocles’ Tragic Hero and His Time, 
New Haven- London, and Goheen (1951), The Imagery of Sophocles’Antigone. A Study of 
Poetic Language and Structure, Princeton. Cf. also Rutherford (2001).  
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One of the criticisms levelled against the formalistic approach is 
that it tends to isolate the play in a cultural vacuum, as if it were 
completely divorced from its historical and cultural context. For instance, 
the critics who interpret Greek tragedy from an aestheticized perspective 
argue that the worldviews of the play, as well as the gods, are merely 
literary constructs which have little relationship with the real life of fifth-
century Athens.11 Parker summarizes the main arguments of this theory, 
which he intends to rebut, in the following words:  
‘The worldview of a literary work is a function of genre and 
plot. […] The heroes of tragedy, it can be argued, do not suffer in 
order to illustrate theological truths; the plays acquire a theology […] 
in order to illustrate the sufferings of the heroes. If Phaedra is to be 
wretched, Aphrodite must be cruel. Again, theology has a 
narratological function, as a way of conferring shape and cohesion 
(or a planned incoherence) on a sequence of events.’12 
Parker calls into question this view by maintaining that, even 
though tragedies are not religious treatises, beliefs inevitably impose 
certain constraints upon plots: 
‘If the misery of Phaedra, caused by the cruelty of Aphrodite, is 
to be credible, must not the cruelty of Aphrodite fall within the range of 
forms of divine behaviour acknowledged by Greek belief?’13 
According to the scholar, not only does the religion of theatre 
bear some relation with the practiced religion of fifth-century Athens, 
but Greek tragedy also operates as a framework for exploration and 
explanation of contemporary religious experience.14  
                                                 
11 One of these critics is Mikalson (1991).  
12 Parker (1997), 145.  
13 Parker (1997), 145.  
14 Parker (1997), 159.  
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The aim of this research is precisely to investigate how and to 
what extent Greek tragedy, in the wake of recent advances in 
intellectual life, participates in contemporary debates over the following 
religious issues: the proper relationship between gods and mortals, the 
nature of the divine, the interpretation of an event as the work of a 
divine agency as opposed to a more rational explanation according to 
natural laws.  
What my method has in common with formalism is the 
methodology of close reading, as well as the attention paid to language. 
On the other hand, my method is also informed by Parker’s approach to 
the study of Greek tragedy. My decision to analyse individual words in 
especially meaningful passages is not motivated by a philological interest 
for its own sake. On the contrary, word analysis aims not only to show 
how language can illuminate the meaning and significance of specific 
passages and, more broadly, of themes in the play as a whole but also to 
examine the mutual interaction between tragedy and its historical and 
cultural contexts.  
For instance, in the OT language reveals a fundamental opposition 
between human intelligence and divine knowledge: it is especially telling 
that Oedipus’ method of investigation is described by means of terms 
belonging to fifth-century philosophical discussion and scientific 
procedure, such as ζητεῖν (‘to investigate’), σκοπεῖν (‘to examine’), 
ἱστορεῖν (‘to inquire into something’), τεκμαίρεσθαι (‘to form a judgment 
from evidence’), εὑρίσκειν (‘to find after search’).15 Subtle wordplays, 
however, call into question the effectiveness of Oedipus’ rational research 
                                                 
15 Knox (1957); Di Benedetto (1983). 
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method by undermining the value of these scientific terms through the 
process of reversal. To give just one example, a kind of reversal consists in 
the transformation of an active verb into the passive voice: Oedipus makes 
great efforts to discover (εὑρίσκω at vv. 68, 120, 440-1) the murderer of 
Laius but, in the end, it is him who is discovered ‘as base and of base birth’ 
(εὑρίσκομαι at 1397, 1421). The agent directing the search for truth 
becomes both the object of the investigation and the thing discovered.16 
Wordplays of this kind might be an indication of the play’s pessimistic 
view of the contemporary procedure of scientific discovery and, more 
generally, of the role played by human knowledge in the lives of mortals.17 
A similar accusation of radical disjunction between the tragic world 
and that of everyday life has characterized another approach to the study 
of Greek tragedy, that is, the study of the stagecraft of tragic plays. The 
first investigations into the performance of Greek drama were carried out 
in the 1960s, and Taplin’s The Stagecraft of Aeschylus (1977) was pivotal in 
this new approach to the study of Greek tragedy, which tried to supersede 
previous text-centred scholarship.18 Soon after the publication of Taplin’s 
landmark work, a number of studies on specific stagecraft issues were 
published,19 and in the following decade a theoretical debate developed 
among critics over the function of performance criticism. Goldhill (1986) 
and Wiles (1987), while acknowledging the value of Taplin’s analyses, 
criticized the scholar’s idea of the immutability of the meaning of a text, 
                                                 
16 Knox (1957), 128-31; Di Benedetto (1983), 90-1. Knox highlights that the verb εὑρίσκω is 
typical of scientific discovery: for examples from Thucydides, Gorgias, Hippocrates, see 
ivi, 128-9.  
17 Further examples of how linguistic analysis can enhance our understanding of the 
plays will be given in the following chapters.  
18 Taplin developed his analysis of the stagecraft of Greek tragedy in Taplin (1978).  For a 
brief overview of the history of performance criticism, see Harrison – Lliapis (2013), 2-6.  
19 Hamilton (1978), Mastronarde (1979), Bain (1981),  Halleran (1985). 
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which is to be communicated to the audience, as well as his lack of interest 
in the specific context in which the plays were performed.20  
This study, and especially the last chapter which is devoted to 
stagecraft techniques in Aeschylus’ Eumenides and in Euripides’ Orestes, to 
some extent draws inspiration from Taplin’s method, in that my 
investigation is not merely concerned with how the plays were stage-
managed but rather with the meanings that could be conveyed by the 
staging of them: my aim is to delve into the ways in which stage events, 
like the characters’ movements and their shifting spatial relationships, are 
shaped into meaningful patterns and complicate the discussion of various 
topics, such as the religious theme of the opposition between human and 
divine agency.21 For instance, in analysing Euripides’ Orestes, I will discuss 
the meaning of Orestes’ appearance on the roof of the royal palace, a place 
generally reserved for the deities, and I will stress the significance of his 
decision to act as the deus ex machina of his own plot.  
On the other hand, my approach is in line with works that reject the 
concept of the immutability of the text and, on the contrary, stress the role 
played by the spectators in the process of creating meaning and 
interpreting what they see on stage.22 An eloquent example of the 
audience’s role in the production of meaning is that given by Goldhill in 
his analysis of the palace-miracle scene in the Bacchae: the scholar argues 
that, if the skene-building does not really fall down as a result of the 
earthquake caused by Dionysus or if there is only a minor alteration of the 
building’s façade, the disjunction between what the chorus proclaims (Ba. 
                                                 
20 Wiles and Goldhill do not agree on all issues: Wiles (1987) attacks Goldhill (1986) for 
putting the theatrical text before performance. See Goldhill’s response (1989).  
21 Taplin (1978), 4.  
22 Goldhill (1986), 265-86; Goldhill (1989), 180 ff; Wiles (1987), 139 ff.  
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582-603) and what the spectators see on stage must have given rise to 
doubts of interpretation. Is the chorus merely deluded by Dionysus’ 
power? Or is the audience expected to imagine by dramatic convention 
the event not represented on stage as taking place? To quote Goldhill, ‘the 
audience come directly under the power of Dionysus’ theatrical illusion, 
as they experience in some way what has not really occurred. The scene 
thus becomes an expression of the linkage of Dionysiac ecstasy and the 
theatrical experience, in which the audience is directly implicated in the 
functioning of the text.’23 In the first chapter of this study I will discuss an 
additional example which shows how the narrative of the Ion directly 
engages the audience in assessing scepticism surrounding the story of 
Creusa’s intimate contact with Apollo by making the spectators reflect on 
the specificity of any theatrical performance, that is, the tension between 
the real and the mythical.24 
Secondly, I agree with Goldhill’s argument that, to deepen our 
understanding of dramatic performance, due consideration must be given 
not only to the system of dramatic conventions, expectations defined by 
specific dramatic techniques, and transgressions of dramatic codes, but 
also to the historical and cultural background of each play. To put it in the 
scholar’s words, ‘on the one hand, the language and transmission of a play 
cannot be understood in a (cultural, historical, intellectual) vacuum […]. 
On the other hand, any attempt to read an ancient play must broach the 
difficult questions of the (philological) constitution, comprehension and 
semantics of the text’.25 That Greek drama is to be interpreted as the 
product of a particular culture is an important methodological principle 
                                                 
23 Goldhill (1986), 280.  
24 See infra, Chap.1.  
25 Goldhill (1997), 327-8. 
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derived from historical anthropology, the aim of which is to study 
Athenian drama in its cultural context, as a performance which took place 
in the Panhellenic festival of the Great Dionysia. 
Within this line of research, however, scholars disagree on whether 
the Great Dionysia is to be primarily interpreted as a religious or civic 
festival. On the one hand, critics like Sourvinou – Inwood stress the cultic 
context of the festival and argue that ‘Greek tragedy was perceived by 
fifth-century audiences not as a theatrical performance, simply framed by 
ritual, but as a ritual performance.’26 According to a different line of 
interpretation, the tragic plays were deeply engaged with religious 
exploration but were not themselves forms of ritual.27 The former view, 
the so-called ritualistic approach, asserts that the discourse of religious 
exploration articulated in the tragic plays was part of the religious 
discourse of the πόλις; as a consequence, the playwrights’ treatment of 
religious issues was likely to be subject to religious constraints set by the 
πόλις.28 The latter, by contrast, holds that ‘the constraints imposed on the 
playwrights were far more obviously political rather than religious’ given 
                                                 
26 Sourvinou-Inwood (2003), 1. For Sourvinou-Inwood’s discussion of the theory of the 
ritual origin of Greek tragedy, see ivi, 67-196; contrast Scullion (2005). This theory traces 
its origins back to the studies carried out by the school of Cambridge Ritualists in the 
early 20th century: cf. Harrison (1912) and Murray (1912). The belief of this school that 
tragedy must be studied as ritual has influenced the works of Girard (1977) and Burkert 
(1983). For a ritualistic approach to Greek tragedy, see also Seaford (1994).  
27 Scullion (2002), 134-135. Tragedy can represent, manipulate, and distort ritual patterns 
but is not itself ritual. For instance, the murder of Agamemnon is represented as a 
corrupted sacrifice in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon: Zeitlin (1965). To give an additional 
example, Vernant’s study of the OT argues that the scapegoat ritual underlies the 
narrative of the Oedipus myth: Vernant and Vidal-Naquet (1988), 113- 140. For further 
examples of perverted rituals in Greek tragedy, see Segal (1986a), 50 ff.    
28 Sourvinou – Inwood (2000) and (2003), 1 ff.  
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that the Great Dionysia was first and foremost a civic festival funded by 
the πόλις of Athens.29  
One of the criticisms levelled at the ritualistic approach is that it 
provides a limited perspective on the topic of religious exploration in 
Greek plays.30 By depicting Greek tragedy as re-enacting, or providing the 
aetiology for, rituals, this mode of research runs the risk of focusing on 
religious practices, while neglecting the issue of religious beliefs and 
concerns.31 Owing to the idea that theatrical performances are deeply 
embedded in the religious framework of the πόλις, it may also incur the 
danger of ruling out the possibility that the religious discourse developed 
in Greek tragedy contains not only serious thinking about the gods but 
also a calling into question of divine nature and divine agency.32 By 
contrast, my main interest in this research is to discuss the searching 
questions about religious problems posed by the narrative of the tragic 
plays and to delve into the meaning and significance of the elements of 
criticism in the tragic representation of the divine realm.  
Greek drama enjoyed some degree of autonomy in addressing 
theological problems for two reasons.33 The first lies in a central feature of 
ancient Greek religion:34  since Greek religion had no dogma and no sacred 
                                                 
29 Scullion (2002), 134-135.  
30 Scullion (2002); Allan (2004); Versnel (2011); Kindt (2012); Whitmarsh (2014).  
31 Versnel (2011); Kindt (2012). 
32 Kearns (1995), 525-6; Scullion (2002), 134-5; Whitmarsh (2014), 115.  
33 Pelling (1997), 213-235.  
34 Two major syntheses of archaic and classical Greek religion are Burkert (1985) and 
Bruit-Zaidman - Schmitt-Pantel (1992). Their research, however, has been criticized ‘for 
drawing on information from a wide range of sources derived from a wide array of poleis 
and for presenting this information in the form of a unified, coherent and authoritative 
account of archaic and classical Greek religion as such’: Kindt (2012), 4. To avoid the 
danger of oversimplification inherent in the holistic approach to Greek religion, other 
critics have preferred to adopt a local perspective focusing on the religious system of 
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texts, religious issues were subject to negotiation. In fact, the authority of 
religious practices and beliefs was partly based on oral oracular responses 
and traditions, and partly on written texts expounding ancient myths.35 
Both served as source materials from which the Greeks could learn about 
the histories of the gods, their main attributes and prerogatives, and the 
origins and purposes of specific festivals.36 Such a lack of a canon of 
scripture left ample room for religious exploration: a large variety of 
sources, such as lyric and epic poetry, philosophical works, drama and 
historiography, thus concerned themselves with problems of theodicy and 
theological questions concerning the existence and nature of the gods, and 
their role in human lives.37 
The second reason why the tragic genre was particularly suitable 
for investigating sacred matters is that, as opposed to other genres, it had 
some license by virtue of one of its main characteristics, namely its double 
perspective.38 Thanks to the setting of the plays in the heroic age, the tragic 
world was perceived by the fifth-century Athenians as both distant from 
their present reality and part of it.39 This double perspective, which is a 
                                                                                                                                     
archaic and classical Athens: Parker (1996), (2007), Humphreys (2004), Deacy (2007), and 
Hedrick (2007). My research has an even more specific focus since its analysis is limited 
to Athenian religion in the fifth century, as represented and explored in Greek tragedy.  
35 Parker (2011), 13-6.  
36 Hesiod’s Theogony, for instance, can be considered as an attempt to give a systematic 
representation of the divine pantheon. The works of both Homer and Hesiod could have 
played a role in transmitting a common set of myths among the ancient Greeks.  
37 Two introductory guides to Greek religion which focus on literary sources are Gould 
(1985) and Kearns (1995). Cf. also Harrison (2007). On the religion of Greek tragedy, see 
Yunis (1988); Mikalson (1991); Sourvinou-Inwood (1997), (2003); Parker (1997), (1999), 
(2007); Scullion (2005); Calame (2015). 
38 See the analysis of the differences between tragedy and oratory (‘censored speech’) in 
Parker (1997), 105-25. 
39 The world of fifth-century Athens was shaped by events which occurred in the heroic 
age (e.g. Theseus’ synoecism): Sourvinou – Inwood (2003), 15-6. The double perspective 
also works in ‘non-heroic age settings’: for instance, in Aeschylus’ Persai the world of the 
play is ‘geographically distanced’ (ivi). Cf. Zeitlin (1990).  
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typical feature of almost all extant plays,40 allowed the playwrights to 
address problematic issues that were relevant to the audience at a safer 
distance, as if they belonged to a remote past and distant places. 
Furthermore, even though there undoubtedly were religious constraints 
placed upon the way a story could be represented on stage, the 
malleability of myths enabled Greek tragedians to modify them in order to 
stress those elements most fit for purpose in the treatment of sacred 
matters.41  
To give an example, in Euripides’ Andromache Neoptolemus goes to 
Delphi to ask Apollo’s forgiveness for his previously arrogant attitude 
towards the god but he is killed by some men while he is praying to the 
deity. Both Orestes and Apollo are accomplices to this sacrilegious crime 
committed in the course of a ritual: the messenger explicitly blames the 
prophetic god for taking part in the murder and for holding a grudge 
against a worshipper who had repented his wrongdoing (1161-5). It has 
been claimed that this expression of criticism uttered by the herald has no 
bearing on Apollo for two reasons.42 First of all, the audience is likely to 
have considered Neoptolemus’ chastisement as inevitable given that he is 
traditionally depicted as the hybristic perpetrator of the impious murder 
of Priam at Zeus’ altar.43 What is more, Apollo’s connivance in a violent 
act polluting a sacred place is probably less serious than it may at first 
appear due to the fact that Apollo’s shrine has already been desecrated by 
the very presence of a person guilty of impiety, namely Neoptolemus. 
However, a weakness of both arguments is that they fail to acknowledge 
                                                 
40 A notable exception is Phrynichos’ Capture of Miletos.  
41 Allan (2000), 4-39.  For the notion of the malleability of myth, see also Gould (1985), 
219-21; Bremmer (1987), 1-7.  
42 Sourvinou – Inwood (2003), 332-8.  
43 Il. Pers. 62. 9-10 D.; Il. Parv. Fr. 17 D; E. Tr. 16-7; Hec. 23-4.  
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that the slaying of Priam is never mentioned by any character nor is it 
ascribed to Neoptolemus; on the contrary, Achilles’ son is portrayed 
positively throughout the play.44 In the eyes of the spectators, this change 
in Neoptolemus’ characterization must have been especially striking 
precisely because they are likely to have initially associated him with an 
abhorrent crime. Euripides’ reshaping of the Neoptolemus’ myth 
highlights the problematic aspects of Apollo’s vindictiveness and, as a 
consequence, raises theological issues about divine behaviour.45  
What makes the study of religious issues in tragic plays particularly 
interesting is precisely the fact that, thanks to the relative freedom enjoyed 
by the playwrights, Greek tragedy can provide valuable insight into the 
overlap and synergy between unofficial and official modes of religious 
expression.46 Greek tragedy thus gives us a perspective on fifth-century 
Athenian religion which differs from the one given by the influential 
model of πόλις religion formulated by Sourvinou-Inwood.47 According to 
this model, religion was embedded in every aspect of culture: 48 there was 
                                                 
44 Allan (2000), who discusses the general improvement of the character of Neoptolemus 
in detail, calls Neoptolemus’ transformation ‘the most radical reworking of myth’ (25).  
45 Allan (2000), 35.  
46 To give an example, Euripides’ Bacchae has been interpreted as a play representing the 
fifth-century Athenians’ reaction to a new form of religiosity, which distances itself from 
the established religious practices and presents some traits resembling the henotheistic 
features typical of the new cults of the 4th century: Versnel (1990); Allan (2004); Versnel 
(2011). 
47 Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), 295-322. The influential model of πόλις religion elaborated 
by Sourvinou-Inwood is already present in nuce in the works of Burkert (1985), Bruit-
Zaidman - Schmitt-Pantel (1992), and the so-called Paris school: Vernant (1980), Vernant 
and Vidal-Naquet (1988). These scholars tried to ‘explain the principles and practices of 
ancient Greek religion by referring to an internally coherent cultural system, conceived as 
the archaic and classical Greek πόλις’: Kindt (2012), 3. For a discussion of the 
indebtedness of the theory of  πόλις religion to the structuralist conception of religion as 
a universal system of signs [Gould (1985), influenced by Geertz (1963], see Kindt (2012), 
13-15.  
48 See Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), (2000), (2003); Bruit-Zaidman - Schmitt-Pantel (1992), 1ff; 
Parker (1996), 1-2; (2007), 452; Bremmer (1999), 1-4; Price (1999), 89. For a critical 
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no separate notion of religion as a distinct sphere of activity or belief.49 As 
a consequence, in the absence of a church and priesthood, religious 
activity was controlled and mediated by the πόλις. Sourvinou-Inwood 
argues that ‘the πόλις was the institutional authority that structured the 
universe and the divine world in a religious system, articulated a 
pantheon with certain particular configurations of divine personalities, 
and established a system of cults, particular rituals and sanctuaries, and a 
sacred calendar.’50 One of the limitations with the model of πόλις religion, 
however, is precisely the fact that it fails to take into consideration all 
those competing religious discourses which run parallel to the religious 
activity sanctioned and mediated by the πόλις: due to the emphasis put 
on the official aspects of religion, it runs the risk of giving an incorrect 
description of Greek religion as a coherent and consistent system.51 
A further disadvantage of the ritualistic approach is its lack of sense 
of proportion: owing to its focus on cult, it overlooks the importance of 
other essential components of the Athenian dramatic festivals, such as the 
political dimension and the general civic context.52 My approach is in 
agreement with the interpretation of Greek tragedy as an experience 
involving deeply religious meaning. Yet, this study distances itself from 
the ritualistic approach in that it aims to set tragic plays in a broader 
                                                                                                                                     
evaluation of the concept of the embeddedness of Greek religion, see Nongbri (2008), 440-
60; Kindt (2009a), (2012); Whitmarsh (2015), 3-12.   
49 For a discussion on the legitimacy of using the terms ‘beliefs’ and ‘believe’ in the study 
of Greek religion, see Feeney (1998), 12-46; Versnel (2011), 539-59; Kindt (2012), 30-1; 
Harrison (2015), 21-28. 
50 Sourvinou-Inwood (1990), 295-322.  
51 This interpretation of archaic and classical Greek religion has been challenged by 
several scholars. For instance, Gould (1985) stresses the improvisatory nature of Greek 
religion, which found no difficulty in accommodating new cults: see also Allan (2004). 
Veyne (1988) and Versnel (2011), on the other hand, point out inconsistencies within the 
ancient Greek religious system. See, more generally, Kindt (2012), 20-25. 
52 Scullion (2002), 134-5. 
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context than the cultic one and to view fifth-century Athenian drama as a 
part not only of a religious festival but also of a socio-political institution.53 
Scholars who hold that the Great Dionysia was first and foremost a 
civic festival funded by the πόλις of Athens are divided as to how the 
festival itself is to be interpreted in terms of the civic ideology of the 
πόλις.54 
In an important study devoted to the social, political and 
ideological context of Athenian drama, the collection of essays Nothing to 
Do with Dionysos?, two contributors have laid emphasis on the patriotic 
elements of the festival.55 On the one hand, Longo, in the essay entitled 
‘The Theater of the Polis’, claims that the aim of the Dionysian contests 
was to consolidate social identity.56 On the other hand, Winkler’s paper 
‘The Ephebes’ Song: Tragoidia and Polis’ puts emphasis on the didactic 
function of tragedy: the plays, thus conceived, invite the spectators to 
meditate on the topics of proper and improper civic conduct.57 According 
to both scholars, the Great Dionysia was a medium of propaganda to 
celebrate the power and values of democratic Athens and to strengthen 
cohesion among the citizens. By contrast, in another essay anthologized in 
                                                 
53 Euben (1986), 22-3.  
54 I follow the definition of ‘ideology’ given by Gellrich (2011), 40: ‘a system of ideas or 
mental habits that both determine and coexist with social practices.’ 
55 Winkler – Zeitlin (1990). This view is challenged by Griffin (1998), 39-61 and Rhodes 
(2003), 104-19. Both scholars maintain that the political aspect of tragic plays did not 
consist in either promoting democratic values or making specific references to recent 
historical events; Greek tragedy rather addressed broader socio-political issues (such as 
the right to asylum and burial, and the consequences of war) which were not specific to 
the political reality of a democratic city. Cf. also the collection of essays edited by Carter 
(2011), the aim of which is to stress Greek tragedy’s ‘political relevance to the classical 
Greek πὁλις in general’ (ivi, 10), not specifically to fifth-century democratic Athens.  
56 Longo (1990), 12-19.  
57 Winkler (1990a), 20-62. For a discussion of the didactic function of Greek drama, see 
also Croally (2005), 55-70.  
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the same volume, Goldhill’s ‘The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology’, 
Greek tragedy is interpreted not simply as a didactic medium but also as a 
questioning one: the critic specifies that ‘rather than simply reflecting the 
cultural values of a fifth-century audience, […] tragedy seems deliberately 
to make difficult the assumption of the values of the civic discourse’.58  
A similar view is held by Vernant and by the French tradition of 
structuralist anthropology: drama does not authenticate the values and the 
institutions of society but rather reveals subsurface conflicts and inherent 
tensions underlying power and gender relations in the πόλις.59 
Structuralism approaches the mental and social context of Greek drama as 
a system of binary oppositions and argues that the function of mythic 
thought is precisely to mediate contradictions in human lives. On the one 
hand, tragedy expresses the anxieties of its audience by calling into 
question human and divine justice and by subverting the normative codes 
of the social order; on the other hand, it eventually reaffirms the social 
order by showing the dangers of impiety, of violence, and of the crossing 
of boundaries. As Euben puts it nicely, ‘the tragedians validated the city’s 
institutions and called them into question; they reaffirmed its structure of 
order and pushed the mind beyond that order to face the chaos those 
structures had exorcised.’60 
Insights derived from structuralist anthropology, such as the notion 
that gender differences can be explained by binary oppositions 
(male/female, active/passive, public/domestic, and so on), have influenced 
gender studies and especially those works analysing the conceptual 
                                                 
58 Goldhill (1990b), 124. Griffin (1998), contra. Cf. also Goldhill (2000) and Seaford (2000). 
59 Vernant (1980), (1991); Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988); Segal (1982a), 221-34 and 
(1986a), 43-75.  
60 Euben (1986), 29.  
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structures which underlie the tragic and mythical representation of 
women and its relation to the socio-political context of fifth-century 
Athens.61 In the course of this research I will point out how in tragic 
narratives (e.g. A. Supp., Eu; E. Ion; Or.) gender issues are closely 
connected with political issues, such as the discourse of citizenship and 
the need to preserve both the city’s autochthony and the household’s 
perpetuation through legitimate male heirs. The tragic world order is 
often represented as being jeopardized by women’s subversive behaviour 
and by their refusal to submit to male power and male sexuality: Greek 
tragedy subverts rigid gender roles by putting ‘feminized males’ and 
‘masculinized women’ on stage.62 According to a widely held hypothesis, 
however, the aim of such inversion of gender roles is not so much to 
challenge the dominant androcentric ideology as to validate it by showing 
the negative impact of the threat of women’s power on the social order.63  
This hypothesis concerning gender role reversals in tragic plays 
may be conceived as part of a broader view according to which Greek 
tragedy’s distortion of any kind of familiar patterns of order (whether they 
be social, linguistic, political, sexual, spatial, and so on) ultimately serves 
the purpose of reaffirming the socio-political, civic, and ritual order of the 
city by showing dangers resulting from the derangement and inversion of 
the normative codes.64 This view is based on the premise that playwrights 
and audiences shared the same conceptual filters through which tragedies 
were written and made sense of, and that these filters were in turn shaped 
                                                 
61 Foley (1981); Loraux (1986) and (1993); Zeitlin (1996); Zelenak (1998).  
62 For a study of ancient Greek sexuality, see Halperin – Winkler – Zeitlin (1990); Winkler 
(1990b); Bowlby (2007). 
63 According to Zeitlin (1996), in the plays women play the role of the ‘radical other’, a 
category that helps men define and reassert their masculine identity. cf. also Mossman 
(2005).  
64 Cf. Segal (1986a), 47 ff.  
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by the contemporary socio-political reality and by the cultural 
assumptions framing it.65 A weakness with this view, however, is that it 
tends to posit the context as an objective entity which is chronologically 
and logically prior to the production and performance of the plays: Greek 
drama is thus interpreted as reflecting the cultural and historical 
background in which it was produced ‘even, paradoxically, when it seems 
to deflect it.’66  
Other scholars, by contrast, maintain that Greek drama cannot be 
conceived as simply reflecting and validating the social order, albeit by 
means of a paradoxical reversal of it. On the contrary, attention must be 
drawn to the fact that Greek drama, thanks to its polyphonic form, gives 
voice to marginal groups (like women, foreigners, and slaves): the 
resistance of these marginal voices to the dominant cultural discourse thus 
opens up fissures in the dominant system. In Gellrich’s words, if we 
ignore these fissures, we suppress ‘the capacity of literature to operate in 
ways that cast doubt on the self-consistency of ordinary assumptions 
about personal roles and identities.’67  
To give an example, the Oresteia puts on stage an androgynous 
queen who defies the male-dominated hierarchy by breaching the 
marriage bond and by trying to usurp kingly power but, in the end, the 
law of the father is founded anew and the rule of the male over the female 
                                                 
65 Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988); cf. Sourvinou- Inwood (2005), 293-304. 
66 Gellrich (2011), 41. The scholar is critical of the contributions collected in the anthology 
Nothing to Do With Dionysus: cf. the preface to Winkler – Zeitlin (1990), 4: ‘We will 
consider how individual plays or groups of dramas directly or indirectly pertained to the 
concerns of the body politic, which were reflected or deflected in the complex 
conventions of the stage.’ 
67 Gellrich (2011), 49. Cf. Hall (1997).  
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is re-confirmed.68 However, as I will show in the last chapter of this study, 
the apparently harmonious resolution of the Atreid saga leaves the 
audience with a set of uncomfortable questions regarding the effectiveness 
of human and divine justice, and the opposed ways in which female and 
male moral agency are judged on stage: the troublesome question of why 
a female act of vengeance upon a man should be judged differently from a 
similar act of revenge carried out by the male upon a female may be one of 
the factors contributing to the human jurors’ indecisiveness.69 By giving 
voice to marginal groups that in real life were not allowed either to 
express their opinion in public or to take political action, the multi-vocal 
form of Greek tragedy goes beyond the cultural assumptions and the 
socio-historical reality of its own production.70  
That Greek drama does not simply reflect contemporary reality and 
ideology but rather transcends them is a methodological principle derived 
from New Historicism, a form of literary theory that criticizes an earlier 
positivist historicism for treating the text as a mere mirror of its context.71 
A strength of this approach is that it warns against the fallacy of 
interpreting the context as a normative given: the context is rather ‘a text 
that itself requires interpretation.’72 According to this interpretation, Greek 
                                                 
68 Zeitlin (1996), 87-119; Foley (2001), 201-234.  
69 I will discuss gender issues especially in the first chapter (when I analyse Aeschylus’ 
Suppliants and Euripides’ Ion), and in the last one, which is devoted to Aeschylus’ 
Eumenides and Euripides’ Orestes.   
70 Hall (1997), 125.  
71 The chief exponent of New Historicism is Greenblatt: cf. his introduction to Greenblatt 
S. (1982), The Forms of Power and the Power of Forms in the English Renaissance, 3-7 (Genre 
15).   
72 Gellrich (2011), 45.  
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drama has the potential for influencing its cultural context rather than 
being merely influenced by it.73 
In studying the relation between Greek tragedy and its background, 
my research distances itself from the historicist effort to detect references 
to specific historical events in the plays; my interest rather lies in 
investigating the extent to which Greek tragedy is part of, and contributes 
to, the intellectual and socio-political developments of the fifth century. In 
this sense, my study is informed by insights derived from New 
Historicism, which describes the relation between a text and its context as 
a two-way process of interaction and negotiation. An important point 
worth stressing when trying to understand the function of Greek tragedy 
is precisely that Greek drama forces the mind to reach beyond the familiar 
social, ritual, and mental structures. In the course of this research I will 
show that the ways of thinking about the gods found in a text do not 
merely map onto the audiences’ real-life religious experience; on the 
contrary, texts can have a creative and moulding force.74  
In the first chapter, for instance, I will analyse how Greek tragedy, 
as opposed to earlier sources, plays down the laudatory aspects of the 
sexual encounters between gods and mortals and puts emphasis on their 
dangerous potential by showing their negative impact on the socio-
political order of the city and on the preservation of the bloodline. The 
                                                 
73 Examples of how the methodological principles of New Historicism has been applied 
to the study of Greek literature, and especially of Greek tragedy, can be found in Vernant 
– Vidal-Naquet (1988), 29-48, who interprets Greek drama as the turning point between 
heroic ideals on the one hand, and legal and political modes of thought on the other 
hand; Foley (2011), 131-50; Goff (2011), 1-37; Gellrich (2011), 38-58; Hall (1997), 93-126.  
See also Feeney (1998), esp. 142 and (2004), 18-20, who discusses the ways in which 
Roman literature and Roman religion interact with each other. 
74 Feeney (ibid.); Pelling (1997), 213-235. 
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narrative of the plays thus challenges an earlier, celebratory view of a 
heroine’s intimate relationship with a deity by addressing the concerns of 
their audiences in matters not specifically related to religion. Similarly, in 
the second chapter I will argue that the problem of the opposition between 
human and divine knowledge is bound up with a discourse on the 
changes that can and do occur at the level of cultural codes shaping 
people’s beliefs and their ways of making sense of the world. By putting 
on stage characters, like Oedipus and Pentheus, who do not initially 
interpret diseases and natural catastrophes according to the commonly 
held cultural codes (that is, as manifestations of divine anger) but rather 
view these phenomena as the products of unseen natural forces operating 
in the world and inside the body, Sophocles’ OT and Euripides’ Bacchae 
encourage the audience to think of alternative frameworks of 
interpretation in the wake of recent medical speculation and historical 
investigation.75 Finally, the third chapter shows how the problems of 
human responsibility and of Orestes’ madness are framed in terms of a 
new concept of the human subject developed thanks to the advent of law 
and to advances in contemporary medical inquiry, which stress the human 
agent’s capacity to make autonomous decisions, to undertake actions, and 
to control those unseen forces operating in the cavity inside the body.76 
__________________ 
The present study is divided into three thematic units, each of 
which focuses on a different religious topic and investigates the ways in 
which it is developed in different plays. A couple of tragedies have been 
                                                 
75 Lloyd (1979), 15-29; Vegetti (1983); Cambiano (1991); Thomas (2000), 28 ff; Holmes 
(2010).  
76 Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 62-3; Holmes (2010), 275 ff.  
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chosen for closer analysis in each chapter but, when necessary, references 
have been made to additional plays. The first and last chapters discuss the 
topic under investigation by comparing the ways in which either the same 
myth (e.g. the myth of the Atreidae in Chap. 3) or the same type of stories 
(e.g. the myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals in Chap. 1) 
are treated by Aeschylus and Euripides. In the first chapter I will deepen 
the investigation into the tragedians’ reworking of myth by looking at the 
representation of sexual encounters between male gods and mortal girls in 
pre-tragic poetry as well. Differences and similarities in the treatment of 
the same myth by different playwrights and in different kinds of sources 
will be analysed with the aim of pointing out that the scope of religious 
problematization differs according to what elements of the story are either 
stressed or overlooked. In the second chapter, by contrast, I will study 
how the same religious theme (that is, the opposition between human and 
divine knowledge) is developed differently by Sophocles and Euripides 
through the telling of various myths.  
This project starts by studying one of the closest forms of contact 
between gods and mortals depicted in Greek tragedy, namely the stories 
of sexual intercourse between a male deity and a mortal girl. By 
comparing how these myths are treated in Aeschylus’ Suppliants and 
Euripides’ Ion to the way in which they are represented in pre-tragic 
poetry, the first chapter aims to evaluate the validity of the thesis put 
forward by Parker that in the hands of tragedians such myths partly lost 
their dignifying character and became problems of theology.77 I will first 
examine the negative consequences of a liaison with a god on the lives of 
the mortals directly involved in the sexual relationship: we will see that it 
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causes endless suffering and, in the case of Io, it even results in the 
transformation and degradation of the heroine into a bestial state. I will 
then deepen the investigation into this topic by showing that in both plays 
the religious problematization of these myths is closely connected with, 
and partly intensified by, the discussion of several socio-political issues 
which were of great concern to ancient Greek society, such as gender roles, 
legal matters concerning citizenship and legitimacy, and problems relating 
to the city’s relationship with foreign countries and its preservation of its 
own identity and autochthony. 
The second chapter concerns the opposition between human and 
divine knowledge: by comparing Sophocles’ OT with Euripides’ Bacchae, it 
discusses both the extent to which men can trust their intellect when 
transferring knowledge into action and the question of whether it would 
be more advisable to rely on the insight into reality given by the gods 
either directly (Bacchae) or through prophecies (OT).  
I will argue that the aim of both plays is neither to celebrate human 
intellect nor to show that it is always defective in comparison to divinely 
inspired knowledge. The OT and the Bacchae rather articulate a discourse 
on the key role played by emotions in both human inquiry and in that 
special mode of knowing which is granted as a privilege to very few 
humans through divine revelation. My argument is that the two tragedies 
show that human intelligence and the revealed knowledge of the seers can 
have either positive or negative results depending on the purpose for 
which one has recourse to either mode of knowing. In addition to this, I 
will demonstrate that emotions affect cognition indirectly through 
influencing a person’s ability to focus attention and can also serve more 
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directly as an unconscious instrument for guiding or stopping one’s search 
for information.  
This chapter comprises two parts: the first section analyses the 
process of the human search for knowledge, whereas the second raises 
religious questions regarding the extent to which men can gain insight 
into divine will and divine nature.  In each of the two parts I will further 
develop the discussion of the opposition between human and divine 
knowledge by investigating how in both plays epistemological issues are 
interwoven with political discourse (Section 2.1) and with some of the 
most recent enquiries carried out in contemporary medical speculation 
and historical investigation (Section 2.2).  
Finally, the third chapter addresses the topic of divine intervention 
in human life through the analysis of Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Euripides’ 
Orestes: more specifically, it investigates how the different forms of divine 
intervention represented in the two plays (the gods’ physical presence and 
active involvement on stage in the Aeschylean tragedy as opposed to the 
remarkable absence of the deities in the Euripidean one) are closely linked 
to the gradual evolution of the concepts of human agency and 
responsibility from a religious conception of human actions as 
preordained by supernatural forces to a new view, introduced thanks to 
the advent of law, which lays emphasis on the intention of the human 
agent.  
The last chapter is mainly concerned with the non-verbal elements 
of a theatrical representation (such as the actors’ movements as indicated 
by implicit stage directions, exits, entrances) and aims to demonstrate that 
these theatrical techniques are not merely structural devices but rather 
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have the important function of conveying different views on human 
nature, society, politics and religion. I will argue that, by putting 
Olympian and chthonic deities on stage for most of the play, Aeschylus in 
the Eumenides frames the problem of the matricide as a cosmic affair; by 
contrast, in the Orestes the Atreid saga is seemingly reduced to a purely 
human matter. I will point out how the remarkable absence of the gods for 
almost the whole Euripidean play allows the playwright to introduce 
innovative frameworks for interpreting Orestes’ violent actions. Finally, I 
will discuss the extent to which the analysis of different forms of divine 
intervention in the Eumenides and in the Orestes can shed some light on the 
socio-political issues raised by both playwrights.  
This study does not claim to be comprehensive, but merely 
illustrative of Greek tragedy’s intermingling of religious exploration with 
contemporary socio-political themes, philosophical investigation and 
medical inquiry. As far as the criteria for selecting the plays for closer 
investigation are concerned, I have chosen those tragedies that I believe 
will best stimulate the discussion prompted by the question which my 
investigation raises: to what extent is the discussion of theological 
problems complicated, problematized and pushed to its extreme by means 
of Greek tragedy’s direct engagement with other not specifically religious 
issues which were of relevance to fifth-century audiences?  
In the first chapter Aeschylus’ Suppliants and Euripides’ Ion have 
been selected as the object of analysis because both problematize the 
myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals by showing how in 
the tragic world an excessively close contact with a deity may create the 
same threats to gender balance, to the socio-political order, to the purity of 
an autochthonous city, and to the preservation of bloodlines as the ones to 
45 
 
which the playwrights’ contemporary society felt to be particularly 
vulnerable. Similarly, in the second chapter I have chosen the Bacchae by 
Euripides and the OT by Sophocles for closer analysis because, out of the 
total tragic output constituted by the surviving plays, these best illustrate 
the interrelation between epistemological inquiry, religious queries and 
political matters, and help frame the problem of the opposition between 
human and divine knowledge in an interesting way. Finally, to address 
the issue of human agency and of the role played by supernatural factors 
in the human decision-making process, in the third chapter I have opted 
for Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Euripides’ Orestes for a twofold reason. On 
the one hand, both plays specifically deal with Orestes’ vicissitudes after 
the matricide and thus make it easier to compare how differently the 
matricide is judged on stage in Aeschylus’ and Euripides’ treatments of 
the same myth. On the other hand, the two tragedians set the story of 
Orestes in different worlds and, by virtue of their divergent choice of 
setting, present diverse views on the process which led the hero to commit 
matricide and on the consequences of Orestes’ violent actions. In fact, the 
Eumenides is set in a world still characterized by the primitive system of 
private vendetta, which at the end of the play is replaced by the law courts 
established through a divinely sanctioned procedure. By contrast, the 
Orestes is set in a context where legal procedures to judge criminal acts are 
already in effect and are depicted as entirely human. These plays can thus 
constitute a rich source of information about the ways in which Greek 
tragedy represents the changes in the conceptions of human agency and 
responsibility brought about by the advent of law. Still, all of this does not 
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take away that the research could be expanded to include the analysis of 
other extant tragedies addressing the topics chosen for analysis.78  
The common thread of this work is to show how religious 
exploration in ancient Greek tragedy is tied up with a number of 
competing discourses informed by advances in contemporary political, 
philosophical and medical discourse. The analysis of such an interrelation 
of themes can give us insight into the process whereby, on the one hand, 
the ancient Greeks made sense of the external world through religion and, 
on the other hand, their religious perspectives were shaped by discourses 
on matters not specifically related to religion. It also enhances our 
understanding of the extent to which Greek tragedy, by capturing 
underlying anxieties in contemporary society and by grasping the most 
recent tendencies in intellectual thought, informed the context of its 
production, here understood as the expectations and cultural assumptions 
of its audiences. Greek tragedy pushes the mind to think beyond the 
familiar structures and the boundaries of the audience’s contemporary 
reality and, in doing so, paves the way for changes in worldviews, 
including the concepts of human and divine agency, the different forms of 
contact and communication between gods and mortals, and the nature of 
the gap between the human and the divine.   
                                                 
78 To give a couple of examples, the analysis of Euripides’ Heracles and Sophocles’ 
Trachiniae could fruitfully deepen the study of the myths of sexual intercourse between 
gods and mortals (Chap.1) and of the opposition between human and divine knowledge 
(Chap. 2) respectively. Similarly, an investigation into Sophocles’ Ajax could enhance our 
understanding of the tragic representation of divine intervention in human lives 
(Chap.3).  
 
 
1. The Problematization of the Myths of Sexual 
Intercourse 
between Gods and Mortals in Greek Tragedy 
 
1.0 Introduction 
The gods play a major role in Greek plays: either they appear on 
stage as characters or their will is revealed through portents and oracles. 
They intervene in human lives, and their actions influence the course of 
events. The closest contact between gods and mortals is represented by the 
myths regarding sexual intercourse between them. As Parker argues, 
‘such myths of sexual contact between man and god were by origin myths 
of a kind of grace, an ennobling contact between the perishable and the 
divine. The tragedians transformed them […], and they became in their 
hands living and breathing problems of theology.’1 
In what sense did they become ‘problems of theology’? What are 
the elements of criticism in the depiction of these myths and of the 
consequences of such unions on human lives? By addressing such 
questions, this chapter aims to discuss to what extent, and on what 
grounds, the myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals are 
problematized in Greek tragedy.  
The chapter falls into five main sections. The first (1.1) examines 
Athenian attitudes towards men’s and women’s engagement in 
extramarital sexual activity. In exploring how these crimes were treated in 
Athenian law I shall point out the fundamental differences between 
                                                 
1 Parker (2007), 143-4.  
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contemporary and ancient Greek perspectives on rape and adultery. In 
this regard, particular attention will be paid to the notion of female 
consent, which seems to have played no role in the Athenian regulation of 
sexual offences. After exploring the issue of extramarital sex in the human 
sphere, I will go on to investigate attitudes towards the myths of divine 
rape/seduction in Greek tragedy and earlier sources (1.2). In the third and 
fourth sections I shall further discuss the problematization of the myths of 
sexual intercourse between gods and mortals in Greek tragedy by looking 
more closely at two plays, namely Aeschylus’ Suppliants (1.3) and 
Euripides’ Ion (1.4). Differences and similarities in the representation of 
such myths in Greek drama versus earlier sources will be highlighted and 
discussed throughout Sections 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 with the aim of assessing 
the extent to which Greek tragedy distances itself from pre-tragic poetry in 
calling into question the gods’ sexual encounters with mortal girls.2 
Finally, the concluding section of the chapter (1.5) will give some final 
thoughts on tragedy’s specific contribution to this debate.  
To investigate the problematization of the myths of sexual 
intercourse between gods and mortals in Greek tragedy, I have formulated 
the following set of research questions. First of all, are these sexual 
encounters represented as forcible or consensual unions? If the intercourse 
between a god and a girl is depicted as an act of rape, is the violence of the 
act one of the grounds on which such myths were problematized or not? 
To put it another way, did the lack of female consent somehow affect the 
way in which these myths were perceived by the ancient Greeks? This 
                                                 
2 For the sake of convenience I include under the term ‘pre-tragic poetry’ the Homeric 
Hymns, the Hesiodic corpus, the Homeric corpus and lyric poetry in its broadest sense 
(Gentili, 1995a, 42-68), although the Greek word ποίησις is not attested before the 5th 
century BC (Ford, 1992, 13-56).  
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question was triggered by the fact that, according to the commonly held 
view, in ancient Athenian society there was no distinction between 
consensual and non-consensual intercourse. The aim of the first section on 
Athenian legislation is precisely to show that this thesis has been 
influenced by the Athenian law of adultery and rape and that, at least as 
far as legal and social sanctions against female rape victims/adulterers are 
concerned, the ancient Greeks did not consider female consent as a matter 
of no importance. We can thus hypothesise that on stage a victim of divine 
rape might have drawn greater sympathy from the audience.  
On the other hand, if the sexual union was consensual are there any 
other grounds on which these myths were problematized? What are the 
consequences of such sexual transgression not only on the heroine’s life 
but also on the community as a whole? The grounds on which a god’s 
union with a mortal girl is called into question in Greek tragedy are not 
necessarily similar to the legal reasons why an extra-marital sexual union 
is punished in human society given that human laws do not usually apply 
to divine actions. However, we shall see that the Ion intensifies the critique 
of Apollo’s behaviour precisely by means of references to specific 
Athenian laws, which either limit divine actions or are broken by the god. 
 
1.1 Attitudes Towards Human Rape and Seduction 
The question of what constitutes adultery and rape has developed 
throughout history. In order to understand what the ancient Greeks 
thought about rapists and seducers, it is necessary accurately to determine 
differences and similarities between the standard contemporary and 
ancient Greek meaning of both concepts. 
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Whereas the Greek notion of ‘adultery’ (μοιχεία) substantially 
corresponds to the contemporary one,3 the ancient concept of ‘rape’ is far 
more nebulous and difficult to define. In contemporary definitions of 
sexual violence the most important criterion is the lack of consent of either 
party,4 while in ancient Greek society both seduction and sexual assault 
were felt as being serious offences not so much against the unwilling 
woman as against her husband or her male guardian (κύριος) since such 
sexual acts were believed to damage a citizen’s honour and to threaten his 
bloodline.5 It may thus be argued that female consent was not an 
important factor in the Athenian regulation of sexual offences. In ancient 
Greek language there is not even a single and specific term for ‘rape’. The 
Greeks used either the word βιασμός (lit. ‘violence’)6 or ὕβρις (lit. ‘wanton 
violence/ outrage’),7 although its meaning was not limited to forced sex. At 
other times they pointed to the violent nature of the sexual act simply by 
adding the word βίᾳ (‘by force’) to neutral terms expressing sexual 
activity.8 Nevertheless, as Sommerstein puts it nicely, ‘the absence of a 
lexeme does not automatically imply the absence of the 
conceptual/semantic distinction it would have marked’.9  
                                                 
3 The only difference is that the contemporary concept of ‘adultery’ refers to any sexual 
intercourse between a man and a woman, one or both of whom are married to other 
people, whereas the ancient Greek notion of μοιχεία is broader because it encompasses 
any sexual union between a man (either married or unmarried) with a woman in 
someone else’s charge (either her husband or her κύριος): Foxhall (1998), 132; Cohen 
(1991a), 98-109, contra. For a rebuttal of Cohen’s thesis, see Cantarella (1991), Foxhall 
(1991), Omitowoju (1997). Cf. also Scafuro (1990), 134. 
4 Rape is defined as ‘sexual intercourse initiated by a person against another person 
without valid consent’: Smith (2004), 169–170. 
5 Lys. 1. 4, 17, 25.  
6 See, for instance, Men. Epit. 236, Satyr. Vit. Eur. fr. 39 vii 8. 
7 See, for instance, Pi. P. 2. 28, Lys. 1. 2.  
8 Cf. E. Ion. 10-11: Scafuro (1990), 128. αἰσχύνω (Lys. 1. 32; Paus. 1. 21. 4) and ἀτιμάζω (E. 
Hipp. 885-6) are also used with reference to an act of sexual violence: Harris (1990), 373.  
9 Sommerstein (2006), 245, n. 6.  
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The thesis that in ancient Greece there was no distinction between 
consensual and non-consensual intercourse has been heavily influenced 
by Athenian law on rape and adultery.  
That female consent was not taken into consideration to determine 
the penalties of sex offenders has been put forward as evidence that the 
ancient Greeks did not distinguish between rape and seduction. However, 
there has been much debate as to whether these crimes were actually 
treated similarly by Athenian law or whether adultery was considered a 
more heinous crime than forcible sex. The following subsection (1.1.a.) 
retraces the main lines of this debate with the aim of investigating the role 
played by female consent in determining the penalties for both male 
rapists and seducers. I will then discuss the extent to which the lack of 
female consent both reduced the negative consequences suffered by 
women in the aftermath of assault and affected the reputation of both the 
perpetrators and the victims (1.1.b.). 
1.1.a. 
Before the 90s it was widely agreed that for the ancient Athenians 
rape was a less heinous crime than adultery on the basis of a passage of 
Lysias’ speech On the Murder of Eratosthenes (1. 32), in which Euphiletos 
argues that ‘the lawgiver considered that those who use force deserve a 
less penalty than those who use persuasion; for the former are hated by 
the persons forced, while the latter corrupt thereby their victims' souls, 
thus making the wives of others more closely attached to themselves than 
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to their husbands, […] and causing uncertainty as to whose the children 
really were’.10  
In 1990, however, the validity of this shred of evidence was 
challenged by Harris, who argued that the reliability of this source is 
compromised by Euphiletos’ intent to defend himself against a charge of 
murder.11 He thus presents adultery as a far more outrageous crime than 
rape so as to convince the jury that his killing of Eratosthenes is an act of 
justifiable homicide and therefore not punishable. In order to emphasize 
the seriousness and dangerousness of adultery, he distorts the meaning of 
the Draconian law by implying that it ‘inflicts the death penalty on 
adulterers, while it only specifies what constitutes lawful homicide’.12 
Furthermore, he does not take into account that this law is not limited to 
the punishment of adulterers but also applies to rapists.13 Finally, he omits 
to mention that the γραφή ὕβρεως decrees capital punishment for rapists 
too.14 Therefore, according to Harris, rapists and adulterers suffered much 
the same consequences and the reasons why rape and adultery were 
treated similarly by Athenian law are precisely the lack of importance of 
female consent in the regulation of sexual behaviour and the overriding 
concern shown for the preservation of bloodlines.15 
                                                 
10 See, for instance, Dover (1973), 62 and (1974); Cole (1984), 101 ff. 
11 Harris (1990), 370-7.  
12 Harris (1990), 371. Cf. also Cole (1984), 103.  
13 According to the Draconian homicide law (D. 23. 53) the murder of the offender caught 
in the act is judged ‘justifiable homicide’, whether he is a rapist or an adulterer. Cf. Cole 
(1984), 100-1; Harris (1990), 371.  
14 Harris (1990), 373; Ogden (1997), 28, 30. For a discussion of the private and public 
prosecutions (δίκη βιαίων and γραφή ὕβρεως respectively) which could be brought to 
try a man charged with the crime of rape, see Cole (1984), 99-100 and Ogden (1997), 25-
42; Dover (1978, 36), contra.  
15 In support of Harris’s thesis see also Brown (1991), 533-4; Lefkowitz (1993), 20-21. 
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Five years after the publication of Harris’ paper, the traditional 
position was defended by Carey, who maintained that, although Lysias’ 
text is clearly guilty of distortion, ‘the extreme position of Euphiletos rests 
on a real distinction drawn by the Athenians. To argue that a distinction 
between rape and adultery is exaggerated is not to invalidate the 
distinction altogether.’16 For Euphiletos quotes two statutes: the Draconian 
law on homicide in I. 30, which merely includes the murders of both a 
rapist and a seducer in the list of justifiable homicides, and another law in 
I. 28, which states that death is the statutory penalty for adultery. Carey 
suggests that the latter should be identified with a post-Draconian law 
specifying legal procedure in cases of μοιχεία. Should this hypothesis be 
proved true, it would also resolve the problem of the evidence of 
Plutarch’s Solon. 23, in which it is clearly stated that an adulterer could be 
legally killed, whereas a rapist had only to pay a fine.17 Consequently, 
although the right to kill a rapist was still legally available under the 
Draconian law on justifiable homicide, the probability that the Athenians 
later issued a further law specifically on the penalties for adultery can be 
advanced as a piece of evidence indicating that μοιχεία was treated as a 
more serious crime than rape.18  
To conclude, although it is still far from certain whether post-
Draconian legislation treated adultery as a more heinous crime than rape 
or not, it is probable that μοιχεία was at least considered as a more 
dangerous sexual offence. In the ancient world it was impossible for a man 
to know for sure whether a child was his legitimate son or not. This is the 
                                                 
16 Carey (1995), 410.  
17 The problem of the evidence of Plu. Sol. 23 has been resolved differently by Ogden 
(1997), 25-42.  
18 Carey (1995), 412.  
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reason why both adultery and rape were considered as crimes. 
Nevertheless, rape was thought to have less serious consequences because 
it was an isolated incident, and therefore pregnancy resulting from the 
rape could be easily detected. On the other hand, seduction could lead to a 
long-term adulterous relationship, and thus raise doubts about the 
legitimacy of any children born to a married couple.19 
1.1.b. 
The Athenian laws on adultery and rape thus aimed at 
safeguarding the interests and honour of the males by protecting 
bloodlines.20 This is the reason why adultery was probably punished more 
severely. However, it is one thing to acknowledge that μοιχεία was 
considered a more dangerous offence than rape given that it was believed 
to put at greater risk a family’s bloodline. It is another thing to claim that 
female consent did not matter at all.  
First of all, to argue that female consent was a matter of no 
importance, it should also be shown that rape victims were treated in the 
same way as seduced women.21 It has been argued that both the victim of 
rape and the female adulterer were regarded as polluted on the basis of 
two passages from Demosthenes and Menander.22 Yet whereas pollution is 
likely to have been the reason why a female adulterer could no longer 
participate in religious ceremonies,23 the passage from the Epitrepontes by 
                                                 
19 Lacey (1968), 115; Harrison (1968-71), i. 32; Cole (1984), 106; Carey (1995), 416.  
20 Ogden (1997), 26; Harris (1997), 483-96.   
21 Sommerstein (2006), 233.  
22 Ogden (1997), 27 ff on the basis of D. 59. 87 (with regard to a female adulterer) and 
Men. Epit. 894-900 (with regard to a raped girl). 
23 See D. 59. 87. Furthermore, according to Plutarch (Sol. 23), a female adulterer could 
even be sold into slavery under Solon. See Lacey (1968), 115; Ogden (1997), 25-42; Seaford 
(1990), 160.  
55 
 
Menander cannot be advanced as proof that pollution befell rape victims 
as well. For Charisios defines himself as ἀλιτήριος (‘villain’, ‘offending 
against sb’ 894) when he acknowledges his own past sexual transgression: 
this adjective merely refers to the wrongness of the act of sexual violence 
committed and does not imply that the rapist, let alone the victim of rape, 
is polluted.24 What is more, the passage of Demosthenes clearly indicates 
the legal implications affecting the life of a female adulterer, while we 
have no evidence of similar sanctions against a raped girl.25 Although a 
raped girl was also likely to remain unmarried due to her loss of 
virginity,26 it is significant that pecuniary compensation was granted to the 
κύριος of a rape victim only.27 The purpose of a monetary penalty for rape 
was probably to compensate the victims for the negative consequences of 
the crime.28 In contrast, no compensation was given to the husband/κύριος 
of a woman who consented to an illicit sexual affair.  
Secondly, to understand Athenian attitudes towards rape and 
adultery fully, social sanctions must also be taken into consideration 
because they are likely to have been an equally effective non-legal 
enforcement mechanism. Athenian law only informs us about the legal 
treatment of extramarital unions, and says nothing about the reputation of 
sexual offenders in the social sphere. To put it another way, the criteria 
according to which the seriousness of a criminal act is judged by the law 
are not necessarily equivalent to those according to which the perpetrator 
                                                 
24 Harris (1997), 483-96.  
25 Carey (1995), 414.  
26 The plays by Menander suggest that a raped girl might get married to her aggressor 
but this solution might be merely comic fantasy. See Cole (1984), 106; Pierce (1997), 163-
84.  
27 Plu. Sol. 23.  
28 Scafuro (1990), 136. The scholar points out that remuneration would help the κύριος to 
sustain his unmarried daughter.  
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and the victim of such an act are judged more or less severely by the social 
group they belong to. Even if the penalties for rape were probably lighter 
than those for adultery, this does not mean that the act of raping a girl was 
socially condoned. In this regard, it is significant that Herodotus depicts 
rape negatively as the typical behaviour of either barbarian soldiers or the 
tyrant.29 In Greek society male lust and violence against free women were 
considered as negative forms of sexual interaction.30 As far as the rape 
victims are concerned, it is undeniable that an extramarital sexual union, 
whether voluntary or involuntary, was a source of shame for females. 
Nevertheless, from several sources it seems probable that those women 
who consented to an extramarital sexual affair had a worse reputation 
than the victims of sexual violence because they had an active role in the 
sexual activity.31  
To conclude, in Athens female consent was not an important factor 
in determining the penalties for male rapists/adulterers but it did play a 
role in influencing the legal sanctions against female rape 
victims/adulterers and the social sanctions against perpetrators and 
victims of both sexual crimes.  
 
                                                 
29 Hdt. II. 131; III. 80. 5; IV. 3; VIII. 3. See also Clearch. FHG 2. 307 = Ath. 541C-E; Plu. De 
mul. vir. 253C-E. For a discussion of the passages and for further references, see Cole 
(1984), 112 ff; Harrison (1997), 185-208.  
30 Just (1989), 153-93; Zelenak (1998), 29; Wiles (2000), 73; Papadopolou (2011), 52. For a 
study of the triumph of the ethic of self-regulation during the age of Perikles, see Dover 
(1973), 69-73; Zeitlin (1986), 129-31; Stewart (1995), 74-90. 
31 Sommerstein (2006), 233-53 has used the evidence of Greek tragedy (E. Hip. 715-21, 885-
6; Tro. 914-1032) to show that a raped girl was judged less harshly than a female 
adulterer, whose sexual passion was regarded as unforgivable. For a discussion of the 
reasons why female erotic passion was considered more reproachable and dangerous 
than male lust, see Cole (1984), 106 ff and Foxhall (1998), 132 ff, esp. 133.  
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1.2 Attitudes towards divine rape and seduction 
The overview of Athenian law on rape and adultery in the previous 
section has revealed that in ancient Greek society these kinds of sexual 
transgression were considered legally punishable acts, and that a stigma 
was attached to both crimes. Whereas any sexual offence carried out by a 
human is always condemned, the issue becomes more complex whenever 
gods and goddesses are involved in the sexual act. The myths of sexual 
contact between gods and mortals are usually stories of erotic pursuits 
which culminate in sexual intercourse between the fleeing human and the 
divine pursuer.32 The heroine’s flight can be interpreted either as an 
indication of her effort to escape sexual assault or merely as the mix of 
attraction and repulsion that characterizes the relationship between two 
lovers. Sub-section 1.2.a. addresses the issue of whether the intercourse 
between a male deity and a mortal woman is to be considered as an act of 
sexual violence or not. I will then examine whether the (forcible) sexual act 
was somehow criticized (1.2.b.).  
1.2.a. 
Scholarly opinion is divided as to whether the gods’ sexual acts 
with mortal women are forcible unions or not. For some scholars sex 
between gods and girls is to be classified as rape, and the aim of these 
myths is to assert men’s power and control over women.33 In contrast, for 
others such unions are pleasant for the mortal girl and, therefore, must be 
                                                 
32 The focus of this chapter is limited to the myths of the erotic pursuits of mortal girls by 
male deities. However, divine amours also comprise tales involving either a male deity 
pursuing a young boy or a goddess abducting a boy.  
33 Brownmiller (1975); Keuls (1985); Passman (1993); Stewart (1995); Deacy (1997).  
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labelled as ‘acts of abduction/seduction’ rather than ‘acts of rape’.34 Due to 
the ambiguity surrounding the depiction of these myths in ancient Greek 
pottery, pre-tragic poetry and tragedy, the same scenes or the same 
passages have sometimes been adduced as evidence to support opposing 
theses. 
To begin with, fifth-century Athenian vase-paintings depicting 
scenes of divine pursuits typically show a god brandishing a weapon 
while he pursues a fleeing woman. The sexual act is never depicted but 
there is sometimes physical contact between the two of them: the god 
either apprehends the girl or grabs her clothes or touches her 
shoulder/arm, whereas the woman holds one or both hands towards the 
chaser and looks backwards.35 The backward glance has been adduced as 
a proof that the pursued girl is seduced by the deity rather than raped: 
since in ancient Greece eyes are believed to be the channel of erotic 
passion,36 this interchange of gazes is an indication that the fleeing woman 
has started feeling attracted to her pursuer.37 A serious weakness with this 
argument, however, is that the same stereotyped gestures are also used to 
depict violent tales, such as the scene representing Orpheus running away 
from a Thracian woman with an axe.38 In this case, the eye-contact 
expresses anxiety only: it is typical of a fleeing person to look back at times 
in order to check the distance between him/herself and the chaser. 
                                                 
34 Burnett (1962); Zeitlin (1986); Lefkowitz (1993); Rabinowitz (1993). 
35 The motif ‘grabbing the girl’ can have sexual connotations: Sourvinou- Inwood (1987), 
137. For a detailed account of this type of painting, see Keuls (1985), Stewart (1995), 
Kilmer (1997), Kilinski (1998). See also Kaempf – Dimitriadou (1979).  
36 A. R. 3. 253; Theoc. 2. 82-6; Pl. Phdr. 251 69ff. Buxton (1992), 84, 112-3; Seaford (1990), 84; 
Sourvinou-Inwood (1991), 68-9. 
37 Lefkowitz (1993), 22, n. 16. 
38 San Antonio Museum of Art 86. 134. 65. This incongruity has been noted by Kilinski 
(1998), 42, n. 100.  
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Similarly, the gesture of outstretched hands is more likely to express fear 
and protest rather than consent and desire.39  
Just as in Athenian vase-paintings the gestures performed by either 
the divine pursuer or the pursued girls are subject to opposite 
interpretations, so are most of the accounts of sexual encounters between 
gods and mortals. To give an example, a fragment from Aeschylus’ 
Kares/Europa has been advanced as evidence proving that violence is not a 
characteristic of female mortals’ encounters with the gods: Europa boasts 
of her pregnancy and defines her abduction by Zeus as ‘a toilless trick’ 
(κλέμμα ἄμοχθον, 2-3).40 From this it may be inferred that Zeus abducted 
the girl without any struggle, meaning that she did not offer any 
resistance. However, it has been rightly pointed out that this does not 
prove at all that the intercourse was consensual. It merely means that, 
thanks to his clever trick, Zeus did not need to pursue the girl, implying 
that, ‘had it not been for the trick, attempted resistance would have 
ensued.’41  
As far as the accounts of these myths are concerned, however, a 
distinction must be made between different kinds of sources. It is true that 
in both Greek tragedy and pre-tragic poetry the precise nature of the 
sexual relationship between gods and mortals is usually kept unclear:42 the 
                                                 
39 Keuls (1985), 50; Stewart (1995), 79; Deacy (1997), 43-63. 
40 A. fr. 99 R.  Lefkowitz (1993), 24-5. 
41 Deacy (1997), 45. In addition to this, in Europa’s discourse about her heroic offspring 
each eulogistic comment on her children is soon afterwards lessened by a negative 
element (vv. 10 ff; for a reconstructing hypothesis concerning the lacuna which follows 
line 10 see Sommerstein, 2008c, 113). Therefore, this fragment can be more properly 
defined as ‘Europa’s lament’ (as Gantz, 1981, 23 calls it) rather than ‘Europa’s boasting’. 
42 For a thorough analysis of the ambiguity as between rape and seduction in Euripides’ 
Alope, Antiope, Melanippe Sapiens, Melanippe Captiva, see Scafuro (1990), 136-8; 
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most common verbs used to describe the sexual act are neutral terms such 
as μείγνυμι,43 which occurs either alone44 or in association with the 
expressions ἐν φιλότητι ‘to join in love with somebody’45 and ἐν 
ἀγκοίνῃσι ‘to lie in the arms of somebody’.46 Yet in earlier sources words 
belonging to the semantic field of violence are almost never used to 
describe the intercourse between a male deity and a mortal woman. 
Sometimes stress is laid on the gentleness of the union: Evadne is said to 
have ‘first touched the sweets of Aphrodite beneath Apollo's embrace’ 
(ὑπ᾽ Ἀπόλλωνι γλυκείας πρῶτον ἔψαυσ᾽ Ἀφροδίτας),47 and Apollo’s 
union with Cyrene is called ‘sweet’ (ἐπὶ γλυκεραῖς εὐναῖς).48 Other times 
either the abduction (ἀρπάζω)49 or the taming of the girl (δαμάζω)50 is 
highlighted, but no violence is involved in such acts: for instance, Zeus is 
                                                                                                                                     
Sommerstein (2006), 237-40. Note the use of φθείρω in E. Melanipp. Sap. fr. 485 N²: the 
verb ‘to undo’ can refer to seduction but a violent connotation is often implicit.  
43 For a discussion of the way in which Pindar uses the verb μείγνυμι to describe ‘the 
human commingling with the divine’, see Hoey (1965), 235-62. Other verbs with a neutral 
connotation are εὐνάομαι ‘to be bedded with’ (Hom. Il. 16. 176: Spercheius - Polydora) 
and παραλέχομαι ‘to lie with’ (Hom. Il. 16. 184: Hermes – Polymele; Hom. Od. 11. 242: 
Poseidon – Tyro).  
44 Hes. fr. 140 M-W: Europa – Zeus; Pi. O. 6. 29: Pitane – Poseidon; Pi. O. 9. 59: 
Protogeneia – Zeus; Pi. P. 3. 14: Coronis – Apollo; Pi. P. 9. 13, 68, 84: Cyrene – Apollo, 
Alcmene – Zeus. The verb μείγνυμι occurs in tragedy as well, but sometimes the violent 
nature of the sexual union is subsequently highlighted in a more detailed account of the 
sexual act (for instance, A. Pr. 735-8; E. Ion. 338 cf. 437 ff and 859 ff). See also A. Supp. 295; 
E. Antiope Fr. 223. 72 Collard-Cropp (2008), VII. cf. Sommerstein (2006), 239.   
45 Hes. Th. 940-44: Alcmene – Zeus, Semele – Zeus; Hes. fr. 30 M-W: Tyro – Poseidon; Hes. 
fr. 141 M-W: Europa – Zeus; Hes. Sc. 35: Alcmene – Zeus. For a discussion of the concept 
of reciprocity inherent in this phrase, see Calame (1992), 30 ff.  
46 Hom. Od. 11. 266-8: Alcmene - Zeus; Hes. fr. 43 a: Eurynome – Poseidon.  
47 Pi. O. 6. 35. Transl. by D. A. Svarlien.  
48 Pi. P. 9. 12.  
49 ἀρπάζω: Hymn to Aphrodite. 5. 203-4 (Zeus – Ganymede) and 218 (Dawn – Tithonos); 
Hom. Od. 15. 250-1 (Dawn – Cleitus); Pi. O. 1. 40-1 (Poseidon – Pelops); Pi. O. 9. 58 
(Protogeneia – Zeus); Pi. P. 9. 10 (Cyrene – Apollo). ἀναρέπτομαι: Hes. Th. 990 
(Aphrodite – Phaethon); Hom. Il. 20. 234 (Zeus – Ganymede); Pi. Pae. VI. 136 (Zeus – 
Aegina).  
50 Hes. fr. 43 a M-W: Mestra – Poseidon; Hes. Sc. 48, 53: Alcmene – Zeus; Hymn to the 
Dioscuri. 17. 2-4: Leda – Zeus; Bacch. 9. 63-4: Asopus’ daughters.  
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said to have lain with Protogeneia ‘peacefully’ (ἕκαλος, P. O. 9. 58) after 
carrying her off (ἀναρπάσαις, 58).51  
In contrast, there are tragic passages in which the heroines more or 
less explicitly blame the gods for the sexual assault. In Section 1.3 I will 
give another example of the ambiguity surrounding the depiction of the 
myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals in Greek tragedy 
by analysing the way in which the Danaids insert an implicit reference to 
the violence suffered by Io in the account of her beatifying union with 
Zeus (Aeschylus’ Suppliants). Furthermore, Section 1.4 will discuss 
Creusa’s explicit critique of Apollo’s violent behaviour (Euripides’ Ion). 
These plays have been chosen for analysis because they are specially 
indicative of the differences between the ways in which Greek tragedy 
and earlier sources represent such myths. 
Before proceeding in the discussion, it should be noted that the only 
case in pre-tragic poetry where the abduction is explicitly said to have 
been carried out by force is the story of Persephone and Hades, which is 
recounted in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter: the god forcibly (βιαζομένης, 
68) carries off (ἁρπάξας, 19) the unwilling girl (ἀέκουσαν, 19, 72; 
ἀεκαζομένην, 30, 432) to the Underworld.52 It may be argued that Greek 
tragedy returns to this moment of violence and terror in the hymn (see, for 
instance, E. Ion. 941 ἄκουσα ≈ H. Hom. 2. 19, 72 ἀέκουσαν; E. Ion. 11, 437 
βίᾳ ≈ H. Hom. 2. 68 βιαζομένης) and intensifies it by stressing the negative 
consequences of such an illicit liaison on the heroine’s life and by making 
the critique of divine behaviour harsher.  
                                                 
51 Gerber (2002), ad loc.  
52 H. Hom. 2. 19 (ἁρπάξας δ᾽ ἀέκουσαν); 30 (τὴν δ’ ἀεκαζομένην ἦγεν); 68 (ὥς τε 
βιαζομένης); 72 (λαβὼν ἀέκουσαν ἀνάγκῃ); 431-2 (φέρων ὑπὸ γαῖαν ἐν ἅρμασι 
χρυσείοισι/ πόλλ’ ἀεκαζομένην). 
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In fact, the myth of Persephone as recounted in the Homeric Hymn 
differs in more than one aspect from the tragic accounts of sexual 
intercourse between gods and mortal girls, which are the focus of my 
analysis, and moves towards a more positive outcome. One obvious 
difference is that it concerns two deities and, as we shall now see in 
further detail, has cosmic implications. Second of all, Persephone’s sexual 
relationship with Hades is not represented as a one-off sexual intercourse 
but rather as a marital union sanctioned by the will of Zeus: Zeus ‘gave’ 
(δῶκεν, 3) Persephone to Hades without the consent of the bride and of 
her mother Demeter (3-9).53 As Foley argues, ‘the Demeter/Persephone 
myth became a paradigm in Greek art and literature for human marriage 
as a rite of initiation; in marriage the bride could be thought to undergo a 
symbolic death before a symbolic rebirth and reincorporation into a new 
household as wife and mother’.54 The period of separation between 
Demeter and her daughter suggests that the young girl is on the threshold 
of adulthood and is thus ready to gain some independence from her 
mother. 
 It is true that the Hymn highlights the problematic side of marriage 
by representing Persephone’s abduction as a deceptive and violent trick 
foisted on an idealized mother/ daughter relationship and by framing it on 
the divine level as a conflict of genders.55 However, it must also be borne 
in mind that the story ends with a happy outcome: Persephone is allowed 
to spend more time with her natal family than with her husband and, in 
                                                 
53 Foley (1994), 105 categorizes this form of marriage, which is common in the human 
realm whereas is new to Olympus, as ‘a patriarchal and virilocal exogamy, that is, a 
marriage between members of two different social groups arranged by the father of the 
bride in which the bride resides with her husband’.  
54 Foley (1994), 104.  
55 Foley (1995), 114-5: Demeter, supported by Hekate and Persephone, challenges the 
patriarchal politics of Zeus, with whom Helios and Hades side.  
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compensation for her stay in the Underworld, she receives her own τιμαί 
separate from those of Demeter in her new role as the queen of the 
Underworld. The fortunate denouement of the Demeter/Persephone story 
has also important cosmic implications.56 Firstly, Persephone, thanks to 
her connection both to her husband in the realm of the dead and to her 
mother in the worlds of earth and Olympus, joins the spheres of the 
κόσμος, which the divine brothers Zeus, Hades and Poseidon have 
previously divided among themselves. Moreover, Demeter’s painful 
experience of loss and reunion with her daughter results in the foundation 
of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which foster a new and more beneficent 
relationship between mortals and the divine powers above and below by 
giving the initiates hope for a better destiny after death.  
Persephone’s myth reflects the archetypal scheme of virgin girls’s 
initiation into sexuality and womanhood and is relevant to the study of 
tragic stories of rape/seduction because it is often used by ancient Greek 
tragedians to evoke the connection between marriage and death, both 
conceived as rites of passage from one status to another. The most glaring 
examples are Euripides’ Helen and Alkestis, which have been called ‘anodos 
drama’ since they are built upon the mythical story pattern of 
Persephone’s descent (kathodos) to the reign of her bridegroom and her 
subsequent ascent (anodos) to the upper world.57 In both plays a tragic 
heroine, after being carried off either to the Underworld (Alkestis) or to a 
realm of symbolic death (Helen in deathlike Egypt), is finally rescued. The 
heroine’s experience of death, grief and separation ends with a reduction 
of past suffering, a symbolic remarriage with her lost husband and a 
                                                 
56 Richardson (1974); Foley (1995).  
57 Foley (2001), 301-331.  
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newly acquired reputation as a chaste and loyal wife. Furthermore, in a 
parallel fashion with Persephone’s myth, both Helen and Alkestis will be 
worshipped in Spartan cults linked with youthful initiation.58 
In Section 1.3 I will analyse another tragedy, the Suppliants by 
Aeschylus, which dramatizes the Danaids’ resistance to matrimony and 
motherhood. The play exploits the thematic connection between marriage 
and death inherent in the archetypal myth of Persephone but subverts the 
traditional pattern, at least initially. As I will show, the fifty young 
daughters of Danaus, instead of undergoing a symbolic death before being 
reborn in a new identity as wives and mothers, invoke the god Hades only 
because they intend to bring violent deaths on their bridegrooms on their 
wedding night.  
1.2.b. 
So far we have seen that, with the notable exceptions of few Greek 
plays, the accounts of the myths of intimate contact between a male deity 
and a mortal woman avoid specifying whether the sexual act is consensual 
or non-consensual. Whether or not the mortal woman eventually 
acquiesces to sexual interaction, another question arises: was the (forcible) 
sexual act between gods and mortals somehow criticized? The depiction of 
the consequences of sexual transgression is the area in which the treatment 
of such myths in Greek tragedy differs most substantially from that in 
earlier sources.  
                                                 
58 Alkestis will be celebrated at the Carneian festival in Sparta et in Athens (E. Alc. 445-
54), whereas Helen will preside over the initiation of virgin girls into womanhood (E. Hel. 
1465-78).  
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Lefkowitz has argued that a stigma was attached to the women 
seduced by mortal men only, whereas in Greek mythology divine 
seduction brings no disgrace.59 The examples given by the scholar to 
support her thesis, however, come from epics: both Polymele and Tyro, 
after being impregnated by Hermes and Poseidon respectively, get 
married and their new husbands even allow them to bring up the children 
born of their previous union with the god.60 In contrast, if we look at the 
extant Greek plays we will see that only once is it predicted on stage that 
the female protagonist will find another husband who will care for her 
previous children as well: at the end of the Melanippe Desmotis, Poseidon is 
likely to have appeared as a deus ex machina in order to urge Metapontos to 
marry Melanippe.61  
Furthermore, even if in most cases the heroine and her child are 
eventually rescued by divine intervention, Greek tragedy focuses on the 
horrible misfortunes and the severe punishment to which an unmarried 
motherhood leads: the young mother is typically forced to expose her 
child and sometimes even risks her own life. To give an example, 
Euripides’ Antiope dramatizes the heroine’s flight, the exposure of her 
illegitimate children and her persecution by Dirce: all these events have 
                                                 
59 Lefkowitz (1993), 22-26. 
60 Polymele gets married to Echecles (Hom. Il. 16. 173-92), whereas Tyro to Cretheus 
(Hom. Od. 11. 236-59).  
61 See Collard – Cropp (2008), VII. 567, 588 with references. There are other examples of 
girls (Creusa, Tyro and Antiope) who get married despite having been raped/seduced, 
but in all three cases the pregnancy is kept secret from the groom: their marriage cannot 
thus be advanced as an argument to support the thesis that the sexual affair between a 
god and a mortal girl does not bring disgrace upon the heroine. As regards the myth of 
Antiope, we do not know for sure whether Epaphus is aware of her bride’s pregnancy or 
not, but he is more likely to be unaware of it: Antiope gets married with him soon after 
being impregnated by Zeus and fleeing from her father, and she gives birth to Zethus and 
Amphion only after her husband is killed by Lycus (Hyg. Fab. 8; Apollod. 3. 5. 5). 
According to other sources, Antiope was either carried off (Paus. 2. 6. 1-4) or violated by 
Epaphus (Hyg. Fab. 7).  
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been triggered by Antiope’s rape by Zeus.62 In contrast, in the Odyssey 
there is no mention of the problems resulting from the illicit sexual affair: 
it is only said that Antiope ‘boasted (εὔχετ᾽) that she had slept even in the 
arms of Zeus, and she bore two sons, Amphion and Zethus, who first 
established the seat of seven-gated Thebe’.63 Therefore, in earlier sources 
the focus always lies on the positive consequences of such union,64 
whereas tragic characters usually complain about the repercussions of that 
event.65  
On the one hand, tragic heroines typically express their resentment 
against the gods by blaming them for their lack of interest in the wretched 
condition of their nearest and dearest.66 A girl’s intercourse with a god 
results in suffering rather than personal gain and glory. The heroines’ 
feelings of anger and betrayal are usually triggered by their evaluation of 
a situation where their rights are apparently broken: they feel entitled to 
special treatment on the ground that they have experienced intimacy with 
a god. Their inference is in turn based on one of the cornerstones of 
                                                 
62 See Collard – Cropp (2008), VII. 170 ff. with references. 
63 Hom. Od. 11. 260-3. The verb εὔχομαι is a typically Homeric term. See Chantraine 
(1970), s.v. As opposed to Greek tragedy, the motif of the exposure of illegitimate 
children occurs just once in earlier sources (Pi. O. 6. 29-58) but is treated in a different 
way (see Section 1.4). 
64 Hom. Il. 16. 185-6; Hom. Od. 11. 254-7; Hes. Th. 940-44: Hes. Sc. 52; Hes. fr. 43 a M-W; 
Hes. fr. 141 M-W, 1-32; Pi. O. 6. 41, 70, 8 ff.; Pi. O. 9. 64 ff. cf. also Pi. P. 9. 5 ff. 
65 Euripides’ Heracles is the exception: the Euripidean character of Amphytrion, who 
boasts of sharing his wife with Zeus (1-3), would fit perfectly into a lyric poem, were it 
not for the fact that he later harshly blames Zeus for being uncaring and unjust (339-47).  
66 See A. Supp. 315, Pr. 576-88, 640-86, 735-46, 759 (the myth of Io); A. fr. 47a R (Diktyoulkoi: 
the myth of Danae); S. Tr. 1264-9; E. HF. 339-47, Ion. 10-11, 355-8, 437-8, 445, 505, 939, 
Alope fr. 107 K , Antiope fr. 208, 210 K .  
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ancient Greek religion, namely the belief that there exists a relationship of 
reciprocity between gods and mortals.67  
According to the ancient Greeks’ religious beliefs, a claim on divine 
protection can be established especially by three categories of 
worshippers: the pious devotee, who has earned divine goodwill by 
means of generous offerings and reverent attitude; the suppliants, who 
put a deity under an obligation as soon as they take refuge at his/her altar; 
all mortals that enjoy a preferential relationship with the Olympians due 
to their ties of kinship or sexual ties with a divinity.68 Although the 
principle of reciprocity governs human relations with the gods, the 
human-divine relationship is always unbalanced: whereas the benefits 
accorded by the gods in return for sacrifices and votive-offerings are 
essential to men, the worshippers can give gods only honours.69 Moreover, 
deities cannot be literally forced to reciprocate men’s favours and 
sometimes can even reject a prayer or an offering.70 In any case, the gods 
are not only eager to be venerated, but they can also be negatively affected 
by the lack of honours:71 if a god fails to perform the function expected of 
him, his own cult is put at risk.72 This is the reason why several examples 
of demands with menaces, which are typical of an ancient kind of 
                                                 
67 The ancient Greeks used to offer sacrifices, festivities or other votive-offerings to the 
gods either to thank them (Bremmer 1998, 127-37) or to ask for divine help in return 
(Dover 1974, 250; Yunis 1988, 38-58; Parker 1998, 105-25). 
68 Yunis (1988); Parker (1998); Bremmer (1998).  
69 Parker (1998), 122-4.  
70 Parker (1998), 116-7.  
71 Dover (1974), 76 gives the example of the story told by Aristophanes in Pl. Smp. 190 C: 
Zeus gives up his intent to destroy the human race because, if he did so, the gods would 
be deprived of their honours.  
72 From Plutarch (Nic. 26. 6; cf. Th. 7. 86. 5) we are informed that a religious crisis spread 
among Athenian soldiers when Nicias, despite having lived a pious life, died a horrible 
death at Syracuse. For other examples, see Mikalson (1991), 152 ff.  
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prayers,73 are found in Greek tragedy where characters often threaten the 
Olympians that they will stop offering sacrifices to them unless their 
demands are met.74  
Human response to divine indifference is much harsher if the 
neglected individuals have either mated with a deity or are the offspring 
of such unions.75 The gods’ apparent betrayal, as well as the pain suffered 
by the individuals directly involved in the sexual relationship, is one of 
the grounds on which the myths of sexual affairs between gods and 
mortals are problematized in Greek tragedy: the characters seem to believe 
that it would have been preferable not to be granted the privilege of such a 
close relationship with a god and to conduct, on the contrary, an ordinary 
life. In the Prometheus Bound the Titan asks Io: ‘[…] By the talking oaks of 
Dodona you clearly, and in no riddling terms, were saluted as the 
renowned bride-to-be of Zeus: is any of this pleasing to you?’ (832-5). Io 
never answers this question: she rushes away while complaining about the 
bite of the gadfly, which keeps tormenting her (876-86). Soon afterwards 
the Oceanids proclaim their wish that they may never unite ‘with any 
partner from among the heavenly ones’ (897).76  
                                                 
73 Whitman (1951), 122 ff.  
74 See, for instance, A. A. 581-2, 821, Ch. 255-7, 791-3; S. El. 457-8; E. Tr. 1059-80. For a 
discussion of these passages, see Parker (1998), 108. For a discussion of Zeus’ problematic 
betrayal of the city of Troy (προύδωκας, 1061), see Yunis (1988), 65-99; Mikalson (1991), 
134-64; Parker (1997), 151, 154.   
75 See A. Supp. 315, Pr. 576-88, 640-86, 735-46, 759; A. fr. 47a R (Diktyoulkoi); S. Tr. 1264-9; 
E. HF. 339-47, Ion. 10-11, 355-8, 437-8, 445, 505, 939, Alope fr. 107 K , Antiope fr. 208, 210 K .   
76 Lefkowitz (1993), 29-31 claims that they are not refusing the sexual act per se with a god 
but are simply rejecting the transition from girlhood to womanhood (30). A weakness 
with this argument, however, is that they explicitly state at vv. 901-3: ‘For me, when 
marriage is on my own level, it inspires no fear; but I do fear that the eye of a superior 
god, from which one cannot flee, may look on me with desire’. Therefore, they are 
unequivocally rejecting the union with a god only. Cf. Simonides, fr. 216 Bergk = schol. Il. 
9. 556. 
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Similarly, it is worth noting how differently the divine origin of the 
offspring born to such unions is judged in Pindar’s Isthmian 3 and in 
Euripides’ Ion. In the Pindaric ode it is represented as a blessing: ‘Only the 
children of the gods are unwounded’.77 By contrast, in the Ion it is rather 
regarded as cause of ruin. The chorus comments on Creusa’s sad story: ‘I 
have never heard it told that children from the gods ever meant for 
mortals a share of blessing’.78 The mentality according to which the 
intercourse between a god and a girl is to be considered as a privilege and 
as an honour is thus called into question.  
On the other hand, this sort of belief, which plays down the 
celebratory aspect of an intimate relationship with a deity, may merely 
reflect the limited human perspective, which is confined to the joys and 
sorrows of one’s brief existence. It cannot thus grasp the gods’ purposes, 
which go beyond the finite temporal dimension of human life. In fact, in 
most cases mother and son are eventually rescued and reunited.79 
Furthermore, from a broader perspective the sexual encounters between 
male deities and girls ‘have lasting consequences for civilization’:80 just as 
in earlier sources the extraordinary qualities of the heroes born to such 
unions are usually praised,81 so in Greek tragedy stress is usually laid on 
their glorious fate.82 One could thus argue that in Greek tragedy the sexual 
unions between gods and mortals are at first represented as being 
                                                 
77 Pi. I. 3. 19.  
78 E. Ion. 506-7. Cf. Owen (1939) and Lee (1997), ad loc; Swift (2010), 99 ff.  
79 There are, however, at least two examples that unequivocally show that the god has 
abandoned at least one of them to their fate: Euripides’ Heracles (1087, 1129) and Alope 
(the heroine is put to death by her father Cercyon). See  Collard-Cropp (2008), VII. 116.  
80 See Lefkowitz (1993), 21. 
81 Hom. Il. 16. 185-6; Hom. Od. 11. 254-7; Hes. Th. 940-44: Hes. Sc. 52; Hes. fr. 43 a M-W; 
Hes. fr. 141 M-W, 1-32; Pi. O. 6. 41, 70, 8 ff.; Pi. O. 9. 64 ff. cf. also Pi. P. 9. 5 ff. 
82 The offspring of divine origin usually become either civilising heroes (e.g. Heracles) or 
famous eponyms (e.g. Ion) or the ancestors of important royal lineages (e.g. Ephaphus). 
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dangerous for both the girl and her offspring, but are then shown to be 
beneficial to the community.  
From this hypothesis two conclusions could be drawn. First, the 
treatments of these myths in Greek tragedy and in earlier sources differ 
from each other in their focus of interest, which is in turn prompted by 
their different generic function.83 They highlight different parts of the 
same myth while overlooking others: for instance, the victory odes tend to 
omit all the unpleasant elements of the myth, which are not suitable for 
their eulogistic purpose.84 By contrast, the Greek tragedians’ interest in 
representing the hardships overcome by a mortal girl as a result of her 
intercourse with the god can be interpreted as a characteristic of the tragic 
genre, which typically focuses on human suffering. Similarly, in chapter 3  
I will analyse one of the most significant examples of Greek tragedy’s 
reworking of myth, that is, Aeschylus’ and Euripides’ treatments of the 
myth of Orestes as opposed to the Homeric version: I will show that 
Orestes’ revenge against Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra, which in the 
Odyssey is presented as an exemplary model for Telemachus’ future 
vengeance upon the suitors, in the hands of tragedians becomes an 
intractable ethical paradox. Even though the principles of patriarchal 
marriage and of the punishment of sexual transgressors is operative in 
both treatments of the Orestes myth, the difference in genre changes the 
ethical question raised by the tragic plays: the Homeric laudatory model 
of heroic vengeance is undermined by the morally problematic nature of 
matricide and by the ethical issue of Orestes’ accountability.  
                                                 
83 For a discussion of issues of genre, see Rossi (1971); Herington (1985); Winkler – Zeitlin 
(1990); Ford (1992); Harvey (1955); Griffin (1998); Rutherford (2001); Rhodes (2003); Scott 
(2005); Swift (2010), 35-60; Clay (2011); Agócs – Carey – Rawles (2012).  
84 Gentili (1995a), 165-211; Swift (2010), 121-39.  
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On the other hand, the scope of the critique of the gods’ behaviour 
may be attenuated by pointing out that such expressions of criticism are 
not to be taken too seriously given that they are usually proffered by the 
victims of rape/seduction in a moment of great despair. The heroines are 
still unaware of the positive impact that their intercourse with a god will 
have on their offspring’s fate and, more broadly, on the entire community 
in the long run. The second conclusion  one could draw from this line of 
argument is that the glorifying elements of a god’s union with a mortal 
girl, which are usually praised in earlier sources, are in the end 
acknowledged in Greek tragedy as well once a broader rather than an 
individual perspective is adopted to assess the consequences of the sexual 
act.  
In the following sections, however, I shall argue that such sexual 
affairs are called into question on both the personal and the socio-political 
levels: not only do they cause an individual to endure overwhelming 
adversities but they also become a source of destabilization for the socio-
political order of the entire community. This in turn raises important 
theological issues that cast doubt on the very belief that the sexual 
encounters between gods and mortals provide any benefit. It follows that 
it is not merely a matter of choosing a different focus of attention: Greek 
tragedy explores a set of traditional beliefs and, to a certain extent, 
challenges them. Therefore, not only the representation but also the 
implications of these myths in Greek tragedy differ from those in earlier 
sources. In analysing Aeschylus’ Suppliants and Euripides’ Ion, I shall 
show that the religious problematization of a god’s union with a mortal 
girl is intertwined with issues which were of great concern to ancient 
Greek society, such as gender roles, the theme of autochthony, the 
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concepts of citizenship and legitimacy, and the problem of the city’s 
relationships with other countries. 
 
1.3 Aeschylus’ Suppliants 
Aeschylus’ Suppliants is about the Danaids’ flight from Egypt to 
Argos in an attempt to escape a forced marriage to their Egyptian cousins. 
They seek refuge in Argos because they can claim Argive origins through 
their descent from the Argive priestess Io. Although it occurred before the 
action of the play begins, Zeus’ rape of Io is of great relevance to the 
development of the plot of the Suppliants, for it is put forward by the 
Danaids as an argument in defence of their right to reject marriage with 
the Aigyptiads and to obtain special protection from Zeus, their divine 
progenitor. What is more, the heroines take advantage of their ancestry to 
make their request for help against their suitors more pressing. The 
Argives’ decision to protect them in turn brings about negative 
consequences for the stability of Pelasgus’ reign. This section discusses in 
more detail the impact of this sexual affair both on Io’s life and on the 
gender and the social-political orders of the city of Argos.  
As far as Io’s story is concerned, there is much debate among 
scholars as to whether her intercourse with the god is to be interpreted as 
a rape or as a consensual union. Such uncertainty about the nature of Io’s 
relationship with Zeus is accentuated by the confusion surrounding the 
depiction of this myth in other literary sources. The violent nature of the 
union between Zeus and Io seems to emerge from the compressit by 
Hyginus (Fab. 145. 3), the ἔφθειρε by Pseudo-Apollodorus (II. 1. 3) and the 
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βίαιος εἶναι of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound (737).85 Zeus’ portrayal by 
Nonnus of Panopolis, on the contrary, is positive: in the Dionysiaca the 
sexual act is described as a tender loving caress (ἀκηρασίων ὅτι κόλπων/ 
Ἰναχίης δαμάλης ἐπαφήσατο θεῖος ἀκοίτης/ χερσὶν ἐρωμανέεσσι III. 
285). Finally, the Metamorphoses by Ovid uses neutral terms to describe the 
intercourse: Zeus is simply said to have prevented the girl’s escape and 
have carried off her shame (tenuitque fugam rapuitque pudorem, I. 600). Even 
though Ovid’s rapes are not usually sexually explicit, such characteristic 
‘does not hamper the poem’s use of violence’86 and, as we shall see in a 
moment, does not attenuate the heroine’s suffering resulting from the 
illicit union.  
Turning back to Aeschylus’ treatment of Io’s myth, the ambiguity of 
the Greek text and the absence of the protagonist’s own voice make it 
more difficult to determine whether violence was involved in the sexual 
act.  
Some scholars argue that the sexual act is entirely voluntary for 
both parties:87 the blame for Io’s suffering falls upon Hera alone, whereas 
Zeus is her rescuer because he put an end to her interminable wandering 
and gave her the gift of a child as a reward for the pains she endured.88 
Several passages have been put forward in support of this thesis: the 
Danaids call Zeus “rescuer” (σωτήρ v. 26), praise his balanced and just 
                                                 
85 Cf. also A. Pr. 759 (ἐκ Διὸς πάσχω κακῶς).  
86 For an analysis of divine rapes in Ovid’s metamorphosis, see Richlin (1992), 162 who 
argues that, ‘whereas a rape is normally not explicitly described, the text makes up for 
this in the metamorphosis. It is as if there were an analogic relationship between rape and 
mutilation. Indeed, several women are transformed as punishment’ (165).  
87 Belfiore (2000), 47-8 and references; Papadopolou (2011), 44-6, contra.  
88 A. Supp. 162-5, 306-8, 540-2, 556-64. 
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power,89 and present the god’s union with Io under an almost beatifying 
light, as a breath and touch with rescuing properties.90 Yet since Io’s myth 
is told by the Danaids to support their case, it cannot be excluded that 
their account is either a misinterpretation or a modified version of the 
story.91  
A different interpretation maintains that the sexual relationship 
between Zeus and Io involved some violence, although the god is 
euphemistically said to ‘have made force kindly’ (εὐμενῆ βίαν κτίσας, 
1067). A lexical study by Whittle of this drama has highlighted the fact 
that the Danaids, at the very moment in which they exalt Zeus’ power by 
remembering his healing touch of Io, use a word (ῥυσίων, v. 315) which 
has a violent connotation.92 Given that all occurrences of the word ῥύσιος 
and its derivatives refer to a violent seizure, 93 the scholar maintains that 
this term is more likely to derive from the verb ῥυσιάζω (“plunder, seize 
as a booty”) rather than from the commonly accepted ἐρύω (“release, 
save”). According to this interpretation, an ironic parallel between Zeus’ 
“making prize” of Io and the enforced marriage dreaded by the Danaids is 
developed in the play: both Io and her descendants are prey chased by a 
dreadful predator.94  
                                                 
89 At v. 90 the chorus sings that Zeus ‘never uses violence’ (βίαν δ’ οὔτιν’ ἐξοπλίζει v. 
98). 
90 A. Supp. 16-7, 44-5, 577. For a discussion of the role of both touch and breath as agents 
of conception, see Zeitlin (1996), 149-53; Vasunia (2001), 43-7.  
91 Zeitlin (1996), 123-71; Papadopolou (2011). 
92 Whittle (1964), 1-7. In this regard, I think it is worth noting that the same word is used 
to describe both the Egyptian suitors’ intention of grabbing the Danaids as a prize 
(ῥυσίων ἐφάπτορες, v. 728) and Zeus’ behaviour when, by seizing Io, he fathered 
Epaphus (καὶ Ζεὺς γ’ἐφάπτωρ χειρὶ φιτύει γόνον, v. 313). 
93 A. Supp. 412, 424, 610, 728.   
94 Whittle (1964), 2-4. Belfiore (2000), 48, contra. 
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It must also be taken into account that the heroine ‘shed tears with 
sorrowful shame’ (δακρύων δ᾽ ἀποστάζει πένθιμον αἰδῶ, 578-9) as soon 
as Zeus restored her to human form. The text does not specify what has 
prompted Io’s feeling of shame, but it is likely to have been both her 
recollection of the pain endured in the recent past95 and Zeus’ present 
display of erotic desire for her.96 In this respect, it is significant that shame 
is also experienced in the Ion by Creusa, namely by another victim of 
divine rape. In both cases αἰδώς does not necessarily apply to one’s 
blameworthy actions only, but can also be triggered by something that one 
has endured.97 It follows that this emotion cannot be put forward as 
evidence in support of the thesis that Io consented to the sexual union.  
Such ambiguity inherent in the sexual act between the god and the 
mortal girl may refer to the reticent behaviour that is typical of any virgin 
on the threshold of womanhood: an amount of symbolic violence is 
needed to tame the nubile girl and to persuade her to submit to the yoke 
of marriage.98 Similarly, Io’s transformation into a cow and her subsequent 
recovery of human shape may symbolize those female puberty rites in 
which adolescent girls are disguised as wild animals for a period before 
marriage.99 For instance, in the Arkteia at Brauron, a female ritual the aim 
of which is to prepare young Athenian girls for the transition to 
                                                 
95 This is supported by the scholium on 578-9, which explains Io’s shame in this way: 
ἐννοῦσα ὃ πέπονθεν.  
96 For the double prospective/retrospective aspect of αἰδώς, see Cairns (1993), 187-8. Cf. 
Johansen – Whittle (1980), on 578-9, contra.  
97 Cairns (1993), 307-8. E. Ion. 288 (αἰσχύνη), 336 (αἰδούμεθα), 341 (αἰσχύνεται), 367 
(αἰσχύνεται). We shall discuss in further detail Creusa’s attitude towards the act of 
sexual violence she has suffered in the following section.  
98 Seaford (1987); Zeitlin (1996), 124; Vasunia (2001), 54-5; Bowlby (2007), 87; Papadopolou 
(2011), 51-2. For the interpretation of Io’s madness as the disease of virgins, see Zeitlin 
(1996), 154-5; Bachvarova (2013), 423-30.  cf. also the Hippocratic treatise On Diseases of 
Virgins. 8. 466-70. 
99 Robson (1997), 70 ff. 
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womanhood, the participants dress up as bears  (ἄρκτοι). Their symbolic 
disguise identifies them as wild animals who are to be tamed by males 
through marriage in order to get rid of their savage nature: if they were 
not put under proper male control, their feminine wildness could threaten 
the social order. This is the reason why a girl’s transformation into an 
animal in the myths of bestial rape could be interpreted as the means 
whereby a god punishes a virgin for refusing sexual activity with him.100  
In the myth of Io, however, it is Hera who turns the heroine into a 
cow out of jealousy (295-9). Therefore, in this case Io’s metamorphosis 
cannot be interpreted as the punishment for rebelling against male sexual 
dominance. Her loss of human form is first and foremost a mere act of 
revenge performed by Zeus’ betrayed wife. Additionally, on a broader 
level, Hera’s harsh chastisement of Io represents the transgressive nature 
of her union with Zeus: not only has the Argive priestess had sex out of 
wedlock but she has also overstepped the boundaries separating gods and 
mortals by sleeping with a male deity.101 Such a sexual transgression must 
be punished since it has led to the disruption of order: the hierarchical 
relationship between gods, humans and animals has been jeopardized.102 
As retribution for such a close contact with a deity, the heroine is 
downgraded by being transformed into a lower life-form: she is 
                                                 
100 Robson (1997), 76. 
101 A belief in the female tendency to go out of bounds underlies the myths of a girl’s 
transformation into an animal. Halperin – Winkler – Zeitlin (1990), 135-69;  Sourvinou-
Inwood (1991), 47-51.  
102 Interestingly, in Plato’s Republic (9. 571b-d) sex with a god, as well as sex with an 
animal, is classified among the unnecessary (μὴ ἀναγκαίων) and lawless (παράνομοι) 
pleasures. See Winkler (1990b), 38-9; Forbes- Irving (1990), 62 ff; Zeitlin (1996), 157. 
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temporarily removed from the human world and forced to regress to a 
bestial state.103  
The physical transformation into an animal is undoubtedly a 
degrading experience given that it deprives the mortal girl of uniquely 
human abilities, namely the capacity to speak and express her own 
emotions: emphasis is put on on Io’s loss of speech both in Aeschylus’ 
Prometheus Bound, where the heroine is said to be unable to control her 
tongue (γλώσσης ἀκρατής, 884), and in Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which 
describes the grief felt by Io/the heifer as soon as she realizes that she 
cannot communicate with her father Inachus but must limit herself to 
licking his hands (I. 645-648).104 Io’s dehumanization is made even more 
painful and demeaning by the fact that the girl is turned into a maddened 
heifer tormented by a gadfly (A. Supp. 306-308). The animal’s frenzy 
reflects the heroine’s insanity, which has been caused by the pollution 
springing from the illicit liaison.105 As a result of an encounter with a deity, 
Io temporarily loses her human identity and has to endure toilsome and 
endless wanderings. The heroine is eventually restored to human form by 
Zeus and gives birth to glorious offspring. Nevertheless, the very fact that 
she had to undergo a bestial metamorphosis and hence suffered 
unbearable pain highlights the dangers inherent in any close contact 
between a mortal and a deity.  
                                                 
103 For an analysis of human metamorphosis as a degrading experience involving 
regression to bestial or vegetal form (cf. Daphne in Ov. Met. I. 525-30), see Thumiger 
(2014), 2 ff and Richlin (1992), 158-79. Whereas the girl’s metamorphosis involves 
degradation, the same is not true for the gods: Thumiger (2014), 4. Cf. Robson (1997), 75-
6.  
104 Cf. Thumiger (2014), 8-11; Richlin (1992), 158-79.  
105 Forbes-Irving (1990), 14-5.  
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The breaking of boundaries between humans, animals and deities, 
to which Zeus’ union with a mortal girl has led, not only affects the life of 
Io but also has negative side-effects on the following generations. The 
Suppliants juxtaposes two similar acts of female resistance to male sexual 
dominance: one involves human characters only, whereas in the other the 
male protagonist is a god. Although several generations separate the 
Danaids from their ancestress, a tight link connects their tribulations with 
Io’s vicissitudes: for, the Danaids’ actions are shaped by their subjective 
interpretation of the benefits that Io’s special relationship with Zeus has 
bestowed on her and that, in their opinion, should be shared by her 
descendants. Both the fifty sisters and their ancestress resist male sexual 
dominance, thereby posing a threat to the social order. There is, however, 
a major difference between the two stories.  
In Io’s case such a danger is accentuated by the fact that Io 
eventually mates with a god and thus dangerously crosses the boundaries 
between gods and mortals. As far as the myth of Io is concerned, the 
negative impact of this sexual transgression seems nevertheless to be 
confined to the heroine’s life. There is no real danger of subverting either 
the cosmic or the gender hierarchy because Io’s status is temporarily 
downgraded and the heroine eventually resigns herself to the sexual act. 
Furthermore, as compensation for the suffering she has endured, Zeus 
rewards her with the gift of a glorious child: childbirth reconciles Io to her 
socially ascribed role as mother. Therefore, when it comes to a deity’s 
sexual transgression, it seems that the potentially negative consequences 
of this act are easily kept under control and offset by divine agency. 
Despite Io’s initial resistance to male dominance and her subsequent 
excessively close contact with a male deity, in the end the power 
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relationship between gods and humans as well as gender relations are 
effectively rebalanced.  
By contrast, the Danaids stubbornly refuse their suitors and even 
dare to kill them on their wedding night. What prompts them to such a 
dreadful act? Apart from the loathing of their suitors, a major role in this 
event is played by their erroneous belief that they have the right to ask 
Zeus for special treatment by reason of the bond of their distant kinship. 
Therefore, the negative impact of Zeus’ union with Io turns out to be long-
lasting: it is not limited to Io’s lifetime but rather reverberates across 
generations. For, as we shall see a little later, the Danaids defend their 
right to reject marriage with their cousins precisely on the grounds that 
they can trace their origins back to Epaphus’ miraculous conception by Io 
and Zeus. Their ancestor’s extraordinary birth is thus adduced as evidence 
in support of their act of rebellion.  
Once an exceptional event such as sexual intercourse between a god 
and a girl is transposed into the human realm and used by a group of 
virgins to their advantage, the negative effects of that original sexual 
transgression on both human society and divine order become far more 
difficult to contain. At the end of the trilogy, balance is once again restored 
thanks to divine intervention. Yet before things are finally sorted out, the 
Danaids’ firm belief that they enjoy Zeus’ favour by virtue of their family 
tie causes much trouble, which I shall now discuss more fully; in brief, it 
results in gender conflict, excessive worship of one god at the expense of 
others, pollution and political crisis.  
I shall begin by analysing the reasons for the Danaids’ refusal to 
marry their cousins. Several hypotheses have been advanced, such as 
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congenital misandry,106 the condemnation of endogamy in favour of 
exogamy,107 the pathological sexual psychology of the protagonists,108 and 
the theory of the oracle.109 The most likely view is the one according to 
which the Danaids reject their suitors because of their ὕβρις: the 
Aigyptiads’ arrogant behaviour subverts the positive model of male 
sexuality, represented both by Pelasgus and by Zeus.110  
On the one hand, Pelasgus himself warns the Egyptian herald that 
‘he may take the Danaids so long as they consent (ἑκούσας, 940) with 
friendly heart, if pious words should persuade (πίθοι, 941) them’. This 
passage is an indication of the opposition between marriage by force and 
marriage by consent, which is one of the main themes of the play. To 
achieve marital harmony, there must be reciprocal persuasion and 
desire.111 The Egyptian suitors’ lust and violent behaviour thus contrast 
with the moderate attitude and self-control that are expected from any 
good Athenian citizen.112  
On the other hand, as previously mentioned, Io’s myth is employed 
by the heroines as an argument in support of their right to reject a marital 
                                                 
106 Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1914), 13-5.  
107 Thomson (1949), 410 ff.; Macurdy (1944), 95-100. Cf. also MacKinnon (1978). 
108 For the theory of the Danaids’ obsessive attachment to their father, see Caldwell (1974), 
45-70. For the Danaids’ presumed erotic desire for Zeus, see Zeitlin (1996), 153-60. For a 
synopsis of all of the psychological interpretations, see Belfiore (2000), 40-41; Zelenak 
(1998), 52-3.  
109 Sicherl (1986), 81-110; Rösler (2007), 180-3; Sommerstein (1995), 111-132; Sommerstein 
(1996), 141-152. 
110 Robertson (1936), 105; Johansen – Whittle (1980), 13-4. See also Zeitlin (1996), 123-71 
and Sommerstein (1996), 163. For the debate on whether the heroines do not want to get 
married to their cousins only or whether they reject marriage with any man, see more 
recently Vasunia (2001), 55; Sandin (2003) on 8.  
111 Cf. A. fr. 44 R. 
112 Just (1989), 153-93; Zelenak (1998), 29; Wiles (2000), 73; Papadopolou (2011), 52. For a 
study of the triumph of the ethic of self-regulation during the age of Perikles, see Dover 
(1973), 69-73; Zeitlin (1986), 129-31; Stewart (1995), 74-90.  
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union that is the exact opposite of the positive form of sexual act 
experienced by their ancestress.  
This statement seems to contradict what had been argued earlier, 
namely that, in approaching Io, Zeus blended force and kindness together. 
To understand on what grounds the fifty daughters are able to use this 
myth belonging to their family history as the basis for their claim, it is 
worth looking more closely at lines 531-7 and 590-4 from the first stasimon.  
τὸ πρὸς γυναικῶν δ᾽ ἐπιδὼν 
παλαίφατον ἁμέτερον 
γένος, φιλίας προγόνου γυναικὸς 
νέωσον εὔφρον᾽ αἶνον· 
γενοῦ πολυμνήστωρ, ἔφαπτορ Ἰοῦς· 
Δῖαί τοι γένος εὐχόμεθ᾽ εἶναι 
γᾶς ἀπὸ τᾶσδ᾽ ἐνοίκου.113 
(Α. Supp. 531-7) 
τίν᾽ ἂν θεῶν ἐνδικωτέροισιν 
κεκλοίμαν εὐλόγως ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις; 
<αὐτὸς> ὁ πατὴρ φυτουργὸς αὐτόχειρ ἄναξ 
γένους παλαιόφρων μέγας 
τέκτων, τὸ πᾶν μῆχαρ, οὔριος Ζεύς. 
(Α. Supp. 590-4) 
 
Look benignly upon the women's cause, look upon our γένος114 ancient in 
story, and renew the happy tale of our ancestress, the woman of your love; show 
that you remember all, you who laid your hand upon Io. We boast that we are of 
the γένος of Zeus, springing from an inhabitant of this land. 
 
On what god could I appropriately call on account of actions that give me 
a juster claim? The Lord and Father himself, with his own hand, was my 
                                                 
113 I accept Headlam’s correction of ἔνοικοι (ME) to ἐνοίκου. Cf. Johansen-Whittle (1980) 
on 537. The scholar argues that Headlam’s reading (γᾶς ἀπὸ τᾶσδ᾽ ἐνοίκου) ‘is 
intrinsically vastly superior not only to the transmitted text but also to other emendations 
so far proposed’: for instance, γᾶς ποτε τᾶσδ’ ἔνοικοι (Burges, Page) ‘makes the Danaids 
claim that they once inhabited Argos, which is false’.  
114 The reasons why I preferred to keep the Greek word γένος rather than accept the Loeb 
edition’s translation ‘race’ will be explained in the following paragraphs.  
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engenderer, the great, wise, ancient artificer of my γένος, the all-resourceful one, 
Zeus who grants fair winds.  
The Danaids ask Zeus to watch over (ἐπιδὼν) their γένος. This 
term, which is connected with a root meaning ‘engender’ as in γίγνομαι 
or gigno, does not have an exact equivalent in English. The word ‘race’, for 
instance, cannot properly convey what the ancient Greek meant by γένος, 
namely, a group of people into which one enters by the fact of birth.115 
Since we no longer accept the notion that a nation or people share a 
common descent, the closest equivalent for γένος, term that implies 
common origins, is ‘descent-group’.116 In fact, the Danaids make their 
request sound much stronger by reminding him that they are the 
descendants of the woman he loved (φιλίας προγόνου γυναικὸς, 533; 
Δῖαί τοι γένος εὐχόμεθ᾽ εἶναι, 536).  ‘The use of the verb εὔχομαι (‘to 
boast’) is especially meaningful since it indicates that the archaic 
mentality, according to which divine origin is a mark of honour in spite of 
the potentially violent aspect of the sexual intercourse, is still at work.117  
It is precisely by virtue of this family bond with Zeus that the 
chorus expects him to help them: they specify that there is no other god 
they could call on more appropriately (εὐλόγως, 591). The adverb 
εὐλόγως, which literally means ‘with a good reason’, refers to the role of 
reciprocity in the relationship between gods and mortals: the Danaids 
think that they are entitled to divine protection due to the intimacy 
experienced by their ancestress in the physical contact with the god. Just 
                                                 
115 Jones (1996), 316-7. Moreover, ‘race’ is a by-product of Darwin’s biological 
determinism that has been distorted in the service of racist doctrines. Nowadays it is 
widely agreed that ‘races’, as a biological and physiological concept, do not exist: Isaac 
(2004); McCoskey (2012). 
116 Jones (1996), 317; Isaac (2004), 1-52.  
117 Cf. A. Supp. 19. In Section 1.2.b. we have seen that this kind of boasting is typical of 
pre-tragic poetry (Od. 11. 260-4). See also Liddell-Scott-Jones, ad loc. (εὔχομαι). 
83 
 
as Zeus loved Io (φιλίας, 534), so he should show a loving attitude 
towards his lover’s descendants. They should be given special care and 
attention.  
At v. 535 the Danaids urge him to be ‘much-remembering’ 
(πολυμνήστωρ): this phrase hints at the practice defined by Lysias as 
‘reminders of sacrifices’.118 The ancient Greeks used to make their 
supplications more compelling by appealing to past sacrifices offered to 
the Olympians. In this case the heroines appeal to Zeus’ special connection 
with their γένος and remind him that he was the one who delivered Io 
from her suffering: soon afterwards they invoke him with the epithet 
ἐφάπτωρ ‘toucher’. As soon as he touched Io, he brought her back into 
fully human form and stopped her pain. The Danaids thus ask Zeus to 
‘renew the happy tale of their ancestress’, namely to treat them as kindly 
as he treated Io. Just as Io, because of Zeus’ love, was goaded by the 
gadfly sent by Hera, so they are chased by their cousins’ ἵμερος. Therefore 
– by extending the parallel – just as Zeus in the end guaranteed her a 
fortunate destiny, so he should also bring to an end the sufferings of his 
beloved’s descendants with a happy outcome.  
The fifty daughters identify themselves with their ancestress, but 
there is a contradiction in the analogy established between their story and 
that of Io: since their ancestress was eventually forced to have sexual 
intercourse with her suitor, why should the Danaids escape the marriage 
with their cousins? The Danaids’ request ‘to renew the happy tale of their 
ancestress’ refers to Io’s final rescue only: they thus omit Io’s suffering and 
overlook Zeus’ partial responsibility for the adversities she was forced to 
                                                 
118 Lys. 2. 39. See Parker (1998), 106.  
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face. These omissions mean neither that they misinterpret the meaning of 
Io’s myth119 nor that they idealise her intercourse with the god as an 
asexual/spiritual union.120 For, as we have seen earlier, it is clear from their 
account of Io’s story that they are well aware that their ancestress had a 
sexual relationship with Zeus which probably involved some sort of 
(symbolic) violence. Nevertheless, there is a huge difference between the 
(symbolic) violence of sexual penetration, which can metaphorically be 
linked to a virgin’s resistance to her passage into womanhood, and the 
Aigyptiads’ generally abusive behaviour.121 Whereas the βία of the 
defloration is tolerated, the marriage with Aegyptus’ sons cannot be 
accepted by the Danaids since their suitors’ violent attitude will negatively 
affect every aspect of their lives, including their sexuality.122  
Even if the Danaids’ case must initially have aroused sympathy 
among the audience, the heroines’ attitude cannot be condoned because 
resistance to sex is always potentially transgressive given that it may 
involve denying the social role of spouses and mothers.123 This in turn 
results in a gender conflict which jeopardizes the institution of marriage 
and destabilizes the social order.124 This is the reason why Zeus does not 
                                                 
119 The thesis of the misinterpretation of Io’s myth is put forward by Murray (1958), 69-70.  
120 According to Zeitlin (1996), 155-8 and Sommerstein (1996), 163, it is as if they fancied 
that Io has always remained a virgin. Cf. Papadopolou (2011), 39-49 and references.  
121 The Egyptian suitors are both violent towards their cousins and impious towards the 
gods. What is more, they respect the authority neither of Danaus nor of Pelasgus (9, 30, 
81, 104, 225, 426, 487, 528, 751, 757-8, 798, 817, 845, 839, 880-1, 884, 893-4, 904, 909, 914-22).  
122 In this regard, it has been pointed out that the suitors’ violent lust is called ὕβρις (81, 
104, 426, 487, 528, 817, 845, 881), which is also the legal term for the crime of rape. See 
Zelenak (1998), 51; Vasunia (2001), 49; Bowlby (2007), 82; Papadopolou (2011), n. 12, 134.  
123 The Danaids are meaningfully likened to the Amazons, the female warriors who used 
to kill their male offspring (287): Papadopolou (2011), 53. These heroines have also been 
considered as ‘a band of proto-feminists who claim their right to dispose of their own  
body’: Bowlby (2007), 82, 87.  
124 For a discussion of the extent to which gender conflict is bound up with ethnicity, see 
Zelenak (1998), 45-58; Wiles (2000), 73 ff.  
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grant the Danaids’ desire to avoid marriage despite their supplications 
and their bond of kinship.125 Although Zeus does not directly put male 
power at risk by fulfilling the heroines’ wishes, his intercourse with Io has 
a negative impact on the social order: for, not only do the Danaids take 
advantage of this story to justify their act of rebellion but their firm belief 
that they have the right to demand Zeus’ protection against their suitors 
also exacerbates their obstinacy.126 Their attitude is well-exemplified by the 
following passages from the parodos: 
σπέρμα σεμνᾶς μέγα ματρὸς εὐνὰς  
ἀνδρῶν, ἒ ἔ, 
ἄγαμον ἀδάματον ἐκφυγεῖν. 
εἰ δὲ μή, μελανθὲς 
ἡλιόκτυπον γένος 
τὸν γάιον, 
τὸν πολυξενώτατον 
Ζῆνα τῶν κεκμηκότων 
ἱξόμεσθα σὺν κλάδοις 
ἀρτάναις θανοῦσαι, 
μὴ τυχοῦσαι θεῶν Ὀλυμπίων. 
(Α. Supp. 151-61) 
καὶ τότ᾽ αὖ δικαίοις 
Ζεὺς ἐνέξεται ψόγοις, 
τὸν τᾶς βοὸς 
παῖδ᾽ ἀτιμάσας, τὸν αὐ- 
τός ποτ᾽ ἔκτισεν γόνῳ, 
νῦν ἔχων παλίντροπον 
                                                 
125 He only defends the suppliants’ right to asylum in Argos in his role as Zeus Hikesios 
(346, 385, 479, 616). For the reverence that even the gods owe to the suppliants, see A. 
Supp. 815 (σεβίζου); Eu. 92-3 (σέβει…σέβας).  
126 In this respect, it is interesting to compare this play with Euripides’ Hippolytus. In this 
drama Poseidon did grant Theseus three wishes by virtue of their biological tie (Hansen, 
2002, 215; E. Hipp. 45-6), but his mortal son misused them: for he used one of them 
against his innocent son, thereby causing his death (E. Hipp. 882ff, 1166 ff, 1313-24, 1412-
14). Consequently, it is once again shown that any kinship relation between gods and 
men is dangerous because a mortal is not able to understand and make good use of the 
privileges that may be bestowed upon him by his/her divine begetter. 
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ὄψιν ἐν λιταῖσιν 
 (Α. Supp. 168-74) 
 
[…] that the mighty race of our august mother may escape the embrace of 
men (ah me), unwedded, unsubdued. And if not, this dark-skinned sun-beaten 
race will supplicate the underworld Zeus, the ever-hospitable Zeus of the dead, in 
death, with nooses instead of olive-branches, if we have not secured the aid of the 
Olympian gods. 
Τhen my just reproaches will catch Zeus out, for he disowns the child he 
himself once begot of the heifer, turning his glance away from our prayers.127 
The heroines wish that they may remain ‘unwedded’ (ἄγαμον, 153) 
and ‘untamed’ (ἀδάματον, 153). The adjective ἀδάματος is especially 
telling since it denies the process of sexual union and marriage through 
which women were, according to the mentality of the ancient Greeks, 
domesticated by men. Therefore, the Danaids are potentially dangerous 
elements in society since they stubbornly refuse to submit to male 
power.128 They are confident that they can be victorious over men because 
they are convinced that Zeus is obliged to stand by them by virtue of their 
descent from the woman he loved (151). From the Danaids’ perspective, if 
the god dishonours (ἀτιμάσας, 171) them (the children of the heifer), he 
can be accused of unjust behaviour.  
The Danaids also issue a veiled threat by saying that, besides not 
granting him the praise and honours due to the gods, they may turn to a 
more hospitable god, Hades (154-61).129 The god of the Underworld is 
                                                 
127 Here I follow the translation of Burian (1991) since the text translated in the Loeb 
edition differs from the Oxford Classical Texts edition.  
128 A. Supp. 392-3, 1068. For an analysis of the imagery linked to man’s taming of woman, 
see Vasunia (2001), 56.   
129 In the previous section we have seen that demands with menaces are typical of an 
ancient kind of prayers and are proof of the ancient Greeks’ belief that there existed some 
sort of reciprocity between gods and mortals: Whitman (1951), 122 ff; Parker (1998), 108. 
See, for instance, A. A. 581-2, 821, Ch. 255-7, 791-3; S. El. 457-8; E. Tr. 1059-80. For some 
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called “the Zeus of the dead” (Ζῆνα τῶν κεκμηκότων, 157).130 In this case, 
their invocation to Hades simply means that the girls are even prepared to 
commit suicide in order to avoid an unwanted marriage.131 In the 
following play, however, once they realize that they must get married to 
their cousins, they feel betrayed by Zeus and thus decide to take the law 
into their own hands and confer masculine power upon themselves.  
There is a fragment (fr. 5 R), probably belonging to the Aigyptioi, in 
which the expression ‘the Zeus of the dead’ (τὸν Δία τῶν κεκμηκότων) 
occurs: it is likely that in the second play of the trilogy the Danaids once 
again invoke Hades when they realize that the Egyptian army has the 
upper hand in the war against Argos but this time the Danaids direct their 
violent intentions not against themselves but rather against their 
bridegrooms. On their wedding night, namely at the very moment in 
which men should subjugate women, the fifty brides stab their grooms to 
death. The Danaids’ feeling of being treated unfairly by the very god who 
in their opinion should have protected them may have played a role in 
triggering their violent reaction.132  
                                                                                                                                     
examples describing how a god’s cult can be put in danger by lack of sacrifices and 
honours, see Dover (1974), 76; Mikalson (1991), 152 ff. 
130 Johansen-Whittle (1980) on 157, 158. See also Seaford (1980), 23-9 on ‘black Zeus/ 
Hades’ in Sophocles’ Inachos.  
131 For the associations between marriage and death, see Rehm (1994) and Vasunia (2001), 
48-51. As the scholars point out, funerals and wedding rites share common elements: 
ritual purification, the cutting of hair, the veiling of both the bride and the corpse, the 
movement from one’s (paternal) home to a new house (either the grave or the house of 
one’s husband).  
132 Their feeling of betrayal springs from the fact that they expect Zeus to protect them 
against the suitors. To give an example, they interpret the favourable winds and lack of 
thunderstorms during their navigation as indications of Zeus’ support and favour (134-
7). Significantly they assert that so far they have had no reason to complain (οὐδὲ 
μέμφομαι, 137) and urge Zeus to bring about a propitious conclusion. This utterance 
implies that, if their navigation had not been good, they would have blamed it on their 
divine progenitor. The problem is that they misinterpret Zeus’ will and overvalue their 
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Therefore, the negative impact of Zeus’ union with Io is not limited 
to Io’s lifetime because in the long run it is partly responsible for the social 
disorder resulting from the Danaids’ refusal of marriage. The audience is 
likely to have gradually lost sympathy for the Danaids’ cause, as the 
violence of the heroines’ intentions becomes increasingly clear throughout 
the trilogy. The victims of male violence have become executioners and, 
consequently, represent a threatening deviation from the positive model 
of feminine behaviour required by ancient Greek society.  
What is more, the Danaids’ special connection with Zeus induces 
them to commit another act of ὕβρις: they assign too much power to him 
while neglecting the other Olympians, especially Aphrodite.133 In this 
respect, it significant that, at the end of the play, the secondary chorus 
warns the fifty girls that there must be no excess in the worship of the 
gods (1061). The Danaids’ excessive commitment to Zeus is one of the 
repercussions of the erotic encounter between the male deity and their 
ancestress: just as that excess of contact with the divine exceeds the proper 
bounds of the god-man relationship, so the Danaids do not render the 
gods proper worship.  
Only at the end of the trilogy is the power of Aphrodite reaffirmed 
thanks to Hypermnestra, who is the only Danaid to spare her husband.134 
The harmonious union between Lynkeus and his wife restores the gender 
                                                                                                                                     
tie of kinship. In the exodus the secondary chorus points out their misunderstanding by 
asking them provocatively: ‘Why did the sons of Aegyptus get good sailing in their swift-
sped pursuit?’ (1045-6). This question challenges the Danaids’ belief that they enjoy 
special divine protection by pointing out that Zeus has not granted their request to cast 
the suitors back into the purple-coloured sea (528-30).  
133 Zeitlin (1996), 146-9. 
134 For a discussion of the reasons for Hypermnestra’s act of mercy, see Winnington – 
Ingram (1961), 147; Ferrari (1977), 1318-19; MacKinnon (1978), 80-1. 
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balance.135 Before the final resolution is reached, however, it is clearly 
shown that excessive closeness between gods and mortals is potentially 
dangerous both on the personal and on the social levels. Zeus’ sexual 
affair with Io also threatens the political stability of the city of Argos, 
which piously decides to grant the suppliants asylum, as we shall now see 
in greater detail.   
Io’s union with the Olympian god has been interpreted as a myth 
which glorifies the Greeks’ ethnic anteriority and superiority over all other 
ethnic groups136 and hence justifies Greek colonization in the 
Mediterranean.137 For the fruit of such union is Epaphus from whom the 
eponymous founders of several foreign races descended. Given that these 
people trace their origins back to Greece, the appropriation of foreign land 
by the Greeks is somehow legitimized. Aeschylus’ treatment of this myth 
could thus be associated with the mythological device through which the 
sexual encounter between a god and a girl provides divine sanction for the 
Greek colonies.138 The most famous example is the liaison between Apollo 
and Cyrene, which is told by Pindar in the ninth Pythian: Phoebus, 
enamoured of the Thessalian nymph, carried her off to Libya where he 
                                                 
135 For the right balance between force and persuasion in any sexual relationship, see 
Zeitlin (1996), 158-9 and A. fr. 44 R.  
136 For the different opinions given by Aeschylus and Herodotus about this topic, see 
Vasunia (2001), 36-7.  
137 Sandin (2003), 5; Papadopolou (2011), 27: ‘The creation of genealogies which provide 
mythical ancestors in foreign countries, but ultimately trace their origin back to Greece, 
may be an ethnocentric form of appropriation, using myths to appropriate foreign lands 
and to justify Greek colonies around the Mediterranean.’ As far as the African continent 
is concerned, the Greeks actually founded the colony of Cyrene only but, through this 
mythological device, they claim that they could rightfully occupy, or extend their 
influence over, many more territories. Lloyd (1975), 13 points out that in Egypt there 
existed a civilization ‘strong enough to prevent much colonization’. Nevertheless, the 
Greeks founded the ἐμπόριον of Naucratis, which became the centre of Greek trade in 
Egypt, and other settlements of Greek mercenaries such as Daphne.  
138 Dougherty (1993); Athanassaki (2003).  
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made her the foundress of the namesake Greek city.139 On closer analysis, 
however, it becomes evident that the myth of Io in the Suppliants has far 
more problematic implications.  
As far as the Pindaric version of this myth is concerned, two points 
are worthy of mention. First of all, Apollo’s union with Cyrene is 
described as a legal marriage,140 whereas in all other literary sources the 
liaisons between gods and mortals are usually represented as one-off 
sexual encounters. The reason for this peculiarity probably lies in the fact 
that Pindar wants to accentuate the lawfulness of this founding act, while 
suppressing the violence of the abduction (ἅρπασε, 6).141 In this way, only 
the positive consequences of Apollo’s erotic attentions towards Cyrene are 
stressed: the nymph is given a portion of Libya as her rightful (ἔννομον, 
58) possession.142 As a consequence, Greek presence in Libya is also 
legitimate. There is a further way in which this myth is exploited to justify 
the Greek occupation of foreign land. Since Pindar’s version speaks of a 
marital union between Apollo and Cyrene and marriage is considered as a 
civilizing institution, this foundation myth can be used to celebrate Greek 
colonization as a civilizing process.143  
A couple of differences between the myths of Io and Cyrene are 
immediately noticeable. To begin with, Zeus did not marry Io but merely 
                                                 
139 Cf. Hyg. Fab. 161; Nonn. D. 13. 300 ff; A. R. 2. 498 ff; Call. Ap. 85 ff; D. S. 4. 81. 1. 
140 At v. 51 Cheiron prophesies that Apollo will be ‘the husband’ (πόσις, 51) of Cyrene, 
who is called ‘bride’ (νύμφαν, 57). Cf. also the use of the verb ἀρμόζω (‘to betroth’) at v. 
13. For a more thorough analysis of this passage, see Carey (1981), 65-103, esp. 74, 80; 
Dougherty (1993), 137-9; Athanassaki (2003), 99.  
141 For an analysis of the way in which Pindar suppresses the violent aspects of 
colonization by means of the prophesied marriage between Apollo and Cyrene, see 
Athanassaki (2003); Carey (1981) on v. 58; Dougherty (1993), 140 ff.  
142 Athanassaki (2003), 99; Carey (1981), 58.  
143 Dougherty (1993), 9, 140 ff.  
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mated with her (μειχθῆναι, 295), whether or not there was consent on her 
part. What is more, Zeus did not carry the girl off to Egypt with the aim of 
making her found a Greek colony, but Io was rather forced to run off by 
the gadfly. Although she eventually settled in the land of the Nile, the 
play does not hint at any civilising function performed by this heroine of 
Greek origins in the Egyptian land. On the contrary, it highlights the 
barbarous aspects of Io’s descendants, who have lived in a foreign land 
over four generations.  
One might object that there is a rigid line of demarcation separating 
the Aigyptiads and the Danaids: the former are in all respects negative 
and barbarous characters, whereas the latter retain their Greekness despite 
their exotic appearance.144 According to this line of interpretation, the 
suppliants symbolize the preservation of Greek traditions in a barbarian 
land, and the reason why they reject the marriage with their cousins is that 
they do not want to marry men who despise their national origins, and do 
not respect Greek gods.145  
Yet the interpretation of the fifty sisters as ‘the paladins of 
Greekness’ is not convincing: they are as barbarian as Aegyptus’ sons, as 
much as they try to hide it. To win sympathy from Argos, they use a 
denigratory rhetoric directed against their suitors by representing them as 
more barbarous than the barbarians themselves.146 In this way they want 
to affirm their cultural diversity by claiming that, unlike their cousins, 
they have never forgotten their roots and have preserved Greek customs 
                                                 
144 Vasunia (2001), 40-3. 
145 Couch (1932), 54-55. 
146 The dark colour of the skin, for instance, is typical of both the Danaids (70, 154-5) and 
their suitors (719-20, 741-5). However, in the case of Aegyptus’ sons, this characteristic is 
described by the chorus by means of a gloomy metaphor (a spider, a black nightmare: 
885-7) which makes it appear as a monstrous somatic trait. 
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and traditions. Nevertheless, they share most of the same characteristics 
with them.147 The only difference is that Aegyptus’ sons, represented by 
their Egyptian herald, are ostentatiously violent and disrespectful towards 
Greek religion and Greek laws,148 whereas the Danaids intentionally 
assume a pious attitude towards the Greek gods and praise the power of 
the Argive δῆμος by emphasising the importance of the decisions taken 
collectively by the citizens.149 However, the Danaids’ respectful behaviour 
may merely be the result of prudent calculation aimed at ingratiating 
themselves with the Argives and at turning things to their favour.150 In 
conclusion, the Greek text provides us with several clues which warn us 
against drawing a clear distinction between the savage and barbarian 
nature of Aegyptus’ sons and the Danaids’ pious behaviour and 
compliance with Greek customs.  
There is a further meaningful difference between the myths of 
Cyrene and Io, as represented in Pindar and Aeschylus respectively. On 
the one hand, the aim of Pythian 9 is to play down the violent aspects of 
Greek colonization by telling the story of a Greek girl who, upon divine 
command, takes up residence in Libya and founds a settlement in which 
                                                 
147 Cf. their somatic traits (70, 154-5, 719-20, 741-5), exotic clothes (235-6, 432, 123 = 133), 
foreign language (119 = 130) and different religious background (220, 10245). Hall (1991), 
117-21, 144-6;  Johansen – Whittle (1980), 2. 106; Bakewell (2013), 35-6.  
148 A. Supp. 839, 884, 893-4, 904, 909-14, 920-2, 934-7. 
149 A. Supp. 625-709, esp. 640, 699-700.  
150 In this regard, it is worth pointing out that in the first episode (370-5) they exalt 
Pelasgus’ sovereignty, whereas in the II stasimon they sing a hymn to the power of the 
Argive δῆμος. This is proof of their ability to change attitude rapidly to fit the 
circumstances. Given that it is far easier to persuade a single person rather than an entire 
assembly, they initially suggest that Pelasgus should not consult with the other citizens 
before making a major decision. Only after they are informed that the Argives have 
decreed to give them refuge in Argos, do they praise the democratic power of the 
assembly. The thesis of the Danaids’ cunning is also supported by the fact that insidious 
guile is traditionally ascribed to the Egyptians (Cratin. fr. 406 KA; Ar. Th. 920-22; Hyper. 
III. 3, 13; A. fr. 373 R). Musti (1995, 22-5), by contrast, argues that the Danaids are 
gradually attracted to democratic ideology; Bakewell (2013, 36-8), contra.  
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natives and colonists collaborate peacefully. On the other hand, the 
Suppliants is about a group of people who, in spite of their Argive roots, 
have been barbarised and have now decided to go back to Argos to seek 
protection against their suitors: their blood ties with the Argives make 
them confident that their request for help will be granted. It is precisely 
the Danaids’ return to their ancestral home that is problematic since it will 
entail violence and will pose a serious threat to the wealth and political 
stability of the Argive reign. Therefore, the myth of the Danaids is not so 
much an αἴτιον justifying the policy of Athenian expansion as a myth 
highlighting the dangers inherent in the arrival of a group of foreigners, 
who nonetheless have Greek blood in their veins.  
The incorporation of foreigners into a πόλις was a crucial issue at 
the time in which the play was produced: soon after the end of the Persian 
wars Athens opened up to the non-Greek world on both the political and 
the commercial levels. This change in Athenian foreign policy was caused 
by more than one factor. First of all, Athens realized that Sparta, its loyal 
ally in the fight against the barbarians, was becoming too powerful and 
potentially dangerous: since the Spartans replaced the Persians as the 
object of the Athenian fears, diplomatic relations were established 
between Athens and its former barbarian enemies.151 What is more, in the 
aftermath of Greek victory at Salamis, Athens enjoyed a period of strong 
economic growth, which attracted increased numbers of foreigners.152 
Finally, the wars of the Delian League caused Athens to come in contact 
                                                 
151 Cimon, the main supporter of anti-Persian policies, was ostracized from Athens in 461 
BC as the result of his unsuccessful expedition against the Spartan Helots (Plut. Cim. 
17.2). Moreover, after Xerxes’ death (465 BC), Athens sent an embassy headed by Callias 
to Susa to negotiate with Artaxerxes (Hdt. VII. 151). These preliminary negotiations may 
have led to the ‘Peace of Callias’, which marked the end of the Greco-Persian Wars. 
152 See, for instance, the expansion of the Piraeus and the rise of Athenian naval power: 
Plu. Them. 4.1; D. S. 9. 19. 7.  
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with non-Greeks coming from the Aegean, the Black Sea area and Asia 
Minor: consequently, after the end of hostilities, Athens intensified trade 
relations with foreign countries, such as Phrygia, Thrace, and Lydia.153 For 
all these reasons the Athenians had to cope with an increasing influx of 
foreigners.154 
In the case of Danaus and his daughters, the reception of 
newcomers is made more complicated by their paradoxical status as 
foreign kinsmen of the Argives, which is in turn the result of the ethnic 
confusion introduced by Zeus’ union with Io in Egypt. As soon as 
Pelasgus is informed about the Danaids’ genealogy, he expresses his fear 
that their mixed ethnicity may lead to social and political turmoil:  
εἴη δ᾽ ἄνατον πρᾶγμα τοῦτ᾽ ἀστοξένων, 
μηδ᾽ ἐξ ἀέλπτων κἀπρομηθήτων πόλει 
νεῖκος γένηται· τῶν γὰρ οὐ δεῖται πόλις. 
(Α. Supp. 356-8) 
 
May the business of these citizen-strangers not prove ruinous, and may 
this event, never expected or planned for, not bring strife to the community: the 
city does not need that! 
Their arrival, whose unpredictability is stressed by two alpha-
privative adjectives (ἄελπτος, ἀπρομήθητος, 357), is immediately 
perceived by the Argive king as a negative event which could result in 
strife (νεῖκος). The implied idea is that it would have been better for the 
                                                 
153 X. AthPol. 2.8; Pl. Ap. 17d-18a. Bakewell (2013), 19.  
154 Aristotles (Pol. 1275b35) writes that Cleisthenes πολλοὺς γὰρ ἐφυλέτευσε ξένους καὶ 
δούλους μετοίκους. The meaning of this passage is disputed since the word ‘μετοίκους’ 
can be interpreted either as a direct object or as an apposition. According to Bakewell 
(2013), 17-9, the two most likely hypotheses are that Cleisthenes distributed among the 
tribes either ‘many metics who were once foreigners and slaves’ or ‘many foreigners and 
slaves as metics’. Cf. also Papadopolou (2011), 65-75. Please note that Aristotle’s use of 
the word ‘μετοίκους’ is anachronistic since μετοικία was probably created in the 460s (IG 
i³ 244; A. Eu. 1011, 1018): Bakewell (1997), 219-21.  
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city of Argos if those barbarian people of Argive roots had remained in 
Egypt (τῶν γὰρ οὐ δεῖται πόλις, 358). The potentially harmful effects of 
their arrival, which Pelasgus wishes he could avert (εἴη δ᾽ ἄνατον, 356), 
are closely linked to the Danaids’ ambiguous status (ἀστόξενοι, 356): they 
are distant relatives of the Argives, though foreigners by birth.  
Why is their double ethnicity perceived as especially threatening?  
To understand how this ethnic confusion complicates matters, it is 
useful to compare how Pelasgus struggles to cope with the problem of the 
Danaids’ arrival to the way in which Apis the Healer in ancient times had 
freed Argos from a horde of snakes by effecting ‘a drastic cure’ (ἄκη 
τομαῖα, line 268):  
Ἆπις γὰρ ἐλθὼν ἐκ πέρας Ναυπακτίας 
ἰατρόμαντις παῖς Ἀπόλλωνος χθόνα 
τήνδ᾽ἐκκαθαίρει κνωδάλων βροτοφθόρων, 
τὰ δὴ παλαιῶν αἱμάτων μιάσμασιν 
χρανθεῖσ᾽ ἀνῆκε γαῖα †μηνεῖται ἄκη†155 
δρακονθόμιλον δυσμενῆ ξυνοικίαν. 
τούτων ἄκη τομαῖα καὶ λυτήρια 
πράξας ἀμέμπτως Ἆπις Ἀργείᾳ χθονὶ 
μνήμην ποτ᾽ ἀντίμισθον ηὕρετ᾽ ἐν λιταῖς. 
(Α. Supp. 262-270) 
 
Apis the healer and seer, son of Apollo, came from the land of Naupactus 
across the sea, and cleansed this land of the man-destroying creatures which the 
earth, stained by the pollution of old bloodshed, had sent up from below, a hostile 
horde of serpents sharing our home. From these Apis effected, beyond all cavil, a 
decisive, liberating cure for the Argive land, and in return won as his reward the 
right to be remembered in prayers. 
The adjective τομαῖος (‘decisive’, 268) is especially meaningful 
since it derives from the verb τέμνω, ‘to cut’. The defensive measures 
                                                 
155 On the many unsuccessful attempts to correct the corrupted text, see Johansen – 
Whittle (1980) on 166.  
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taken by Apis are likened to a surgical operation, the aim of which is to 
remove the infected part. It is Pelasgus who tells the Danaids the story of 
Apis: he proudly proclaims to be the son of the earth-born (γηγενοῦς, 250) 
Palaichthon and tells the chorus that since ancient times the Argive 
territory has been tenaciously protected against all invaders. The tone of 
Pelasgus’ speech is intimidating: he is warning the strangers that, as Apis 
eradicated the brood of serpents in order to protect the Apian land from 
pollution, so he will strenuously defend Argos from any external threat.156  
Nevertheless, it is precisely the Danaids’ singular condition as both 
foreigners and relatives of the Argives that impedes him from effecting a 
cure that is as drastic but effective (ἄκη τομαῖα, 268) as the one chosen by 
Apis. The Danaids’ double ethnicity is perceived by Pelasgus as especially 
threatening precisely because it impedes him from resorting to violence in 
order to thwart the danger that these people pose to the Argive reign: 
Pelasgus, unlike Apis, cannot eliminate the problem simply by driving the 
Danaids out by force since ‘a twofold defilement (διπλοῦν μίασμα)—from 
strangers and from natives at once (ξενικόν ἀστικόν v. 618)—would arise 
before the city’ (618-20). For the Argive assembly would be committing a 
double offence by not complying with its duty of care towards both guests 
and citizens.157  
To sum up, on the one hand, the city of Argos had better welcome 
them with open arms. On the other hand, if the Danaids are welcomed in 
Argos, they may become a threat to the racial purity of the Argive 
                                                 
156 For lexical analogies between the Danaids and the horde of snakes, see Bakewell 
(1997), 216-9; Pattoni (2006), 163-4.  
157 What is more, to compel Pelasgus to side with them, the Danaids threaten to commit 
suicide on the altars of the gods (461-5). 
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bloodline. This impasse has been brought about by ethnic identity 
confusion, which is in turn the result of Zeus’ union with Io in Egypt.  
In light of the above, Aeschylus’ Suppliants can be interpreted as 
representing the desperate attempt of an autochthonous city to preserve 
the purity of its origins.158 The only possible solution is to incorporate 
Danaus and his daughters as metics: they are thus granted rights of 
residency while remaining aliens, namely non-citizens (609-10).159 In this 
way both the danger of pollution is thwarted and the autochthony of the 
Argives is preserved. This brings us back to the historical context of the 
mid fifth century BC: the increased flow of foreigners triggered anxiety 
among Athenian citizens, who felt the urgency to proclaim their superior 
identity by distancing themselves from the newcomers.  In this regard, it is 
meaningful that during the fifth century the myth of Athenian 
autochthony was given greater and greater prominence:160 on the grounds 
of this myth, the Athenians could assert their primacy over all other ethnic 
groups, the Dorians above all.161 It was thus especially important to 
                                                 
158 Argos is particularly well suited to serving as the alter-ego of Athens since the 
Pelasgians, as well as the Athenians, can boast autochthonous roots (Hdt. I. 56. 2; VIII. 44. 
2; Paus. 2. 1. 4- 2. 2. 1; Apollod. 3. 8. 1; Serv. Aen. 2. 84). Montanari (1981), 29-121; 
Rosivach (1987), 305-6; Thomas (2000, 117-22); Mitchell (2006), 219; Bakewell (2013), 90-1; 
Pattoni (2006), 157 ff.  . 
159 For a discussion of Pelasgus’ assumption of the roles of πρόξενος and προστάτης, see 
Gould (1973), 90; Giordano (1999), 71-7; Cuniberti (2001), 143; Papadopolou (2011), 70; 
Bakewell (2013), 29-32.  
160 The Athenians believed that they had sprung from the soil of Attica (Hom. Il. 2. 547-8; 
Pi. I. 2. 19; Hdt. 8. 55; Apollod. 3. 14. 6; E. fr. 360. 6-8 Loeb edition (Erechtheus) and had 
always thereafter occupied the same land (Th. 1. 2. 5, 2. 36. 1). The two ideas were 
blended together in the fifth century for ideological reasons. See Rosivach (1987), 294-301; 
Parker (1987), 187-207, esp. 193-5; Isaac (2004), 109 ff; Zacharia (2008), 32 ff; Mc Coskey 
(2012), 57. 
161 Hdt. 1. 56. 2; Thuc. 1. 2. 6; 2. 36. 12. For an analysis of the reasons why the Athenians 
were proud to be autochthonous, see Montanari (1981), 54-55; Saxonhouse (1986), 255-6; 
Rosivach (1987), 302-6; Parker (1987), 195; Dougherty (1996), 254-6; Hall (1997), 51-6; 
Thomas (2000), 118. 
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preserve the pure autochthonous blood of the Athenian citizen body. In 
response to these needs, the institution of μετοικία was created in the 460s 
with the aim of drawing a clear line of demarcation between the 
Athenians and ‘the others’.162 A few years later (451-0 BC) Pericles’ law on 
citizenship was motivated by a similar attempt at self-definition, as we 
shall see in the next section.163  
All things considered, the incorporation of the Danaids into the 
πόλις through the institution of μετοικία seems to be the best way both to 
calm the fear of losing one’s identity in the encounter with a stranger and, 
at the same time, to praise Argos’ φιλοξενία, a quality that Athens 
traditionally boasts of.164 What is striking, however, is that the following 
dramas of the Danaid trilogy show that this is an imperfect - though 
inevitable - solution to a difficult problem:165 it does not resolve the 
complications resulting from the Danaids’ double ethnicity. On the 
contrary, it further complicates matters: instead of securing political 
stability, the reception of foreigners in the city of Argos results in military 
defeat, in bloodshed and in the establishment of tyranny.166 To make 
                                                 
162 If μετοικία is founded in the 460s (Bakewell, 1997, 219-21), Aeschylus’ Suppliants 
addresses a topic of great interest to the audience.  
163 For the reasons for Pericles’ law, see Rhodes (1981), 333-4; Bakewell (2013), 34-58; 
Azoulay (2014), 82. 
164 Th. I. 2. 6; Loraux (1986), (1993). For the interpretation of the Suppliants as a play which 
conveys a message of cooperation among different countries with the aim of legitimizing 
a new friendly political relationship between the Athenians and the Persians, see Mitchell 
(2006); Zeitlin (1996), 123-171.  
165 I follow the traditional order of the plays comprising the Danaid trilogy (Suppliants, 
Aigyptioi, Danaides). For a rebuttal of the new order of the play suggested by Sicherl 
(1986), 81-110 (followed by Sommerstein, 1995 and 1996; Rösler, 2007), see Sandin (2003), 
11 n.30; Papadopolou (2011), 63.  
166 For the reconstruction of the plot, see Johansen – Whittle (1980), 44 ff; Winnington- 
Ingram (1961), 141-52. In the lost plays of the Danaid trilogy the character of Danaus, who 
assumes the royal throne after Pelasgus dies on the battlefield, is likely to have been 
represented as the exact opposite of the positive model of democratic king embodied by 
Pelasgus, whose rule is characterized by piety, φιλοξενία, and respect for the authority 
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things worse, Argos is actually polluted by the Danaids’ murder of their 
husbands.167 Pelasgus’ efforts to prevent the spread of μίασμα by piously 
granting the suppliants refuge turn out to have been worthless. Finally, 
even the preservation of the Argive autochthonous bloodline is 
jeopardized: a hybrid royal dynasty, sprung from the union between 
Hypermnestra and Lynkeus, will henceforth rule over the reign of 
Argos.168  
On the other hand, it must also be borne in mind that 
Hypermnestra and Lynkeus are the only ones in the entire group of 
foreign newcomers who prove to be pious, righteous and conciliatory. In 
the second and third dramas of the trilogy attention is perhaps drawn to 
such positive behavioural traits. If in the Aigyptioi it is Lynkeus who leads 
the negotiations between the Egyptian army and Danaus,169 he has the 
opportunity to show his diplomatic skills, which associate him with the 
positive model of wise king embodied by Pelasgus. What is more, since 
Hypermnestra is the only Danaid not to kill her husband, it is possible to 
infer that Lynkeus maintains a moderate attitude in his personal life as 
well: Lynkeus is likely to take advantage of the power of persuasion 
(πειθώ) both to negotiate with Danaus successfully and to seduce his 
                                                                                                                                     
of the Argive demos. His propensity towards tyranny has already been revealed in the 
previous play (Supp. 492-6, 985-8). Moreover, Danaus urges his daughters to kill their 
bridegrooms (Σ E. Hec. 886; Hyg. Fab. 168. 3-5), and thus shows his impious attitude. 
Finally, he does not comply with the law of hospitality since Aegyptus’ sons were 
probably Danaus’ guests at the moment of their death: Winnington – Ingram (1961), 146. 
167 Aegyptus’ sons are both relatives of the Danaids and their hosts in the royal palace: if 
the Danaids are accommodated in the royal palace at the end of the Suppliants (956-63, 
1009-11), the murder of their husbands is also the murder of guests: Winnington – Ingram 
(1961), 146.  
168 Σ E. Hec. 886; Σ E. Or. 872; Paus. 2. 16. 1; Apollod. 2. 2. 1. 1; Pi. N. X. 21-2; B. Ep. XI. 73-
6. 
169 Winnington – Ingram (1961), 141-52. For the debate on the identity of the chorus in the 
Aigyptioi, see Cunningham (1953), 230-1; Johansen – Whittle (1980), 23-5; Garvie (1969), 
191-8.   
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bride. The new Argive royal family thus springs from a union based on 
mutual consent and desire. The benefits of Lynkeus’ persuasiveness and 
moderate behaviour are twofold: not only do both qualities reconcile 
women with the institution of marriage, but they also give hope that the 
reign of Argos will hereafter be powerful, long-lasting and harmonious.   
If the Danaides celebrate the foundation of a glorious royal dynasty 
descending from the fruit of that illicit liaison,170 it may be argued that, by 
the end of the trilogy, the eulogistic function of the myths of sexual 
intercourse between gods and mortals is recovered. By telling a 
continuous story comprising more than one generation, the connected 
trilogy provides perspectives beyond those perceived by a single 
individual or a group of people living in the same place and historical 
time period. For instance, from the standpoint of both Pelasgus and the 
Argive citizens the Danaids’ arrival is undoubtedly a calamitous event. By 
contrast, the Argives who live under the reign of Lynkeus and 
Hypermnestra are likely to consider it as a providential event guided by 
Zeus.  
The Danaid trilogy shows that a man cannot judge the importance 
of an event in absolute terms but rather can only decide whether it is 
either positive or negative on the basis of its consequences on his own 
personal life and on the society to which he belongs. Human 
understanding is necessarily limited due to the fact that the outcome of an 
action – whether it be positive or negative - may become evident only long 
after that action is undertaken. Therefore, it is extremely difficult – if not 
impossible – for a mortal to establish the correlation between an event and 
                                                 
170 We cannot be sure that this is the version of the Danaid myth which was enacted. For 
an overview of all the variants of this myth, see Garvie (1969), 163-233. 
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its results. An act that in the present provokes suffering and destruction 
may turn out to be beneficial in the future, and vice versa. 
Unpredictability and instability are constitutive elements of the human 
condition.  
Nonetheless, what is tragic about this is that human nature tends to 
value any experience on a relative basis rather than on an absolute one. 
This is the reason why a future benefit does not necessarily compensate 
for one’s past suffering, especially if it is enjoyed either by the following 
generations or by the community as a whole. Although in the end Zeus’ 
union with Io probably turns out to be beneficial to the Argive reign, this 
positive outcome is only reached through lots of suffering endured by the 
Argives. By stressing the negative side-effects of Zeus’ affair with Io on the 
wealth and stability of Pelasgus’ kingdom and on the well-being of its 
citizens, the Suppliants plays down the laudatory aspects of the sexual 
encounters between gods and mortals.  
Besides causing Io pain, such union is put forward by the Danaids 
as an argument in support of their stubborn refusal to marry their suitors: 
by virtue of their descent from Zeus, the heroines believe that, whatever 
their claim, they have the right to get special divine support. The Danaids’ 
rejection of marriage is threatening because, taken to extremes, it could 
lead to social destabilization. What is more, as the result of Zeus’ union 
with Io, the distinction between kin and foreigner has become blurred 
given that the descendants of the Argive princess have been barbarised 
during their stay in Egypt. Such ethnic identity confusion has put the city 
of Argos in a delicate situation, which eventually results in foreign 
military occupation and in a tyrannical takeover.  
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The glorious future of the city of Argos under the new dynasty 
founded by Hypermnestra and Lynkeus is thus established at the expense 
of its previous citizens living under the reign of Pelasgus. This, we might 
say, is the tragic awareness that underlies the Suppliants. 
Similarly, in the Ion the illustrious offspring of Apollo and Creusa, 
despite many vicissitudes and much pain, eventually ascends the throne 
of Athens. However, as I shall discuss in the following section, Euripides 
goes one step further: Apollo’s union with Creusa not only causes 
individual mortals lots of suffering but is also of doubtful benefit to 
Athens. For the enthronement of Apollo’s son is carried out by means of a 
trick which shakes the Athenian patriarchal order to its foundations and 
even affects the god himself.  
 
1.4 Euripides’ Ion 
Like the Suppliants, the Ion discusses the impact of the sexual 
intercourse between a god (Apollo) and a girl (Creusa) both on the human 
life of the heroine and on the political order of Athens. The action of both 
dramas is influenced by a similar event which has taken place prior to the 
beginning of the play: a god rapes a virgin and impregnates her. What is 
more, in both plays this past event is connected more or less directly with 
the threat posed by an intruder to the purity of an autochthonous royal 
family and to its political stability. However, there are several differences 
in the description of the sexual act and in the analysis of its implications. 
This section considers how and to what extent Euripides’ representation of 
Apollo’s union with Creusa differs from Aeschylus’ treatment of a similar 
myth of sexual intercourse between a deity and a girl.  
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To begin with, let us briefly review the sequence of events that 
occurred just before the action of the play begins: Creusa, the daughter of 
Erechtheus, the autochthonous king of Athens, exposes her child fathered 
by Apollo. She then gets married to Xuthus, but their marriage is childless. 
The married couple thus decides to consult the Delphic oracle about 
having children: the scene opens in Delphi soon after they arrive at the 
temple of Apollo.  
One difference between the treatments of the myths of Creusa and 
Io is immediately noticeable: in the Ion the victim of rape is a character of 
the play, whereas in the Suppliants the girl sexually possessed by Zeus 
lived five generations before the historical moment in which the Danaids’ 
story takes play. This difference makes the critique of the divine rapist’s 
behaviour harsher in the Ion due to the fact that Creusa gives voice to her 
grief and anger on stage. Closer attention is thus paid to the heroine’s 
feelings, and much stress is laid on her grief and sense of shame.  
Two accounts of the violence suffered are given by the heroine 
herself. The first one exemplifies her reticent behaviour well since she 
hides the identity of the real victim of the rape out of shame.171 Although 
she is reluctant to speak openly of the rape, several elements of criticism 
emerge from her fragmented speech: the rape is condemned as a daring, 
unjust and disgraceful act, and Apollo is blamed for abandoning his 
offspring.172 As we have seen in the previous section, Io also felt shame 
after her intercourse with Zeus. Her feelings, however, can be interpreted 
both as expressing grief for the sexual violence and merely as an 
                                                 
171 E. Ion. 336. Hoffer (1996), 303-8 gives a psychological interpretation of Creusa’s 
attitude: her self-suppression, shame and riddling speech identify her as a victim of 
violence and oppression. 
172 E. Ion. 252-4, 288, 384, 386.  
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indication of feminine modesty prompted by the god’s erotic attentions.173 
By contrast, Creusa’s shame cannot be considered as a mere symptom of a 
prudish attitude since she explicitly accuses the god of behaving badly 
and harshly criticizes the act of the rape itself as ‘a shameful deed’ 
(αἰσχύνην, 288). What is more, Ion acknowledges that Apollo is guilty 
(ἀδικεῖ, 355) and hypothesises that even the god feels ashamed for what 
he did (αἰσχύνεται, 367).  
Once she is informed that Loxias has just given a son to Xuthus 
only, Creusa’s hopelessness reaches its climax: besides being bound to be 
childless for the rest of her life, she will have to put up with the presence 
of an illegitimate child inside her house. Out of desperation she thus 
decides to set aside shame and to give a more explicit account of the 
sexual violence experienced. Creusa’s monody (859-922) is a sort of an 
anti-hymn to Apollo:174 her lyric condemnation of Apollo focuses on his 
bad treatment of her.175 The rape is depicted as the dreadful reversal of a 
joyful marriage (γάμος), and she uses terms from the semantic field of 
violence, shamelessness and pain.176 She also holds the god responsible for 
                                                 
173 See Section 1.3.  
174 LaRue, (1963); Zacharia (2003), 76-99; Swift (2010), 90-101; Rynearson (2014), 56-61.  
175 Other scholars, by contrast, maintain that Creusa’s monody reveals that she was not 
raped but rather seduced by the god: Burnett (1962), 95-6; Lefkowitz (1993), 26-8; 
Rabinowitz (1993), 197-201. For the rebuttal of this thesis, see Deacy (1997), 45; Zacharia 
(2003), 76-99. 
176 Apollo is called ‘the divine partner of the bed’ (θεὸς ὁμευνέτας, 894) who acted 
shamelessly (ἀναιδείᾳ, 895). Creusa’s resistance to Apollo’s desire is expressed by the 
word ἄκουσα (‘unwillingly’, 941) and is emphasised by means of an agonistic metaphor: 
she ‘contested a terrible contest’ (ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἀγῶνα δεινὸν ἠγωνίσμεθα, 939). A similar 
image is used by Cassandra to describe her divine rapist as a wrestler (παλαιστής, A. A. 
1206). See Scafuro (1990), 144 ff. What is more, as Huys (1995) points out in his study, the 
word γάμος describing Creusa’s union with Apollo is always accompanied by terms 
which negate the positive nature of the marriage: 10-11 (Φοῖβος ἔζευξεν γάμοις/ βίᾳ 
Κρέουσαν), 437 (βίᾳ γαμῶν), 445 (βιαίων…γάμων), 505 (πικρῶν γάμων/ ὕβριν), 941 
(δύστηνον γάμον). Zacharia (2003), 76-99 points out that Apollo’s shamelessness in 
Euripides’ Ion strongly contrasts with Loxias’ moral scruples in approaching Cyrene in 
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their son’s death: it was Creusa who exposed the new-born, but she did so 
because she thought the god would save his own son (965).177 By contrast, 
as far as Creusa knows, the god let their offspring die in the wild (917-9). 
Whereas in the Suppliants the birth of a child signals the end of Io’s 
suffering and her final reward, in the Ion the same event triggers a 
downward spiral of greater calamity: she abandons her offspring, and this 
dreadful act results in unbearable pain.  
At this point, we should wonder why she decided to conceal her 
pregnancy and expose her baby. By her own admission she did so for fear 
of her mother,178 but Hermes in the prologue and Athena in the exodus 
assert that it is Apollo who wanted to keep his sexual affair secret.179 The 
reasons for the god’s silence over his paternity will be discussed later on. 
Let us for the moment analyse Creusa’s feeling of fear: she is probably 
afraid of her parents’ punishment for her illicit sexual affair. In Section 
1.2.b. it has been pointed out that in Greek mythology divine seduction 
usually brings no disgrace.180 It follows that Creusa’s reticence and fear 
                                                                                                                                     
Pi. P. 9. 39-41: the Pindaric Apollo, before mating with the nymph, even asks Chiron for 
permission. Apollo’s abduction of Creusa while the girl was plucking flowers (κρόκεα 
πέταλα ἔδρεπον, 889-90) can also be compared with Pluto’s abduction of Proserpina in 
Ov. Met. V (violas aut candida lilia carpit, V. 392). Both texts openly criticize the god’s 
violent behaviour (Ion. 893-5 κραυγὰν Ὦ μᾶτέρ μ᾽ αὐδῶσαν […]ἆγες ἀναιδείᾳ ≈ Ov. 
Met. V. 395-398 raptaque Diti […]maesto/ et matrem et comites, sed matrem saepius, ore/ clamat; 
Ion. 941, ἄκουσα ≈ Ov. Met. V. 415, cf. 492 invitae) even though Ovid’s description of rape 
through the words of the fonts Cyane and Aretusa is far more explicit: the imagery of 
Pluto hurling his sceptre in the fountain (V. 422, contortum valido sceptrum regale lacerto) 
and piercing the land to make his way to Tartarus (V.423 icta tellus; 426 inconsolabile 
vulnus; 492 terra nihil meruit patuitque invita rapinae) replicates the violent image of 
penetration. Cf. Curran (1978), 222. 
177 Cf. E. Ion. 1497-500. Rabinowitz (1993), 201-2 claims that Creusa is to be blamed more 
than Apollo due to the fact that she decided to expose the child. Nevertheless, her human 
helplessness and her belief that her baby would be rescued by his divine father is likely to 
have aroused sympathy among the spectators (960). See further Hoffer (1996), 302.  
178 E. Ion. 898 (φρίκᾳ ματρὸς), 1497 (ἐν φόβῳ).  
179 E. Ion. 14-5, 69-73, 1353, 1565, 1601-3.  
180 Lefkowitz (1993), 26. 
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must have sprung from her conviction that nobody would believe her 
story. Scepticism usually surrounds the stories of sexual intercourse 
between gods and mortals in Euripidean plays.181 For instance, Amphion, 
the son of Antiope and Zeus, asserts that he cannot believe that a god 
would come to the bed of a mortal girl imitating the behaviour of a 
malefactor.182 Similarly, the sisters of Semele claim that ‘she has conceived 
a child from a mortal father and then ascribed the sin of her bed to 
Zeus’.183 Likewise, Ion is reluctant to believe right to the end that a woman 
mated with Apollo: he twice supposes that it is a clever trick to which 
mortal girls resort whenever they want to escape the shame of an illicit 
sexual affair by shifting the blame on a god.184 He is not convinced of his 
divine origin until Athena appears to confirm Creusa’s version of the facts: 
ὦ Διὸς Παλλὰς μεγίστου θύγατερ, οὐκ ἀπιστίᾳ 
σοὺς λόγους ἐδεξάμεσθα, πείθομαι δ᾽ εἶναι πατρὸς 
Λοξίου καὶ τῆσδε· καὶ πρὶν τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἄπιστον ἦν. 
(E. Ion. 1606-8) 
 
Pallas, daughter of great Zeus, I believe what you have said, I am 
convinced that I am the son of Loxias and this woman; even before this was not 
incredible. 
The authority of divine speech finally persuades Ion: mortals 
cannot receive the word of a deity with disbelief  (ἀπιστίᾳ). Athena’s 
appearance dispels Ion’s previous doubts about his father: that he is of 
divine origin is no longer unbelievable (ἄπιστον) to him. Had it not been 
for Athena’s intervention, Ion would probably never have believed in his 
                                                 
181 Huys (1995), 90-1; Segal (1999), 98-102.  
182 E. fr. 210 N². For Lycus’ scepticism, see E. fr. 223 N². 
183 E. Ba. 27-30, 242-7, 286-97.  
184 E. Ion. 340-341, 1523-7.  
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divine origin.185 Creusa’s awareness that humans lack a propensity to 
believe stories of intimate contact between gods and mortals contributes to 
worsening her situation because it spurs her to abandon her child.  
On the one hand, such scepticism is a necessary plot device, which 
advances and complicates the action,186 and on the other hand, it can be 
seen as a reflection of the fifth-century rationalizing tendency.187 Ion in this 
play, as well as Amphion in the Antiope, seems to act as the spokesperson 
of avant-garde philosophical speculation against divine 
anthropomorphism.188 However, the plot itself then confirms that Ion is of 
divine origin, although nobody initially believes it. Therefore, scepticism 
about the myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals is 
eventually rebutted.189 It follows that Ion’s initial reaction of disbelief is 
more likely to be simply a way of coping with an event that defies 
explanation in terms of typical human experience.  
Euripides is playing on the specificity of theatre, namely the tension 
between the real and the mythical. As Gould points out, in any tragic 
performance two different perspectives of myth coexist: whereas the 
                                                 
185 This observation will come in handy later when we analyse Euripides’ 
problematization of Apollo’s behaviour.  
186 Huys (1995), 90-1.  
187 Susanetti (2007), 230.  
188 It is widely acknowledged that Euripides often drew on cutting-edge philosophical 
theories to put unconventional ideas into the mouths of the characters: Conacher (1998); 
Ostwald (1999), 33-49; Allan (1999-2000), 145-56; Dillon (2004), 47-73; Whitmarsh (2014), 
109-26.  
189 What is more, the theory of the development from μῦθος to λόγος in ancient Greek 
civilization (Nestle, 1940) has fallen out of favour among a considerable number of 
scholars (Dodds, 1951 and Buxton, 1999 with further recent bibliography): it has been 
argued that there was no sudden change from myth to reason and that the new way of 
explaining reality introduced by rational philosophy did not involve a total rejection of 
mythology. By contrast, the mythical and the rational coexisted throughout the centuries. 
For a discussion of the rationality of myth, see Gould (1999), 107-116. See also Kindt 
(2012), 36-54.  
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audience considers the events performed on stage as belonging to myth, 
from the characters’ point of view they are real life experiences.190 Creusa’s 
and Ion’s vicissitudes belong to the world of myth but, once they are 
performed or recalled on stage, they become the harsh reality of the 
characters’ own lives. In the Ion things become even more complicated 
because Euripides makes the heroine directly involved in the sexual 
relationship with a god reveal her own story, whereas in the Suppliants 
Io’s union with Zeus is recalled on stage several decades after it happened. 
In the latter case, the reliability of the account of the sexual intercourse 
between the god and the mortal girl is never disputed: this event has 
already been accepted as belonging to the mythical past, as the terms used 
by both the Danaids and Pelasgus indicate.191 By contrast, scepticism about 
Creusa’s story springs from the overlap between the mythical and the real. 
What is unbelievable in real life is credible and true in the world of myth: 
the story of Creusa’s rape by a god gives rise to doubt and disbelief on 
stage precisely because for the characters Creusa’s myth coincides with 
real life. Sexual encounters between a deity and a mortal are plausible in 
the world of the myth only, whereas they are doubtful if they either 
happen or are recounted as happening in the real world.  
This is confirmed by the fact that Ion has no doubt that both 
Poseidon and Zeus have had several violent sexual unions with mortal 
girls (445, 507-8), but Creusa’s confession that she had a sexual union with 
Apollo sounds unbelievable to his ears. The plot of the Ion stimulates the 
audience to compare their own perspective and reaction to accounts of 
                                                 
190 Gould (1999), 108. For a discussion of the ways in which the mythical past can be 
conflated with the present, see Burkert (1979); Bremmer (1987); Calame (2003). For the 
extent to which the ancient Greeks believed in their myths, see Mikalson (1991); 
Sourvinou – Inwood (2003), Parker (2007), contra. 
191 λόγος and derivatives (295, 310); φημί and derivatives (φάτις) at vv. 291, 293, 301. 
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sexual encounters between gods and mortals with those of the characters 
on stage. Any spectator would have had a similar reaction of disbelief if 
the person sitting next to him had claimed to be Zeus’ son: such a claim 
would have been perceived as belonging to the reality of the utterer’s 
personal experience and thus as lacking the authentication of cultural 
tradition. By contrast, Heracles’ divine paternity would have been taken 
for granted by the audience since Heracles’ myth is part of the collective 
memory shared by the whole community. Euripides thus plays on the fact 
that in any theatrical performance the boundaries between myth and 
reality are blurred: as soon as a spectator realizes that he would react in 
the same way as Ion does on stage, he is also forced to acknowledge that 
such a reaction of incredulity is wrong. For Ion is indeed Apollo’s son.   
In conclusion, the expressions of scepticism uttered by Ion are not 
to be considered as evidence that in this play the myths of sexual 
intercourse between gods and mortals are criticized as risible and 
senseless stories which can no longer be believed in the wake of the latest 
advances of philosophical speculation. Euripides problematizes these 
myths of intimate contact between a deity and a girl on a different level, as 
we shall see a bit later in this section.  
Let us return for a moment to the discussion of the accusations 
brought against Apollo by the victim of rape. Apart from the violence 
suffered, what causes the greatest distress to Creusa is Apollo’s uncaring 
attitude. Just as the Danaids lay claim to Zeus’ protection by virtue of their 
bond of kinship, so too Creusa expects Apollo to save their own son. 
Similarly, Creusa feels resentment against Apollo precisely because he is 
believed to have broken the ‘reciprocity contract’ which should have 
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created a certain obligation towards the woman he coupled with and their 
offspring.192 At vv. 912-917 Creusa angrily exclaims: 
Ἰὼ <ἰώ> κακὸς εὐνάτωρ, 
ὃς τῷ μὲν ἐμῷ νυμφεύτᾳ 
χάριν οὐ προλαβὼν 
παῖδ᾽ εἰς οἴκους οἰκίζεις· 
ὁ δ᾽ ἐμὸς γενέτας καὶ σός, ἀμαθής,  
οἰωνοῖς ἔρρει συλαθείς […] 
(E. Ion. 912-918) 
 
Oh, wicked lover, though you had no previous favour from my husband, 
you gave him a child for his house; yet my son and yours, unfeeling god,193 has 
vanished taken as prey for birds […]. 
From this passage it is evident that, at least from the humans’ point 
of view, the principle of reciprocity governs the relationship between gods 
and mortals. Creusa is angry at Apollo because the god, although he has 
received no favour (χάριν οὐ προλαβὼν, 914) from her husband, has 
reserved special treatment for him. The word χάρις refers to the practice 
of a continued and reciprocal exchange of favours between deities and 
worshippers, whereas the concessive clause highlights the fact that Apollo 
was not required to give Xuthus a child as a gift since there was no favour 
to reciprocate. On the contrary, as the adversative particle δέ stresses 
(916), Creusa is the one who should have enjoyed Apollo’s special care 
and affection by virtue of their previous sexual affair. This is the reason 
why she accuses Apollo of being evil (κακός, 912) and unfeeling (ἀμαθής, 
                                                 
192 Creusa calls both her husband and Apollo ‘ungrateful betrayers of her bed’ (λέκτρων 
προδότας ἀχαρίστους, 880). 
193 Cf. Owen (1939) on 916: ‘ἀμαθής is almost certainly an apostrophe’.   
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917) and even imagines him playing his lyre joyously without any care for 
their child (905-6).194  
From the beginning of the play, however, the audience is aware 
that the charge of child neglect is unfair and that Creusa’s belief that her 
son is dead is false.195 In the prologue Hermes affirms that he saved Ion by 
bringing him to Delphi upon Apollo’s command (28-36). What is more, 
several times throughout the play the characters acknowledge that Loxias 
directed the events to the final reunion between mother and son.196 These 
passages have been put forward by scholars as evidence in support of the 
thesis that the critique of the god ultimately proves to be unfounded and 
the figure of Apollo is fully rehabilitated: he did care for Creusa and his 
offspring.197  
Nevertheless, from the vantage point of the mortals such a close 
relationship is still a doubtful privilege since it has resulted in a prolonged 
period of separation between mother and son. The god has acted in aid of 
family reunification too late and has not even reassured Creusa about 
Ion’s fate.198 In this regard, the charge brought against Apollo by Ion is 
particularly meaningful: at vv. 448-9 Ion exclaims that Apollo is ‘guilty 
(ἀδικεῖτ’) of pursuing his own pleasures and taking no thought for the 
future (τῆς προμηθίας πέρα)’. Ion is provocatively accusing the prophetic 
god of lacking insight into the future.199 Being a mortal, he cannot help but 
                                                 
194 The adjective ἀμαθής can have either a moral or an intellectual meaning. See Bond 
(1988), n. ad loc. 
195 E. Ion. 951-3, 1439-53.  
196 E. Ion. 67-75 (Hermes); 1456-7 (Ion); 1343, 1347-9, 1353, 1357-60, 1367-8 (Pythia); 1565, 
1595 (Athena), 1609-13 (Creusa).   
197 See Wassermann (1940); Burnett (1962); Wolff (1965), 184.  
198 E. Ion. 310-2, 320, 324, 360-1, 563-5, 668-70, 1369-79.  
199 The word προμηθία literally means ‘foresight’. See Lee (1997), n. ad loc., contra. 
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judge the violent act committed by Loxias from the narrow perspective of 
the specifically human.200 Ion’s sentence thus means that Apollo, at the 
moment of the rape, did not think about the negative consequences that 
his act would have had on human lives.  
Apollo’s uncaring attitude is due to the different way in which gods 
and mortals perceive time, as we have already seen in the analysis of the 
Suppliants.201 The human conception of time is limited to their short 
existence, and this is the reason why they evaluate both divine agency and 
their own happiness on the basis of their emotional well-being. By 
contrast, the suffering experienced by mortals is of less importance to the 
gods due to the fact they have a broader view of the future, which 
comprises more than one generation. In this regard, the twofold 
etymology implied by the name ‘Ion’ is worth mentioning. Apollo decided 
to call his child Ion to make him the eponymous founder of the Asian 
Ionian cities, as Hermes explains in the prologue (73-4), whereas Xuthus 
chooses the same name for a different reason: he names the boy after the 
participle of the verb ‘to come/go’ because Ion was the first person he met 
as he ‘came out’ (ἐξιόντι, 662) of the temple.202 Since men cannot predict 
the future, the etymology given by Xuthus inevitably refers only to the 
fortuitous reunion with his son, without any hint at the future glorious 
role played by Ion.  
To sum up, the glorious destiny of the Athenian lineage, which 
should be considered as the adequate compensation for Ion’s and Creusa’s 
misfortunes, cannot blot out their previous distress. It follows that, on the 
                                                 
200 Wassermann (1940), 589-90; Burnett (1962), 93. 
201 De Romilly (1968), 113-41; Segal (1999), 74-81, 91-3; Mirto (2009), 10 f.  
202 See also E. Ion. 535, 802.  
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personal level, a close relationship with a god is not worthwhile. On the 
other hand, the divine origin of Ion should at least be beneficial to the city 
of Athens since it can be put forward both as evidence of the nobility and 
prestige of the royal family and as an argument in support of Athens’ 
imperialistic claims. What is more, the heterosexual union between the 
autochthonous Creusa and Apollo should restore the gender balance, 
which is usually compromised in the myth of autochthony. However, I 
shall now argue that all but one of the potential benefits deriving from 
Apollo’s union with Creusa are impaired by Apollo’s actions.  
We have seen that in the Suppliants Zeus’ union with Io threatens 
the political stability of Argos and the autochthony of its rulers because 
the city that piously grants the Danaids asylum suffers foreign military 
occupation and a tyrannical takeover. Similarly, in the Ion the racial purity 
of an autochthonous city is suddenly menaced by an intruder, namely Ion, 
who is initially believed to be the illegitimate son of Xuthus. Therefore, at 
first glance the danger that a foreigner might inherit the throne is similar 
to the threat posed by the Danaids. Yet there is a significant difference 
between the two stories: whereas a mixed royal dynasty does take over 
Argive rule, in the Ion this eventuality turns out to be merely a false 
menace, given that Ion is actually Creusa’s son. In the long run the sexual 
intercourse between a god and a mortal girl jeopardizes the autochthony 
of the royal dynasty in the Suppliants, whereas it preserves it in the Ion. 
What in the Suppliants is a negative consequence of Zeus’ liaison with Io 
turns out to be the only actual advantage brought about by a similar 
sexual union in the Ion. I shall now examine the differences between the 
two plays in more detail. 
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Creusa is a noble native of Athens,203 the only surviving daughter of 
the king Erechtheus.204 Since Erechtheus died leaving no male heir, Creusa 
has become an ἐπίκληρος, namely the daughter who transmits her 
father’s property to her sons.205 According to the Athenian institution of 
the epiklerate, she should have married her closest male relative on the 
paternal side of the family. By contrast, she was given in marriage to the 
foreign-born Xuthus in return for military service.206 This apparently 
incongruous betrothal actually follows a typical habit of archaic 
marriage:207 in case of need, the head of a household can adopt a foreign 
ally and betroth his daughter to him.208 Such mixed marriage has the 
advantage of both enhancing the military strength of the household and 
protecting its property since, as the result of the adoption, the bride is not 
transferred to an alien οἶκος. Therefore, if Creusa had borne Xuthus a son, 
the royal property would have been transferred to a legitimate heir.209 The 
                                                 
203 Creusa’s nobility is constantly highlighted: γενναιότη (237), εὐγενής (240, 242), 
γενναίος (262), ἐσθλός (620), εὐπατρίδης (1073).   
204 E. Ion. 277-80; cf. E. fr. 360 K (Erechtheus).  
205 See esp. Loraux (1993), 202 ff.  
206 E. Ion. 57-64, 292-8. His foreign origins are frequently stressed throughout the play: 
οὐκ ἐγγενὴς (63); ἐπακτὸς ἐξ ἄλλης χθονός, (290, 592); ξένος, (293, 813); θυραῖος (702-
3). 
207 Whereas archaic marriage aimed at establishing relationships of mutual assistance 
between aristocratic families, after Cleisthenes’ reforms the main purpose of matrimonial 
unions was to ‘ensure the legitimate continuity of the citizen households’ (Seaford, 1990, 
155). In the democratic state there was an increasing tendency to discourage marriages 
with non-Athenians (e.g. Pericles’ law on citizenship): Todd (1993), 178.  
208 In this case, the girl must have been betrothed by a male guardian, given that Creusa’s 
father is dead: Mirto (2009), 22-3.  
209 Although the property of the Erechtheid household cannot be alienated from the 
ἐπίκληρος, Creusa still needs Xuthus to beget a legitimate son to whom she may 
bequeath Erechtheus’ holding. For an ἐπίκληρος does not own the property but rather is 
the medium through which a male child may inherit his grandfather’s property. Cf. 
Lacey (1968), 138-42.  
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integration of an outsider into an Athenian οἶκος is accepted provided 
that the marriage results in the birth of a successor.210  
The problem is that the couple were barren. To complicate things 
further, the Delphic oracle apparently reunites the foreign husband with a 
son of his own, who was born out of Xuthus’ previous illicit affair with an 
unknown woman. The autochthony of the Erechtheid line is thus 
jeopardized since an alien, who has no blood tie with Creusa, becomes the 
heir to the throne of Athens.211 The fear of losing one’s identity and 
presumed racial purity accentuates xenophobic attitudes. Ion himself, as 
soon as he is informed about Loxias’ oracle (507-38), worries about his 
foreign origins and illegitimacy:212  
εἶναί φασι τὰς αὐτόχθονας 
κλεινὰς Ἀθήνας οὐκ ἐπείσακτον γένος, 
ἵν᾽ ἐσπεσοῦμαι δύο νόσω κεκτημένος, 
πατρός τ᾽ ἐπακτοῦ καὐτὸς ὢν νοθαγενής. 
καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχων τοὔνειδος ἀσθενὴς μὲν ὤν213 
μηδὲν καὶ οὐδὲν ὢν κεκλήσομαι· 
ἢν δ᾽ ἐς τὸ πρῶτον πόλεος ὁρμηθεὶς ζυγὸν 
ζητῶ τις εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ἀδυνάτων ὕπο 
μισησόμεσθα 
(E. Ion. 589-97) 
 
ἐλθὼν δ᾽ ἐς οἶκον ἀλλότριον ἔπηλυς ὢν 
                                                 
210 See Seaford (1990), 158.  
211 The autochthony of the Erechtheid line is highlighted at E. Ion. 20-1, 29-30, 267, 589-90, 
737, 1000. 
212 A little later he also complains that a foreigner’s tongue is enslaved in Athens (τό γε 
στόμα/ δοῦλον πέπαται, 674-5). This reminds us of the advice given by Danaus to his 
daughters in Aeschylus’ Suppliants (194-203): ‘You are an alien, a fugitive (ξένος, 202), 
and in need. Bold speech (θρασυστομεῖν, 203) does not suit the weak.’ Ion also prays 
that his mother may be Athenian, so that he may have free speech (παρρησία, 672). This 
passage has been interpreted as a reference to Pericles’ law on citizenship since it implies 
that a child has a right to citizenship only if both of his parents are Athenian. See Walsh 
(1978), 307; Segal (1999), 67-74.  
213 I keep the transmitted text (μὲν ὤν L : μένων Musgrave) 
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γυναῖκά θ᾽ ὡς ἄτεκνον, […] 
πῶς οὐχ ὑπ᾽ αὐτῆς εἰκότως μισήσομαι, 
ὅταν παραστῶ σοὶ μὲν ἐγγύθεν ποδός, 
ἡ δ᾽ οὖσ᾽ ἄτεκνος τὰ σὰ φίλ᾽ εἰσορᾷ πικρῶς; 
(E. Ion. 607-8, 611-13) 
 
They say that the famous Athenians, born from the soil, are no immigrant 
race. I would be suffering from two disabilities if I were cast there, both the 
foreignness of my father and my own bastardy. And with this reproach, if I am 
insignificant,214 I shall be called no one and nothing. If I attempt to be somebody 
by aspiring to the city’s helm, I shall be hated by the powerless. 
 
Then suppose I come, as a foreigner, to a house that is not mine and to 
your childless wife. […] How will she not hate me, and with reason, when I take 
my stand beside you while she, being childless, looks with bitterness at what gives 
you joy? 
In Athens Ion would be put at a disadvantage: he would be 
powerless (ἀσθενής, 593) because he does not come from a famous 
(κλεινὰς, 590) and autochthonous (αὐτόχθονας, 589) γένος, which has 
not been brought in from outside (οὐκ ἐπείσακτον, 590) but rather has 
always lived in the same place. Ion’s shortcomings are expressed by 
means of a medical metaphor: compared to Athenian citizens, he suffers 
from two ailments (δύο νόσω, 591), namely his foreignness (ἐπακτοῦ, 592; 
ἔπηλυς, 607) and illegitimacy (νοθαγενής, 592). Due to these defects, 
which are both regarded as a blot on his name (τοὔνειδος, 593), the 
Athenians will despise him.  
The fear of reproach against newcomers is also felt by the Danaids 
in the Suppliants (ψόγον, 973; γλῶσσαν…κακήν, 994-5). Nevertheless, 
whereas Danaus’ fifty daughters ask the Argives for protection only, 
Xuthus intends to place his illegitimate son on the throne of Athens: as a 
consequence, Ion will be hated not only by the Athenians (μισησόμεσθα, 
                                                 
214 Owen (1939) on ἀσθενὴς at 593: ‘ineffectual’, i. e. ‘of no political weight’.  
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597) but also by his adoptive mother for more personal reasons 
(μισήσομαι, 609). Creusa’s grief for being childless (ἄτεκνος, 608, 613) 
will turn into bitterness (πικρῶς, 613) if she is forced to welcome her 
stepson.  
This is exactly what happens shortly afterwards. Xuthus is accused 
of having betrayed his wife215 and of having devised a diabolical plan to 
rob the Erechtheids of their household216 and to make his illegitimate son 
the country’s future king (828-9).217 However, it would be unthinkable to 
let a foreign-born interloper reign over an autochthonous city:218 as the 
ancestor Erechtheus strenuously fought against the Thracian incursion, so 
Creusa must defend the racial purity of Athens at all costs (721-4).  
Another similarity can here be detected between the Ion and the 
Suppliants: to justify their intention to ward off the foreign threat, both 
Pelasgus and the Athenian chorus call to mind a similar act of self-defence 
carried out by a previous ruler of the city, namely either Erechtheus or 
Apis.219 Yet the king of Argos restricts himself to menacing the Danaids 
and, in the end, welcomes them in his royal palace in order to respect the 
                                                 
215 E. Ion. 808 (προδεδόμεσθα), 864 (προδότης), 880 (λέκτρων προδότας ἀχαρίστους). 
216 E. Ion. 692 (ἔχει δόλον τέχναν), 705 (ἐξαπαφὼν), 809-10 (μεμηχανημένως 
ὑβριζόμεσθα), 834 (μηχαναῖς), 826-7 (κἄπλεκεν πλοκὰς/ τοιάσδ’). In this regard, it is 
interesting to note that excessive cunning is a typical characteristic of foreign people and 
that it is ascribed to the Danaids as well in Aeschylus’ Suppliants (see Section 1.3.). Yet, 
whereas the fifty daughters are indeed sly, both Ion and Xuthus are innocent. On the 
contrary, it is Creusa and the old tutor who will prove capable of devising deadly 
stratagems to get rid of Ion (1028, 1216, 1279-80).  
217 See also E. Ion. 809-11, 865-6. Creusa’s old pedagogue even speculates that it was 
Xuthus that made up the false oracle (823-7). There is some irony here: for, the oracle is 
indeed false, but the blame lies with Apollo only, as we shall see below. Cf. Zacharia 
(2003), 136.   
218 E. Ion. 719-24, 843-6, 978, 1048-60, 1069-73.  
219 Pelasgus mentions Apis’ success in eradicating a brood of invasive snakes (A. Supp. 
262-70). 
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inviolability of the suppliants. Creusa, by contrast, contrives a cunning 
and effective way (δόλια καὶ δραστήρια, 985) to kill the young intruder.220  
Creusa’s plan, however, is thwarted by divine intervention: Apollo 
intervenes because he does not wish to be polluted (οὐ μιανθῆναι θέλων, 
118). Similarly, Pelasgus decides to welcome the Danaids with the aim of 
avoiding pollution (Supp. 472-3). Nevertheless, in the Suppliants it is 
precisely the Danaids’ reception into the city that eventually leads to 
μίασμα.221 By contrast, in the Ion reconciliation between the two parties is 
made possible by the arrival of the Pythia, who brings the recognition 
tokens. Once the ἀναγνώρισις between mother and son has taken place, 
the threat posed by Ion to Athenian autochthony immediately turns out to 
be illusory: not only was Ion not born from Xuthus’ illicit affair with an 
unknown woman, but he is not even the half-Athenian son of Creusa by 
Xuthus. On the contrary, he was born by the autochthonous daughter of 
Erechtheus to Apollo: therefore, as Athena as deus ex machina proclaims, he 
is entitled to rule over Attica.  Instead of jeopardizing the racial purity of 
the Athenians, he will have the merit of perpetuating the autochthonous 
Erechtheid line. The first problem caused by Apollo’s union with Creusa is 
thus solved on all levels.  
Returning to the apparent advantages of Creusa’s sexual union 
with Apollo, it has been argued that Euripides intentionally modifies the 
myth of Ion by making him Apollo’s son with the aim of reconciling two 
opposite myths, which were both essential for the self-representation of 
                                                 
220 E. Ion. 987-1038, 1050-7, 1181-6. Since the Gorgon is an earth-born monster (989), her 
venom is the best weapon to use against he who endangers the perpetuation of the 
Erechtheid stock. 
221 See Section 1.3. 
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Athens, namely the Ionianism and the autochthony of Athens.222 Whereas 
in the archaic period the Ionian identity of the Athenians was strongly 
affirmed,223 an anti-Ionian attitude began to emerge in the fifth century: 
after the end of the Persian Wars Athenian identity became a subject of 
more urgent concern due to the increasing flux of foreigners and, as a 
consequence, the myth of Athenian autochthony was given increasingly 
greater prominence.224 The autochthonous origins of Athens made it 
possible for the Athenians both to exalt their democratic origins and to 
fulfil their desire for self-definition as distinct from any other γένος.225 
However, it was also important for the Athenians not to deny their 
kinship links with the Ionians completely since the latter were their 
allies.226 Consequently, Athens did not profess to be of Ionian descent 
anymore but rather claimed to be the μητρόπολις of Ionia:227 this modified 
version of the relationship between the two Hellenic races allowed Athens 
to deal with the Ionians from a position of strength and to justify its 
imperialism.228 
Similarly, in the Ion Euripides thinks up an original way to praise 
the Athenians’ autochthony while defending their imperialistic claims: 
contrary to tradition, the playwright makes Apollo and the autochthonous 
                                                 
222  Dougherty (1996), Saxonhouse (1986), Hall (1997b), 51-6. According to the main 
version of the myth of Ion, the hero is the son of Creusa and Xuthus, who is Hellen’s 
offspring and has two siblings, namely Aeolus and Dorus (Hes. fr. 10a 20-3, ed. Solmsen – 
Merkelbach – West; Hdt. VII. 94, VIII. 44; Paus. 7.1-2; E. Melanipp. Sap. fr. 10 f Page). See 
Owen (1939), x-xvii; Wolff (1965), n. 9; Parker (1987), 206-7. 
223 Cf. Sol. fr. 4a West; Hdt. 1. 56. 2, 1. 143. 2; Th. 7. 57. 2; Hall (1997b), 51.  
224 Montanari (1981), 40-3, 54-5; Alty (1982), 1-14; Rosivach (1987), 297; Hall (1997b), 53-5; 
Zacharia (2003), 48-55; Isaac (2004), 109 ff; Mc Coskey (2012), 57 ff.   
225 The Athenians gradually distanced themselves from their previous aristocratic 
ideology (cf. Cleisthenes’ reforms): Dougherty (1996), 254; Montanari (1981), 53-7. 
226 Hdt. I. 143. 3 with Alty (1982), 8.  
227 Th. 1. 12; Str.. 14. 1. 3; Paus. 7. 1-2.  
228 Hall (1997), 55-6. Cf. also Zacharia (2003), 44-55, contra.  
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Creusa Ion’s parents. As a result of this invention, the foreignness of Ion is 
eliminated and the Ionians come to be the Athenians’ descendants. For, as 
Athena predicts at the end of the play, ‘children born to Ion’s four sons 
shall come to dwell in the island cities of the Cyclades and the coastal 
cities of the mainland. […] They shall be called Ionians after this boy and 
win glory’ (1581-9). Thanks to this bond of kinship, Athens’ leading role in 
fifth-century Greek politics is justified. What is more, by making Achaeus 
and Dorus the younger stepbrothers of Ion, Euripides stresses that both 
the Achaeans and the Dorians are inferior and of mixed blood. The 
supremacy of the Athenian γένος is thus once again strongly affirmed. For 
all these reasons the Ion has long been interpreted as a play spreading 
Athens’ political propaganda in order to support Athenian imperialism.229  
This theory, however, has fallen out of favour among scholars since 
it suffers from some serious limitations.230 First of all, the action of the play 
shows the dangers inherent in the myth of autochthony. An 
autochthonous city inevitably becomes xenophobic, but the Athenian 
demand for racial purity has potential harmful effects, as the plot of the 
Ion illustrates: to protect the autochthony of the Erechtheid line, Creusa 
almost kills her only son.231 Xenophobia has brought the Athenian royal 
dynasty to the brink of extinction, but such danger is ultimately averted 
by divine intervention. As Athena predicts at the end of the play, Creusa 
and the city of Athens will cure their previous infertility provided that 
they both open up towards the foreigners: Creusa will bear two sons to 
her foreign husband, and Athens will become the mother city of Ionian 
                                                 
229 Owen A. S. (1939), xi-xii; Grégoire (1950), 168 ff; Hoffer (1996), 313.  
230 Esp. Mirto (2009), 62 n. 66; Lee (1997), 34; Walsh (1978), 301-15 
231 For an analysis of the dangers inherent in autochthony, see Whitman (1974), 69-103; 
Mastronarde (1975), 163-76, esp. n. 18; Walsh (1978), 305-6; Saxonhouse (1986), 256-61; 
Goff (1988), 47-50 and (1995), 365; Rabinowitz (1993), 206-8; Loraux (1993), 220-36.  
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colonies.232 Therefore, the aim of the play is likely to be not so much to 
express Athenian pride in racial exclusiveness as to indicate the need for a 
more open attitude towards outsiders.233  
Additionally, although in the play there is undoubtedly an 
assertion of Athenian superiority over all other Greek ethnic groups,234 this 
boasting is mitigated by two key elements. On the one hand, the attitude 
towards the Ionians is laudatory: Ion’s four sons will give their names to 
the Athenian tribes and will be renowned in Hellas. Given that the four 
tribes of ancient Athens had already been replaced by Cleisthenes’ ten 
tribes at the time of the production of the play,235 this anachronistic 
reference to the eponymous role of the Ionians must have been 
intentionally flattering.236 On the other hand, the eponyms of the Dorians 
and the Achaeans are still Ion’s brothers, even though they are of mixed 
blood: the kinship between the Athenians and the other Hellenic races is 
highlighted despite their different levels of blood purity.237  
For all these reasons scholars have proposed a slightly modified 
version of the commonly-held interpretation of the Ion as a piece of 
political propaganda: Apollo’s union with Creusa has indeed been the 
means through which the Athenians have preserved their autochthony, 
which in turn justifies their imperialism by making them superior to any 
other Greek ἔθνος. However, Athenian supremacy is expressed in a 
                                                 
232 Barrenness is a common problem among autochthons: see Loraux (1993), 213-20; 
Rynearson (2014), 51.  
233 Saxonhouse (1986), 272-3; Zacharia (2003), 44-102.   
234 See Montanari (1981), 191-7; Loraux (1993), 213-20.  
235 The Ion was probably performed in 411 BC. For the rejection of an earlier date for the 
play, see Wolff (1965), n. 8; Walsh (1978), 313-5;  
236 Zacharia (2003), 48-55.  
237 Walsh (1978), 307 ff; Zacharia (2003), 48-55.  
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moderate and somewhat conciliatory way so as to promote ties of 
friendship among countries.238 In this way, the most sinister and violent 
aspects of autochthony are offset. Nevertheless, as I shall show in a 
moment, the Athenians’ claim to hegemony, which is based on Ion’s 
divine origin, is jeopardized precisely by Apollo’s behaviour.  
Ion’s divine origin also serves as a way to nullify another drawback 
of the myth of autochthony. Whereas birth from the earth deprives 
women of their status as mothers, the heterosexual union between the 
autochthonous Creusa and a male deity recuperates female power in a 
way that restores gender dynamics. In a feminist reading of the play, the 
myth of Ion has been interpreted as exalting the role of the mother and 
giving prominence to Creusa by making her ‘the sole bearer of 
legitimacy’.239 This thesis, however, is not convincing because Creusa 
eventually resigns herself to accepting male authority: although the 
maternal bond is essential to validate Athenian autochthony, Ion’s 
physical tie to his natural mother is kept secret in deference to his bond to 
his putative father. According to a diametrically opposite interpretation, 
the play ultimately reasserts the dominance of the paternal principle given 
that Ion can inherit the Erechtheid household provided that he is 
recognized as Xuthus’ legitimate son.240 Yet the interpretation of the Ion as 
a play propagating patriarchal ideology is also unconvincing because 
Xuthus’ authority is irremediably challenged by the insertion of an 
                                                 
238 Wassermann (1940), 595; cf. Walsh (1978), 308-12; Zeitlin (1989), 177-179; Zacharia 
(2003), 48-55. According to Walsh (1978) and Loraux (1993), 57-71, the play symbolizes 
the relaxation of Pericles’ law of citizenship. Cf. Seaford (1990), 159 and Hoffer (1996), 
314, contra. 
239 Loraux (1990), 171. See also Saxonhouse (1986), 256-71; Loraux (1993), 184-236; Zeitlin 
(1996), 289. 
240 Rabinowitz (1993), 213 ff.; Saxonhouse (1992), 76-89. 
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illegitimate child into his household.241 Such a serious blow dealt to male 
power is once again ascribable to divine agency, as I shall now discuss 
more fully.  
A further potential benefit deriving from Apollo’s union with 
Creusa is that it resolves a problem affecting Athenian autochthony: an 
autochthonous city can pride itself on its racial purity but cannot boast of 
divine origins. For there is no founder-hero fathered by a god, but rather 
all citizens descend from the earth itself. This shortcoming was first 
pointed out by Loraux in her analysis of the myth of Erichthonios’ birth 
from the earth: ‘the virginal goddess Athena, exempted from sex and 
procreation, cannot directly enhance the city’s prestige through the 
popular strategy in Greek myth by which the offspring of a god and a 
mortal confers divine sanction on a city’s beginning’.242 However, the 
Greeks thought up a clever solution to this problem: Erichthonios sprang 
from the Attic soil but, as a matter of fact, the earth itself had been 
fertilized by the semen of Hephaestus overcome by desire for Athena. It 
follows that the Athenians can legitimately claim a divine ancestry: for 
their forefather was born from a sort of heterosexual union and was then 
taken care of by the goddess herself.243 
Bearing all of this in mind, we can assume that Apollo’s paternity in 
the Ion serves the same purpose: by making Apollo the father of Ion, 
Euripides probably intended to glorify both the Athenians’ autochthony 
and their special connection with Apollo.244 What is striking, however, is 
that Apollo’s fatherhood is kept strictly secret: Phoebus even passes his 
                                                 
241 Segal (1999), 93-8; Rynearson (2014), 66. 
242 Loraux (1993), XIV.  
243 Loraux (1993), 57-71. 
244 Cf. the cult of Apollo Πατρῷος in the post-Euripidean: Montanari (1981), 191-7.  
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own son off as Xuthus’ offspring. In order to understand the scope of 
Euripides’ problematization of Apollo’s behaviour, the reasons for the 
god’s silence over his paternity should be analysed.  
Both Hermes in the prologue and Athena in the exodus assert that it 
is Apollo who wants to keep his sexual affair secret by saying that Xuthus 
is the father of Ion.245 This intention is motivated by his desire to make Ion 
take his place in a noble house.246 Therefore, Apollo lies for a good cause: 
he has not neglected his own son but rather has bestowed a putative father 
on him to give Ion what belongs to him.247 Apollo’s lie is closely related to 
his affection for his offspring. Phoebus’ caring attitude is in the end 
acknowledged by Creusa too, after she has finally been reunited with her 
son: 
εὐεργετῶν σε Λοξίας ἐς εὐγενῆ 
δόμον καθίζει· τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ λεγόμενος 
οὐκ ἔσχες ἄν ποτ᾽ οὔτε παγκλήρους δόμους 
οὔτ᾽ ὄνομα πατρός. πῶς γάρ, οὗ γ᾽ ἐγὼ γάμους 
ἔκρυπτον αὐτὴ καί σ᾽ ἀπέκτεινον λάθρᾳ; 
ὁ δ᾽ ὠφελῶν σε προστίθησ᾽ ἄλλῳ πατρί. 
(E. Ion. 1540-45) 
 
It was for your good that Loxias settles you in a noble house. If you were 
called the god’s son, you would not have had a house as your inheritance or a 
father’s name. How could you, seeing that I hid my liaison and tried to kill you 
secretly? But he is doing you good by making you over to another father. 
In this passage the heroine reassures the sceptical Ion that Apollo 
handed him over to another father for his benefit. Two verbs are used to 
stress Apollo’s benevolent intent: εὐεργετέω (‘to show kindness to one’, 
1540) and ὠφελέω (‘to help’, 1545). To convince Ion, Creusa gives specific 
                                                 
245 E. Ion. 69-73 (Hermes), 1353 (Pythia), 1565, 1601-3 (Athena).  
246 E. Ion. 1561-2 (Athena).  
247 E. Ion. 70-73 (Hermes). 
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details on inheritance issues: being called the god’s son (τοῦ θεοῦ δὲ 
λεγόμενος, 1541) is the very condition that would impede Ion from 
inheriting a home (παγκλήρους δόμους, 1542).248 What is puzzling about 
Ion’s process of inheritance is that Apollo’s paternity is not a sufficient 
condition to ensure that Ion obtains what rightfully belongs to him. To 
grant his offspring an inheritance, Apollo must make Xuthus believe that 
Ion is his own child.249  
Blame could be shifted to Creusa: since she concealed her 
pregnancy and even tried to kill Ion, nobody would ever believe that Ion 
is Creusa’s son. She bitterly adds that, had it not been for Apollo’s 
intervention, Ion would have never be able to become the heir to the 
throne of Athens.  
Nevertheless, scepticism is not the real reason why Ion’s inheritance 
would be taken away from him. Just as Athena’s speech was sufficient to 
help Ion overcome disbelief in his divine origin, so Apollo should have 
been able to persuade Xuthus that Ion was fathered by the god himself. In 
addition to this, Phoebus’ declaration of paternity should have sufficed to 
grant Ion an automatic right of succession to the throne. On the contrary,  
to guarantee Ion a glorious future as the king of Athens, Phoebus must 
give him up for adoption. This constraint imposed on Apollo highlights 
the scope of Euripides’ problematization of the myths of sexual 
intercourse between gods and mortals: a god, who should not be 
concerned with human laws, seems to be forced to adhere to inheritance 
law, as I shall discuss in further detail. As a consequences, the prestige of 
divine paternity is irremediably compromised, and the popular strategy in 
                                                 
248 Lee (1997), on 71-3; Zacharia (2003), 70-6.  
249 Susanetti (2007), 244-5.  
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Greek myth by which a local hero of divine origin glorifies his city is 
called into question.  
In this regard, it is worth analysing how different Euripides’ 
treatment of the myth of Ion is from the depiction of sexual intercourse 
between a male deity and a girl in earlier sources.  
The myth of Evadne in Pindar’s Olympian 6 is especially 
interesting.250 The heroine is impregnated by Apollo and, as much as she 
tries to hide her pregnancy out of shame and fear, she cannot escape the 
notice of her step-father Aepytus.251 ‘Unspeakable anger’ (χόλον/ οὐ 
φατὸν, 62-3) is Aepytus’ first emotional reaction to his stepdaughter’s 
illicit behaviour. However, he decides to consult the Pythian oracle about 
such a great misfortune. Meanwhile, the girl gives birth and exposes the 
baby, who is then rescued by the will of Apollo (68-80). The decision to 
expose the child is likely to have been prompted by the same reasons that 
motivated Creusa’s behaviour, that is shame and fear of punishment, 
which both spring from the heroine’s awareness that scepticism would be 
the most common reaction to hearing her story. In Pindar’s treatment of 
Evadne’s myth, however, as opposed to Euripides’ Ion, the situation is 
resolved simply thanks to Apollo’s declaration of paternity. In fact, as 
soon as Aepytus is informed about the divine origin of his grandson 
Iamus, he changes his attitude towards Evadne’s illegitimate offspring: he 
commands Evadne to recover her son since he is bound to become a great 
                                                 
250 Mirto (2001) and references.  
251 Whereas in Pindar Evadne alone is held responsible for the concealment of her 
pregnancy and for the exposure of the new-born, in the Ion Apollo shares responsibility 
for both acts since he wants to keep his paternity secret. For a similar case of joint 
responsibility in epic sources, see Hom. Od. 11. 236-59: Poseidon urges Tyro to tell 
nobody about their union but, unlike the Euripidean Apollo, he appears to his mortal 
lover in order to reassure her about the glorious fate of her offspring.  
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prophet and the founder of a famous line (80 ff). Therefore, it is the divine 
origin of Iamus that makes Aepytus change his previous hostile attitude 
towards Evadne’s offspring: Iamus is no longer considered as merely an 
illegitimate child but rather as the glorious child of Apollo.252  
Another Pindaric ode worthy of mention is the ninth Olympian 
since it concerns another married couple who, like Creusa and Xuthus, are 
affected by barrenness. Protogeneia’s rape by Zeus, which results in the 
birth of Opus, is presented by Pindar as a kind of fertility treatment: the 
god carried off the girl (ἀναρπάσαις, 88) and lay with her peacefully 
(ἕκαλος μίχθη, 88-9) ‘so that age would not overtake her husband Locrus 
and lay the burden of childlessness on him’ (90-2).253 It is also specified 
that Locrus ‘rejoiced to see his adopted son’ (εὐφράνθη τε ἰδὼν ἥρως 
θετὸν υἱόν, 96). Therefore, in Pindaric poetry divine paternity is a credit to 
the child’s entire family: the offspring of a god is freed from the stigma of 
illegitimacy, and the mortal adoptive father feels honoured to foster him.   
In the Ion, by contrast, the offspring born from the illicit sexual 
affair between Phoebus and Creusa does not benefit from his divine 
origin; on the contrary, he is stigmatized as any other child born out of 
wedlock. If divine paternity were still such a powerful source of prestige 
that it could wipe out the child’s illegitimacy, the Erechtheid line would 
never be at risk of extinction: Apollo could openly acknowledge paternity 
of his child, Xuthus would be thrilled to adopt him, and Ion would 
                                                 
252 Cf. the myth of Asopos’ daughters in Corinna’s fragment 654 (esp. 44-51) and the story 
of the birth of Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew. I. 19; Ephrem, Commentary on the Diatessaron, 
2. 4; Protevangelium of James, 14. 1.  
253 Transl. by D. A. Svarlien. Cf. Gentili (2013), 542-3.  
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automatically become the legitimate heir to the throne of Athens.254 By 
contrast, Apollo cannot simply give Ion up for adoption but must also 
make the mortal parent believe that the child is his natural son. For the 
problem lies in the very fact that Ion could never be considered as 
legitimate despite his glorious divine origin. Divine paternity has partly 
lost its celebratory and legitimizing function: to be able to inherit what is 
due to him, Ion must be passed off as the legitimate heir of Xuthus.   
Euripides thus problematizes the myths of sexual intercourse 
between gods and mortals by showing Apollo’s attempts to cope with the 
consequences of his sexual union with a mortal girl. In this respect, it is 
worth recalling Athena’s assertion that Apollo preferred not to come into 
their sight because he feared their reproach (μέμψις, 1558).255 Scholars are 
divided as to the meaning of this problematic utterance. For some, 
Athena’s speech confirms Ion’s previous hypothesis about Apollo’s feeling 
of shame (αἰσχύνεται, 367), which was interpreted as an admission of 
guilt.256 Apollo feels bad about his behaviour: he ravished a defenceless 
girl, thereby causing great pain. For others, Apollo’s willingness to avoid 
direct contact with Ion and Creusa is not due to his shame but is rather 
intended to save them from blasphemous behaviour.257 A further 
hypothesis can be advanced: Phoebus feels not so much guilty about using 
violence against Creusa as ashamed of not having handled the situation 
properly. In the long run his stature has been diminished as a consequence 
of his sexual affair with a mortal girl. 
                                                 
254 According to the Athenian law of inheritance, if a woman with a male child born of a 
lawful marriage becomes an ἐπίκληρος, her son is entitled to inherit the family’s estate. 
In this case she is not legally an ἐπίκληρος anymore: MacDowell (1978), 96; Lacey (1968), 
139-42. 
255 Cf. the analysis of this passage in Susanetti (2007), 232, 245. 
256 Rosenmeyer (1963), 113-22; Conacher (1967), 269 ff.  
257 Owen (1939), xxxi, 178; Wasserman (1940), 602.  
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First of all, to grant his offspring an inheritance, he had to give a 
false oracle intentionally, and his falsehood has damaged his credibility.258 
While divine oracles are usually enigmatic, though truthful, the oracular 
response given to Xuthus is unambiguous, yet false.259 Some scholars have 
maintained that Xuthus misinterprets the oracle whose real meaning is 
that Apollo merely gives his own son up for adoption.260 Creusa herself 
seems to interpret the oracular response in such a way because, in reply to 
Ion’s question of why Apollo gave his child to Xuthus, she asserts: ‘he did 
not say that you are his son (πεφυκέναι μὲν οὐχί, 1534); he merely gave 
him his own son as a present (δωρεῖται, 1535), just as a man might give a 
friend his son to be his heir’. Nevertheless, two out of three accounts of the 
oracle report that Phoebus actually predicted that the first person met by 
Xuthus out of the temple would be his son (πεφυκέναι).261 Both Hermes 
and Xuthus use the verb φύω, whereas only the chorus leader says that 
Apollo ‘gave (ἔδωκ’, 787) Xuthus as a son to the one whom he should first 
encounter’ without specifying whether the oracle also implied that Ion 
was his natural son or not. Even if the Pythian prophecy was somewhat 
ambiguous, it was undoubtedly meant to deceive Xuthus given that 
Athena herself, at the end of the play, urges Creusa and Ion to respect the 
wishes of Apollo and not to reveal the truth to Xuthus (1601-2). 
The way Apollo deals with the consequences of his liaison also 
challenges his prophetic ability. He intends not to reveal Ion’s true 
                                                 
258 Even Ion, Apollo’s faithful servant, casts doubt on the credibility of the Delphic oracle 
(vv. 1537-8, 1546-8).  
259 The responsibility for interpreting an oracle incorrectly usually falls on men only: S. 
OT. 711-19; Hdt. I. 53ff. Cf. Mirto (2001), 26-7. 
260 Owen (1939), xix; Hartigan (1991), 76. For a rebuttal of this thesis, see Mirto (2001), 29-
46. 
261 E. Ion. 69-71 (Hermes); 534-6 (Xuthus). The present perfect πεφυκέναι construed with 
the genitive means ‘to be born from somebody’ (Liddell – Scott, s.v. B. 2).  
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paternity until Creusa and Ion come back to Athens (1566-8), but the 
unexpected reactions of humans forestall the divine plans.262 Loxias is thus 
forced to disclose such information in advance in order to impede mother 
and son from killing each other. 
Finally, the most serious blow dealt to Apollo’s omnipotence 
consists in the fact that the god seems to be limited by human laws on 
inheritance given that a divine origin no longer grants privileged 
treatment. To enthrone his son rightfully, he must lie because Ion’s destiny 
depends on the Athenian laws of inheritance in spite of the fact that he is 
of divine origin. I have argued that Ion’s sceptical attitude towards the 
story of his divine origin is not to be considered as evidence that the play 
supports advanced philosophical theories against divine 
anthropomorphism; on the contrary, the plot itself seems to rebut such 
theories by confirming that Ion is Apollo’s son. Nonetheless, in the play a 
critique of anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods unfolds on another 
level: whereas it was widely acknowledged among the Greeks that human 
laws do not apply to the gods, the Ion shows that, as soon as Apollo 
interferes in human affairs, he is in a way obliged to conform to such laws. 
It is absurd that a god is forced to do so in the same way as it would be 
absurd for gods to be punished for their wrongdoing according to human 
laws. The startling aspect of the constraints imposed on Apollo is 
highlighted by the charge of ἀνομία (‘lawlessness’, 443) which Ion 
provokingly brings against Loxias in the first episode when he 
sarcastically states: 
εἰ δ᾽ (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται, τῷ λόγῳ δὲ χρήσομαι) 
                                                 
262 Mastronarde (1975), 163-76; Mirto (2001), 39 ff; Zacharia (2003), 128-49; Susanetti 
(2007), 225.  
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δίκας βιαίων δώσετ᾽ ἀνθρώποις γάμων 
σὺ καὶ Ποσειδῶν Ζεύς θ᾽ ὃς οὐρανοῦ κρατεῖ, 
ναοὺς τίνοντες ἀδικίας κενώσετε. 
(E. Ion. 444-447) 
 
It will never happen, but I say it anyway: if you pay recompense to mortals 
for your rapes, you and Poseidon and Zeus, the ruler of heaven, you will empty 
your temples in paying for your crimes. 
These verses have been interpreted as a reference to the Athenian 
law concerning the legal action claiming compensation for criminal 
injuries (δίκη βιαίων).263 The tone of Ion’s invective is provocative: he 
inconsistently applies the criteria of human justice to the judgment of 
divine behaviour although he is well aware that the gods, as opposed to 
men, do not have to pay the penalty for their crimes.264 In fact, he bitterly 
comments: ‘It will never happen, but I say it anyway’ (444). Therefore, on 
the one hand it is acknowledged on stage that neither Apollo nor any 
other divine rapist can be judged and punished by the Athenian legal 
system, but on the other hand, it is shown that Apollo must comply with 
inheritance law to enthrone his son. Even worse, Apollo also breaks 
another law to reach his goal: as the result of Loxias’ deceitful oracular 
response, Xuthus welcomes Ion to his home as his own lost son. This is the 
worst consequence of Apollo’s union with Creusa because divine rape 
ultimately results in the social danger most feared by Athenian society: 265 
an illegitimate child is brought up by an unknowing putative father.266 
                                                 
263 Mirto (2009), 49 ff. 
264 Wolff (1965), n. 32; Hoffer (1996), 309-10.   
265 Ebbott (2003), 67-83; Susanetti (2007), 224; Mirto (2009), 49 ff. 
266 It has been argued that the seriousness of this transgression is lessened by the fact that 
Xuthus is a foreigner: Wolff (1965), 189; Wassermann (1940), 596-8; Burnett (1962), 91-3; 
Zacharia (2003), 70-6. This thesis, however, is not entirely convincing since the aim of the 
play is to promote friendly relationships between the Athenians and foreign countries. 
Moreover, as we have seen above, the marriage with the foreign-born is accepted for 
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Turning back to the positive consequences of Apollo’s sexual affair 
with Creusa, we have seen that their sexual union seems to bring at least 
one advantage: the divine origin of Ion, by preserving the autochthony of 
the Athenians, justifies Athens’ hegemony over other Greek states. 
However, it is precisely the problematic aspect of Ion’s illegitimacy that 
partly undermines this positive effect: there is nothing glorious about 
Athenian ancestry since in the myth of Ion the legitimacy of the 
indigenous citizens paradoxically clashes with the illegitimacy of the boy 
who is bound to rule over the city in violation of Athenian law.267 Whereas 
in Aeschylus’ Danaid trilogy the dynasty founded by Hypermnestra and 
Lynkeus grants the city of Argos a glorious destiny, in the Ion the prestige 
of the new Athenian royal line is compromised by Apollo’s lie. 
In conclusion, the audience is hardly likely to have agreed with 
Athena’s opinion that ‘Apollo has done all things well’.268 The final 
solution is all but perfect since it involves destabilizing the male hierarchy 
by inserting an illegitimate child into a household.  
 
1.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the myths of sexual encounters 
between gods and mortals are problematized in Greek tragedy, whereas 
they are positively represented in pre-tragic poetry. As far as the 
representation of the sexual act is concerned, ambiguity surrounds the 
accounts of such sexual affairs in both kinds of sources, although the 
                                                                                                                                     
political reasons: if the royal couple had not been barren, Creusa’s son by Xuthus would 
have rightfully inherited the throne of Athens.  
267 See Mirto (2001), 336-41.   
268 E. Ion. 1595: καλῶς δ᾽ Ἀπόλλων πάντ᾽ ἔπραξε.  
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Suppliants and the Ion either implicitly or explicitly hint at the violence 
involved in the intercourse.  
The most striking differences in the treatment of these myths are 
found in the depiction of the consequences of the sexual transgression. 
The idea that any excessive contact with the divine is threatening, given 
that it can induce mortals to overstep their bounds is a traditional belief, 
which is often expressed in pre-tragic poetry as well.269 However, in pre-
tragic poetry attention is drawn to the positive outcome of the stories of 
intimate contact between a male deity and a girl, while Greek tragedy 
stresses their dangerous potential.  
Both the plays chosen for analysis focus on the immediate 
aftermath of the event and on the hardships endured by the heroine, 
which are by contrast overlooked in earlier sources. Moreover, in both 
plays the sexual unions between gods and mortals are shown to be not 
only troublesome for the person directly involved in such a close 
relationship with a deity but also potentially damaging to the socio-
political stability of a state. Yet the treatments of this kind of tale in the 
Suppliants and in the Ion differ from each other in two important respects.  
In the former play Zeus’ union with Io is shown to be dangerous 
because it makes the Danaids believe that they have the right to obtain 
divine support by virtue of their special family connection with Zeus. This 
belief in turn leads to socio-political destabilization in Argos. The 
heroines’ obstinacy is especially indicative of the arrogant attitude to 
which an excessively close relationship with a god can lead: a sexual affair 
                                                 
269 Hoey (1965). For a discussion of the complementary needs ‘to make the absent present’ 
and ‘to maintain the ontological gap separating humanity from divinity’, which are co-
present in ancient Greek religion, see Kindt (2012), 36-54; Versnel (2011), 379-91.  
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between a deity and a mortal is undoubtedly troublesome because 
humans may misinterpret its significance and try to turn it to their 
advantage. However, Zeus neither grants them any privilege nor supports 
their act of rebellion: in the end they are punished and the importance of 
marriage is reconfirmed. Zeus’ authority is thus not called into question: 
since the Danaids’ request was ill-founded, the god did not fulfil their 
wish.  
By contrast, Ion has a right to succeed to the throne of Athens, and 
Apollo directs events with the aim of giving his son what is due to him. To 
reach his goal, however, the god must lie and must pass off his own son as 
the legitimate heir and offspring of Xuthus. Whereas in the Suppliants the 
Danaids’ hope of being entitled to a preferential treatment is sufficient to 
cause a number of serious problems, in the Ion it is precisely Apollo’s lie 
that undermines gender balance and jeopardizes the prestige of the royal 
dynasty of Athens. As opposed to the Danaid trilogy, the Ion also shows 
that the negative consequences of an excessive contact between a god and 
a mortal affect the deity himself as well. For, as a result of Apollo’s lie, the 
god’s stature has been diminished: he has been forced to give up his 
paternity in a sense, and to do this, has even compromised his reputation 
as a prophetic god whose oracles are always truthful in spite of their 
inherent ambiguity.  
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2. Divine and Human Knowledge  
in Sophocles’ OT and Euripides’ Bacchae 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The distinction between human and divine knowledge is already 
emphasised in Homer and other early poetry, and it is a theme that 
features prominently in Greek tragedy as well, especially in Sophocles’ OT 
and Euripides’ Bacchae.270 Both plays are produced in the late fifth century, 
a time of great intellectual fervour and of on-going political turbulence 
due to the Peloponnesian War, and investigate epistemological issues in 
ways that overlap with contemporary intellectual thought.  
Past scholarship has focused on the relationship between tragedy 
and the emerging philosophical and medical discourses. According to one 
view, both plays praise fifth-century rationalism and scientific spirit in the 
wake of Anaxagoras’ thought, Hippocratic investigation and the Sophistic 
movement.271 In fact, Oedipus’ search for truth is based on scientific 
enquiry (ζήτημα, 278-9; τεκμαίρεσθαι, 109, 916; σκοπεῖν, 68, 291, 407) 
and on his critical intelligence (γνώμη, 398), which are words pregnant 
with scientific and philosophical significance in fifth-century Athens since 
they call to mind the theories of Anaxagoras, the thought of the doctor-
philosopher Alcmaeon of Croton, Thucidydes’ work and the Hippocratic 
treatises.272  
                                                 
270 Hom. Od. 18. 130-7; Semon. fr. 1. 1-5 (quoted by Allan, 2005, 71-82); Heraclit. DK 83; A. 
Ag, PV; S. Trach, OT; E. Hel, Ba.  
271 Stella (2010) on 390-400; Vegetti (1983); Diano (1968); Dodds (1966). 
272 See Anaxagoras’ famous dictum on reaching the unknown by conjecturing from the 
visible to the invisible (Anaxag. DK 59 B 21 a). See also Hp. VM. 3, Prog. 24, Acut. 68; Th. I. 
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A different view, on the other hand, argues that both plays aim to 
blame the intellectual progress of the fifth century rather than exalt it. 
Pentheus, Jocasta and Oedipus, who reject the words of the prophets, are 
taught that it is not cautious to rely on one’s intellect alone since divine 
will and oracles always find fulfilment.273 The opposition between human 
intelligence and the unscientific knowledge of prophecy ends in both 
plays with the victory of prophetic and divine truth over defective human 
knowledge. 
It has also been pointed out that the contrast between these two 
kinds of knowledge is articulated in the two tragedies through the 
distinction between mere visual skills, which are typical of any man, and 
true insight, which is a feature of divine knowledge and a privilege 
granted by the gods to few men. It is commonly accepted that Greek 
tragedy questions the reliability of the knowledge acquired through the 
five senses and, especially, through visual perception: whereas in Greek 
historiography αὐτοψία is the most reliable way to gather information, 
Greek plays show that the sense of sight is particularly vulnerable to 
divine delusion.274  
The focus on the weakness of the senses in Greek tragedy might be 
motivated by the influence of Presocratic philosophy and its discussion 
                                                                                                                                     
1. 3; I. 10.5 (cf. Hdt. I. 57); Alcmaeon of Croton DK B1. Cf. Knox (1957), 119-126; Diano 
(1968), 119-65.  
273 S. OT. 385-8, 705-6, 707-25, 945-53, 964-72, 979, 1080-5. Di Benedetto (1983); Vernant – 
Vidal-Naquet (1988), 113-140; Knox (1957).  
274 Aeschylus’ Oresteia, Sophocles’ Ajax and OT, and Euripides’ Helen and Bacchae are the 
plays which most significantly develop the topic of the weakness of the senses: Segal 
(1971), 560-1; Buxton (1980), 22-37; Goldhill (1984); Hartog (1988); Calame (1996), 17-48; 
Thumiger (2013), 223-45. There are, however, also tragic passages supporting the view 
that personal vision (αὐτοψία) is the most reliable source of knowledge: A. Pers. 266; S. 
OT. 7, Trach. 747; E. Supp. 684, IT 901. Cf. Hdt. 1. 7. 2; Th. I. 20-2. See also Gregory (1985), 
27.    
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about the difference between reason and sense perception.275 This crucial 
distinction can be found in Parmenides’ work. In more than one fragment 
the philosopher overvalues reason against sense perception: only the 
former is believed to grasp the essence of reality, while the five senses are 
likely to be deceived by mere appearances.276 In both the tragedies chosen 
for analysis human sensory perception, however, is opposed not only to 
reason but also to an inner form of sight, which consists of either divine 
prophecy or the privileged reciprocity of gazes between Dionysus and his 
initiates. 
To give an example, in the Bacchae Dionysus takes advantage of the 
limits of human vision to punish the wrongdoers, whereas he allows his 
initiates to gain insight into what is true about reality. Similarly, in the OT 
the sighted Oedipus does not even know who he is, whereas the blind 
Teiresias is the only one who has access to true knowledge.  
This chapter is an attempt to give some additional observations and 
remarks on these well-studied topics by analysing them from a different 
perspective. First of all, I will explore how the contrast between human 
and mantic knowledge is bound up with political discourse: the kind of 
knowledge typical of a democratic system is set in opposition both to the 
privileged mode of knowing claimed by the seers and to the autocratic 
knowledge that the tyrant aspires to gain. Secondly, special attention will 
be paid to the fact that in the plays gaining knowledge about both divine 
and human matters is described not simply as an intellectual process but 
also as a physical one. In other words, the process of gaining knowledge 
                                                 
275 Allan (2005), 71-82; Grelka (2013), 19-33. 
276 Parm. DK 1. 28-32, 6. 4-9.  
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involves the several facets of one’s total being: body, five senses, mind, 
and emotions. 
In this regard, it is worth pointing out that, even though the 
distinction between ψυχή and σῶμα is as old as Homeric poetry, ψυχή 
does not originally refer to mental activity but rather to the principle of life 
which, at the moment of death, leaves σῶμα (corpse). On the contrary, 
intellectual activity is linked to the body and is located either in the chest 
or in the lungs.277 The act of thinking is itself described as an encounter of 
physical stuffs in Presocratic philosophy.278 Similarly, the Hippocratic 
corpus gives a physical account of mental activity, as well as of sense 
perception and emotions: the functioning of all these phenomena depends 
upon the soundness of the body organs to which they are related.279   
Therefore, in the archaic and classical periods there is no neat 
separation between the cognitive, sensory and emotional dimensions of 
human nature.280 Thinking, emotions and sensations cannot unequivocally 
                                                 
277 For some examples, see Holmes (2010), 29-37; Wright – Potter (2000), 13; Onians (1954), 
116.  
278 Emp. DK 31 B105; Heraclit. DK 22 B118 (quoted by Holmes, 2010, 117-8). It is only later 
that ψυχή comes to denote the mental foil to σῶμα: associated with thought, perceptions 
and emotions, ψυχή with its passions reigns over the body (Cf. Gorgias, Helen). The 
western body-mind dualism stems from Descartes’ thought and has its furthest origins in 
Plato’s work (e.g. Phaedo and Meditations). See Wright – Potter (2000).   
279 Intellectual activity is related to air and the brain (On the Sacred Disease) and to the 
blood (Breaths, Diseases I). For some physical accounts of sense perception, see Places in 
Man 2 (6. 278), Fleshes 15-17; Regimen I. 35. In On the Sacred Disease the corruption of the 
brain by bile and phlegm brings about abnormal emotional states: emotions are thus 
given a somatic explanation. On the other hand, they can also trigger somatic reactions: 
for instance, violent emotions create vibrations, which in turn can cause heart 
palpitations or sweating. See Humours 9 (5. 490. 5-8), On the Sacred Disease 17 (6. 392. 5-12; 
15-394. 2). Cf. Gundert in Wright – Potter (2000), 13-35.  
280 In this regard, it is interesting to point out that early Greek medical practice also 
consists of three complementary activities: observing the effects either of a disease or of a 
treatment on the patient’s body, reflecting on such visible effects, and making conjectures 
on the basis of the inward reactions of the body as felt by the patient himself (τοῦ 
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be attributed either to the mind or to the body because the boundaries 
between mind and body are blurred and partially overlap. For instance, 
emotions are not merely mental states but also bodily expressions. They 
are embodied and manifest through bodily symptoms: for instance, fear is 
constituted by a combination of physical experiences, such as incapability 
to breathe, heart palpitation and perspiration.281 Similarly, sensory 
sensation takes place by means of the body but the information gathered 
through the five senses is then interpreted thanks to mental processes.282 In 
analysing the OT and the Bacchae I will show that there is no clear 
opposition between empirical and rational knowledge.283 By contrast, both 
tragedies lay emphasis on the role played by emotions in one’s process of 
inquiry, a topic that has recently drawn greater attention in scholarly 
literature:284 emotions shape both the reasoning and the sense perception 
of the characters on stage. 
Before proceeding, a brief word about terminology may be useful. 
What is emotion? The issue of definition is permeated by confusion in 
scholarly literature and has even been considered as insoluble by Paul 
Griffiths: the problem lies in the several approaches to the study of 
                                                                                                                                     
σώματος τὴν αἴσθησιν, Hp. VM. 9. 3 cf. Schiefsky, 2005, ad loc). Therefore, the doctor 
must take into account what is apparent to his own senses, what is felt by the patient, and 
what his own reason and experience tell him about what has been grasped by perception. 
Cf. also Hp. Praec. I L. 9. 250. 2-5. Similarly, the method of Herodotus (2. 99) is based on 
‘his own sight (ὄψις), judgement (γνώμη) and enquiry (ἱστορία).’ 
281 Konstan (2006); Chaniotis (2012) (ed.), 21. On emotions and facial expressions, see 
Chaniotis (2012) (ed.), 134 and Ekman (1982), (1992).  
282 See Onians (1954), 74-5 and his analysis of lexical correspondences between verbs 
expressing sense perception (e.g. ἀίω, αἴσθομαι ‘I perceive’) and verbs indicating bodily 
functions (ἀίω, ἀίσθω ‘I breathe in’). 
283 I use the adjective ‘empirical’ in the sense employed by Lateiner (1986), 3, n.5: ‘the 
word indicates the belief that knowledge depends on sensation and practical experience, 
but does not imply systematic commitment to the experimental method.’  
284 For the study of emotions in Classics, see for instance Harris (2001); Braund and Most 
(2003) (eds); Konstan – Rutter (2003); Sternberg (2005) (ed.); Konstan (2006); Cairns (2008), 
(2009); Meineck (2011).  
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emotions that have been so far proposed by scholars.285 There is one school 
of thought that, studying emotions with a focus on the resulting 
physiological changes, holds that emotions are innate and universal: Paul 
Ekman, for instance, argues that a few basic emotions are universally 
identified by facial expressions.286  
Ekman’s project and its results, however, have been challenged 
from two main fronts. On the one hand, Anna Wierzbicka has highlighted 
the ethnocentric bias arising from Ekman’s use of English terminology to 
describe allegedly universal basic emotions: according to the researcher, 
‘the caterigorisations of the emotions that every language makes are 
culture-bound’.287 To elude the danger of ethnocentrism, it has been 
proposed to use ‘scripts’ in the subjects’ own mother tongue rather than 
labels in the researcher’s language in order to describe and define the 
emotions in question: ‘a script is a mini-narrative that will usually 
encompass (at least) the conditions in which emotion X occurs, the 
perceptions ad appraisals of those conditions, and the responses (whether 
symptomatic, expressive, or pragmatic) that result’.288  
Ekman’s approach is also vulnerable to the criticism that emotions, 
owing to the fact that they involve a substantial cognitive component, are 
creations of culture: since any emotion is made of judgement and 
appraisals, one’s emotional states is likely to be conditioned by the social 
                                                 
285 Griffiths (1997), 15, 17; Lloyd (2007), 58;. Cf. Cairns (2008), 43.  
286 Ekman (1998) develops Darwin’s research, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and 
Animals (1872; rev. ed. 1998, London), which concerns the biological aspects of emotional 
life: it explores the animal origins of the physiological expressions of human emotional 
reactions. Cf. the work by the evolutionary psychologist David Buss (1994), (2000), also 
indebted to Darwin.  
287 Wierzbicka (1999), cited by Chaniotis (2012) (ed.), 433.  
288 Cairns (2008), 46. Cf. Russell (1991); Chaniotis (2012) (ed.), 433-468.  
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environment in which the subject lives.289 Konstan, in particular, explores 
the extent to which the ancient Greek conceptions of the individual 
emotions differs from the way emotions are characteristically conceived in 
our contemporary world. The rationale for his research is based on the 
argument that, ‘insofar as emotions are a function of valued judgements, 
they will vary from one individual to another and according to the 
collective values of particular communities.’290 Over the course of this 
chapter, we will see that the ancient Greek concept of anger differs in 
important respects from what we call ‘anger’ nowadays. Similarly, I will 
show how what one fears changes along with society’s development since 
the emotion of fear tends to be a reflection of one’s perception of the 
world.   
The idea that emotions are not the opposite of reason but are rather 
interwoven with cognitive and sensory processes and complement them is 
fully present in ancient Greek accounts of the emotions. Interestingly, 
some verbs such as φρονέω and οἶδα, which were later reserved for the 
expression of intellectual activity and awareness, in their original meaning 
are comprehensive terms involving cognition, emotion and conation: 
Onians gives several examples from the Homeric poems which show that 
these verbs are not merely used to describe an intellectual process but 
rather cover ‘undifferentiated psychic activity.291 In Homer’s Iliad (XXII. 
263-4), for instance, wolves and sheep are said to ‘feel evil sentiments 
toward each other’ (λύκοι τε καὶ ἄρνες […] κακὰ φρονέουσι διαμπερὲς 
ἀλλήλοισιν). An additional example is Eurykleia’s description as 
                                                 
289 Budelmann – Easterling (2010); Lloyd (2007); Konstan (2006), (2005); Nussbaum (2001); 
Scherer et al. (2001); Frijda et al. (2000); Frijda (1993); Solomon (1993).  
290 Konstan (2006), 24.  
291 Onians (1954), 13 ff.  
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‘truehearted’ (κεδνὰ ἰδυῖα) in the Odyssey (I. 428). Furthermore, Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric may be considered as the first attempt to apply a cognitive 
approach to the study of πάθη, that is, forms of psychological experience 
that involve physiological changes resulting from pain and pleasure and 
‘in account of which people change and differ in regard to their 
judgements’.292  
My analysis aims to show that affective phenomena can and should 
be included in the epistemological analysis of the characters’ search for 
truth in the Bacchae and in the OT. By ‘affective phenomena’ I mean 
emotions conceived as involving both bodily activity (that is, sensations 
and bodily symptoms) and mental activity. As Altieri argues, ‘all 
emotions, beside being embodied, have an intentional component 
constituted by beliefs and desires: they involve the construction of 
attitudes and generate some sort of action’.293 I thus use the term ‘emotion’ 
in its broadest sense which entails not only the physiological aspects but 
also the cognitive awareness of emotion: both aspects are worth studying 
since cognition is relevant to the starting point of the emotional process, 
whereas the physical reaction shapes the course of an emotion and its 
outcome.294 As far as my usage of the terms for individual emotions is 
concerned, while being aware of the caveat that the ancient Greek terms 
diverge to some degree from their closest modern equivalents, I agree 
with Cairns’ claim that ‘the best we can do is to use our language to 
                                                 
292 Arist. Rh. 1378a20-3; de An. 403a25-b2. Cairns (2008), 45; Konstan (2006). For arguments 
in favour of the trustworthiness of Aristotle’s account of ancient Greek emotions, see 
Konstan (2005), 228.  
293 Altieri (2003), 8-9.  
294 Chaniotis (2012) (ed.), 9; Konstan (2006), 25 ff.  
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interpret theirs, with the fullest possible attention to the diversity of the 
date regarding the scenarios to which the terms of both languages refer.’295 
Studying the human quest for knowledge as a process involving the 
total being will help us show that both tragedies articulate a series of 
reflections on the great influence that affective phenomena exercise both 
over human inquiry and over that particular mode of knowing which is 
granted as a privilege to very few humans through divine revelation.  
Emotions can have either a positive or a negative impact on both 
the process of gathering/interpreting information and on how one is 
spurred into action.296 The misinterpretation of accurate information 
provided by the senses may arise from mistaken reasoning: it is a matter 
not so much of taking into account what one has seen as of pondering 
what it is that one has seen. It is precisely one’s emotions that shape the 
way in which one interprets the relevance of the information gathered: 
emotions are elicited by appraisals, that is, by subjective cognitive 
evaluations of occurring events, and ‘complement reason by establishing 
salience’.297  
Such a characteristic can be either advantageous or 
disadvantageous depending on the circumstances. On the one hand, it can 
provide insight into an obscure situation: emotions such as anger, jealousy 
or fear, which connect to what an agent thinks, suspects, or is afraid of, 
can make one disposed to look into things carefully and to notice every 
sign that either confirms or disproves one’s suspicions; consequently, as 
                                                 
295 Cairns (2008), 58.  
296 For the connection between emotion and action, see Konstan (2006), 25 ff; Chaniotis 
(2012), 14, 28, 230; Strongman (2003), 67.  
297 Altieri (2003), 4. Lada (1993), esp. 113-119 and (1996), 403-4 with further bibliography. 
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Altieri argues, they might ‘allow the subject to take in modes of 
information not likely to arise without the distinctive distribution of 
affective energies.’298 On the other hand, affective phenomena might make 
one overfocused on a goal, concern or supposition and might therefore 
blind one to other important features of the same situation. As a 
consequence, one might not act in accord to one’s own best interests, still 
less in accord with the interests of the community to which one belongs. 
On the one hand, Pentheus’ resistance to the cult of Dionysus in the end 
brings destruction upon his own royal house. On the other hand, Oedipus 
causes harm to the realm he intended to protect because he is excessively 
preoccupied with personal matters and, as a consequence, loses sight of 
what should be his primary objective, namely, the well-being of the 
citizens.  
The chapter is divided into two thematic units. The first section 
(2.1) investigates the process of human search for knowledge and aims to 
show that the Bacchae by Euripides and the OT by Sophocles, by 
discussing the role played by emotions in one’s process of knowledge 
acquisition, articulate different conceptions of the subject considered both 
as a knowing agent and as a political being. We will see that the 
democratic model of distributed knowledge is opposed to the autocratic 
knowledge of the tyrant.  
Section 2.2 concerns the human knowledge of the divine, and 
addresses to what extent men can gain insight into divine will and divine 
nature. I will analyse how the interpretation of phenomena that are 
traditionally believed to be divine manifestations changes depending on 
                                                 
298 Altieri (2003), 6-9. 
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the cultural codes used in the wake of contemporary intellectual advances. 
As in the previous chapter, my major concern is to investigate how in both 
plays religious ideas regarding the opposition between human and divine 
knowledge are tied up with other competing discourses from philosophy, 
from medical science to political theory.  
2.1 The Process of the Human Search for Knowledge 
Both plays chosen for analysis put on stage a king who undertakes 
a series of actions to find and tackle the root causes of a crisis affecting his 
kingdom. Oedipus needs to find an effective cure for the plague 
devastating Thebes, whereas Pentheus must deal with the supposed threat 
posed by Dionysus and by its cult.  
This section compares the steps involved in Pentheus’ assessment 
of the status of Dionysus to the measures taken by Oedipus to find out the 
truth about the oracle and, ultimately, about his own past. The aim of this 
section is to discuss the extent to which physical factors and affective 
phenomena influence the processing of data by the mind, whether 
information is obtained from witnesses’ testimonies or through the 
inquirer’s direct observation. Even first-hand experiences are filtered 
through the mind, which in turn interprets them according to one’s 
aspirations and emotional states. An additional purpose is to analyse how 
the plays’ investigation of issues relating to knowledge and of the role 
played by emotions in one’s process of inquiry merges with political 
discourse.  
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2.1.1 The Limitations of Human Knowledge and their Political 
Consequences 
The Bacchae and the OT highlight the impediments to human 
knowledge: if one relies on either what one has seen first-hand or on the 
capacity to assess circumstances, make valid inferences and draw sound 
conclusions, one is nonetheless likely to make mistakes. 
As far as one’s own direct experience is concerned, the Bacchae gives 
a supernatural explanation of the limits of human autoptic perception,299 
whereas the OT pushes the discussion further by showing that, even when 
it is first-hand, human knowledge is inherently flawed, irrespective of 
divine opposition. Irony can be detected in the passage in which Oedipus 
boasts that, had he been present when the murder was committed, he 
would easily have found some piece of evidence to solve the case (220-
1).300 Actually, he was on-the-spot even though he is still unaware of it.  
Oedipus looks for any hint which, together with other pieces of 
evidence, may shed some light on the mysterious murder of Laius.301 As 
time goes by, however, traces decay and fade away (δυστέκμαρτον). 
Jocasta (915 ff) thus suggests that he should form conjectures 
                                                 
299 In Subsection 2.2.1.b. I will discuss how and why the vision of the wrongdoers such as 
Pentheus is distorted by Dionysus. 
300 I follow Dawe’s text (1982): μὴ οὐκ ἔχειν. By contrast, Jebb (1949) and Stella (2010) 
read: μὴ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον (I would not go far on the trail if I were tracing it alone 
‘without a clue’). 
301 At vv. 120-1 he affirms that ‘one discovery (ἀρχὴν) may lead to many others’, and at v. 
221 says that he needs a σύμβολον, namely ‘anything you can συμβάλλειν with 
anything else when putting two and two together’: Jebb (1949) on 220-1. An example of a 
successful use of Oedipus’ method of investigation is the scene where he recognizes the 
shepherd as soon as he enters the stage by inferring his identity from his age and from 
the servants accompanying him (1110 ff). For a thorough analysis of the terms used by 
Oedipus to describe his process of reasoning (σταθμᾶσθαι 1111, σύμμετρος 1113, 
ἐπιστήμη 1115), see Di Benedetto (1983), 88; Hall in Ormand (2012), 21 ff.  
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(τεκμαίρεται, 916) by relying on his previous experience and should 
interpret new events by means of past ones.302 However, later Jocasta 
accidentally gives evidence of the unreliability of the method she 
proposes. To persuade her husband not to pay regard to Teiresias’ 
accusation that he was the murderer of Laius, she provides the following 
piece of evidence (σημεῖα, 710): what she has learnt from her experience is 
that oracles given by mortals must never be trusted given that a prophecy 
once given to Laius eventually did not come true. Contrary to what was 
predicted, Laius was not killed by his son but by a group of robbers. 
Moreover, their child never became a parricide; on the contrary, though 
innocent, he died after being exposed on a mountain (711-25). The flaw in 
her reasoning is that she did not actually see either her husband murdered 
by brigands or her baby die in the wild. She thus jumps to hasty 
conclusions based on the criterion of verisimilitude and others’ 
testimonies. That a defenceless exposed baby must have died is the most 
likely hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is just one of all the possible scenarios. 
The play thus explores the limitations of the human process of inquiry.  
                                                 
302 The OT gives voice to ideas which were in vogue in Athens in the second half of the 
fifth century and were spread by philosophers, historiographers and physicians. In a 
much-quoted fragment Anaxagoras argues that ‘appearances are a vision of the invisible’ 
(ὅψις γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα, Anaxag. DK 59 B 21a), meaning that the 
observance and analysis of phenomena also make it possible for men to gain insight into 
those events that are not the object of direct perception. Similarly, the Hippocratic corpus 
asserts that, as to the reasons for illnesses, one forms a judgement (τεκμαίρεσθαι) from 
all the symptoms (τεκμηρίων) taken together (Hp. Prog. 17. 467). Finally, Thucydides 
writes that he conjectured that the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians 
would be a great one from a series of clues, which he subsequently lists (I. 1-2). For a 
discussion of these references, see Diano (1968); Longo (1972); Ugolini (1987); Knox 
(1957). See also Lateiner (1986), 5-6, 11-3 for further examples drawn from early Greek 
medical writers (On regimen 1, 7. 14-7; Hp. VM. 12. 15-6 cf. Schiefsky, 2005, 22) and for a 
discussion of Herodotus’ analogical explanations (Hdt. 1. 57. 1; 2. 33. 2). As Hartog (1988), 
225-30 argues, comparison and analogy are ‘procedures of translation’ whose function is 
‘to set the thing before the eyes’ in order to instil belief in the addressee. They can thus 
serve as substitutes for one’s own direct experience.  
148 
 
Such investigation into the limits of human knowledge is 
interwoven with political discourse: by illustrating that anyone’s direct or 
indirect experience of an event can be misleading, the tragedy encourages 
the audience to reflect on their own experience. The spectators are 
attending a performance; consequently, they have first-hand experience of 
what happens on stage except for the events which occurred in the past 
and reported by the messenger. Will they be able to interpret the series of 
events correctly or might they also be mistaken in their understanding?  
Throughout the play the spectators can pride themselves on their 
ability to pinpoint the times when the characters on stage are either 
deceived by their limited knowledge or misuse a word without even 
noticing. For instance, in the OT there is a misuse of the concept of truth: 
at v. 800 Oedipus sincerely promises that he will tell Jocasta the whole 
truth (τἀληθὲς ἐξερῶ). His intention is to confess to the murder of a man 
in a cross-way but he is still unaware that his confession only gives part of 
the truth. For the crime he has committed is far more serious than he 
thinks: it’s not mere homicide but rather parricide. Dramatic irony signals 
the epistemological superiority of the audience over the characters.303 Yet 
realizing how frequently the characters’ understanding is blurred by their 
partial knowledge and by the ambivalence of language should warn the 
spectators against the confidence of having superior knowledge.304 The 
spectators should realize that they themselves struggle fully to understand 
the ironies of language and the chain of the events performed in front of 
them. As Goldhill argues, tragic irony ‘gives an uncomfortable view of the 
                                                 
303 Liapis in Ormand (2012), 91-2. 
304 For the ambivalence of language, see also Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 85-112; 
Goldhill (1986), 218 ff; Pucci (1992), 105-22; Budelmann (2000), 1-18; Goldhill (2012). 
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audience’s political role as judging citizens and asks a painful question of 
the confident self of fifth-century democracy’.305  
By showing that human knowledge, however resourceful men 
might be, is inevitably defective, the plays demonstrate that even the most 
common procedures used by democracy in the gathering of information 
and in the making of decisions, such as witnesses’ testimonies, are limited 
by a series of factors.  
On the one hand, physical factors may affect the process whereby 
one gains and retains knowledge. One’s memory of events can grow less 
and less precise whenever one recalls them.306 To give a couple of 
examples, in the fifth episode the second messenger, before he recounts 
Jocasta’s death and Oedipus’ act of self-blinding, warns the chorus that 
they will hear of what happened in the palace so far as his memory serves 
him right (ὅσον γε κἀν ἐμοὶ μνήμης ἔνι, 1239). Moreover, even though he 
was present at the tragic event, he is not able to describe Jocasta’s death 
because a much more frightful happening had grabbed all his attention.307 
Memories can also be altered and falsified by subjective interpretations of 
past events. In this regard, the most illustrative example is Creon’s report 
of the oracle: it is impossible to distinguish the elements which are part of 
the prophetic message from the ones which are merely Creon’s 
interpretation of Apollo’s words (95-8).308 
On the other hand, witnesses can lie or omit information for several 
reasons, such as shame, fear, and eagerness to protect somebody. For 
                                                 
305 Goldhill (2012), 37.  
306 Segal (2001), 63-4, 123-6 analyses how time can block knowledge.  
307 S. OT. 1252-4: ‘Oedipus burst in crying out loud, so that we could not watch her 
calamity to its end, but were gazing upon him as he moved around.’ 
308 For a detailed analysis of this passage, see Pucci (1992), 22-4; Stella (2010) on 102. 
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instance, the only eyewitness to Laius’ murder might have exaggerated 
the number of the killers because he was ashamed of not being able to 
protect his master.309 By contrast, Polybus and Merope hide the truth of 
Oedipus’ real parents out of love for their adopted son but in the end truth 
comes out thanks to the revelation made by a drunkard who, as opposed 
to Oedipus’ foster parents, has no personal reasons for hiding the truth 
(774-80). Similarly Jocasta, spurred by maternal love, refuses to confirm 
the identity of the Theban shepherd who was charged with exposing the 
baby born to the royal couple (1053-61).  
Consequently, the trustworthiness of sources may be compromised 
by the witnesses’ emotions.  
2.1.2 The Role Played by Affective Phenomena in Human Inquiry: 
the Tragic Interweaving of Epistemological Investigation, Religious 
Exploration, and Political Inquiry. 
By illustrating how emotions influence the process of knowledge 
acquisition and transmission, the OT and the Bacchae demonstrate that the 
kind of knowledge typical of a democratic system (namely, distributed 
knowledge), even though it is as defective as any other kind of human 
knowledge, is still preferable to the privileged knowledge claimed by 
either the seers or the Dionysiac initiates and to the archaic model of 
autocratic knowledge, which tyrants such as Oedipus or Pentheus aspire 
to gain. The distribution of knowledge ensures that different versions of 
the same event can be compared and contrasted to each other. The greater 
the opportunity for comparison between different accounts of the same 
                                                 
309 Pucci (1992), 123-44; Garvie (2005), 46; Stella (2010) on 118-9.  
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story, the more likely it is that a version of the story freer from the 
constraints dictated by personal emotional states will emerge. 
By contrast, the danger inherent in the archaic model of the 
autocratic knowledge of the tyrant is that knowledge acquisition and 
distribution might be subject to the fears and desires of one single person, 
namely the ruler. Even though both Oedipus and Pentheus use reasoning 
to get to the truth and to make decisions, that reasoning is driven by 
emotion. Emotions thus influence the mind and the process of knowledge. 
No problem arises if the ruler’s actions are motivated by a genuine desire 
for the well-being of his people. Yet, if the king is driven by his 
individualistic impulses, the tight control of information imposed by the 
tyrant might turn out to be harmful to the community. 
In support of this argument, I shall now compare and contrast the 
way Oedipus and Pentheus handle the crises affecting their kingdoms. 
2.1.2.a. Oedipus’ and Pentheus’ searches for truth:  
hindrances and limitations. 
Both kings affirm that they want to acquire information about the 
problem at first hand (OT. 6-7; Ba. 215-6). Yet, whereas Oedipus’ 
willingness to have direct experience is motivated by a genuine desire to 
find the truth and a sincere concern for the well-being of the Thebans,310 
Pentheus’ intention conceals a voyeuristic desire, which will lead him to 
cause harm to his kingdom rather than benefit it. The first objective of 
Pentheus’ desire for αὐτοψία is not to ascertain facts but rather quickly to 
put a stop to both the spread of the new religious cult of Dionysus and its 
                                                 
310 S. OT. 11-3, 58-72, 93-4, 128-9, 132-6. 
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criminal revelry (Ba. 226-7). At the same time, he wants to see with his 
own eyes such criminal revelry, a bitter sight which nonetheless brings 
him pleasure (Ba. 814-5). Therefore, in the Bacchae there is a misuse of the 
concept of αὐτοψία since the king’s claim about the necessity of αὐτοψία 
is merely an excuse to satisfy his hidden desires, which will in turn cause 
him to commit impiety by violating the secrecy of the Dionysiac mysteries.  
Moreover, Pentheus’ desire to reject the subversive cult of Dionysus 
turns out to be harmful to his own royal family and to the Theban reign 
given that it endangers the lives of the citizens by drawing divine anger 
upon Thebes.  Pentheus is so focused on his intent to thwart the threat 
posed by the Dionysiac cult that he fails to acknowledge the supernatural 
nature of the events brought about by divine action in the palace (643 ff). 
Pentheus’ lack of knowledge in turn leads him to behave unwisely and to 
bring destruction upon the royal house. In this regard, it is worth 
analysing the following exchange: 
Πενθεύς 
ὁ θεός, ὁρᾶν γὰρ φῂς σαφῶς, ποῖός τις ἦν; 
Διόνυσος 
ὁποῖος ἤθελ᾽· οὐκ ἐγὼ 'τασσον τόδε. 
Πενθεύς 
τοῦτ᾽ αὖ παρωχέτευσας εὖ γ’ οὐδὲν λέγων. 
Διόνυσος 
δόξει τις ἀμαθεῖ σοφὰ λέγων οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν. 
(E. Ba. 477-80) 
 
Pentheus 
The god – what did he look like? You claim you saw him clearly. 
Dionysus 
He looked as he wished to look: I had no say in the matter. 
Pentheus 
Another evasive answer: you talk nonsense so cleverly. 
Dionysus 
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Speak wisdom to a fool and he will think you foolish. 
The stranger’s comment on Dionysus’ outward appearance would 
have probably been understood by any initiate who has had the chance to 
‘see the god as the god saw him’ (470): for Dionysus can take any form he 
likes.311 By contrast, Pentheus blames the stranger for ‘side-tracking his 
interlocutor with empty phrases’ (τοῦτ᾽ αὖ παρωχέτευσας εὖ κοὐδὲν 
λέγων, 479). From several ancient sources we know that riddling 
language was part of the initiation into the mysteries and was employed 
to confuse the initiands before revealing to the them the truth.312  
Pentheus claims that there is nothing in what the stranger says but 
he cannot actually see the truth hidden in his words because he is ἀμαθής 
(479). The adjective ἀμαθής can have either a moral or an intellectual 
meaning:313 in this passage it is usually translated as ‘foolish’ but it literally 
means ‘lacking knowledge/unlearned in something’.314 It is also worth 
remembering that in the context of the mysteries this term has a more 
specific connotation since it implies ‘uninitiated’.315 The dialogue between 
Pentheus and the stranger refers to the knowledge gap between the two 
parties: Pentheus is ἀμαθής in the sense that he lacks the basic 
information to understand a discourse about Dionysus, probably because 
he is not initiated into the Dionysiac mysteries. The word σοφά indicates 
                                                 
311 Vernant – Vidal Naquet (1988), 395: ‘The epiphany of Dionysus is that of a being who, 
even in proximity and intimate contact with one, remains elusive and ubiquitous, never 
where he seems to be, never fixed in a definite form’: a god, a smiling young man, a bull, 
a lion, a snake, a flame, and so on. Cf. E. Ba. 100, 618, 920-22, 1017-23 
312 Cf. Pl. Phd. 69c; Derveni Pap. col. 7; Plu. Mor. 389. See Seaford (1981), 254-5; (1996) on 
480; (2006), 52.  
313 Cf. E. El. 971; Or. 417; Ion. 917: see Lee (1997), n. ad loc; HF. 347: see Bond (1988), n. ad 
loc. 
314 Kovacs (2002b) translates it as ‘a fool’, Buckley as ‘foolish’.  
315 Cf. Arist. Quint. De Mus. 3. 25; Ar. Nu. 135, Derveni Pap. col. 5. 10. See Seaford (1996), n. 
ad loc. 
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those things that need some sort of knowledge or expertise to be 
understood properly. Wisdom implies a possession of knowledge to apply 
appropriately to any given circumstance. Consequently, whoever 
possesses wisdom is likely to avoid wrongdoing. By contrast, Pentheus is 
induced by his lack of knowledge and by a widely prevailing feeling of 
personal resentment and boldness to act impiously. He tries in vain to re-
establish his authority over the stranger by the use of force, that is, by 
putting him in prison.316 Dionysus’ reply is telling: 317  
οὐκ οἶσθ᾽ †ὅτι ζῇς,† οὐδ᾽ ὃ δρᾷς, οὐδ᾽ ὅστις εἶ. 
(E. Ba. 506) 
You do not know what your life is or what you are doing or who you are. 
That the king does not know who he is does not mean that he is 
unaware of his name and genealogy, as Pentheus incorrectly thinks,318 but 
rather that he is not able to define himself in opposition to the identity of 
his interlocutor; that is to say that he does not acknowledge his mortal 
status as opposed to the divine status of his interlocutor. Consequently, he 
does not even understand the power relations between them: he 
erroneously believes that he has – or at least should have – the upper hand 
over the stranger. He thus both acts and will be punished accordingly.319 
What is more, by taking position against Dionysus and thus displaying his 
insolence (θράσει, 270), Pentheus becomes ‘a bad citizen’ (κακὸς πολίτης, 
271) because he endangers the well-being of all the Thebans. 
                                                 
316 E. Ba. 505: ‘And I, more masterful than you, bid them to bind you.’ (ἐγὼ δὲ δεῖν γε, 
κυριώτερος σέθεν).  
317 For a discussion of this passage and of its variants, see Dodds (1944) and Susanetti 
(2010), ad loc.  
318 In fact, he answers back by saying his name (507).  
319 Interestingly, in the fourth stasimon the chorus blames Pentheus for trying to ‘master 
by force what cannot be mastered’ (τἀνίκατον ὡς κρατήσων βίᾳ, 1001).  
155 
 
I have argued that Oedipus, as opposed to Pentheus, in his search 
for first-hand information is spurred by his genuine intention to make 
careful and effective decisions for the highest good of the Theban citizens 
in his care. Yet Oedipus’ inquiry, due to the arousal of fears concerning his 
personal life and his past, gradually shifts its focus from the most effective 
cures for the plague to the king’s own origins. As a result, he completely 
forgets about the primary motive for which he is looking for the killer of 
Laius. He is initially worried about the well-being of the Thebans and asks 
for the collaboration of anyone to collect information about Laius’ 
murder,320 whereas later on his only concern is that he might not be 
worthy of the throne of Thebes because of his obscure origins, and that 
Creon, in connivance with Teiresias, might take advantage of that to 
deprive him of the throne.321 The arousal of these emotions, which have 
nothing to do with the prosperity and stability of the reign but are rather 
linked to the king’s personal matters, is disadvantageous for the 
community: fear of losing power and anger at Teiresias spur Oedipus to 
disdain collaboration with the very man who is in possession of valuable 
information.322  
Oedipus initially holds the prophet of Apollo in high regard (300-4): 
after calling him their saviour (σωτῆρα, 304), he asks him to help them 
decode the prophetic message. Yet soon after a dialogue begins between 
them, Oedipus gets angrier and angrier to the point that he exclaims that 
he is so furious (ὡς ὀργῆς ἔχω, 345) that he will leave unsaid nothing of 
what he understands (345-6). Oedipus thus accuses Teiresias of being an 
accomplice in the murder of Laius (346-9), and the prophet answers back 
                                                 
320 S. OT. 84-146; 216-315. 
321 S. OT. 378-403, 435-7, 532-621, 642-3.  
322 For the co-existence and connection of fear and anger, see Chaniotis (2012) (ed.), 23.  
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that the unholy polluter of Thebes is rather Oedipus (350-3). Teiresias tells 
the truth but reveals part of his mantic knowledge at the most 
inappropriate moment: in the exchange of accusations his revelation loses 
credibility because it is likened to Oedipus’ unfounded charge sprung on 
the spur of the moment. Once it is unleashed, emotion tends to be self-
validating: it can influence how one thinks in such a way as to reinforce 
the cognitive evaluation that triggered the emotion.323 Oedipus cannot 
believe Teiresias any longer since he is convinced that his words are not 
prophetic at all but have rather been uttered in retaliation.  
But what is it that makes Oedipus angry in the first instance? To 
understand the reasons for the king’s angry reaction, it is useful to call to 
mind Aristotle’s definition of anger in order to point out the divergencies 
between the ancient Greek conception of such emotion and our own: 
according to Aristotle, anger is a desire for revenge which is elicited by a 
voluntary slight on the part of people who are believed to be unfit to slight 
the offended party.324 It is evident that our modern concept of anger is 
broader since it indicates a response not only to slight but to more general 
kind of offences, including injustice and personal (physical or 
psychological) harm.325 By contrast, Aristotle limits the definition of ὀργῆ 
to one’s reaction to a deliberate slight committed by one’s inferiors. Anger 
thus depends on an appraisals not only of intentions but also of social 
roles.  
Oedipus loses his temper in the dialogue with Teiresias for the 
same reason that Pentheus gets angry at Dionysus-the stranger: both 
                                                 
323 Konstan (2006), 37-8. For an example of how anger may distort decision-making, see 
Antiph. 5. 72.  
324 Ar. Rh. 2.3 1378b10 ff.  
325 Konstan (2006), 65 ff.  
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rulers must deal with reticent interlocutors, who seem not to disclose 
knowledge intentionally. Anger thus springs from a perceived insult and 
disrespect (ἀτιμάζεις, OT 340) on the part of a person who, according to 
the king, should be his subject. Both rulers aim to pursue and gain a 
specific kind of knowledge, that is, the autocratic knowledge of the tyrant. 
The tyrant demands to be the only person to retain full control over 
information and the spread of it. Reticence thus raises the king’s suspicion 
and provokes his anger since it is believed to conceal information that 
might damage his royal power.  
In the Bacchae the king of Thebes would like to know from the 
stranger what Dionysus looks like (ποῖός τις ἦν, 477) and what kind of 
form (τίν’ ἰδέαν, 471) his rites take.326 The knowledge that the king would 
like to gain, however, is acquired through an extraordinary experience 
reserved for the privileged group of the initiands only. Pentheus, being 
unable to get access to the secret knowledge that is passed on to the 
initiates alone, suspects that it may concern illicit and dangerous activities. 
In its inclusiveness the cult of Dionysus subverts the traditional power 
structures.  
Moreover, just as Oedipus cannot fully trust Teiresias, so Pentheus 
cannot rely on the loyalty of the soothsayer. A seer can be a powerful ally 
to the ruler since he can make up or modify a sacred story with the aim of 
                                                 
326 A reference to Protagoras’ fragment On the Gods has been detected in this passage: the 
brevity of human life impedes the human knowledge of the divine because men are not 
provided with enough time for the collection of a significant amount of data. Just as 
Protagoras takes an agnostic view on the existence and the appearance (ἰδέαν, Protag. 
DΚ 80 Β 4) of the deities, so Pentheus needs to collect visual data to be convinced of the 
divine status of Dionysus. Di Benedetto (2004) on 471. 
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bringing advantage to the ruling family.327 However, he can also be a 
dangerous ally since he is not easily manageable due to his privileged 
position, as we shall see in the following section.  
Both the initiates to the Dionysiac Mysteries and the soothsayers 
become suspicious in the eyes of the ruler because they constitute an 
uncontrollable and menacing source of power. Yet the rulers are mistaken 
when they decide to disdain the advice given by Teiresias because in both 
plays the seer is ultimately shown to be right. The kings’ desires to gain 
autocratic knowledge and maintain full control over their kingdoms have 
negative consequences for Thebes: in the Bacchae it draws destruction and 
divine vengeance, whereas in the OT it delays the discovery of truth, 
which is necessary to sort out the problem of the plague.  
2.1.2.b. The Opposition between Mantic Knowledge and Human 
Knowledge 
The Bacchae and the OT thus problematize the archaic model of the 
autocratic knowledge of the tyrant. However, the aim of the plays is not 
merely to show that the rulers would have been better to confide in the 
revealed knowledge of the seer. They portray the soothsayers in an 
ambiguous light. To give an example, in the OT Oedipus accuses Teiresias 
of ‘having sight only when it comes to profit’ (388-9) and insults him by 
calling him μάγος, a negative term indicating an impostor involved in 
                                                 
327 E. Ba. 330 ff. When Cadmus tries to persuade Pentheus to welcome the cult of 
Dionysus, his arguments hinge on one basic concept: be Dionysus a god or a man, the 
royal family can only benefit from his claim to a divine origin since Pentheus will gain 
honour from a divine descent (330 ff). Therefore, what is important is not so much the 
actual status of Dionysus as what people believe and claim about him, and a ruler, with 
the connivance of the seer, can manipulate and turn his citizens’ beliefs to his advantage. 
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some sort of wizardry and political manoeuvring.328 A similar accusation 
is brought against the prophet in the Bacchae: Teiresias’ support of the 
Dionysiac cult is believed to be motivated by his intent to achieve 
monetary gain (257). What is more, the Euripidean play pushes the 
critique further by representing Teiresias as an astute soothsayer who, 
unlike his Sophoclean namesake, has no foreknowledge of his ruler’s fate 
but takes the side of Dionysian religion merely on political grounds and 
from common sense considerations (358-369).329  
Scholars have argued that in such criticism of the seers there might 
have been a polemical reference to cases of manipulative exploitation of 
divination for political purposes, which occurred in fifth-century 
Athens.330 Therefore, the aim of such invectives against seers is not to 
undermine the trustworthiness of divinely inspired knowledge as 
opposed to a rational pursuit of truth.331 It is rather to criticize those 
human agents who, because of their machinations, have made one of the 
few techniques by which men have access to the divine will completely 
unreliable.  
                                                 
328 Μάγοι were the priests and interpreters of signs of the ancient Medes but in the fifth 
century BC the term μάγος came to be used with a pejorative connotation to indicate 
people involved in fraudulent activity for the love of gain: Morb. Sacr. 1. 10-12; Gorg. Hel. 
10-14; E. Or. 1496 ff. See Lloyd (1979), 13, 15-29; Flower (2008), 64-5, esp. n. 118; 
Whitmarsh (2015), 97-114.  
329 Winnington – Ingram (1948), 57.  
330 See Longo (1972), 23-9, Ahl (1991), 35-53 and Stella (2010), on 387-9, 390-400, and pp. 
31-4 with examples; Whitmarsh (2015), 75-86. In this regard, Jocasta’s invective against 
the seers is interesting: by highlighting that the oracle did not come directly from Apollo 
but rather from his ministers, she insinuates that it might have been made up or modified 
(707-25). Cf. also Hdt. 5. 63, 5. 66: the priestess may have been bribed to give a false 
oracle.  
331 It has been argued that tragic growing hostility towards professional μάντεις is due to 
the rise of intellectualism in fifth-century ancient Greece, especially in the fields of 
philosophy and medicine, which causes divinely inspired knowledge to lose favour and 
credibility: Di Benedetto (1983); Vegetti (1983). Cf. Knox (1957), esp. 61-98; Diano (1968); 
Stella (2010) on 390-400. 
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In this regard, it is significant that both the plays represent the 
paradox of a soothsayer who divests himself of his prophetic art in order 
to be believed. When Teiresias foretells that Pentheus will bring suffering 
on Thebes, he even denies speaking by his prophetic art (μαντικῇ μὲν οὐ 
λέγω, 368): anyone would draw the same conclusion merely by looking at 
the facts (τοῖς πράγμασιν δέ, 369). In the Bacchae Teiresias does not take 
advantage of his privileged knowledge for the same reason that in the OT 
he does not link what he knows about Oedipus to his mantic art, and does 
not reveal the meaning of the prophecy until he is forced to; that is, the 
suspicion raised by intrigue and secrecy surrounding oracular 
consultations.332 In the dialogue with Oedipus, to whose ears such a 
delayed revelation sounds like a mere fabrication (357), the prophet gives 
the following explanation for his silence: 
ἥξει γὰρ αὐτά, κἂν ἐγὼ σιγῇ στέγω.  
(S. OT. 341) 
 
Things will come of themselves, even if I veil it in silence. 
The first sentence stresses the inevitability of the fulfilment of any 
oracle, whereas the concessive one justifies his conduct: he is responsible 
for no disgrace that has befallen the Theban land. For, even if had spoken 
earlier, it would have made no difference to the outcome. Therefore, he 
chose what he thought would be the safest way for him to act: to keep 
silence and not get involved.333 Apart from his awareness that he is 
powerless to divert the course of fate, another consideration might have 
                                                 
332 Edmunds (2000), 34-73 analyses all the passages in which Teiresias fails to appeal to 
his seercraft and his authority as a seer. The only reference to his mantic art is at vv. 461-
2. According to Winnington – Ingram (1948), the characterization of Teiresias in the 
Bacchae is ‘a satirical picture of a shrewd ecclesiastic’. 
333 Teiresias’ reticence is stressed by the use of the vague term αὐτά, ‘these things’, which 
increases the ambiguity of his words and builds suspense: Budelmann (2000), 19-60.  
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played a role in his decision: he is afraid that the king might not believe 
him and might accuse him of conspiracy, which is exactly what happens 
in the course of the play. For, as I have already said, suspicion is cast on 
seers and oracles.334  
In a world where political manoeuvring prevails even in the sphere 
of the sacred an ordinary man’s advice based on common sense is more 
likely to be trusted than the divinely inspired words of a seer.  
The following conclusion can be drawn from this analysis. The 
opposition between mantic knowledge and human knowledge in the OT 
and the Bacchae is not merely an opposition between two forms of 
knowledge. It also hides a political antinomy: in both dramas a king, who 
makes every attempt to have control over every source of information, is 
set in opposition to an uncontrollable, and thus dangerous, source of 
power and secret knowledge. The political reasons why the wisdom of the 
seers and of the Dionysiac Mysteries is disregarded must not be forgotten. 
For the interweaving of knowledge issues and political discourse sheds 
light on the fact that the two forms of knowledge represented in the 
dramas are not more or less reliable in themselves. On the contrary, their 
reliability depends on the motives that spur one on to start an inquiry and 
on the purpose for which a person uses the knowledge acquired.  
The following passage from the Bacchae illustrates this point well: 
the Asian maenads try to define what σοφία is but they can only give a 
negative definition. 
τὸ σοφὸν δ᾽ οὐ σοφία 
τό τε μὴ θνατὰ φρονεῖν. 
                                                 
334 For further interpretations of Teiresias’ silence, see Segal (2001), 57-9; Ahl (1991), 77-83.  
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(E. Ba. 395-6) 
 
Cleverness is not wisdom, nor is it wise to think thoughts not mortal. 
There seem to exist two different kinds of wisdom: a true and a 
false one.335 Scholars are divided as to who is the subject of the chorus’ 
criticism. According to one interpretation, the maenads are criticizing the 
rationalist mind-set of men like Pentheus, who fights against the god 
(θεομαχεῖν, 1255), as opposed to the pious attitude of the seer, who relies 
on divinely inspired knowledge.336 A different view maintains that the 
polemical target of the critique is more likely to be Teiresias himself since 
he is the only one who speaks as a sophist, albeit in defence of Dionysus.337 
However, the chorus is not necessarily referring to a specific character. 
The maenads are elaborating a discourse on human knowledge in general 
and on its positive and negative uses. By means of a paradoxical sentence, 
the maenads argue that the possession of any kind of skills is not sufficient 
to be clever, which implies that cleverness is a matter of ends to which 
skills are applied. If the purpose is to battle against the god, then it cannot 
be called true wisdom. 
In this regard, it is worth analysing a passage from Pindar’s 
Olympian 9: after the poet rejects the myth of Heracles fighting against 
Poseidon, Apollo and Hades, he declares that ‘to speak evil of the gods is a 
                                                 
335 For a thorough analysis of this passage, see Winnington – Ingram (1948), 59-70.  
336 Dodds (1944) and Seaford (1996) on 395. 
337 Susanetti (2010) on 395-6. Cf. the first episode: Teiresias, soon after claiming ‘not to 
play the sophist when the gods are concerned’ (οὐδ’ ἐνσοφιζόμεσθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν, 200) 
and rejecting the use of sophistry in his enquiries into divine matters (vv. 201-204), 
actually speaks as a sophist when he equates Demeter with earth/dry food, and Dionysus 
with the wet/wine (275 ff; cf. Prodic. 84 B 5 DK). The seer thus uses sophistic explanation 
to anchor the new cult of Dionysus in the past and to show that it will not subvert 
tradition: if Dionysus is wine, it follows that he is as old as one of the oldest beverages. 
Susanetti (2010) on 274-9, 285-97; Conacher (1998), 17-25.  
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hateful skill’ (τό γε λοιδορῆσαι θεοὺς/ ἐχθρὰ σοφία, 37-8). The word 
σοφία refers to poetry: a poet can be called σοφός because he masters the 
poetic art. Nevertheless, if it is used against the Olympian deities, such an 
art becomes hateful and hostile to the poet himself since it can provoke 
divine anger.338 
Similarly, the chorus in the Bacchae asserts that, if human skilfulness 
leads men to ‘think thoughts not mortal’ (τό τε μὴ θνητὰ φρονεῖν, 396), it 
will inevitably pull down divine vengeance upon them: for Dionysus 
hates the man who does not keep his wise heart and mind 
(σοφὰν…πραπίδα φρένα, 428) away from excessive men. In the fourth 
stasimon the chorus further clarifies that cleverness is not good or bad in 
itself. Rather there are good and bad ways to take advantage of it: the 
maenads affirm that they ‘do not begrudge those who pursue cleverness 
in due measure’ (τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθονῶ καιρῷ θηρεύουσι, 1005), and 
specify that honouring the gods and behaving according to justice lead 
mortals to success. Therefore, cleverness is a good possession provided 
that it is not excessive and is not used against the gods.  
Just as human intelligence is not bad or good in itself provided that 
it used neither against the gods nor to the disadvantage of the community, 
so the revealed knowledge of the seers is reliable unless it is manipulated 
for political reasons. It is the purpose for which one has recourse to either 
mode of knowing that determines whether that form of knowledge is 
positive or negative. 
 
                                                 
338 Gentili (2013) mentions the story of the divine punishment suffered by Stesichorus for 
offending Helen in one of his poems.  
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2.1.2.c. The Models of Distributed Knowledge and Autocratic Knowledge 
Compared. 
We have seen that the plays criticize the autocratic knowledge of 
the tyrant since both Pentheus and Oedipus are induced to behave 
unwisely and to reject the very wisdom that would have been most 
effective and beneficial to the community. 
As Wohl points out in her analysis of the OT, the transformation of 
the tyrant from the bearer of impossible potency to the bearer of utter lack 
is a warning against ‘the peril the tyrant’s ecstasy poses to the symbolic 
order’.339 At the same time, it represents Athens’ democratic ideology: for, 
‘by figuring that such an exorbitant power could ever be claimed by one 
individual, the tyrant makes that imagined power available to the δῆμος 
as a whole.’340 Democratic freedom is freedom from the political and 
sexual domination of tyrants.341 Following Wohl’s thesis, it can be argued 
that democratic freedom is also freedom from the autocratic model of 
knowledge, which is typical of the tyrant, and from any kind of 
knowledge that is reserved for members of a privileged group and can 
thus be manipulated by the élite for their own ends. To be able to curb 
individualistic impulses effectively, knowledge must be distributed.  
Oedipus, by committing incest and parricide, transgresses paternal 
law and jeopardizes the authority of Zeus given that, as the chorus 
highlights, νόμοι are ‘the children of Olympian Zeus’ (863-72). In his 
metaphorical blindness, he endangers both the cosmic and the political 
orders. Harmony is restored only when Oedipus, after gaining full 
                                                 
339 Wohl (2002), 259.  
340 Wohl (2002), 215 ff.  
341 Wohl (2002), 3-4.  
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knowledge about his past, loses part of his prosperity and power, which is 
symbolically represented by the loss of his eyes. His downfall, by showing 
that the tyrant cannot be self-sufficient, opens up a space for a fantasy that 
claims for the whole πόλις the power, control over knowledge and civic 
prosperity that were the prerogatives of the tyrant.  
Oedipus’ personal story of rise and fall allows the Athenian 
spectator to look upon the tyrant’s exorbitant sovereignty and to enjoy this 
fantasy of power just long enough to become aware not only of its enticing 
aspects but also of its threats. Wohl argues that in Athenian democratic 
ideology we find ‘political fantasies that contradict or complicate the 
simple declarations of love of the good Athenian citizen’.342 An example 
given by the scholar is the Athenians’ attitude towards Alcibiades as it is 
described by ancient Greek historiographers. Alcibiades, the scion of an 
illustrious family who became embroiled in allegations of sexual 
perversion, religious profanity and tyrannical ambitions (Th. 6. 15. 4), 
exercised a profound attraction on the Athenians to the point that the 
citizens, after exiling him, wanted him back since ‘they lusted with an 
amazing desire to be ruled by him as a tyrant’ (Plu. Alc. 34. 6-7).  It is 
undoubtedly a logical contradiction that a democratic city like Athens 
longs for tyranny. This episode is thus illustrative of unconscious desires 
lying beneath the surface in Athenian democracy: any exorbitant power, 
such as that of a tyrant, retains its attractiveness even to those who are 
subjected to it. Democratic citizens may be fascinated by it and may 
secretly desire to assume it unto themselves.  
                                                 
342 Wohl (2002), 1-2.  
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Both the OT and the Bacchae arouse democratic fantasies, such as 
the possibility that anyone, even humble people, have the same level of 
knowledge as the ministers of Apollo and may get access to the secret 
knowledge of the Dionysiac mysteries. In the OT, for instance, it is not 
Teiresias but rather a mere drunkard that first discloses the truth about 
Oedipus’ origins (OT. 779-86). In the Bacchae, on the other hand, Dionysus 
is said not to discriminate between the rich and the poor (421-3) and to be 
happy to receive joint honours from everyone and to be magnified by all 
without exception (208-9).343   
Yet a question arises: once the citizens assume to themselves such 
power, will they act better than a tyrant? They might, but they might also 
be enticed into using it to take control over information, to turn it to their 
advantage and to manipulate it for political purposes. In any historical 
period political madness might affect not only tyrannical regimes but also 
democratic systems.  In fact, both the OT and the Bacchae show that, within 
the democratic ideology that sustains such fantasies, the prohibited 
tyrannical desire to have privileged access to, and control over, knowledge 
lives on. 
 
                                                 
343 Dionysus is the god of the πλῆθος, who ‘equally gives the painless joy of wine both to 
the rich and to the lowly’ (421-3): Dodds (1944) on 430-3. See also Goff’s interpretation 
(2004), 271-88 of Dionysiac maenadism as ‘a cultural resource for women that could 
afford them an intellectual experience as well as release from a subordinate existence.’ Di 
Benedetto (2004) on 395 argues that the Bacchae represents Euripides’ twist in his political 
beliefs: Euripides defends the re-establishment of the democratic government after the 
Athenian oligarchic coup of 411 BC by re-evaluating the importance of the simple people 
(430-1) and by extolling anti-elitist feelings. By contrast, Beltrametti (2007), 42-54 
maintains that Dionysus represents the model of divine royalty and that the play, taking 
Archelaus of Macedonia as the model of a good ruler, praises monarchy, the oldest form 
of government.   
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2.2 The Knowledge of the Divine 
Both the OT and the Bacchae address the theme of the knowledge of 
the divine although they develop it in different ways: whereas the 
Euripidean play raises questions about divine identity, the OT deals with 
the concept of divine will and focuses on human effort to find out what 
the gods expect of mortals.  
To judge who a god is and what the gods wish a person to do, men 
need clear signs. The sensory dimension plays a major role in the mental 
processes by which knowledge of any kind is acquired.344 Yet the 
interpretation of any data perceived by the five senses also involves 
reasoning and thinking. The process of giving meaning to the data 
acquired is based on a set of cultural codes, that is, of particular frames 
that help the members of a society make sense of things. For instance, it is 
assumed that the gods exist provided that they manifest themselves 
through phenomena which are culturally-recognized divine 
manifestations. Similarly, there is a set of natural phenomena which, 
according to culturally specific codes, are believed to signal divine will. 
For example, catastrophic events such as earthquakes, due to their 
superhuman destructive force, can be viewed as signals of divine anger.  
The occurrence of an event which is at the limits of man’s analytic 
capacities leaves men no recourse but to mythical and religious thought. 
Interpreting such events as brought about by the gods allows men to make 
sense of the world. These phenomena are interpreted as unambiguous and 
objective signs of the divine precisely because they fit in with the cultural 
codes according to which a specific culture interprets them. This means 
                                                 
344 Whitmarsh (2015), 87-96.  
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that, whenever a member of that culture witnesses an earthquake, for 
example, he/she truly believes that the gods are communicating with men 
through that natural event and thus feels that he/she is objectively in 
contact with the divine.  
Objectivity, however, is culturally constituted, that is, criteria of 
objectivity may vary among different societies.345 Culturally specific codes 
supply univocal meaning for the members of a specific culture only, 
whereas different explanations and interpretations of the same 
phenomena can be given in other cultures. In addition to this, criteria of 
objectivity can change over time even within a particular group: at certain 
periods the members of a specific culture can find subjective and 
unreasonable what at other periods they found objective and reasonable, 
and vice versa. The plays chosen for analysis delve into these issues: they 
provide a space for discussing how commonly held cultural codes may 
change and for exploring potential alternatives to them.  
Moreover, both dramas show that human beings perceive the 
universe not only through the five senses but also through their emotional 
response to the occurring events: one’s body language reveals emotions 
and those emotions in turn shed light on the way in which a person has 
interpreted an event. This section aims to show that in the process of 
gaining knowledge the characters on stage reveal the fusion of the 
cognitive, sensory and emotional dimensions of their perceptions, and that 
such a process is influenced by the cultural codes that shape and form the 
basis of one’s understanding of phenomena. 
                                                 
345 For a thorough analysis of how objectivity is mediated and oriented by cultural codes 
and subjective desires, see Sahlins (1995), 148-89. cf. also Geertz (1973), 98 ff.  
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2.2.1 Changing Cultural Codes: the Interpretation of Catastrophic Events 
and the Function of Emotions 
Natural and health disasters, such as epidemics and seismic events, 
can be a manifestation of divine anger, as the plague sent by Apollo in the 
first book of the Iliad and in the OT, and the earthquake conjured up in 
Aeschylus’ PV and Euripides’ Bacchae suggest. Why are these natural 
phenomena believed to be divine acts? For nature is a force which is 
ultimately beyond human control: once unleashed, these powerful natural 
phenomena give rise to fear and astonishment, and such emotions in turn 
inspire religious awe. Moreover, it is hard for men to discover the causes 
of such events. Any event which either defies explanation or is too 
catastrophic to be handled by limited human resources is attributed to 
divine agency because the gods hold both knowledge and power over 
men.346 
However, in the OT and the Bacchae the characters on stage display 
different emotional reactions in response to catastrophic events. As I shall 
now discuss in further detail, the reason why they react differently is that 
emotions are socially and culturally constructed and, consequently, might 
develop according to changes in society and culture:347 we will see that the 
                                                 
346 In this regard, it is significant that the ancient Greeks think that plagues are caused by 
the darts of Apollo or Artemis (e.g. Hom. Il. 6. 428, 19. 59, 24. 758; Lloyd, 1987, 1-12): the 
divine archer, as well as any other human archer, has a visual advantage over his victims 
who cannot see the arrows going toward them. Similarly, human beings are struck down 
by natural and health disasters without even noticing. It follows that the supernatural 
interpretation of the plague as brought about by Apollo’s arrows emphasizes the god’s 
supremacy in sight and knowledge as opposed to the gap in men’s field of vision: 
Holmes (2010), 48-58.   
347 Chaniotis (2012) (ed.), 15-6: for instance, ‘the fear of death and emotional response to 
the loss of loved ones […] depend on factors such as eschatological beliefs, philosophical 
ideas about life, ritual performances, normative restrictions on mourning […].’ 
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characters respond to such phenomena in diverse ways depending on the 
cultural codes used for interpreting them.  
2.2.1.a. Sophocles’ OT 
The action of the OT begins with a rite of supplication. A crowd has 
gathered with suppliant boughs before the altars in front of the royal 
palace, burning incense and singing lamentations (4-5). The priest of Zeus 
informs Oedipus, the king of Thebes, that ‘the fire-bearing god (ὁ 
πυρφόρος θεὸς, 27), hateful Pestilence (λοιμὸς ἔχθιστος, 28), has 
swooped upon the city and ravages it’. The plague is straightforwardly 
interpreted as an act of a god, and more specifically as an act of ‘the fire-
bearing god’, who may be either Ares or Apollo.348 
If such events are divine manifestations, how can men determine 
the reason for divine wrath and how to placate it? On such occasions men 
usually appeal to the gods asking them to demonstrate how to overcome 
adversities: they ask the gods themselves for explanation by consulting an 
oracle. This is what Oedipus has already done before the action of the play 
begins.  
[…] πολλὰς δ᾽ ὁδοὺς ἐλθόντα φροντίδος πλάνοις. 
ἣν δ᾽ εὖ σκοπῶν ηὕρισκον ἴασιν μόνην, 
ταύτην ἔπραξα· παῖδα γὰρ Μενοικέως 
Κρέοντ᾽, ἐμαυτοῦ γαμβρόν, ἐς τὰ Πυθικὰ 
ἔπεμψα Φοίβου δώμαθ᾽, ὡς πύθοιθ᾽ ὅ τι 
δρῶν ἢ τί φωνῶν τήνδε ῥυσαίμην πόλιν. 
(S. OT. 67-72) 
 
[…] I have travelled many roads in the wanderings of reflection. The one 
                                                 
348 Sheppard (1920) on 11. Cf. also Liapis in Ormand (2012), 84-6, and Whitmarsh (2015), 
97-114, who in the representation of the pestilence as an assault of Ares see a reference to 
the plague affecting Athens during the Peloponnesian War.  
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remedy which, by careful thought, I have found I have applied: I have sent Creon, 
son of Menoeceus, my wife’s brother, to the Pythian halls of Phoebus, so that he 
may learn by what deed or word I may protect this city. 
Oedipus’ decision to consult the oracle might be interpreted as an 
indication that he also views the plague as divine punishment. Yet special 
attention must be paid to a significant shift in Oedipus’ understanding of 
the pestilence. The king of Thebes initially tries to apply a rational method 
of research to the study of the causes of the plague affecting his reign: it is 
important to note that Oedipus resorts to divine help only after ‘having 
travelled many roads (πολλὰς δ᾽ ὁδοὺς, 67) in the wanderings of 
reflection’ and having carefully considered (σκοπῶν, 68) any option 
available. The word ὁδός has semantic relevance since in medical science 
and in the semantic field of intellectual process it refers to the research 
method known as successive approximations:  
‘The summary conclusion comes from the origin and the going forth, and 
from many accounts learned little by little, when one gathers them together and 
studies them thoroughly. […] This would be the road (ὁδός). In this way develop 
verification of correct accounts and refutation of erroneous ones.’ (Epid. VI. 3. 
12)349 
With these words the Hippocratic treatise Epidemics describes a 
research method that, by gathering and evaluating data little by little, 
progresses towards deeper levels of understanding.350 Given that men, 
unlike deities, do not possess omniscient knowledge, they must approach 
any problem in a set of stages that should gradually add to their 
understanding. 
                                                 
349 Cf. Hp. VM. 2.2 (Schiefsky, 2005, ad loc).  
350 Stella (2010) on 67; Cambiano (1991).  
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Since Oedipus is unable to find a solution, he finally resigns himself 
to resorting to the oracle of Apollo but his intention is not so much to find 
out what the Thebans are guilty of and how they can make amends as to 
learn from the prophetic god what actions he should take to deliver his 
people from the plague. Therefore, he does not initially interpret the 
plague as a catastrophe arising from μίασμα. He rather consults the oracle 
to find out the natural causes of the plague and the best measures to 
eradicate the disease. This is made evident by the fact that, when Oedipus 
asserts that oracular consultation is the only remedy left (ἴασιν μόνην, 68), 
he uses a word belonging to the semantic field of medical science: that is, 
ἴασις, which literally means ‘healing’.351 This might indicate that Oedipus 
is still far away from understanding what the real meaning of the plague 
is. He is not looking either for past offences for which the wrongdoers 
must make amends or for the culprits in order to punish them. He is 
rather searching for the most effective remedies against the plague.  
One could argue that these two types of intention coincide as the 
only way to find a cure for the pestilence will turn out to be precisely the 
punishment of the person guilty of causing the pollution arising from the 
slaughter of the previous king Laius. The change of focus in Oedipus’ 
speech, however, is striking. It is only later that the oracle itself leads 
Oedipus back to a more religious interpretation of the pestilence (95-107), 
which is based on the nexus between guilt and pollution, and between 
punishment and purification,352 and this view is later confirmed by the 
chorus: 
                                                 
351 Hp. Aph. 2. 17. Stella (2010), on 68; Vegetti (1983).  
352 The oracle clearly orders Oedipus to cure the Theban land from pollution (μίασμα, 97) 
by punishing the killers of Laius (95-107), and Oedipus promises that he shall do 
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ὦ Διὸς ἁδυεπὲς φάτι, τίς ποτε 
τᾶς πολυχρύσου  
Πυθῶνος ἀγλαὰς ἔβας  
Θήβας; ἐκτέταμαι φοβερὰν φρένα 
δείματι πάλλων,  
ἰήιε Δάλιε Παιάν,  
ἀμφὶ σοὶ ἁζόμενος τί μοι ἢ νέον  
ἢ περιτελλομέναις ὥραις πάλιν  
ἐξανύσεις χρέος. 
(S. OT. 151-6) 
 
O sweetly-speaking message of Zeus, in what spirit have you come to 
glorious Thebes from golden Pytho? I am on the rack, terror shakes my soul, O 
Delian healer to whom wild cries rise, in holy fear of you, wondering what debt 
you will extract from me, perhaps unknown before, perhaps renewed with the 
revolving years. 
Interestingly, this passage focuses on the physical effects and on the 
emotions felt by the chorus in connection with their ideas of what the 
epidemic might mean in terms of human losses caused by divine wrath. 
The chorus is in a state of fear (φοβερὰν φρένα δείματι, 152-3) and 
religious awe (ἁζόμενος, 155) towards the prophetic word of Apollo and 
shudders (πἁλλων, 153) at the thought of what debt the god will require 
Thebes to pay. Such bodily symptoms (shudder, 153) and emotions (terror, 
152-3) reveal something about the way in which the chorus interprets the 
epidemic: the elderly Thebans believe that the gods are responsible for the 
outbreak of the plague in Thebes. In this regard, it is noteworthy to 
mention Aristotle’s definition of fear: it arises ‘from an impression of a 
future evil’, which typically comprises judgements concerning the hostile 
attitude of others and their relative power in comparison with one’s 
                                                                                                                                     
anything to drive away the pollution arising from an unvindicated murder. As Holmes 
(2010), 265-74 argues in her analysis of Euripides’ Heracles, ‘μίασμα bridges two worlds 
by accommodating the helplessness of a body caught in a causal chain alongside the need 
to make someone pay for the damage.’ 
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own.353 In other words, fear is a socially conditioned response which is 
elicited by the awareness that someone or something has the power and a 
motive to harm you. In this passage, the pestilence is interpreted as divine 
punishment for a debt which has not yet been settled.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the plague could have resulted from 
divine agency does not exclude the possibility that it can also be explained 
in terms of natural causes. In this regard, the chorus’ utterance that 
‘unpitied, the children lie on the ground, spreading pestilence 
(θαναταφόρα), with no one to mourn them’ (180) is especially 
meaningful: the adjective θανατηφόρος refers to death by contagion and 
thus implies a natural process whereby the plague is spread from person 
to person. A striking similarity can be found between the idea of double 
determination expressed in the play and the kinds of enquiries concerning 
the nature of diseases in Herodotus and early Greek medical writers. 
Herodotus, on the one hand, maintains that diseases can be brought about 
by divine agency.354 On the other hand, his work is informed by certain 
ideas also current in medical circles, namely that diseases are natural 
phenomena and that nature implies a regularity of causes and effects.355 
This belief challenges the notion of divine intervention but Herodotus 
does not rule it out: he rather redefines the idea of divine agency by 
                                                 
353 Ar. Rh. 2.5, 1382a21-25. Konstan (2006), 129-155.  
354 See, for instance, the explanation given by Herodotus for the Scythian female disease: 
it is the result of a sacrilegious act (Hdt. I. 105; IV. 67). Interestingly, this supernatural 
interpretation of the Scythians’ impotence is criticized by the author of On Airs, Waters, 
and Places (22. 3J): Bottin (1996), 13-5; Thomas (2000), 28 ff. 
355 See Lloyd (1979), 15-29. 
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arguing that the gods, to punish mortals, work through natural 
processes.356 
By putting on stage a king who consults the oracle of Delphi not so 
much to find out a way to appease the Olympian deities as to learn what 
natural causes brought about the plague and what healing treatments are 
most effective, and by suggesting that the plague might be doubly 
determined, the play participates actively in some of the kinds of enquiries 
also carried out in medical speculation and historical investigation. It 
invites the audience to reflect on how the cultural codes according to 
which catastrophic phenomena such as the plague are interpreted change 
over time. As Ahl argues, ‘Oedipus’ belief that consultation of the Delphic 
oracle is the only possible way to deal with the plague would have struck 
many of Sophocles’ contemporaries as old-fashioned and not 
efficacious.’357 The scholar mentions the example of Thucydides (2.44) 
who, with regard to the plague of Athens, writes that consultations of 
oracles were ineffectual since the epidemic arose from natural causes. Yet 
the peculiar way in which Oedipus consults the oracle reveals precisely 
his interest in finding out not so much why the gods have brought about 
the epidemic as its natural causes, how it propagates, and how to hinder 
its propagation: he intends to draw on the superior knowledge of the 
prophetic god in order to face the plague in the most effective way.  
                                                 
356 For instance, Herodotus (IV. 205) explains the natural cause which brought about the 
parasitic skin disease contracted by Pheretima, queen of Cyrene: ‘while still alive she 
teemed with maggots’. Yet soon afterwards he also mentions a divine cause: ‘thus does 
over-brutal human revenge invite retribution from the gods’. Interestingly, the view that 
natural causes do not exclude the participation of the divine is also present in medical 
circles: early Greek medical writings such as On Airs, Waters, and Places (22) and On the 
Sacred Disease (2) argue that all diseases have a nature and, consequently, a definitive 
physical cause, while agreeing that they are also divine given that the whole of nature is 
divine. See Lateiner (1986), 11.  
357 Ahl (1991), 35-53. Cf. Fontenrose (1978), 41.  
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The OT artfully calls to mind such changes in the interpretation of 
natural disasters and hints at the predominant cultural codes of the time of 
the performance: it thus proves to be part of the intellectual developments 
of the mid and late fifth century, developments both in understanding the 
physical world and in medicine. 
2.2.1. b. Euripides’ Bacchae 
The plot of the Bacchae is driven forward by the fact that the city of 
Thebes doesn’t acknowledge the divine status of Dionysus. The Thebans 
suppose that the claim of a divine origin for her newly born baby is just a 
clever trick (σοφίσματα, 30) to which Semele resorted in order to escape 
the shame of an illicit sexual affair. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, Ion thinks the same of Creusa. Scepticism usually surrounds the 
myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals since such stories 
lend themselves to be turned to one’s advantage: anyone might easily 
make them up either to shift the blame on a god, as both Creusa and 
Semele supposedly did, or to increase the prestige of one’s family.358 
Therefore, scepticism about the divine origin of Semele’s child is not in 
itself atypical. Nonetheless, it becomes impious because it leads to the 
Thebans’ neglect of Dionysus’ cult. The problem lies in the fact that, as 
opposed to most of the myths of sexual intercourse between gods and 
mortals, in this case the offspring born to the couple is not a hero but a 
god.  
This in turn raises several questions regarding human knowledge 
of the divine: how can men know who a god is? How can they be sure that 
the one who claims to be a deity is not an impostor? From the audience’s 
                                                 
358 cf. Cadmus’ speech in E. Ba. 330-42.  
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point of view the divine status of Dionysus is never at stake from the 
beginning to the end of the play but, thanks to the chronological gap 
between the time in which the story is set and the time of the theatrical 
performance, the Bacchae makes the spectators reflect on this set of 
questions about the frontiers and limits of human knowledge of the 
divine.359  
Given that Greek religion lacked sacred texts, human knowledge of 
the gods, of their prerogatives and attributes, was partly based on oral 
traditions, and partly on written texts expounding ancient myths. The 
Bacchae dramatizes the problematic arrival of a new god who has no 
tradition corroborating his claims to divine authority. How can Dionysus 
thus prove that he is a god? Dionysus’ response is to put on a show.  
The third episode begins with the terrific epiphany of Dionysus: 
while the chorus is alone on stage, for the first time the god manifestly 
reveals himself through his loud voice (ὁ κέλαδος, 578).360 In the course of 
the play he never appears in front of his θίασος in his true form:361 the 
maenads cannot see him but can now hear him. The syntax of the brief 
dialogue between the god and his initiates is elementary and 
                                                 
359 Before the publication of the Mycenaean lamellae (Beltrametti, 2007, 13-64), the Bacchae 
was interpreted as a play representing a historical event, that is the introduction in 
Athens of a new religious cult either from Thrace (Rohde, 1970) or from Macedonia 
(Dodds, 1944). The decipherment of the name of Dionysus on a Linear B tablet from 
Pylos, however, proved that Dionysus was worshipped during the Mycenaean period as 
well: Seaford (1996), 44-52. Therefore, at the time of the performance, the divine status of 
Dionysus is not at stake nor is it a recent acquisition. For an analysis of additional 
interpretations of Dionysus’ arrival in the Bacchae, see Winnington- Ingram (1948), 
Sabbatucci (1979), Versnel (1990), Burkert (1999).    
360 Dionysus needs to repeat his call (ἰὼ ἰώ, πάλιν αὐδῶ, 580) because the chorus cannot 
understand either who is speaking or where the voice comes from (τίς ὅδε, τίς ὅδε πόθεν 
ὁ κέλαδος/ ἀνά μ᾽ ἐκάλεσεν Εὐίου; 578-9). 
361 Only at the end of the play does he shows himself on the θεολογεῖον: in his role as 
deus ex machina he predicts Cadmus’ and Agave’s fate (1330-43).  
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fragmented:362 Dionysus first invites them to listen to him (κλύετ᾽ ἐμᾶς 
κλύετ᾽ αὐδᾶς, 576), and then invokes the goddess Earthquake (Ἔννοσι 
πότνια, 585) asking her to shake the earth so that Pentheus’ palace falls 
down. Therefore, the god manifests himself by means of his voice (αὐδᾶς, 
576; ὁ κέλαδος, 578; πάλιν αὐδῶ, 580), a shout (ἀλαλάζεται, 592), the 
earthquake (591-2, 605-6) and the flame of lightning (594-5, 598-9). Soon 
after such a powerful divine manifestation a messenger enters the stage 
and reports a series of marvels that had happened on Mount Cithaeron 
(666 ff).363 
Pentheus’ attitude towards these miracles is worth comparing and 
contrasting with the reactions of other characters on stage. The messenger 
who reports the marvellous facts that had occurred on Mount Cithaeron 
correctly infers that ‘some god was at work’ (οὐκ ἄνευ θεῶν τινος, 764) 
and, as a consequence, urges the king to receive Dionysus into the city 
(769-70): for, if Pentheus had been there and seen that, he would have 
approached in prayer the god that he now blames (712-3). According to 
the messenger, the vision of θαύματα should instil in Pentheus faith in 
Dionysus. By contrast, the king of Thebes does not interpret them as a 
manifestation of Bromios’ divine power: on the contrary, he 
blasphemously threatens that the only sacrifice he will offer to the god will 
be the bacchants’ blood (θύσω, φόνον γε θῆλυν, 796). His disbelief may 
be due to the fact that he had not seen the wonders on Mount Cithaeron in 
person but he, as well as the chorus, was present at far more prodigious 
                                                 
362 See Di Benedetto (2004), n. ad loc., who argues that this is typical of mystical 
possession.  
363 Cf. the second episode (447-8) where a servant tells Pentheus that the bacchants, who 
had been chained up in the public prison, have just been freed of their bonds. The 
responsibility for this prodigy is ascribed to the Lydian stranger, who is said to be ‘full of 
many marvels’ (πολλῶν…θαυμάτων…πλέως, 449). 
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events, which occurred in his own palace at the beginning of the third 
episode: the flame of lightning (594-5, 598-9) and the earthquake (591-2, 
605-6). Pentheus’ reaction to such natural phenomena differs strikingly 
from the chorus’ response: 
Χορός 
ἆ ἆ, 
πῦρ οὐ λεύσσεις, οὐδ᾽ αὐγάζῃ 
<τόνδε> Σεμέλας ἱερὸν ἀμφὶ τάφον  
ἅν ποτε κεραυνοβόλος ἔλιπε φλόγα 
Διὸς βροντά; 
δίκετε πεδόσε δίκετε τρομερὰ  
σώματα, μαινάδες·  
ὁ γὰρ ἄναξ ἄνω κάτω τιθεὶς ἔπεισι 
μέλαθρα τάδε Διὸς γόνος. 
Διόνυσος 
βάρβαροι γυναῖκες, οὕτως ἐκπεπληγμέναι φόβῳ 
πρὸς πέδῳ πεπτώκατ᾽; ᾔσθεσθ᾽, ὡς ἔοικε, Βακχίου 
διατινάξαντος † δῶμα Πενθέως· ἀλλ᾽ ἐξανίστατε † 
σῶμα καὶ θαρσεῖτε σαρκὸς ἐξαμείψασαι τρόμον. 
(E. Ba. 596-607) 
 
Chorus: Oh! Oh! Do you not see the fire, do you not perceive, about the 
sacred tomb of Semele, the flame that once Zeus’ thunderbolt-hurled thunder 
left?364 Cast on the ground your trembling bodies, Maenads, cast them down, for 
our lord, Zeus' son, is coming against this palace, turning everything upside 
down. 
Dionysus: Barbarian women, have you fallen on the ground so stricken 
with fear? You have, so it seems, felt Bacchus shaking the house of Pentheus. But 
get up and take courage, putting a stop to your trembling. 
 
Experiencing (ᾔσθεσθ᾽, 605) the earthquake and the lightning-
ignited fire terrifies (ἐκπεπληγμέναι φόβῳ, 604) the maenads to the point 
that it causes tremors in their limbs (τρομερὰ σώματα 600; τρόμον, 607). 
                                                 
364 At v. 599 I follow Seaford’s translation (1996) because the Loeb edition keeps the 
transmitted text (Δίου βροντᾷς), whereas the Oxford Classical Texts edition accepts 
Wecklein’s conjecture (Διὸς βροντά).  
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Trembling is an automatic reaction of the body to a frightening event: this 
bodily symptom is thus an indication that the chorus feels terror, as 
Dionysus specifies (605-8). This scene seems to reflect the initiand’s 
initiatory ordeal in the Dionysiac mysteries: the initiands were frightened 
in the darkness by sounds unseen and by terrifying apparitions,365  which 
caused tremor, sweating and amazement.366 The grief and torment of the 
initiands were ended by the appearance of mystic light which brought joy, 
calm and salvation.367 Soon after the palace of Pentheus is burnt up, 
Dionysus manifests himself and encourages the bacchants to stand on 
their feet (ἀνίστατε/σῶμα, 606-7),368 to take courage (θαρσεῖτε, 607) and 
to stop shaking (σαρκὸς ἐξαμείψασαι τρόμον, 607): following the god’s 
advice, the chorus gladly welcomes the mystic light of deliverance (φάος, 
608).  
Whereas the maenads immediately acknowledge divine agency, 
Pentheus seems not to understand what is happening. The representation 
of Pentheus’ response to the marvels focuses on the series of unsuccessful 
actions which the king undertakes with the aim of limiting the damage 
caused by the catastrophic events. First of all, instead of chaining the 
stranger, he ends up trying to bind a bull: he ‘pants out his wrath and 
                                                 
365 Several ancient sources describe the Dionysiac rites as including φάσματα (Pl. Smp. 
211a; Plu. fr. 178. 5ff Sandbach; Aristid. 22. 3; Pl. Phdr. 250b) and the imitation of thunder, 
lightning and earthquake by the use of kettledrums, ῥόμβοι, dances, and so on (A. frr. 23, 
57 R; S. Ant. 152-4; Hdt. 4. 79.2; Pl. R. 621b, Phdr. 254b; Schol. Ar. V. 1363b). See Seaford 
(1981), 259; (1996) on 576-641.  
366 The shivering, trembling, sweating, and amazement of the initiands are mentioned by 
Plutarch, fr. 178 Sandbach (φρίκη καὶ τρόμος καὶ ἱδρὼς καὶ θάμβος) and Plato, Phdr. 
248b (θόρυβος οὖν καὶ ἅμιλλα καὶ ἱδρὼς ἔσχατος γίγνεται). See Seaford (1981), 256; 
(1996), on 616-37.  
367 Cf. Plu. fr. 178 Sandbach. The mystic light emerging from darkness was identified with 
deity in Eleusis (Ar. Ra. 342-3, 455-6; S. Ant. 1146-52; P. O. 2. 53): Seaford (1996) on 608.  
368 As Seaford (1996) on 606-9 argues, ‘mystic initiates might be prostrate in the darkness 
when the mystic light appeared’: cf. Plu. fr. 178 Sandbach (the initiates ‘trodden on by 
themselves’); Pl. Phdr. 248 a (‘trampling upon and colliding with one another’).  
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drips sweat from his body’ (620), while Dionysus calmly (ἥσυχος , 622) 
sits nearby and watches. In this passage there may be a reference to the 
opposition between the calm and bliss enjoyed by the initiates and the 
painful anxiety of the initiand, which in the case of Pentheus cannot be 
turned into happiness because of the king’s stubborn rejection of the 
Dionysiac cult.369 
What is more, after the god kindles Semele’s tomb, he 
straightforwardly orders his servants to bring as much water as possible. 
In this regard, the stranger’s remark that their labour is in vain (μάτην 
πονῶν, 626) is worth noticing: divine fire cannot be put out.370 
Consequently, Pentheus’ command shows precisely that he does not 
attribute the ruin of his house to divine agency. Subsequently, the 
appearance of a divine light (φῶς, 630)371 in the courtyard, does not 
manage to transform Pentheus’ disquiet into blissful tranquillity because 
the king, as opposed to the chorus, obstinately refuses to embrace the cult 
of Dionysus: he runs out of the palace brandishing a sword against the 
light, which he identifies with his prisoner. Finally, after the royal palace is 
shattered and falls down,372 Pentheus still cannot see any divine hand in 
what is happening: at the end of the episode, he threatens the Lydian 
                                                 
369 For the mystic significance of ἡσυχία, see Seaford (1996) on 621-2, 641, 647, 790. 
Perspiration usually occurs in the initiatory process (Plu. fr. 178 Sandbach; Pl. Phdr. 248b). 
Pentheus’ disquiet, which may represent the initiand’s anxious excitement (πτόησις: Plu. 
Mor. 943c; Arist. Quint. De Mus.3. 25) has already been noted by Cadmus in the first 
episode (ὡς ἐπτόηται, 214). See also Seaford (1996) on 214; (2006), 52.  
370 Interestingly, the uninitiated or those who disregard the mysteries are believed to be 
condemned to carry water in leaky jars (Pl. Grg. 493a-b; Paus. 10. 31. 9-11). Cf. Seaford 
(1996) on 625-6.  
371 φάσμ’ Jacobs: φῶς LP. I follow Seaford’s translation (1996), who accepts the 
transmitted text and argues that it is not necessary to change the ms. ‘light’ into 
‘apparition’ since mystic light was a feature typical of mystic initiation.  
372 Dodds (1944), n. ad loc. argues that it was the stable behind the palace that fell down 
given that the backscene must remain standing throughout the play.  
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stranger, who has miraculously escaped his chains, that he will lock him 
up again (792-3). It follows that he has not believed the stranger’s 
revelation that it was the god himself who freed him (649-51).373 
The process of creating fear begins with a frightening sensory 
stimulus (in this case, the earthquake together with the flame of lightning); 
sensory data are then interpreted by the brain whose function is to 
determine possible threat. The same sensory stimulus is received both by 
the chorus and by Pentheus but their interpretations of it substantially 
diverge, as their emotional reactions suggest. The king of Thebes is not 
stricken with dread because he has interpreted the fire as a natural event, 
which can consequently be extinguished simply by using water. By 
contrast, the chorus views it as a supernatural phenomenon resulting from 
divine anger and, more specifically, from Dionysus’ determination to give 
resounding proof of his divine power. 
We should now wonder why Pentheus does not consider such 
prodigious and powerful events as evidence of Dionysus’ divine status.  
One of the reasons why Pentheus cannot see any divine hand in 
what is happening is that his vision has been distorted by Dionysus as a 
punishment for his impious attitude. While the gods can traditionally see 
everything,374  Dionysus takes advantage of the limitations of human 
                                                 
373 See also E. Ba. 498: ‘The god himself will free me when I so desire’ (λύσει μ᾽ ὁ δαίμων 
αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω). In this phrase there may be a reference to Dionysus in his role as 
Lysios. A similar ritual formula (ὁ Βάκχιος αὐτὸς ἔλυσε) is found in the late fourth-
century lamellae of Pelinna (Thessaly), which describe the Dionysiac mystic rituals. See 
Seaford (1996), 41, 190; Di Benedetto (2004), 117.  
374 E. Ba. 394. The divine ability to see everything is often praised in Greek tragedies (for 
instance, A. Supp. 139; Eu. 296; Pr. 567-9). This is the reason why tragic characters usually 
invoke the gods asking them to look graciously upon them (ἐποπτεύω, φυλάσσω, 
ὁράω,). See, for example, A. Ch. 1 (Hermes), 126 (the spirits beneath the earth that keep 
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vision: he causes Pentheus and Agave to experience altered visual 
perceptions of reality in order to punish them harshly. What is more, the 
god of παρουσία conceals his presence by disguising himself as a foreign 
devotee of Dionysus. Throughout the play nobody recognizes him, not 
even the chorus of Asian bacchants.  
Taking on a mortal guise, Dionysus arrives in Thebes with the aim 
of making his divinity manifest to mortals (ἵν᾽ εἴην ἐμφανὴς δαίμων 
βροτοῖς, 20). The presence of the god is manifested by means of three 
senses (smell, sight and hearing), each of which plays a different role and 
has a different value. Soon after his arrival he asks his holy band of Asian 
maenads to take up the drums and make a din ‘so that Cadmos’ city may 
see’ (58-61). In the same sentence two different sensory spheres are 
juxtaposed: sight and sound. On the one hand, the clamour made by the 
kettledrums merely fulfils the function of catching the Thebans’ eyes. On 
the other hand, this phrase may hint at a deeper meaning beyond the 
literal level, namely the opposition between sight and sound, which is 
developed in the course of the play: the auditory sphere, together with the 
olfactory one, is proved to be the most reliable sensory system through 
which the god reveals himself. In contrast, eyesight is shown to be the 
most deceptive sense. 
One of the most noticeable characteristics of the Lydian stranger is 
the perfume emanating from his hair.375 This is an accidental clue 
revealing the divine nature of the foreigner, but it is overlooked by 
                                                                                                                                     
watch over the house: ἐπισκόπους), 246-7 (Zeus), 489 (the spirit of Agamemnon), 583 
(Apollo and Hermes), 985 (Helios), 1064 (a god); E. Ba. 550.  
375 E. Ba. 234-6: ‘a wizard, an enchanter from the Lydian land, fragrant in hair with golden 
curls, having in his eyes the wine-dark graces of Aphrodite’ (γόης ἐπῳδὸς Λυδίας ἀπὸ 
χθονός,/ ξανθοῖσι βοστρύχοισιν εὐοσμῶν κόμην,/οἰνῶπας ὄσσοις χάριτας Ἀφροδίτης 
ἔχων). 
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Pentheus. Dodds points out that the Lydians used to scent their hair and 
that this habit was criticised as a ‘useless luxury’ by Xenophanes.376 It 
seems to me, however, that his perfumed hair is not so much a feature 
indicating Dionysus’ successful disguise as a distinctive peculiarity of his 
divine nature as well as of his mingled nature (θηλύμορφον, 353). In the 
πάροδος the chorus itself associates Dionysus with the smoke of Syrian 
incense (144-5). Moreover, several literary sources depict the gods as 
fragrant, and divine fragrances are sometimes the means by which men 
can perceive the invisible presence of a deity: scents are thus signs 
culturally recognized as indicators of divine nature.377 It is thus likely that 
Pentheus overlooks this clue because he misinterprets the divine scent 
emanating from the stranger’s hair as a mere indication of his Asian 
provenance and of the voluptuous habits of his land.  
Although the stranger exerts a force of attraction on Pentheus (453-
9), the king of Thebes rejects the introduction of Dionysiac rites into the 
city because he considers them a dangerous source of social disorder: the 
first action that the king of Thebes intends to take against the stranger is to 
stop him from beating his thyrsus on the ground and from tossing his 
scented locks.378 In this way, the sensory dimension of the Dionysiac cult, 
by means of which the holy band and the stranger have managed to draw 
the Thebans’ attention, would be neutralized. Therefore, at the end of the 
second episode, Pentheus orders his servants to lock the stranger up in his 
stable.  
                                                 
376 Xenoph. fr. 3 (ἀβροσύνη ἀνωφελής). See Dodds (1944), n. on 235.  
377 For instance, H. Hom. II. 277, IV. 231; Thgn. 9; A. Pr. 115; E. Hipp. 1391-3.  
378 E. Ba. 240-1. Pentheus expresses the same intent in the second episode: vv. 493, 495.  
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As a consequence, Dionysus significantly punishes the sceptic 
Pentheus, who relies on his eyes to inspect everything, by making him 
suffer from visual and perceptual disturbances.379 Similarly, the god 
distorts the vision of the Theban maenads so as to wreak vengeance on the 
sisters of Semele, who offended him. In the fifth episode a messenger 
reports the dreadful facts that have just happened on Mount Cithaeron. 
After Pentheus climbs a tree to get a better view of the bacchants (1059-62), 
the second epiphany of the god occurs. For the second time Dionysus 
reveals himself through his voice only,380 and once again he has to call the 
maenads twice so that they can clearly understand his command to kill 
Pentheus: ‘The maenads had not taken in the shout with their ears, and 
they stood there erect, turning their gaze this way and that. The god a 
second time gave the order’.381 Therefore, the bacchant women, as well as 
Pentheus, rely primarily on sight to gather information about their 
environment. Yet it is precisely through visual distortion that Dionysus 
impedes their clear perception of reality, whereas he reveals himself 
through the auditory sphere.382 The Theban bacchants hear the divine 
command distinctly and obey, but do not fully realize what they are about 
to do since they see double: Agave urges her sisters to catch the beast 
mounted on the tree (τὸν ἀμβάτην/ θῆρ’, 1107-8) in order to prevent him 
from making public the secret dances of the god (μηδ᾽ ἀπαγγείλῃ θεοῦ/ 
                                                 
379 See Vernant’s analysis of the two different forms of vision which emerge from the 
dialogue between Dionysus and Pentheus: Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 392 ff. 
380 E. Ba. 1078-9: ‘from the upper air a voice – I think it was Dionysus – shouted’ (ἐκ δ᾽ 
αἰθέρος φωνή τις, ὡς μὲν εἰκάσαι/Διόνυσος, ἀνεβόησεν). At the same time, the 
stranger disappeared (καὶ τὸν ξένον μὲν οὐκέτ᾽ εἰσορᾶν παρῆν, 1077). Vernant – Vidal-
Naquet (1988), 396 remarks that ‘the epiphany of the god takes the form of a sudden 
disappearance’. Both Dodds (1944) and Seaford (1996), n. ad loc. point out the similarity 
between this epiphany and the divine voice summoning Oedipus at S. OC. 1622-9.  
381 E. Ba. 1086-8 (αἳ δ᾽ ὠσὶν ἠχὴν οὐ σαφῶς δεδεγμέναι/ ἔστησαν ὀρθαὶ καὶ διήνεγκαν 
κόρας./ ὃ δ᾽ αὖθις ἐπεκέλευσεν).  
382 Dionysus brings about visual distortion by maddening them (1094, 1122-4, 1166-7).  
186 
 
χοροὺς κρυφαίους, 1108-9). It follows that they see Pentheus as both an 
animal and a man.383 When Agave begins the killing of her own son, in her 
eyes Pentheus is a lion only.384 
Turning to the reason for Pentheus’ disbelief, we can conclude that 
it is paradoxically his scepticism itself: since he does not honour Dionysus 
as a deity, he cannot enjoy the interchange of gazes with the god, which is 
granted as a privilege to his initiates alone.385 In addition to this, he could 
never understand the act of seeing as a religious experience involving the 
reciprocity of direct gaze between the god and the initiate: confusion and 
prejudices mark his visual perception because what he sees is driven by 
his voyeuristic desire and by his tyrannical urge to keep everything under 
control.386 The ability of miracles to elicit belief also depends on the 
subject’s desire or refusal to believe. Pentheus’ expectation of seeing illicit, 
profane and potentially subversive activities on Mount Cithaeron hinders 
the possibility that he correctly interprets what he sees as a miraculous 
display of divine power.  
Finally, Pentheus’ failure to link the earthquake and the fire to 
divine agency may be part of a broader discourse on the changes that can 
occur in the interpretation of natural disasters. By showing that these 
natural phenomena, which are traditionally ascribed to divine agency, are 
not given a unique interpretation on stage, the Bacchae might hint at how 
religion is forced to develop along with an increasingly complex world 
                                                 
383 See Dodds (1944) on 1106-10; Seaford (1996) on 1107-8.  
384 See the bacchants’ sacrificial shout at v. 1133 (ὠλόλυζον) and Agave’s exultation for 
their successful hunt (1143 ff., 1169 ff.). For an interpretation of Pentheus’ sacrifice as 
belonging to the tragedy’s pattern of mystic initiation, see Seaford (1996) on 1124-1152.  
385 E. Ba. 470, 500-2. For an analysis of the transition from ignorance to knowledge effected 
during the Dionysiac mysteries, see Seaford (1996), 35-44. 
386 Thumiger (2013), 235.  
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where cultural codes gradually change and interpretative options 
multiply. Since the shaking and the burning of the royal palace are 
described by the chorus as they happen, some visual and sound effects are 
likely to have been performed on stage.387 Thanks to the βροντεῖον and 
κεραυνοσκοπεῖον, theatrical devices for replicating the sound of the 
thunder and the effect of lightning respectively, the playwrights are able 
to make the epiphany of the god more realistic and perceptible to the 
audience too, while maintaining distance on stage and reminding the 
audience of the fictional nature of the performance. The theatrical 
imitation of divine manifestation through natural phenomena invites 
reflection on questions about divine identity: if men can imitate the ways 
in which the gods are believed to manifest themselves, how can one be 
sure about who a god is? How much power is required to qualify for 
divinity?388 
It is no longer sufficient for a new god such as Dionysus to prove 
his divinity and power by means of an earthquake or a lightning-caused 
fire because these events might not be unequivocally referable to divine 
agency any more. By representing Pentheus as reluctant to interpret them 
as manifestations of divine power, the play draws attention to the time of 
the performance and to how the cultural codes according to which such 
natural phenomena are interpreted may change over time.  
                                                 
387 This is Seaford’s thesis (1996), n. on 576-641. Dodds (1944) too says that an earthquake 
could be performed on stage (see A. Pr. And E. HF) although it is not possible to know in 
what way.  
388 In this regard the story of Salmoneus is worth mentioning (Apollod. 1. 9. 7): Salmoneus 
claimed to be Zeus and imitated the god by making the noise of thunder and the effect of 
lightning by means of bronze kettles and torches until he was punished by Zeus himself 
with a thunderbolt. See Whitmarsh (2015), 40-51. See also the story of Alexander of 
Abonoteichus in Lucian, Alexander the False Prophet: this false priest of Asclepius made up 
a new snake deity called Glycon, who was probably a puppet-headed trained snake, and 
established a new mystery-cult playing upon the credulity of people.  
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2.2.2 Changing Cultural Codes: the Limits of Human Knowledge About 
Divine Will 
In an increasingly complex world communication between gods 
and mortals becomes much more difficult. Both plays delve into the issue 
of the extent to which humans can gain insight into divine will.  
As far as the OT is concerned, it is worth calling attention to 
another reference to the process of changes in worldview and cultural 
codes by comparing the Sophoclean play with Oedipus’ story recounted 
by Odysseus in the Odyssey (11. 271 ff). According to the Homeric text, 
Epicaste committed a dreadful deed in ignorance of mind (ἀιδρείῃσι 
νόοιο, 272) but ‘straightway the gods made these things known among 
men’ (ἄφαρ δ᾽ ἀνάπυστα θεοὶ θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν, 274).389 Odysseus’ 
account is elliptical but it is significant that the process whereby men gain 
knowledge is described as a concession made by the gods soon after 
(ἄφαρ) the terrible acts occurred: human effort to discover the truth seems 
not to be necessary. By contrast, in the OT Apollo does not disclose the 
identity of the murderer/s. Human intellectual ability must come into play 
to solve the riddle and fulfil the gods’ will. It is acknowledged from the 
beginning that Oedipus will hope to find a way to protect Thebes by 
catching any hint hidden in any message either from the gods (εἴτε του 
θεῶν φήμην ἀκούσας, 42-3) or from a man (εἴτ’ ἀπ’ ἀνδρὸς οἶσθά που, 
43). Consequently, it seems that the series of actions undertaken to get to 
the truth and to free the Thebans from the pestilence is a double process 
where human and divine agents interact: in the OT the gods reveal their 
                                                 
389 Trans. by S. Butler. Cf. Dawe (1982), 1.  
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will through oracles but men must use their intelligence to fill in the gaps 
and to find out what exactly the gods want from them. 
The play, however, is permeated by a pessimistic view of the role 
played by human knowledge in mortals’ lives. We might wonder what 
would have happened if Oedipus had followed Jocasta’s advice and had 
not investigated further. And what if he had asked Creon to disclose the 
prophecy in private and had then covered up the shameful story of his 
crimes? The play provides the audience with a fatalistic answer:  
ἐφηῦρέ σ᾽ ἄκονθ᾽ ὁ πάνθ᾽ ὁρῶν χρόνος 
(S. OT. 1212) 
 
Time the all-seeing has found you out, against your will. 
The truth eventually comes out anyway even if it is unpleasant for 
the searcher.390 The thought underlying this sentence is that men might 
make no effort to acquire information, or might strive in their quest for 
knowledge and be either successful or not: in any of these cases, they will 
only get to know the same elements of truth that would sooner or later 
come to light anyway with the passing of time.  
An even more pessimistic utterance can be found in Jocasta’s 
invective against seers and oracles: she urges her husband not to pay 
regard to prophecies since ‘the god easily reveals the thing, the utility of 
which he pursues’ (ὧν γὰρ ἂν θεὸς/ χρείαν ἐρευνᾷ, ῥᾳδίως αὐτὸς φανεῖ, 
724-5). According to Longo, the words χρείαν ἐρευνᾷ condenses the 
following longer sentence: ἃ θεὸς χρήσιμα ἐρευνᾶν νομίζει, that is, ‘the 
                                                 
390 In this passage the adjective ἄκων cannot mean that Oedipus tries to conceal his 
crimes given that throughout the play he strives to find out the truth. It rather means that 
what he finally discovers is not something that one is pleased to bring to light: Dawe 
(1982) on 1213-4; Stella (2010) ad loc., by contrast, argues that the adjective ἄκων refers to 
the fact that Oedipus committed parricide and incest unwillingly.  
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god easily reveals what he believes that men should investigate’.391 This 
passage conveys a hidden meaning: whether men rely on oracles or 
successfully use their intelligence to gain knowledge, they can only know 
what the gods either let or want them to know. Jocasta’s aim is to divert 
Oedipus’ attention from the prophecy predicting parricide and incest by 
claiming that Apollo does not need to use seers and oracles if he wants 
men to investigate something. Yet Apollo did use his prophecies to guide 
Oedipus in his search for knowledge. When the king consulted the 
Pythian oracle about the identity of his parents, Apollo refused to answer 
his question and gave him another dreadful prophecy (787-93): according 
to Apollo, the identity of his parents was not something to be investigated 
by Oedipus at that time. The reason why Apollo obstructs Oedipus’ 
inquiry is that Oedipus must meet the fate reserved for him by the gods: 
he cannot avoid killing his father and uniting with his mother. He is 
allowed to find out what his origins are only after he fulfils the prophecy: 
it is once again an oracle of Apollo that, by commanding to punish the 
killer of Laius, spurs him to investigate into his own past.  
Yet is it really possible for men to understand divine commands 
clearly and unequivocally? After Oedipus finds out that he was the killer 
of Laius, Creon twice asserts that, before taking any decision, he must 
learn from the god what he should do (1439, 1443).392 Creon’s helplessness 
is indicative of the extreme difficulty that men have in understanding 
what the gods want from men. Even though at the beginning of the play 
                                                 
391 Longo (1972) on 723-5.  
392 In this regard, it is worth analysing a wordplay which puts human knowledge under 
divine control: the semantic field revolving around the verbs μαθεῖν and ἐκμαθεῖν 
initially refers to Oedipus’ rationalistic quest for knowledge (120, 308, 493) but, 
subsequently, occurs in Creon’s speech in association with the necessary comprehension 
of divine words (1439, 1449): Di Benedetto (1983), 91-3. 
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Creon himself reports the oracle which, according to him, ‘clearly’ 
revealed what measures were to be taken against Laius’ killer, he now 
feels stuck and unable to take action.393 The major factor hindering his 
decision-making process is the very fact that he has witnessed how 
Oedipus has totally misinterpreted two prophecies.394 To avoid similar 
mistakes, he decides to consult the Pythian Apollo once again. The content 
of the new oracle is not revealed on stage but the play is likely to have left 
the audience under the impression that it must have been as ambiguous as 
the previous two prophecies. The dramatic power of the ending of the OT 
rests on the tension between closure and lack of closure. 
Just as the OT gives no reassuring answer to the question of 
whether men can gain true insight into divine will as expressed in oracles, 
so the Bacchae presents an uncomfortable view of human ability to grasp 
the real meaning of an event which has been brought about by divine 
agency as a way to communicate with men. We have already seen that 
Dionysus reveals himself through miracles and powerful natural 
phenomena, such as the earthquake and the flame of lightning. Another 
way in which Dionysus tries to show that he is indeed a god is through 
the exemplary punishment of the figure who refused to acknowledge his 
divine status.  
One of the assumptions on which Greek religion relies is that the 
impious man will sooner or later be punished by the gods.395 Divine 
                                                 
393 For a different interpretation of Creon’s decision to consult the oracle a second time, 
see Ahl (1991) and Stella (2010).  
394 According to Vernant – Vidal Naquet (1988), 85-112, Oedipus, who does not 
understand the real meaning of the Delphic oracle about his birth parents, ‘is in the 
wrong not to bother about the god’s silence and to interpret his words as if they provided 
the answer to the question of his origins’. See also Pucci (1992), 105-22.  
395 Cf. E. Bellerophon. fr. 286 N².  
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retribution for impiety should therefore prove the existence of the god. Yet 
the play calls into question the reliability of factual evidence in religious 
matters concerning the existence of a god since it shows that the same 
kind of event - namely, the supernatural punishment of a mortal - can be 
put forward as evidence both proving and disproving the divine status of 
Dionysus. On the one hand, Dionysus uses this device to take vengeance 
on Pentheus and to affirm his divine power. On the other hand, from the 
very moment in which Dionysus was born his mother’s death has been 
advanced by the Thebans as evidence in support of the thesis asserting the 
mortal nature of Semele’s offspring.   
Semele meets her death under remarkable circumstances: she dies 
consumed in lightning-ignited flame. Both her sisters and her nephew 
Pentheus ascribe her untimely passing to Zeus’ thunderbolt, and assume 
that Semele must have offended the Olympian deity. How could she have 
wronged Zeus? Since she claimed that Zeus fathered Dionysus and her 
supposed divine lover killed her, she must have lied about having sexual 
intercourse with him (30-1, 244-5). It follows that Dionysus is not of divine 
origin but is rather a simple mortal boy. However, the conclusion they 
infer from this sequence of events is false because their arguments are 
fallacious. The Thebans, even though they correctly assume that Zeus 
killed the girl by striking her with a thunderbolt, fail to get to the root 
causes of her death. The reason why they misunderstand Semele’s story is 
that the deity who decided Semele’s punishment by death is not the same 
as the one who carried it out. It is Hera who tricked the girl into asking 
Zeus to reveal himself in all his glory, and she did so out of jealousy 
because Semele actually united with Zeus. That Semele died is a unique 
and unmistakable fact, and facts are much more reliable than words, for 
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words can be used to deceive. What Semele claimed about her privileged 
relationship with Zeus is of less value than her prodigious death.396 
Nonetheless, any fact may yield multiple interpretations.   
Since the Thebans have misinterpreted the reasons for Semele’s 
punishment, will they be able to interpret Pentheus’ chastisement by 
Dionysus correctly? Will divine retribution be an effective way for 
Bromios to prove that he is indeed a god? As in Semele’s case, the divine 
punisher is not the actual perpetrator of murder; Pentheus’ mother, 
together with the other bacchants, becomes the instrument of divine 
vengeance. Yet in the Bacchae the cause of Pentheus’ death is clarified by 
Dionysus/the stranger himself even before the Theban king dies: at the 
end of the second episode, he preannounces that Pentheus is about to 
walk into a mortal trap (ἐς βόλον, 848). He will be punished with death at 
the hands of his mother (θανὼν δώσει δίκην, 847; μητρὸς ἐκ χεροῖν 
κατασφαγεῖς, 858) so that ‘he will learn that Dionysus is in the full sense a 
god, a god most dreadful to mortals but also most gentle’ (γνώσεται δὲ 
τὸν Διὸς/ Διόνυσον, ὡς πέφυκεν ἐντελὴς θεός,/ δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι 
δ’ ἠπιώτατος, 859-61).397 It goes without saying that this release of 
                                                 
396 A similar opposition between words and facts is drawn in Euripides’ Helen: the tale of 
Helen’s birth from Zeus and Leda is as questionable as the subsequent λόγος of her ghost 
taken by Paris to Troy. Menelaus does not think that Helen’s account is trustworthy; he 
can only believe what he suffered (πόνοι, 593) during the Trojan War. According to 
Conacher (1998), 70-83, in this passage there might be a reference to Gorgias (Gorg. DK 82 
B3, B11), who argues that λόγοι are incapable of expressing reality. For an analysis of the 
opposition between words and fact in Greek tragedy, see also Goldhill (1986), 199-221, 
222-43.  
397 E. Ba. 860 ἐντελὴς Hirtzel: ἐν μέρει Diggle: ἐν τέλει P. This is a highly controversial 
passage. Seaford (1996) keeps the ms. ἐν τέλει and translates ‘he will recognise Dionysos 
the son of Zeus, that he was born to be a god in initiation ritual most terrible, but to 
humankind most gentle’, thus interpreting the word τέλος as referring to mystic 
initiation. Di Benedetto (2004), while accepting the ms. ἐν τέλει, translates it as ‘nella 
pienezza dei poteri’ (cf. Thuc. I. 40.4; I. 90. 5) since the primary aim of the punishment of 
Pentheus is to show that Dionysus has full rights to be worshipped as a god. Similarly, 
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information only enhances the knowledge of the audience given that 
nobody except for the chorus of Asian maenads is on stage. What is more, 
only the spectators know that it is the god himself who speaks through the 
stranger. Dionysus, however, spells out his intentions a second time on 
Mount Cithaeron. In the fifth episode a messenger reports that, after 
Pentheus climbs a tree to get a better view of the bacchants, an epiphany 
of the god occurs: 
ἐκ δ᾽ αἰθέρος φωνή τις, ὡς μὲν εἰκάσαι 
Διόνυσος, ἀνεβόησεν· Ὦ νεάνιδες, 
ἄγω τὸν ὑμᾶς κἀμὲ τἀμά τ᾽ ὄργια 
γέλων τιθέμενον· ἀλλὰ τιμωρεῖσθέ νιν. 
(E. Ba. 1078-1081) 
 
From the upper air a voice (I think it was Dionysus) shouted: ‘Young 
women, I bring you the man who is mocking you, me, and my rites: punish him!’ 
Even though Dionysus reveals himself through his voice only 
(φωνή τις, 1078), the herald’s conjecture (εἰκάσαι, 1078) that Dionysus is 
speaking acquires a considerable degree of probability thanks to what the 
voice says: Pentheus must be punished because he is guilty of mocking the 
rites (ὄργια γέλων, 1080-1) of the deity who is speaking. The word ὄργια 
reveals the identity of the divine speaker since this term usually refers to 
the secret rites practised by a group of initiates to mystery cults, such as 
the Eleusinian or Dionysiac mysteries.398  
A direct connection is thus established between the death of 
Pentheus at the hands of the bacchants and his scornful attitude towards 
                                                                                                                                     
Hirtzel’s conjecture, accepted by Kovacs (2002), highlights Dionysus’ desire to prove that 
he is a god ‘possessing full rights’: cf. Liddell – Scott – Jones, ad loc (ἐντελής).  
398 Theocr. 26. 13; A. fr. 57 R. The word ὄργια also occurs in connection with the cult of 
Dionysus in two inscriptions of the Hellenistic period: an oracle from Magnesia in Ionia, 
c. 200 BC [IMagn. 215; cf. Henrichs (1978); Seaford (1996), 36 and on 470] and an epitaph 
of a woman from Hellenistic Miletos, c. 276-5 BC [cf. Sokolowski (1955), n. 48].  
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the rites of Dionysus. Thanks to the god’s utterance, it is easier for the 
messenger to interpret all the following remarkable events: the bacchants’ 
frenzy caused by the bacchic god (1094, 1122-4) and Agave’s supernatural 
strength, which is also put in her hands by Bromios (1128).  News of 
Pentheus’ disgrace also reaches Cadmus’ ears: he repeats the god’s words 
that Pentheus ‘meant to mock the god and his rites’ (ἐκερτόμει θεὸν σάς 
τε βακχείας, 1293) and adds that, as a consequence, the king was 
punished by Dionysus justly, yet excessively (ἐνδίκως μὲν ἀλλ’ ἄγαν, 
1249).  
Finally, there is a further epiphany of Dionysos at the end of the 
play: the god as deus ex machina once again proclaims his divine status and 
confirms what the real reason is for the calamities that have befallen the 
house of Pentheus: they treated him with contempt and were thus 
chastised (1330 ff).   
In the Bacchae all the characters, with the likely exception of 
Pentheus, do understand that they have been punished for having 
wronged the god (ἠδικήκαμεν, 1344).399 Yet a crucial question is left open: 
if Dionysus had not appeared as deus ex machina to explain how he wove 
events together to accomplish his will, would the characters have been 
able to grasp the meaning of their punishment anyway or not? At least as 
far as the interpretation of supernatural events is concerned, the play 
                                                 
399 Agave: v. 1296, 1374-6; Cadmus: vv. 1249-50, 1297, 1302-5, 1344-6; Chorus: 1327-8. As 
to Pentheus, the text leaves the issue of his understanding unclear. When the king is 
about to be killed by his mother, he implores her to have pity on her son and not to kill 
him for his mistakes (ταῖς ἐμαῖς ἁμαρτίαισι, 1120-1). However, it is not specified 
whether Pentheus has just understood that he wronged Dionysus by depriving him of 
the honours due to a god or whether the term αἱ ἁμαρτίαι merely refers to the fact that 
the king tried to spy craftily on the bacchants (838, 955), that is ‘to see what he should not 
see, and eagerly try what should not be tried’ (912-3). 
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seems to entertain the view that human intellect needs the help of the 
god’s authoritative voice to be able to interpret a fact in the correct way.400 
2.2.3 The Emotional Construction of Religious Beliefs and Experience 
The OT and the Bacchae call into question the efficacy of 
communication between gods and mortals by representing phenomena, 
which are culturally-recognized divine manifestations, as susceptible to 
multiple interpretations. Even the punishment of the wrongdoers, which 
is traditionally indisputable evidence of the existence of the god, is shown 
in the Euripidean tragedy to be subject to misinterpretation and, as a 
consequence, not fully reliable.  
What are then the grounds of ancient Greek religious beliefs and 
experience? 
The asymmetrical relationship between gods and mortals is 
founded on two basic emotions: fear and hope. Lucian, the second-century 
CE satirist, describes the reasons why a certain Alexander and his friend 
decided to introduce the new cult of the snake-god Glykon in these words: 
‘they readily understood that human life is ruled by two great tyrants, 
hope and fear […]. Thanks to these two tyrants, men continually visited 
the sanctuaries and sought to learn the future in advance, and to that end 
sacrificed hecatombs and dedicated ingots of gold’.401 
Fear and hope are thus the emotional states that most likely 
characterize the worshippers approaching a god. I have already discussed 
                                                 
400 Divine epiphanies, however, are only a rare occurrence beyond the theatrical space: 
see, for instance, the alleged epiphany of Pan to Philippides before the battle of Marathon 
(Hdt. VI. 105).  
401 Luc. Alex. 8, Chaniotis (2012), 205.  
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the passage in the OT (152-6) where the elderly Thebans are seized by a 
mixture of awe (ἁζόμενος, 15) and terror (δείματι, 153) at the sight of the 
plague’s propagation since they interpret it as a sign of the scourge of 
divine anger. What I have not pointed out is that soon afterwards they 
invoke for help the immortal voice of the god by calling it ‘the child of 
golden Hope’ (χρυσέας τέκνον Ἐλπίδος, 158). The fear of the gods must 
be accompanied by hope for the relationship to work successfully.402 As 
Chaniotis points out, in narrative of human encounters with the divine, 
the gods often urge mortals to ‘have courage’ (θαρρεῖν or θαρσεῖν).403 The 
use of such imperative verb phrase presupposes the reality of fear and the 
necessity of hope, conditiones sine qua non of religious belief and 
experience.  
A significant example is Dionysus/the stranger’s exhortation to the 
chorus of Asian bacchants, who have fallen to the ground out of terror in 
the palace-miracle scene, to have courage (θαρσεῖτε, 607). Dionysus’ 
miracles prove his divine power and status by instilling fear in humans. 
For his cult to be successful, however, it has to appeal to, and be accepted 
by people. In fact, Dionysus’ nature comprises not only a vengeful, 
destructive side but also a beneficial and life-giving aspect. Such a dual 
nature is well exemplified by the thyrsus, one of the attributes of the god, 
which can have propitious and harmful effects: it can function both as a 
                                                 
402 For an analysis of the construction of fear and hope in ancient Greek religious 
experience, see Martzavou’s study of the healing miracles of Epidaurus in Chaniotis 
(2012) (ed.), 177-204.  
403 For a discussion of epigraphic evidence testifying to the use of such imperative, see 
Chaniotis (2012), 205-207.  
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supernatural source of water, wine and honey (704-7; 710-11) and as a 
violent weapon (25, 113, 762-3, 1099-1100).404 
The joys associated with Dionysiac worship are present in the 
chorus’s entrance song (64-166): blessed (μάκαρ, 72) is the man who, 
‘happy (εὐδαίμων, 72) in knowing the Dionysiac mysteries, makes his life 
pure’ and dancing (χορεύσει, 114; χοροῖς, 148) for the god is called ‘a toil 
that is sweet’ (πόνον ἡδὺν, 66)  and ‘a weariness that wearies happily’ 
(κάματον τ’ εὐκάματον, 67). Several ancient sources associate mystic 
initiation with dance, and dance is explicitly linked to the mystic transition 
from anxiety to joy by Plutarch.405 
A further characteristic of Dionysiac mysteries is to make the 
initiates feel younger and energetic:406  
Κάδμος 
ποῖ δεῖ χορεύειν, ποῖ καθιστάναι πόδα 
καὶ κρᾶτα σεῖσαι πολιόν; ἐξηγοῦ σύ μοι 
γέρων γέροντι, Τειρεσία· σὺ γὰρ σοφός. 
ὡς οὐ κάμοιμ᾽ ἂν οὔτε νύκτ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ἡμέραν 
θύρσῳ κροτῶν γῆν· ἐπιλελήσμεθ᾽ ἡδέως 
γέροντες ὄντες. Τειρεσίας ταὔτ᾽ ἐμοὶ πάσχεις ἄρα· 
κἀγὼ γὰρ ἡβῶ κἀπιχειρήσω χοροῖς. 
(E. Ba. 184-190) 
 
Kadmos 
Where must I dance, where set my feet and shake my grey head? Show me 
the way, Teiresias, one old man leading another; for you are wise. And so I shall 
never tire night or day striking the ground with the thyrsos. Gladly I have 
forgotten that I am old. 
Teiresias 
                                                 
404 Chaston (2010), 200 ff.  
405 Plu. Mor. 1105; fr. 178; Luc. Salt. 15; E. Ba. 20-22; Ar. Ra. 357. Seaford (2006), 53, 69-70.  
406 A. fr. 264 R; Ar. Ra. 344 ff; Pl. Lg. 666 b-c. Cf. Seaford (1996), ad loc.  
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Then you and I have the same feelings, for I too feel young407 and will try 
to dance. 
Both Cadmos and Teiresias have the same feelings (ταὔτ᾽ ἐμοὶ 
πάσχεις ἄρα, 189): they think young again (ἡβῶ, 190). The sense of 
rejuvenation experienced by Cadmos and Teiresias persuades them that 
honouring Dionysus with dances is the right thing to do even though they 
are old. In fact, Dionysus ‘does not distinguish between the young man 
having to dance and the older man’ (206-7). By contrast, Pentheus, as soon 
as he discerns the two old men playing the bacchants, cannot see anything 
sacred in it but rather finds the behaviour of Cadmus and Teiresias both 
amusing (πολὺν γέλων, 250) and inappropriate (νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, 252). 
Pentheus’ laughter arises from what he considers an incongruous 
happening: since Pentheus has never experienced such sense of 
rejuvenation brought about by the Dionysiac experience, he cannot 
understand what is going on.  
In this regard, it is worth paying attention to the use of laughter in 
the Bacchae and to its meaning.408 Dionysus is also portrayed as laughing at 
Pentheus on two occasions, when Pentheus’ servant ties him up (γελῶν, 
439) and when the god is about ‘to cast the deadly noose upon the 
bacchants’ hunter’ (προσώπῳ γελῶντι, 1021). Dionysus’ laughter conveys 
an awareness of superior knowledge and power. Nonverbal 
communication reveals thought and emotion but there is a difference 
between Pentheus’ amusement at the sight of the old couple dancing and 
Dionysus’ laugh (439, 1021). Whereas in the latter case it indicates that the 
                                                 
407 The literal translation of ἡβῶ is ‘I am young’. 
408 For a discussion of the three modern theories of laughter (the superiority theory, the 
incongruity theory and the relief theory), see Beard (2014), 28 ff; Bennett – Royle (2016), 
96-105: Halliwell (2008).  
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god has taken full and firm control of the situation and can thus afford to 
scoff at his opponent, in the former case it rather suggests Pentheus’ 
arrogance and self-delusion. At the end of the tragedy, the king himself 
degenerates from intimidating power into an object of derision as he is led 
through the city in woman’s dress (854-5).  
Dionysus’ ambiguous laughter has also been interpreted by more 
than one scholar as a clue to the enigmatic nature of the god as δεινότατος 
and ἠπιώτατος (861) to the point that it has been suggested that Euripides 
used a smiling mask in the Bacchae, an anomaly among tragic masks, 
which usually present a neutral expression.409 The hypothesis of the 
smiling mask has been recently challenged on the ground of lack of 
sufficient textual evidence.410 First of all, it has been pointed out that the 
text never describe the god as smiling but rather as laughing since the verb 
γέλαω is used instead of μεδιάω  (380, 439, 1021). In addition to this, the 
only passage where the technical term for theatrical mask is used to 
describe the laughing god (πρωσώπωι γελῶντι, 1021) cannot be adduced 
as a convincing proof of an actual mask on stage since ‘it is a desired 
rather than a real scene of hunting that is described, the laughing face 
belongs to Dionysus rather than the stranger, and it is as a θήρ in which 
the god is invoked – not in human or divine form.’411  
Even though Euripides is more likely not to have introduced a 
smiling/laughing mask in the Bacchae, it must be borne in mind that the 
tragic mask’s expression could be interpreted in several ways by the 
                                                 
409 Chaston (2010), 182 ff; Goldhill (1986), 260;  Foley (1980), 127-8, 132. Cf. also Seaford 
(1996), 186.  
410 Billings (2017), 19-26; Halliwell (2008), 136-7; Wiles (2007), 221-2.  
411 Billings (2017), 23.  
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spectators depending on the angle from which the mask was looked at.412 
In other words, it was not necessary to use a smiling/laughing mask to 
represent a smiling/laughing facial expression. This is further confirmed 
by Meineck’s study of the visual emotional function of the tragic mask: 
drawing on recent research in the field of neuroscience on mirror neurons 
and their role in cognitive experience, the scholar argues that ‘the mask is 
extremely effective in stimulating our neural visual responses and creating 
active and engaged spectatorship.’413 The tragic mask exploits the 
spectator’s duality of vision: on the one hand, the ‘foveal vision’, which 
focuses on people, objects, details and ‘responds primarily to higher-
resolution (fine) images’;414 on the other hand, the ‘peripheral vision’ 
which, by responding to images at a lower (blurred) resolution, allows the 
audience to look at the wider performance space and at the surrounding 
environment. When the gaze of the audience moves from the performer’s 
mask to the background, and then back to the mask, such a visual 
fluctuation between fine and blurry images can trick the eye so that facial 
expressions might seem to change.415 For this reason, the blank neutral, 
and thus ambiguous, expression of the tragic mask is likely to have 
engaged the audience in interpreting the emotional states of the 
characters.  
Neuroscientific studies have demonstrated that people, when 
gazing at others, intently look for emotional markers, which include 
                                                 
412 Wiles (2007), 41-43.  
413 Meineck (2011), 126.  
414 Meineck (2011), 124. 
415 Mona Lisa’s enigmatic smile works in a similar way since the gaze of the viewer moves 
from the smile to the landscape, and vice versa: Meineck (2011), 120-1.  
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κίνησις, that is, gesture, dance, bodily and head movements.416 To connect 
facial expressions to the characters’ emotions and the wider narrative 
framework, the mask must work in synergy with space, words, music and 
especially bodily movement: by doing so, the tragic mask encourages the 
active cognitive engagement of audiences and facilitates individual 
emotional responses.  
Humans process others’ emotions thanks to mirror neurons which, 
by connecting the visual and motor cortexes, enable people to learn 
behaviour through observation and kinesthetic understanding:417 it is a 
form of empathic response that ‘can involve the neural processing of 
similar actions and even a mirroring effect in the viewer’s own facial 
expressions’.418 According to Meineck, such empathic response may have 
been heightened precisely by the masked symporeutic performance of 
Greek tragedy and by the performers’ reliance on choreographed bodily 
movements and conspicuous gestures in concert with words to express 
thought and emotions. Kinesthetic communication activated by mirror 
neurons may have strengthened the spectators’ emotional connection to 
the staged story by eliciting a physical response from them.419 Thanks to 
such shared bodily sensations, it may also have allowed the audience to 
                                                 
416 This is corroborated by research carried out on traditional Japanese Noh masks: see 
Meineck (2011), 126, 130-1.  
417 Rizzolatti et al. (2010); Rizzolatti – Craighero (2004), 169-92. Kinesthesia (deriving from 
the ancient Greek κίνησις, ‘movement’, and  αἴσθησις, ‘sensation’) is ‘the proprioceptive 
sense of movement within one’s own body’: Sklar (2008), 87; Foster (2009), 47.  
418 Meineck (2011), 129.   
419 As Meineck (2011), 136-7 points out, studies have demonstrated that ‘the muscles of 
audience members are stimulated when watching dance performances, where they 
experience a kinesthetic sensation known as motor simulation, and that the neural 
activity in the onlookers increases significantly when the dance performed is known to 
them’. This was likely to be the case of the Athenian audience, which was ‘familiar with 
dance as a cultural participatory activity’ (138). On kinesthesia, see Olsen (2017), Foster 
(2009), Sklar (2008).  
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earn the same knowledge that is somatically acquired by the characters on 
stage. For instance, the chorus’ comprehension of the dual nature of 
Dionysus – knowledge that, as we have discussed, is somatically attained 
during the palace miracle scene – may be interpreted as transferable to the 
spectators by means of kinesthesia.420  
Following on these considerations, the ambiguous mask of 
Dionysus/the stranger is likely to have captured the spectators’ cognitive 
and emotional engagement inducing them to interpret its facial 
expressions and emotional states. When the pose struck by the mask 
conveys a smiling/laughing expression, it may be interpreted as ‘a 
doubling of the god’s ritual role within the story’421 since it recalls 
Dionysos’ pillar masks, which are sometimes depicted as smiling on the 
Lenaia vases.422 Interestingly, the mask-column iconography of Dionysiac 
cult is also recalled, though by means of a tragic reversal, by Pentheus’ 
head/mask impaled on Agave’s thyrsus (1139-1143).423  
These symbolic connections might further enhance the spectators’ 
perception of Dionysos’ ambiguity, which includes both the promise of 
blissful ecstasy and the threat of violent retribution.  
The parallel between Dionysos and Pentheus is reinforced by the 
cross-dressing scene: the feminine disguise of Pentheus is an ironic 
reprisal for the king’s mockery of the feminine appearance of 
                                                 
420 E. Ba. 600 (τρομερὰ σώματα), 604 (φόβῳ), 607 (τρόμον), 607 (θαρσεῖτε), 609 
(ἀσμένη).  
421 Vernant (1988), 382-3.  
422 Chaston (2010) 183; Seaford (1996) on 439.  
423 Chaston (2010), 183.  
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Dionysus/the stranger.424 As Seaford suggests, Pentheus’ transvestism may 
characterize the king as an initiand since feminisation was part of the 
process of initiation, which entailed the passage from one state to another 
through a symbolic death: an argument in support of the interpretation of 
this scene as reflecting the initiation pattern is the fact that the king's robe 
is described as a funerary dress (857).425  
Pentheus, however, is a failed initiate: as opposed to the chorus, 
who in the third episode passes from the experience of solitude (ἐρημίαν, 
609) and of terror as manifesting in their trembling bodies (τρομερὰ 
σώματα, 600) to a state of supreme bliss at the sight of Dionysus’ 
appearance as a light (608-9), the king resists the transition to the 
communal joy which is typical of the initiates.426 Pentheus’ decision to 
dress as a Maenad and to go to Mount  Cithaeron to see the bacchants 
performing illicit sexual activities (esp. 810-6) is induced by Dionysus, 
who plays on the king’s innermost desires, and is part of the god’s plan of 
revenge. The punishment of Pentheus is the instrument by which 
Dionysus affirms his divine power and makes ‘the city of Thebes learn to 
the full (ἐκμαθεῖν, 39), whether it wants to or not (κεἰ μὴ θέλει, 39), his 
bacchic rites’.  It is the audience and, within the dramatic world of the 
myth, the Thebans in general who are supposed to learn from Pentheus’ 
mistakes. Divine ability to make use of human emotions thus plays an 
important role in Dionysus’ successful attempt to wreak vengeance on the 
                                                 
424 Segal (1982), 29 argues that in this scene Pentheus is ironically represented as the 
double of the god. 
425 Seaford (1996) on 833, 857, 912-76.  
426 In this regard, it is worth pointing out that Pentheus reveals his deluded attitude when 
in the palace-miracle scene he mistakes the light created by the god for the human 
prisoner (629-632). For an analysis of the transition of the initiand from isolated anxiety to 
communal joy, see: E. Ba. 72-5; Plu. fr. 178; Ar. Ra.156-7. Seaford (1994), 281-301.  
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one who scorned him and to make an example of him in front of the 
Thebans.    
2.3 Conclusion 
The analysis of the plays carried out in this chapter has shown that 
emotions, sensory perceptions and cognitive activities are closely 
intertwined in the characters’ process of acquiring knowledge. It has also 
been pointed out that the tragedies do not take a position in favour of 
either divinely inspired knowledge or human intellectual ability. They 
rather show that both modes of knowing can take either positive or 
negative values depending on the intentions and emotions shaping one’s 
inquiries. Emotions have a great influence on the acquisition of data 
through the five senses and on the processing of information by the mind: 
it can provide valuable insight into an obscure situation but might also 
affect the reliability of any kind of knowledge.  
Because of this danger, distributed knowledge, which is typical of a 
democratic system, is to be favoured since it can curb individualistic 
impulses and can thus prevent the distortion of information more 
efficiently than any other type of knowledge which may be kept under the 
control either of the ruler or of few privileged people, such as the 
soothsayers. Yet, in spite of this, we have seen that democracy, too, can be 
enticed by the tyrannical desire for power and for control over knowledge 
and may, as a consequence, be lured into manipulating information for 
political purposes. The reliability of any kind of knowledge, whether it be 
the autocratic knowledge of the tyrant or the distributed knowledge 
typical of a democratic system or the revealed knowledge of the seers, 
depends on the emotions and goals which spurs one on to start an inquiry.  
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The discourse on emotions and on the dimension of the body is also 
bound up with a discourse on the changes that can and do occur at the 
level of cultural codes shaping people’s beliefs and their ways of 
perceiving and understanding the world.  
I have discussed how, according to culturally specific codes, 
phenomena such as an earthquake and a plague are interpreted as 
displays of divine power. The belief that such powerful phenomena are 
divine manifestations helps mortals make sense of them and of their 
violent nature. Yet I have argued that the framework through which the 
plays illustrate how characters on stage make sense of events of this kind 
encompasses some of the preoccupations and ideas that were common to 
the enquiry of early Greek medicine and philosophy: medical writers and 
philosophers transformed the meaning of diseases and natural 
catastrophes by transferring causal responsibility from divine agency to 
unseen natural forces operating in the world and inside the body.  
This is supported by those passages where some of the characters, 
such as Oedipus and Pentheus, are not seized either with religious awe or 
fear at the sight of such powerful and unforeseen events. Their unusual 
reaction indicates precisely that they do not initially interpret these 
phenomena as divine acts signalling the gods’ wrath. They rather consider 
them natural calamities, which can be faced and contained by intervening 
at the right time with appropriate means: that is, with water to extinguish 
the fire that has broken out in Pentheus’ royal palace and by finding the 
best cure for the plague affecting Oedipus’ kingdom. Traditional 
theological explanations for these phenomena are thus displaced by the 
new nature-based interpretations.  
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Both rulers are eventually proved wrong and divine agency is 
acknowledged. Nevertheless, Oedipus’ disdain for divine prophecy and 
Pentheus’ theomachy against the new deity might have theological 
implications since these stories explore the possibility that the worship of 
the gods might be pointless and that mortals could actually live without 
the Olympians.427   
The Bacchae, for instance, invites reflection on whether natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes and lighting-ignited fires, are to be 
considered divine manifestations and attenuate their supernatural 
dimension by showing that humans can imitate these catastrophic events 
thanks to theatrical devices. If divine manifestations can be reproduced or 
at least imitated by men, how divine can they be? Similarly, if earthquakes 
or plagues are not the sign of divine anger but merely natural events 
brought about by natural causes, how can gods communicate with men 
and how can they reveal their presence or even existence? By the end of 
both plays, doubts about the divine nature of Dionysus and the value of 
divine prophecy are dissipated but the representation of Oedipus’ and 
Pentheus’ initial reactions to the gods’ manifestations presents an 
alternative to commonly held cultural codes. In the OT, for example, the 
                                                 
427 In this regard, it is worth pointing out the chorus’ reaction to Jocasta’s utterance that 
Apollo’s oracles should not be trusted (S. OT. 707-25, 851-58): ‘If such actions are held in 
honour, why should I dance?’. Jocasta’s distrust of divine prophecy thus brings about a 
ritual crisis which calls into question not only divine authority but also the value of tragic 
ritual performances such as choral dancing. See Henrichs (1994-1995), 66-7, 69-70: ‘In 
speaking of themselves as a chorus, the Thebans step out of the play into the 
contemporary world. […]. The convention of choral self-referentiality enables the 
audience to cross the boundaries between the chorus qua tragic character and qua 
performer, between the drama acted out in the theater and the πόλις religion that 
sustained it, and more specifically between the cults of the πόλις and the rituals 
performed in the plays. […] If a central aspect of the πόλις religion is called into question 
in the play, the ritual identity of the tragic chorus becomes equally questionable, and its 
dramatic status doubtful.’  
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plague is eventually interpreted as an event doubly determined, that is, 
caused by the gods working through nature. As Whitmarsh nicely puts it, 
‘the conservative ending creates a safe space in which dangerous religious 
ideas can be experimented without causing offence.’428 In the wake of the 
intellectual ferment of fifth-century Athens, the OT and the Bacchae thus 
explore different frameworks for interpreting divine manifestations and 
pave the way for multiple interpretations of those phenomena which go 
beyond human reason.  
                                                 
428 Whitmarsh (2015), 113-114.  
 
 
3. Divine Intervention in Aeschylus’ Eumenides and 
Euripides’ Orestes. 
An Analysis of How the Physical Presence or Absence 
of the Gods on Stage Influences Human Agency and Conveys 
Different Worldviews. 
 
3.0 Introduction 
Western contemporary culture emphasizes the importance of the 
will, namely that faculty of the mind that enables a person to act 
deliberately. The person is believed to be the true author of his or her 
actions, for which he/she is truly responsible. By contrast, in ancient 
Greece the relationship between the human agent and his or her actions is 
much less straightforward. The landmark in the scholarly debate on 
human agency in ancient Greece is the publishing of Snell’s monograph 
The Discovery of the Mind: the scholar identifies in Greek drama the 
emergence of the person as a free agent, in contrast to the Homeric poems 
where any human action is engineered by the gods.1 Snell’s arguments 
have been challenged from two different perspectives. On the one hand, 
some scholars have focused their efforts on the attempt to open up a space 
for human agency in the Homeric poems as well.2 Others, on the other 
hand, have tried to reduce the difference between the Homeric world and 
the tragic one by arguing that even in Greek drama decisions are heavily 
                                                 
1 Snell (1953).  
2 See, for instance, Williams (1993), 21-49; Halliwell (1990), 32-59; Gill (1996), 29-41; 
Holmes (2010), 7 ff. cf. Lawrence (2013), 8-10.  
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influenced by the gods since the characters often find themselves under 
the yoke of a supernatural necessity.3  
The ambivalence inherent in Greek tragedy’s representation of how 
humans come to make decisions is due to the fact that Greek drama is 
deeply concerned with the problem of the evolving concept of human 
agency: ancient Greek culture witnesses the evolution of human agency 
and responsibility from a religious conception of human actions as 
resulting from supernatural overdetermining causes to a new view that 
lays emphasis on the role of the human agent: the advent of law is 
believed to be the turning point marking the transition from one view to 
the other.4 Vernant places Greek tragedy at this historical juncture 
marking the passage from ‘heroic values and ancient religious 
representations’ to ‘the new modes of thought that characterize the advent 
of law within the city-state’.5 With the establishment of law courts, the 
religious conception of violent misbehaviour gradually vanishes, leaving 
room for the emergence of a new understanding of crime, which stresses 
the key role played by the individual in carrying out the criminal action: 
more emphasis is put on the intention of the criminal, who is no longer 
believed to have been blinded by, and caught up in, some sinister and 
supernatural force.6 
This chapter aims to investigate the changes in the relationship 
between human and divine agency through the analysis of the Eumenides 
by Aeschylus and the Orestes by Euripides. As previously mentioned in 
the Introduction, these two plays have been chosen for closer analysis 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Rivier (1963), 73-112; Lloyd-Jones (1983), 59-61. 
4 Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 62-3.  
5 Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 26.  
6 Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 62-3; Whitmarsh (2015), 75-86, 254 n. 3.  
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because they present different views on the process which led the hero to 
commit matricide and on the consequences of Orestes’ violent actions. 
Whereas in the Aeschylean version of the Orestes myth the law court is 
established as a replacement for the primitive system of private vendetta 
only at the end of the trilogy, in the Orestes the lex talionis is no longer in 
force from the beginning of the play: public legal procedures to judge 
criminal acts are already in effect and are depicted as entirely human. The 
Eumenides and the Orestes can thus constitute a rich source of information 
about the ways in which Greek tragedy represents the changes in the 
conceptions of human agency and responsibility that occurred in the 
transition from a pre-legal society to a society with law.  
Differences in the playwrights’ treatment of these topics may be 
motivated by the historical and cultural backgrounds of the plays’ 
production. In archaic Greek culture there is a tendency to infer divine 
agency both behind exceptional natural phenomena and behind any 
‘rupture in the fabric of the self’, which may be caused either by a violent 
emotion like fear or by a disease like madness.7 Physical and mental 
symptoms, as well as natural events such as thunders and earthquakes, 
defy rational explanation: therefore, the ancient Greeks usually attribute 
the occurrence of these phenomena to divine agency.  
Presocratic philosophers first attempt rational explanation for 
metereological phenomena: for instance, thunder and lightning are 
interpreted by both Anaximander and Anaximenes as resulting from the 
wind cleaving, or bursting out of, clouds with force.8 In the previous 
                                                 
7 Holmes (2010), 44-47.  
8 Anaximand. DK 12 A 23; Anaximen. DK 13 A 17: see Lloyd (1979), 15-29, 32-49; (1987), 
1-29. 
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chapter I have discussed how in the classical period, thanks to the 
developments in philosophical and medical investigation, both 
catastrophic events such as an earthquake and bodily diseases such as the 
plague start being interpreted as natural processes rather than as divine 
acts.9  
This chapter deepens the discussion of the changes in the 
interpretation of these phenomena by raising complex questions, among 
others, about the true nature both of the frenzy that in Aulis spurs 
Agamemnon to kill his daughter and of the madness afflicting Orestes in 
the aftermath of matricide: is such mental illness god-sent or does it stem 
from another, internal source? Are the Erinyes tormenting Orestes real or 
merely hallucinatory? Is Orestes divinely compelled to kill his mother? Or 
does his decision spring from emotions such as hatred and desire that 
erupt from a hidden space inside him and that he is not able to control?  
In answering these questions I will discuss the extent to which 
Greek tragedy is informed by, and develops, ideas drawn from 
contemporary medical writings, which transform the meaning of diseases 
and the concept of human agency by shifting responsibility from 
daemonic agents to unseen physical stuffs and to the person who should 
have the capacity to master the natural forces operating inside the body.10 
The concept of human nature begins to encompass a concealed inner 
space, a cavity inside the body, which was earlier believed to be an 
invisible realm of daemons. This unseen space is now reconceptualised as 
a site in which different forces (emotions, desires, and powers like ‘the 
                                                 
9 In the previous chapter I have also discussed differences and similarities in the enquiries 
concerning the nature of diseases in Herodotus’ investigation and in early medical 
writers: Lateiner (1986), Thomas (1997), Thomas (2000). 
10 Holmes (2010), 121-147.  
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hot’ and ‘the cold’) work in synergy: even though these forces retain some 
of the sinister and alien nature of the daemonic, they begin to be 
understood as subject to human technical agency.11 Hence, a new concept 
of the human subject emerges: man comes to be defined as an ethical 
subject, that is, a person capable of taking responsibility for one’s body 
and for one’s actions.12 In this regard, I will delve into the significance of 
the crisis that is created on stage in the Orestes when the violent act 
committed by the tragic hero as well as the hero’s subsequent frenzy are 
seemingly decoupled from divine agency.  
I will argue that such crisis is to be interpreted against the backdrop 
of intellectual ferment of late fifth-century Athens. In the second half of 
the fifth century the sophists, itinerant professional teachers and 
intellectuals, spread their teachings in Athens and had a great impact on 
the political and intellectual life of the city.13 They taught men how to 
make full use of their rhetorical skills in the legal and political arenas of 
Athens: their conviction that the power of language can make the weaker 
argument the stronger undermined security of expression and belief.14 
Moreover, the sophists formulated rational criticisms of traditional 
religious beliefs: they called into doubt the existence of the gods 
themselves and questioned conventional ideas about divine power in 
human life by identifying the divinities with natural forces and gifts of 
                                                 
11 Hp. Morb. Sacr. 18 (L) 6. 354. 12; 6. 394. 12-15; Epid. 3. 134. 2-15; Aër. 22; Art. 9-11; VM 3, 
15, 20; Prog. 1 ff; Alcmaeon DK 24 B4. See Holmes (2010), 148-191. 
12 Holmes (2010), 172-191.  
13 Kerferd (1981); Goldhill (1986), 222-243. 
14 Protag. DK 80 A 1, 6a; DK 80 A 21. For Protagoras’ relativism, cf. Protag. DK 80 B 1. 
Goldhill (1986), 227-236. 
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nature.15 To sum up, both medical writers and the sophists tended to 
dismiss divine causality, therefore attributing a crucial role to human 
actions.  
I will approach the much-studied topics of human agency and of 
divine intervention in the mortals’ lives from a particular perspective: my 
investigation is not limited to the narrative of the plays but is also 
concerned with their performative dimension. By ‘performative 
dimension’, I mean all non-verbal elements of a theatrical representation, 
which from now on, for simplicity, will be referred to as ‘stagecraft 
techniques’: these include (but are not limited to) props, scenography, the 
actors’ movements as indicated by implicit stage directions, exits and 
entrances, and so on.16 This study aims to discuss how stagecraft 
techniques are in a fundamental way interwoven into the thematic texture 
of the tragedies: the playwrights employ them to complicate the 
discussion of important religious and political topics, such as human and 
divine responsibility for the mortal characters’ misadventures and for 
their final salvation.17 Among all the non-verbal elements that constitute a 
theatrical performance, the different forms of divine intervention as 
represented on stage will be the main focus of this chapter: more 
specifically, I will investigate how the physical absence or presence of the 
gods influences both human agency and the way in which 
                                                 
15 Protagoras’ agnosticism (Protag. DK 80 B 4) and Prodicus’ natural theology (Prodic. DK 
84 B 5). Cf. Democr. DK 68 A 75. See also Gorgias’discussion on the relationship between 
language, knowledge, and reality (DK 82 B 3). Kerferd (1981), 93-99, 163-72. 
16 For a discussion of the meaning of performance, see Harrison – Lliapis (2013), 1 with 
references.  
17 As mentioned in the Introduction, important studies in the stagecraft of Greek drama 
and in the function of performance criticism are: Taplin (1977), (1985); Hamilton (1978); 
Sider (1978); Mastronarde (1979); Halleran (1985); Goldhill (1986), (1989); Wiles (1987), 
(2000).  
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Clytaemnestra’s death at the hands of her son and Apollo’s command are 
judged on stage. 
While the gods routinely appear physically on the Greek stage,18 
most of the time they are on stage for a short time: a god typically appears 
as deus ex machina either at the beginning of the play to establish the 
context and give background details or at the end of the play to explain 
what has happened and to predict what events will follow beyond the 
staged action of the play. In divine epiphanies of this sort the god is 
usually defined as an outside force, which intervenes in a formal manner 
to set things right.19 Only in two plays out of the extant Greek tragedies 
(Aeschylus’ PV and Eumenides), are the gods characters who truly belong 
to the action of the play: they are on stage for most of the performance and 
interact with the other characters.20 Whereas in the PV the physical 
presence of more than one deity on stage is itself the result of the decision 
to centre the action on the fate of a supernatural being, the Oresteia is a 
human saga in which nonetheless the gods play a key role. The 
significance of the gods’ physical presence on stage and of their 
interactions with mortals in the Eumenides will be assessed by comparing 
                                                 
18 Only Zeus rarely if ever appeared on stage. It is disputed whether he appeared 
weighing out the souls in the prologue of Aeschylus’ Psychostasia: Easterling (1993), 77 ff; 
Sourvinou-Inwood (2003), 463 ff with references.  
19 Dunn (1996), 41.  
20 Sourvinou – Inwood (2003), 459-511 distinguishes between two modes of interaction 
between gods and mortals as represented in Greek tragedy: ‘direct interaction’, which is 
typical of the Aeschylean output, and ‘distanced interaction’, which characterizes the 
extant Euripidean tragedies where the gods ‘only appear at a distance, in a spatially 
distanced epiphany on high, or on an empty stage unseen by the tragic characters.’ (ivi, 
469). As far as the Sophoclean output is concerned, deities appear in only two of the 
extant plays (Heracles in the Philoctetes and Athena in the Ajax) and their mode of 
interaction with humans is similar to the ‘Euripidean epiphany model’, a partly distanced 
interaction.  
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and contrasting it with the remarkable absence of the gods and Apollo’s 
delayed epiphany in the Euripidean version of the same myth.  
The argument of this chapter is that the different forms of divine 
intervention represented in the plays chosen for analysis (prompt vs late 
intervention, the gods’ physical presence and active involvement on stage 
vs the gods’ physical absence) are not merely diverse theatrical techniques 
but rather express divergent views on human nature, society, politics and 
religion.   
 
3.1 The Complex Relationship between Human and Divine Agency in 
Greek Tragedy 
Both the Oresteia by Aeschylus and the Orestes by Euripides closely 
investigate to what extent violent criminal acts, like the one performed by 
Orestes, are to be considered purely human actions or are rather 
influenced by supernatural factors, such as the divine will, inherited guilt, 
and curses. In this chapter I will explore how differently Aeschylus and 
Euripides make use of the physical presence or absence of the gods on 
stage to introduce a range of perspectives on human culpability and on the 
interrelation between divine and human agency. Before analysing how 
stagecraft techniques can shed light on the playwrights’ different 
treatment of these issues, in this section I will briefly review the scholarly 
debate on  the complex relationship between human and divine agency in 
Greek tragedy.  
Agency is the capacity of individuals to act independently, that is, 
to make and enact decisions. There is no doubt that mortal characters in 
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Greek tragedy have the capacity to make choices. Several tragic passages 
depict humans pondering two courses of action before they take their final 
decision. As far as the Atreid saga is concerned, there are two moments of 
crucial decisions: the first one is when Agamemnon wonders whether or 
not to sacrifice his daughter in order to let the Greek fleet sail to Troy, 
whereas the second moment is when Orestes must choose between 
avenging his father by committing matricide and leaving his father 
unvindicated in order to avoid unholy bloodshed.21 In the end, they both 
opt for the first option respectively and carry out their decision.  
Yet is the choice they make a truly free choice or is it somehow 
imposed on them? If the choice is imposed on the actors, what kind of 
constraint or combination of constraints is involved in their decision-
making process?  
It is a characteristic of Greek tragedy to be exploratory rather than 
affirmative, and to condense multiple strands of causality.22 Various 
interlinked factors come into play in the murderous actions that afflict the 
Atreid family.  
The murders committed one after the other by different members of 
the same blighted family, starting from the deaths of Thyestes’ children at 
the hands of Atreus, are all interconnected. The curse cast by Thyestes 
upon the whole house of Atreus is likely to play a role in the subsequent 
                                                 
21 Other famous tragic passages are Pelasgus’ dilemma in Aeschylus’ Suppliants and 
Eteocles’ decision in Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes. In this regard, it is worth pointing 
out that the tough choices that confront Agamemnon and Pelasgus are both described as 
‘heavy’ (A. A. 206-7 βαρεῖα […] βαρεῖα; A. Supp. 342 βαρέα, 347 βαρύς).   
22 Gill (1990), 19.  
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misfortunes suffered by the Atreidai:23 Agamemnon sacrifices his 
daughter in Aulis and is in turn killed by Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus.  A 
desire for revenge is among the reasons which arouse the couple’s 
homicidal impulses: Aegisthus wants to avenge his father Thyestes, 
whereas Clytaemnestra wishes to take vengeance upon the man who 
killed her beloved daughter. Finally, the murder of Agamemnon is the 
triggering event which prompts Orestes to commit matricide. That these 
two crimes are closely connected with each other is clearly signalled in the 
Oresteia by the fact that the same word (πληγή, ‘mortal blow’) is used to 
describe both the death of Agamemnon (A. 1344) and Orestes’ revenge 
(Cho. 312-3).24 The Atreid family is hit by an intergenerational chain of 
violence, which may spring both from Thyestes’ curse and from Atreus’ 
original guilt passing down through generations.25 Since there seems to be 
a taint of inherited guilt which interconnects the Atreidai and causes them 
to re-enact some past error, it is hard to see the members of this household 
as completely autonomous agents.26  
The murders of Iphigeneia, Agamemnon and Clytaemnestra also 
share a further characteristic: even though they are human actions carried 
out by human agents, they all have an element of supernatural causation. 
First of all, it was Artemis who angrily required the human sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia (A. 211): Agamemnon decided to immolate his daughter 
because it was the only way to appease the adverse winds that prevented 
the fleet from sailing (A. 214-7). Secondly, in the Agamemnon 
                                                 
23 Sewell – Rutter (2007), 71-77, however, argues that, even though the curse of Thyestes 
helps to inform the trilogy, its role should not be overestimated: ‘it is simply one of many 
intertwining strands of explanation for the action of the trilogy.’ (ivi, 75).  
24 Goldhill (1990a), 120-22. 
25 Sewell – Rutter (2007), 21-4.  
26 Goldhill (1990a), 120-22.  
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Clytaemnestra gradually merges with the Erinyes and with the δαίμων 
haunting the household of Atreus: she depicts herself and is depicted by 
the chorus as a divine instrument, the embodiment of an avenging spirit.27 
Finally, Orestes kills his mother in obedience to Apollo’s order (Cho. 269-
305).  
In all three cases there seems to be a divine necessity which induces 
the human agents to act as the gods wish in order to suit divine 
purposes.28 This makes us wonder whether these tragic characters are 
truly free to select from opposite courses of action or whether they merely 
see no other choice. The concept of free will, which is closely connected 
with the issue of human responsibility, underlies the formulation of this 
question.  
It is widely agreed, however, that free will is a specifically modern 
problem given that the category of the will is unknown to the ancient 
Greeks, as might be corroborated by the lack of any term which closely 
corresponds to our idea of it.29 In Western modern societies the category of 
the will presupposes that the person is the autonomous centre for his 
decisions, the true source of all the actions that originate from him. By 
contrast, all the ancient Greek terms expressing the notion of the 
intentional first and foremost have a wider and less precise meaning than 
the modern category of will since they comprise actions resulting from the 
                                                 
27 A. A. 1433, 1468, 1476, 1482, 1501-2. However, it must be remembered that at other 
times she vigorously claims responsibility for the regicide (A. A. 1379-80, 1394, 1405-6). I 
will delve into the significance of this contradiction in Clytaemnestra’s account of the 
regicide later in this section.  
28 According to Williams (1993), 104, divine necessities can be both purposive, ‘in the 
sense that events are shaped towards a particular outcome’, and purposed, ‘in the sense 
that they are designed by a supernatural agency that has a motive.’ 
29 Snell (1953), 182-3; Dodds (1966), 42; Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 49-84; Dover 
(1974), 150-1; Sewell-Rutter (2007), 150 ff; Williams (1993), 132 ff.  
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spontaneous impulse of a desire as well as actions stemming from 
reflection and deliberation.30 Moreover, in both cases the truest source of 
action does not reside in the subject himself but rather in the end towards 
which the subject sets himself in motion, that is, either in the object of the 
agent’s desire or in that which reasoned reflection and deliberation 
present to the agent as something enticing. Therefore, once an end has 
been decided upon, action necessarily follows, leaving thus no space for 
an idea of the will which corresponds to our modern concept.31  
In representing the characters’ decisions and actions, Greek tragedy 
always incorporates an inner necessity alongside the supernatural one. 
The definition of inner necessity, as given by Williams, is ‘a necessity 
encountered when an agent concludes that he must act in a certain way.’32 
It follows that necessity can be partly created by the agents themselves 
since their actions necessarily follow upon the agents’ recognition of what 
they must do. The concept of inner necessity entails the claim that a 
human agent can take a supernatural necessity and makes it his own, as is 
evident from the chorus’ description of Agamemnon’s decision to sacrifice 
his daughter in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon: 
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον 
φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν 
ἄναγνον ἀνίερον, τόθεν 
τὸ παντότολμον φρονεῖν μετέγνω· 
βροτοὺς θρασύνει γὰρ αἰσχρόμητις 
τάλαινα παρακοπὰ πρωτοπήμων. 
(A. A. 218-224) 
 
                                                 
30 See Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 49-51, 60, 65-6 who analyse the Greek terms ἑκών, 
ἐθέλω, βούλομαι and its derivatives, and βουλεύω and its derivatives.  
31 Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 58-9, 66-7.  
32 Williams (1993), 130-1.  
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When he put on the yokestrap of necessity, his mental wind veering in a 
direction that was impious, impure, unholy, from that point he turned to a 
mindset that would stop at nothing; for men are emboldened by miserable 
Infatuation, whose shameful schemes are the beginnings of their sufferings.  
Since the chorus emphasizes the fact that Agamemnon is under the 
yoke of Necessity, for some scholars he has no choice.33 Yet it has been 
pointed out that ἔδυ is a verb of action and cannot thus convey the sense 
that the king is submitted to necessity; it rather indicates that Agamemnon 
‘put on the harness of necessity’.34 The terminology chosen is especially 
telling since it communicates the idea that Agamemnon is not merely a 
puppet of the gods: he has actively made a divinely willed course of action 
his own.  
At this point, we might wonder where Agamemnon’s decision to 
put on the harness of necessity comes from. The chorus says that it stems 
from wretched frenzy (παρακοπά, 223), a bad counsellor, which 
emboldens men and causes them to suffer. Some scholars maintain that 
such a fatal frenzy has a religious nature and is similar to the divine power 
of ἄτη, which makes human intellect blind.35 According to this 
interpretation, it is Zeus who intentionally takes Agamemnon’s wits away 
in order to induce him to put on the harness of necessity and to kill his 
daughter: the sacrifice of Iphigeneia and Agamemnon’s consequent 
punishment are thus part of Zeus’ plan to fulfil the curse upon Atreus.36 
The main weakness with this argument, however, is that it does not take 
into account the ambiguity of the language used to describe the breath 
taken by Agamemnon when he resolves to kill Iphigeneia. Padel proposes 
                                                 
33 Denniston- Page (1957); Rivier (1963), 73-112. 
34 Williams (1993), 132 ff.  
35 Rivier (1963), ad loc; Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 76; Gill (1990), 19 ff.  
36 Lloyd-Jones (1983), 59-61. This thesis is rejected by Sommerstein (1996), 362-3.  
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the following translation of vv. 219-220: ‘breathing a wicked [breath? 
Wind?] of the φρήν, turning unholy, impious’.37 The scholar highlights 
that the object of breathing (πνέων) is not specified: it is simply said that 
what is breathed is ‘of the φρήν’. As a consequence, it is not clear whether 
Agamemnon breathes in a wicked wind from outside or whether he 
breathes out a wicked breath coming from within. The latter hypothesis 
implies that the impiety is a characteristic of Agamemnon’s ἦθος since it 
comes from within: if this hypothesis is correct, ‘of the φρήν’ means ‘made 
there’. In the former case, by contrast, the impious thought is described as 
coming from the gods into the mortal agent, that is, as entering the φρήν 
from outside. The ambiguity of this passage is likely to have been 
intentional: it serves the purpose of representing a simultaneously external 
and internal causation.38  
It follows that Agamemnon’s decision is not something forcefully 
imposed from above even though he was not in a normal state of mind 
when it took it; his decision is better described as the human agent’s 
appropriation of a supernatural necessity, which is not the result of divine 
frenzy or the taint of inherited guilt but rather depends on the agent’s 
inner dispositions and traits of character.39 Agamemnon is both bound and 
eager to immolate his daughter.40 Upon arrival at Argos, he himself asserts 
                                                 
37 Padel (1992), 92.  
38 Padel (1992), 90-8. For an analysis of how the gods can breathe emotions and thoughts 
into men, see Onians (1954), 51 ff. 
39 Sewell – Rutter (2007), 171. The scholar (ivi, 48) speaks of ‘a conjunction of inherited 
guilt with moral inheritance: in both authors, the doomed family’s recurrent misfortunes 
through the generations are mediated not simply through some mysterious supernatural 
means, but at least in part through the recurrence of traits and modes of behaviour, 
which help to create the recurrent patterns of doom through intelligible continuities of 
human character and action.’ 
40 Rosembloom (in Goff, 2011, 91-130) argues that ‘Aeschylus compels Agamemnon to 
choose between the titles «father» and «naval  ἡγεμών». […[ Iphigeneia is literally, as the 
223 
 
that the gods are jointly responsible for his safe return and for his 
vengeance on Troy (μεταιτίους, 811).41 The so-called ‘principle of double 
determination’ is working in this play: to quote Sommerstein, ‘it was 
inevitable that Agamemnon would sacrifice his daughter, but that does 
not mean he had no choice. It only means that Zeus chose the right man 
for his job’.42  
Similarly, Clytaemnestra knows well how to push the right buttons 
to persuade Agamemnon to commit the impious act of walking the purple 
carpet. The carpet scene is a repetition on stage of what happened in 
Aulis: the king of Argos once again faces a dilemma which strains the will 
and impels him to a fatal decision. Yet, whereas in the Aulis episode the 
process that led Agamemnon to kill his daughter is merely reported by the 
chorus, the carpet scene literally performs the hero’s decision-making 
process on stage and, as a consequence, allows the audience to gain a 
deeper understanding of the king’s character and inner dispositions.  
There has been much debate as to the reason why Agamemnon, 
despite being aware of the ὕβρις of the act itself, eventually decides to step 
on the precious tapestries.43 The prevailing tendency is to look for 
                                                                                                                                     
chorus calls her, «a preliminary sacrifice of ships’ (προτέλεια ναῶν, 227)’ (ivi, 106-7), that 
is, the preliminary cost of Agamemnon’s naval hegemony. Corrupted sacrifice is a 
recurring motif in the Oresteia: Zeitlin (1965), 463-508; Goff (2007), 81-82.  
41 The legal adjectives μεταίτιος (‘jointly responsible’ A. A. 811; A. Eu. 199, 465) and 
παραίτιος (‘jointly responsible’ A. Ch. 910) recur throughout the trilogy. The gods are 
said to be co-responsible because ‘in Aeschylus the tragic decision is rooted in two types 
of reality, on the one hand, ἦθος, character, and on the other δαίμων, divine power’: 
Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 77.  
42 Sommerstein (1996), 365. Cf. also Dodds (1966), 42; Lesky (1983), 13-23; Vernant (1988), 
72-77; Sewell – Rutter (2007), 136, 174-5.    
43 Agamemnon himself explains that it is impious to walk the red carpet because it is an 
honour reserved for the gods (921-2, 946-7). Another theory worth mentioning is that 
Agamemnon’s act of trampling upon the luxurious purple tapestries is equivalent to 
wasting the wealth of his household: he is afraid that a great shame (αἰδὼς) would fall 
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motivation in the ἦθος of the hero: scholars have come up with theories 
which vary from that of Agamemnon’s chivalry to that of the king’s vanity 
and wantonness.44 By contrast, Goldhill maintains that ‘it is not so much 
the weakness of Agamemnon’s character, as the strength of 
Clytaemnestra’s undercutting arguments that is indicated in this dialogue. 
It is the dramatic staging of the power of the rhetoric of persuasion in the 
pursuit of dominance.’45 To support his argument, the scholar highlights 
how skilful the queen is in redefining the meaning of the act of stepping 
on the carpet by postulating different circumstances: in time of danger it is 
appropriate to use part of the household’s wealth as propitiatory offering 
to the gods. Had Agamemnon pronounced a vow to make an offering to 
the gods, walking upon the red carpet would have been a duty (τέλος), 
the right fulfilment of that vow. Thanks to the manipulation of signs, 
Clytaemnestra is able to challenge social hierarchies by circumventing the 
power of male-dominated society to control discourse: by suggesting an 
alternative deceitful interpretation of the act of walking, she undermines 
the stability of Agamemnon’s initial intention and thus triumphs in her 
aim to kill the head of the household and the king of the city.  
To explain Agamemnon’s sudden surrender, which is at odds with 
his self-confessed awareness of the impiety of the act of stepping on the 
carpet, some scholars hypothesize that a daemonic force is already at work 
through Clytaemnestra: just as Zeus takes away Agamemnon’s wits in 
Aulis, so he does likewise in Argos with the aim of fulfilling the curse 
                                                                                                                                     
upon him if he ruined the resources of his house (948-9). See Jones (1962), 72-137; Seaford 
(2012), 200-201.  
44 The former is proposed by Fraenkel (1950), whereas the latter by Denniston-Page 
(1957). Cf. Lloyd-Jones (1983), 67-9.  
45 Goldhill (1986), 11-4.  
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upon Atreus.46 Yet there is no evidence in the text to suggest that 
Agamemnon is in the grip of ἄτη.47  
This episode, however, shares some similarities with the decision 
taken by Agamemnon in Aulis under the yoke of divine compulsion and 
informs the previous parallel scene, creating an implicit model for 
interpreting the hero’s decision-making process. In both episodes 
Agamemnon is under some sort of constraint, namely, under a 
supernatural necessity in Aulis and under the power of λόγος in Argos. 
Yet in both cases it is Agamemnon who in end takes his own decision 
according to personal motives and inner dispositions: the murder of 
Iphigenia, which is straightaway labelled as an unholy crime, can also be 
interpreted as being the best thing to do under the circumstances since it 
seems to be the only way to placate Artemis; similarly, walking on the 
carpet is a hybristic action in terms of Greek traditional attitudes but, if the 
context were changed in the way suggested by Clytaemnestra, it would 
become a duty (τέλος, 934) for the hero to perform. In the end, it is up to 
Agamemnon to choose from among the available options which act to 
perform and what meaning to give to his action. In both scenes 
Agamemnon makes his own choice, even though Clytaemnestra and the 
gods have undoubtedly had a part in triggering Agamemnon’s decision.  
                                                 
46 Lloyd-Jones (1983), 69, makes a comparison between Eteokles and Agamemnon: 
neither can fight against their doom because they are overcome by the Erinyes. The 
scholar, however, admits that, whereas in the Seven Against Thebes it is clearly indicated in 
the text that Eteokles is in the power of Erinys [cf. Solmsen (1937), 197-211], in the 
Agamemnon the evidence of the text is less positive (ibid.).  
47 In the carpet scene there is no report either of παρακοπά (vs the Aulis scene: A. A. 223) 
or of any other kind of derangement of mind which may be caused by divine forces: 
Lawrence (2013), esp. n. 46 p. 84, n. 52 p. 85.  
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Agamemnon’s surrender share some similarities with Pentheus’ 
yielding to Dionysus in Euripides’ Bacchae. As commented in the previous 
chapter, Dionysus too plays from within his victim’s inner self to induce 
Pentheus to walk into his trap and make an example of him: he makes him 
believe that, if he goes to Mount Cithaeron, he will be able to see the 
bacchants performing illicit sexual activities (esp. 810-6). By playing on the 
king’s desires, Dionysus convinces him to spy on the maenads, that is, ‘to 
see what he should not see, and eagerly try what should not be tried’ (912-
3). To be able to observe, undetected, the θίασος, Pentheus is gradually 
convinced by the god to dress as a maenad (821-38). Such a feminine attire 
serves a dual purpose. It not only makes the king an object of derision in 
the eyes of the Thebans (γέλωτα, 854) but also might symbolically 
transform him into a god’s follower. Transvestism is inherent in Dionysiac 
mystic initiation: through the ritual change of dress, the initiand is 
supposed to abandon his previous identity and to assume a new one.48   
The wearing of a dress of the opposite gender also plays an important role 
in ancient Greek puberty rites where young boys temporarily dress as 
girls before attaining full masculinity and becoming members of adult 
male society.49 Whether the cross-dressing scene recalls a ritual of passage 
or an initiation, it is represented as an unsuccessful rite: Pentheus cannot 
enjoy the joy shared by Dionysiac initiates and, losing his kingly power, 
regresses to an infantile state, ‘held in his mother’s arms’ (969) as a little 
boy. It is undoubtedly Dionysus that drives his victim out of his senses 
and ‘puts giddy madness in his breast’ (ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν, 851) so as 
to induce him to commit a transgression: this serves the god’s purpose of 
punishing Pentheus in order to give a display of power. Dionysus, 
                                                 
48 Segal (1982), 33; Seaford (1996), 30 ff.  
49 Zeitlin (1996), 346.  
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nonetheless, reaches his goal by releasing Pentheus’ innermost desires 
(ἔρωτα, 813). 
Turning to the Atreid saga, a similar combination of internal and 
external factors also seems to concur in both Clytaemnestra’s and Orestes’ 
resolutions to perpetrate murder.  
Clytaemnestra’s case is especially interesting since her violent act 
against the head of the household raises questions about female moral 
agency. As soon as she enters on stage after killing her husband, 
Clytaemnestra openly declares herself to be the perpetrator of the crime: 
she is so sure of the rightfulness of her action that she even dares to boast 
of the murder committed (1394).50 By contrast, the chorus refuses to 
believe that she acted alone and that she was in full possession of her 
mental faculties: her open boasting over the corpses of Agamemnon and 
Cassandra is so shocking that the Argive elders would rather suppose that 
the queen was under the effect of drugs (1407-9) or that a daemon was 
working through her (1470-4).51  
This contradiction in the accounts of the murder of Agamemnon 
has been interpreted as revealing a male-female conflict, that is, a 
fundamental opposition between the ways in which the ancient Greeks 
conceived the moral agency of the two sexes. Women were supposed to be 
confined to the domestic sphere of life and were not allowed to take any 
                                                 
50 There are several passages in the trilogy where the queen claims responsibility for the 
murder of her husband: A. A. 1377, 1380. 1404-6, 1421, 1497, 1551-3, 1567-76; A. Ch. 887-
91.  
51 Winnington-Ingram (1983), n. 42 p. 108. Foley (2001), 212-3 interestingly points out that 
the elders of the chorus prescribe the death penalty for the male Aegisthus only, who is 
believed to have acted deliberately, whereas for Clytaemnestra they propose banishment, 
which is the punishment for involuntary homicide.  
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sort of political action.52 The Agamemnon illustrates a total inversion of 
gender roles: the androgynous Clytaemnestra challenges male-dominated 
hierarchies by undervaluing the marital bond and by taking political 
action against the king of the city.53 By refusing her role as wife 
subordinate to her husband, she also rejects her role as object: 
Clytaemnestra openly asserts her sexual independence and shows her 
desire to rule.54 By claiming the status of a fully autonomous agent, she 
puts Agamemnon’s role as male subject at risk: when he is killed by his 
masculinized wife, the head of the household is reduced to the status of a 
mere object, a corpse.55 The chorus of Argive elders rejects Clytaemnestra’s 
claim to be a fully autonomous actor in an attempt to downplay the 
subversive potential of her criminal act. It would be too frightening to 
acknowledge that a woman is responsible for such a terrible action, which 
challenges male and kingly power; it is much more reassuring to maintain 
that she must have acted as the embodiment of an avenging spirit.  
What is puzzling, however, is that an oscillation between external 
and internal causal explanations for the violent act can be found in 
Clytaemnestra’s speeches as well. In the exodus she seems to row back on 
her previous claim: she disowns the deed and claims that it was the 
                                                 
52 Foley (1981), 139.  
53 Foley (1981), 127-68; Zelenak (1998), 59-72; Zeitlin (1996), 87-119; Holmes (2012), 126-35. 
Cf. also Foley (2001), 201-34.  
54 Wohl (1998), XIII – XXXVII argues that ‘Greek tragedy dramatizes the exchange of 
women as a socially constructive system. […] The exchange is built around the 
distinction between the male giver/subject and the female gift/object, but this distinction 
collapses once the woman refuses her role as object.’  
55 The identity of Agamemnon and the dignity of his role as male subject are gradually 
restored in the following two plays in the person of Orestes, the lawful heir to the throne 
of Argos. It has been argued that Orestes’ revenge, his banishment from the Argive 
realm, and his final return to the city of Argos as its legitimate ruler mirror the stages of a 
puberty rite, which marks his gradual separation from home, from his mother and from 
the world of childhood: Zeitlin (1996), 98-107 with further bibliography.  
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ancient avenging spirit of the household that carried out the attack on 
Agamemnon by taking her form (1497-1504). The queen’s utterance has 
been interpreted as a denial of responsibility by most critics, with the 
notable exception of Neuburg and Foley.56 Foley argues that 
Clytaemnestra does not intend to disclaim responsibility for her actions: 
the participle φανταζόμενος (1500), which refers to the Alastor of the 
household (ὁ ἀλάστωρ, 1501), is more correctly translated as ‘appearing to 
Agamemnon’s wife’ rather than ‘appearing in the shape of Agamemnon’s 
wife.’ In order to present her action as an act of justice, the queen declares 
that, after the vengeful spirit manifested himself to her, she took on that 
supernatural necessity and became the instrument of divine vengeance. 
The aim of the queen’s reference to the daemon is to show that the murder 
of Agamemnon is not merely a wife’s heinous and violent action against 
her husband but rather a rightful revenge for a family murder.57 As 
Neuburg points out, ‘it means that Agamemnon’s death can be seen as a 
result of the very lex talionis morality which is upheld by Zeus and Dike 
(1560-4).’58  
Clytaemnestra is claiming divine authorization for her crime that 
outweighs her human motivations.59 She represents herself not merely as a 
wife who slew her husband but as a rightful avenger. The chorus, though 
disconcerted, must admit that the Alastor might have been an accomplice 
(συλλήπτωρ, 1507) in the murder of Agamemnon: the elders are forced to 
acknowledge that Clytaemnestra’s deed has a double nature just as 
Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter has a dual nature. Both actions can 
                                                 
56 Neuburg (1991), 37-68; Foley (2001), 201-34.  
57 Neuburg (1991), 60.  
58 Neuburg (1991), 61.  
59 She claims divine support from Zeus, Ate, the Erinyes, the Alastor of the house, and the 
Dike of her daughter (A. Eu. 1431-3).  
230 
 
be interpreted as heinous family-murders. Yet they can also be seen as 
justifiable: on the one hand, the queen takes revenge on the slayer of her 
daughter. On the other hand, the sacrifice of Iphigeneia is part of 
Agamemnon’s vengeance upon Troy and Paris and proves necessary for 
the departure of the expedition.  
The same doubleness will also characterize the murder of 
Clytaemnestra at the hands of her son in the following play: Orestes’ 
action can be interpreted either as heinous matricide or as a son’s rightful 
revenge for the death of his father. There is, however, an important 
difference in the decision-making processes which lead the three 
characters to commit murder. Clytaemnestra’s claim that she is the 
embodiment of the spirit of vengeance looks like a distortion of a mortal’s 
troubled appropriation of a supernatural necessity. Only the two male 
heroes are said or shown on stage to struggle between two equally 
difficult choices. By contrast, the moment in which Clytaemnestra decides 
to kill her husband is not represented on stage neither is it recounted 
subsequently: what is striking is that no mention is made of any indecision 
faced by the heroine about whether to avenge the death of his daughter by 
killing her slayer or whether to leave the murder of Iphigeneia unavenged 
in order not to commit an impious crime. To the eyes of the chorus, the 
very fact that she has never been in a moral dilemma undermines her role 
as serious moral agent.60   
Her late appeal to the Alastor might thus appear as a mere excuse: 
in the elders’ opinion, the murder of Agamemnon is first and foremost an 
ignoble and subversive crime committed by a woman against the head of 
                                                 
60 Foley (2001), 205-6 
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the household and the legitimate king of the city. The play shows that it is 
dangerous to allow moral agency to women since their actions are likely 
to subvert the hierarchy of the sexes and to threaten the status of the men 
of a community. Death of a male at the hands of a female cannot be 
categorized as an act of justice, even though this act is carried out in 
revenge for a family murder.  
This creates a tension between the sexes with regard to the notion of 
moral agency and raises uncomfortable questions: why should a female 
act of vengeance upon a man be a priori illegitimate, in contrast to the 
rightful nature of a revenge taken by the male upon the female? Why is 
Orestes’ crime judged on different terms in the last play of the trilogy?61 
Let us analyse the process leading Orestes to commit matricide in order to 
understand on what basis the hero is acquitted.  
In the Oresteia Orestes shows himself facing a difficult dilemma, 
which consists of the opposing pulls of two divine forces: on the one hand, 
if he kills Clytaemnestra, he will be hunted down by the Erinyes of his 
mother (Cho. 912-3, 924); on the other hand, Apollo has threatened him 
with dreadful attacks of the Erinyes of the father if he does not avenge the 
killing of Agamemnon (Cho. 269-96).62 The hero must choose between two 
equally threatening alternatives: the clash between these two supernatural 
impositions paradoxically opens up a space for human agency.63 When he 
finally opts for revenge, both the need to obey Apollo’s command and 
personal motives (ἵμεροι, Cho. 299) come into play in his tough decision: 
                                                 
61 Foley (2001), 233.  
62 Cf. A. Ch. 924-5.  
63 Cf. Snell (1953), 108: ‘under the burden of this twofold ordinance from the gods, man 
stands all alone.’ 
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the grief for his father’s death, the condition of indigence, and the 
usurpation of the throne.64  
The Euripidean description of Apollo’s oracle also leaves some 
space for human freedom in the making of decisions: Electra reports that 
the god persuaded Orestes instead of dictating to him (πείθει, Or. 29), and 
Orestes admits having been gladdened by the prophetic words (ηὔφρανε, 
Or. 287).65 Later on in the chapter we will see that the hero then modifies 
his description of the Delphic oracle: by presenting it as a command 
(κελεύσας, Or. 416), he intentionally places the external determinants of 
the matricide he committed over his inner motivations. I will also show 
that the reasons underlying Orestes’ modification of his earlier version of 
the oracle can be fully understood if we analyse the fragile condition of the 
Euripidean hero in a changing world, where human agents are left alone 
to deal with the consequences of their actions, as opposed to the relative 
security enjoyed by the same hero in the Aeschylean trilogy.  
In neither play, however, is Orestes’ liability for the matricide called 
into question: the hero’s case must go to trial. In the Orestes the first 
verdict reached by the jury even condemns him to death, as opposed to 
the sentence of acquittal delivered at the end of the Oresteia. In the 
Eumenides Apollo’s defence of Orestes, as well as the final acquittal, hinges 
not only on the compelling nature of Apollo’s order but also, and 
especially, on the gender-biased argument that the father-son relationship 
outweighs the mother-son bond. It follows that the hero must be judged to 
be the rightful avenger of the death of his father rather than an unholy 
                                                 
64 According to Sewell-Rutter (2007), 159-60, Orestes’ appropriation of the external 
determinants of the matricide he is about to commit is gradually carried out during the 
κομμός (A. Ch. 306 ff).  
65 Theodorou (1993), 39.  
233 
 
mother-slayer.66 However, Orestes’ acquittal in the Eumenides is not 
without question since only half the jury votes in favour of it and since 
Athena’s vote is needed to break the tie. Later on in this chapter I will 
further discuss the meaning of Orestes’ acquittal and of the decisive role 
played by Athena in the final verdict. More specifically, I will explore why 
it is so important that a goddess, physically present on stage, decides the 
issue: what are the implications of such a decisive divine intervention? To 
what extent and in what ways does it influence the representation of the 
new system of human justice?   
Each of the following sections is devoted to the analysis of a 
different deity or group of deities and delves into the ways in which the 
two playwrights make use of the physical presence or absence of the gods 
on stage to convey different conceptions of Orestes’ crime and to raise 
political questions about the efficacy of human justice and the 
trustworthiness of human institutions.   
 
3.2 The Erinyes in the Oresteia 
This section discusses what lies behind Aeschylus’ exceptional 
decision to represent on stage the Erinyes as visible characters in the 
Eumenides. I will argue that it is not merely an element of surprise, 
introduced to enhance spectator involvement; it is rather one of the 
essential components of the narrative through which the playwright 
articulates a discourse on a cosmic conflict between older and younger 
divinities and on the crucial transition point in human society from a 
                                                 
66 Neuburg (1991), 58.  
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primitive and personal form of justice to the new civilized form of trial. 
Their physical appearance on stage, under the eyes of both the characters 
and the spectators, symbolically represents the integration of these 
chthonic spirits of vengeance, who reside in the dark region of Tartarus, 
into the bright Olympian realm. I will also show that the staging of the 
Erinyes’ entrance is meant to invite reflection on the meaning of this 
exceptional event and on its ethical and theological implications: by 
conveying first verbal images of the Erinyes, then aural ones, and finally a 
visual representation of the goddesses on stage, Aeschylus builds up 
anticipation for the Erinyes’ physical appearance on stage in order to call 
the audience’s attention to the uniqueness of this happening and to stress 
its peculiar significance within the whole narrative.  
Before they make their entrance as χορευταί in the last play of the 
trilogy, the Erinyes are referred to several times in the Oresteia as avenging 
spirits,67 but only three mortal characters claim to be able to see the 
goddesses in the flesh. In the Agamemnon Cassandra describes a revel-
band of Furies who, after drinking human blood, stay in the royal palace 
besieging the chambers and singing an unpleasant song (1185-9). In the 
following play, the Erinyes are supposedly seen by Orestes soon after he 
kills his mother inside the house (1048ff).68 Finally, in the Eumenides the 
Pythia glimpses them asleep as soon as she enters the shrine of Apollo at 
Delphi (34ff). In all three cases sightings of these ancient deities are linked 
with the σκηνή interior, which functions as a symbol of the Erinyes’ 
liminal existence between visible and invisible as well as of those inner 
                                                 
67 A. A. 59, 463, 645, 749, 991, 1119, 1433, 1580; A. Ch. 402, 577, 652.  
68 Since the hero is represented as standing over the corpses of Clytaemnestra and her 
lover, he is to be imagined as still being inside the royal palace, the interior of which is 
shown thanks to the ἐκκύκλημα: Bakola (2017), 174 with further references.  
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and dark spaces, like the mind, that can be controlled by these daemonic 
powers.69 
According to Bakola’s suggestive interpretation of the Oresteia, 
besides these three apparitions of the Erinyes, the trilogy allows its 
audience to see further “flashes” of the ancient deities of vengeance well 
before their physical appearance in the last play.70 The scholar suggests 
that the servants of the house (δμῳαί), who form the main chorus in the 
Choephorae (84) and who might appear as mute characters in the tapestry 
scene as well (Ag. 908-11), are intentionally represented as highly 
suggestive of the Erinyes.  
To begin with, in the tapestry scene Clytaemnestra asks the servants 
of the house (δμῳαί, Ag. 908) to spread the crimson fabrics at 
Agamemnon’s feet: Bakola suggests that a secondary chorus might exit the 
royal palace to carry out the task silently and might re-enter soon 
afterwards following the king.71 The servants of the house remind of the 
Furies since the fabrics they are holding are later called ‘the woven robes 
of the Erinyes’ (Ag. 1580-1) which trap Agamemnon’s corpse: the carpet 
scene might thus be interpreted as an anticipation of the king’s deception 
and murder.  
Furthermore, the δμῳαί ‘who keep the house in good order’ (Ch. 
84) appear again in the second play of the trilogy in their role as χορευταί: 
their half-ripped black garments (Ch. 10-12, 23-31) create a compelling 
visual link with the chorus of the Eumenides (52, 370). What is striking is 
that Orestes, when he appears on the ἐκκύκλημα next to the bodies of 
                                                 
69 Bakola (2017), 166-8.  
70 Bakola (2017), 166-186.  
71 Bakola (2017), 168-9. Cf. also Taplin (1977), 308-9.  
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Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus in a tableaux which evokes the final scene of 
the previous play, asks the chorus to spread out the fabric which covered 
his father and to stand around in a circle (Ch. 980-4): it is thus likely that 
the same δμῳαί that in the Agamemnon spread the crimson fabric in front 
of the king, now are holding it around Orestes. As Bakola highlights, the 
visual symbolism is noteworthy: Orestes seems to be trapped by the 
‘woven robes of the Erinyes’, just as his father had been (Ag. 1580).72  
Interestingly, soon afterwards Orestes allegedly glimpses the 
Erinyes and runs off stage crying out that he is being haunted by them: 
there is no doubt that at the end of the Choephorae the Erinyes are visible to 
Orestes alone. Neither the audience nor the other characters can see the 
goddesses.73 The chorus even dismisses Orestes’ visions as mere fantasies 
(δόξαι, 1051). The subjectivity of these apparitions has been maintained by 
some scholars to the point that it has been assumed that Orestes mistakes 
the chorus of female mourners dressed in black for the black deities of 
revenge.74 This thesis is based on the word δμῳαί, which is used by 
Orestes to address the ‘servant women looking like Gorgons’ (Ch. 1048). 
 The subjective status of the Erinyes, however, would be at odds 
with their undeniable transformation from invisible forces into concrete 
and visible entities in the last play of the trilogy. To solve this incongruity, 
it has been argued that, if we take as a frame of reference the image of ‘a 
line extending from pure subjective fantasy to pure objective fact’, we 
                                                 
72 Bakola (2017), 171-2. 
73 Almost all scholars argue that the Erinyes do not appear to the audience in the theatre: 
Brown (1983), n. 1.  
74 Bakola (2017), 173. For a confutation of this argument, see Brown (1983), 19; Frontisi-
Ducroux (2007), 165-76 and West’s emendation of line 1048 (σμοιαί, ‘hideous’). 
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must ‘place the Furies at both ends of the line simultaneously.’75 This 
means that, on the one hand, they are subjective manifestations ‘in the 
sense that they appear only to Orestes’ but, on the other hand, their 
objective status is grounded in the blood on Orestes’ hands.76 
According to a different interpretation, Orestes is actually referring 
to the chorus of handmaidens but he is not simply hallucinating: the play 
might suggest that these women in dark garments constitute another 
“flash” of the vengeful goddesses, for both the hero and the spectators.77 
This view might be corroborated by a mirror scene in the Eumenides: just 
as in the last play of the trilogy the Erinyes, in a circular formation around 
Orestes, drive his mind into madness by means of a binding song (Eu. 321-
96), so here the hero, surrounded by the singing and dancing δμῳαί, is 
seized by terror, wrath and frenzy (Ch. 1023-5). Both scenes are likely to 
take place in an interior space, conveyed by the use of the ἐκκύκλημα: in 
the Choephorae Orestes is to be understood as being inside the royal palace, 
whereas in the Eumenides as clinging to the statue of Athena inside her 
temple.78 In both cases the σκηνή interior functions as a symbolic space 
representing Orestes’ mind, dominated by these dark and usually unseen 
daemonic powers.  
Thanks to such uncanny and obscure apparitions of the Erinyes, the 
trilogy builds up suspense for their eventual appearance in person.  
In this regard, it is important to bear in mind that Aeschylus was 
the first to give the Erinyes shape by representing them on stage: these 
                                                 
75 Jones (1962), 104. 
76 Jones (1962), ibid. cf. also Brown (1983), 24; Samons (1998-9), 232.  
77 Bakola (2017), 173.  
78 Cf. A. Eu. 242. Bakola (2017), 176 with further references.  
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chthonian deities do not appear in Greek vase-painting until the mid-5th 
century BC.79 Up to the first performance of the Oresteia in 458 BC 
probably no one had seen any representation of them. Consequently, 
many in the audience, without casting doubt on the existence and 
objective reality of the Erinyes, might nonetheless have seen nothing 
unreasonable in the chorus’ incredulous response to Orestes’ claim that he 
was able to see the goddesses right in front of him. They must have agreed 
with the chorus and thought that Orestes, despite being actually 
tormented by the vengeful spirits, had merely envisaged his divine 
persecutors in one of his fits of madness. For neither men nor deities have 
ever been able to get a glimpse of them: the Erinyes are demonic forces 
operating in the darkness, unseen by gods and mortals. 
This is confirmed by the Pythia’s and Athena’s reactions of wonder 
and shock at the sight of the goddesses of vengeance in the Eumenides. In 
the prologue the priestess of Delphi is overcome with such great terror 
that she drags herself out of the temple crawling like a toddler (34-8). By 
contrast, Athena in the second episode reacts with fearless confidence, as 
befits a deity, but she too is struck with amazement (θαῦμα, 407): she 
cannot guess who this ‘strange company is’ (καινὴν … τήνδ’ ὁμιλίαν, 
406) since the chorus do not resemble either goddesses seen by gods or 
human beings (410-2). Athena’s bafflement at her first sight of the Erinyes 
and the stage-direction prescribing the undignified behaviour of a terrified 
Pythia crawling out on all fours are a powerful and crude representation 
                                                 
79 Frontisi-Ducroux (2007), 165-76.  
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of the responses of both the divine and human realms to a yet 
unintelligible and little known demonic force.80  
The characters’ astonishment at the sight of the Erinyes might be 
meant to mirror and anticipate a similar reaction of wonder expected from 
the audience. When, then, are the spectators finally able to see the chthonic 
deities on stage? There is considerable disagreement among scholars as to 
the exact moment when the Erinyes appear on stage and thus become 
visible not only to the characters but to the audience as well. Some 
maintain that the spectators can catch sight of the chorus or at least of part 
of it immediately after the Pythia’s exit from the shrine of Delphi at v. 63.81 
Taplin, however, counters that there is no valid reason for anticipating 
their entry before the choral entrance song: the Erinyes enter on stage 
during the πάροδος (140 ff). The latter hypothesis is to be preferred for 
more than one reason.82 First of all, the way in which the entrance of the 
Erinyes is staged in the πάροδος is proof of the playwright’s intention to 
build suspense, suspense that would have been dissipated by an early 
entry of the chorus. The audience starts visualising the Erinyes well before 
their entrance song thanks to the description given by the Pythia and the 
bestial sounds the χορευταί make when the ghost of Clytemnestra tries to 
awake them. Moreover, when the Erinyes finally enter the stage, they do 
not arrive simultaneously but rather one by one or in small disordered 
                                                 
80 Taplin (1977), 362 ff; Taplin (1978), 61-2; Lada – Richards (1998), 42: ‘In the neatly 
ordered Greek universe, which has reserved distinct compartments for the “bestial”, 
“human” and “divine”, beings such as the Furies invalidate all distinctions. A well 
structured society can only accomodate them at its peril, for they exemplify the chaotic 
and unclassifiable.’ 
81 Brown (1982), 26-32 with references.  
82 See all the pieces of evidence advanced by Taplin (1977), ad loc. and (1978), 107 ff. 
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groups.83 By lengthening the time necessary to make their entrance, this 
staging technique contributes to building further anticipation for their 
arrival.   
This process of progressive verbal, aural, and eventually visual 
creation of the Erinyes in the minds of the spectators heightens the 
dramatic impact and the uniqueness of their physical appearance on 
stage.84 An additional function of the delayed entrance of the chorus is 
precisely to increase the effect of surprise at their physical appearance. 
Until then the spectators had probably not expected that they too would 
have been able to see the Erinyes in person: they must have realized that 
all the three mortal characters who in the trilogy have claimed to have 
seen the goddesses are either in an abnormal state of mind or bearers of 
special powers: Cassandra is in the grip of her psychic possession by 
Apollo, Orestes is struck by madness and the Pythia, in her role as 
priestess of Delphi, is endowed with inner sight into divine things.   
Why then did Aeschylus decide to put such an exceptional event on 
stage, that is, the physical appearance of deities who until then had been 
invisible to both the human and divine eye? What is the meaning of such a 
shocking innovation? 
It is widely agreed that the Oresteia enacts the passage from the 
blood feud of primitive society as embodied by the Erinyes and the 
civilized trial by jury of democratic Athens as proposed and sanctioned by 
                                                 
83 Proof of this is the fact that ‘the opening pair of stanzas is split into short syntactical 
units’, which can be distributed among individuals or small groups: Taplin (1978), 127. 
The scholar thus concludes that the chorus is more likely to have entered σποράδην 
rather than in the usual block formation. 
84 For a detailed analysis of the process of successive approximation by which Aeschylus 
gradually constructs the Erinyes, see Frontisi-Ducroux (2007), 165-76. Cf. also Easterling 
(2008), 222-5.  
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Athena. Therefore, the trilogy also represents a cosmic conflict between 
the older, chthonic deities and the younger Olympians.85 To effect the 
transition of power and prerogatives from the ancient goddesses of 
vengeance to the human jurors of the Areopagus in a peaceful and 
harmless way, it is essential that the older divinities be integrated in the 
new order. At the beginning of the Eumenides the Erinyes are described by 
both Athena and Apollo as a group of outcasts. They are not only 
unknown but also objects of hate to men and the Olympian gods (73, 191). 
Apollo even drives them away from his shrine (179) arguing that it is 
improper for them to approach his temple (185) since ‘their sphere is the 
evil dark of Tartarus under the earth […] and neither men, nor gods, nor 
beasts want to mix with them’ (69-72). Since they belong to the 
Underworld, the invisible realm, their presence on earth is quite singular, 
but serves an important function: they must come out of the darkness and 
of their invisibility to defend their rights and to obtain a new home and 
cult in Athens, in a cave under the hill of Ares.  
Their progressive journey out of the darkness into light mirrors the 
process of their gradual integration in the new Olympian order. The 
transformation of the Erinyes from the invisible infernal goddesses into 
the visible Eumenides honoured in Athens symbolizes their legitimization 
as members of the cosmic community, who will from then onwards be 
part of the common store of knowledge and consciousness of gods and 
mortals.86  
                                                 
85 Fontenrose (1971), 86 ff.  
86 Bacon (2001), 48-59. Athena welcomes the Erinyes in Athens as resident aliens 
(μέτοικοι, A. Eu. 1011). Their change of status is marked by the red robes worn by them 
during the procession which ends the trilogy: in this regard, it should be noticed that in 
the Panathenaia red robes were usually worn by metics to distinguish them from the 
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It has been pointed out that the Erinyes’ transformation into 
Eumenides is signalled by ‘a radical change in the order of music’.87 
Whereas previously in the trilogy the songs chanted by the characters are 
described as unordered and discordant,88 at the end of the Eumenides the 
chorus asks Athena what songs she wants them to sing for the land (902) 
and the goddess implores blessings from the earth, from the sea and from 
the heavens (903-5): the binding hymn of these infernal spirits (ὕμνον […] 
δέσμιον, 306), designed to drive its victims mad, is thus turned into songs 
of blessing.  
The reconciliation of the Erinyes with the Olympian order is also 
essential for the continuing success of the new system of justice under the 
aegis of Zeus and Athena. In their new identity as Eumenides, they do not 
lose all their previous prerogatives. They go on acting as deities of 
punishment, but their sphere of competence switches from the family to 
the city: they are now tasked with supervising human affairs (Eu. 930-1) 
and, more specifically, with enforcing human justice by maintaining the 
principle of fear (τὸ δεινόν) without which no society can be ruled (Eu. 
524-5, 690-710).89  
                                                                                                                                     
Athenian citizens: Taplin (1977), 413; Bacon (2001), 54. The transformation of the Erinyes 
into Eumenides also serves the purpose of solving a gender conflict: see infra, Section 3.4.  
87 Wilson – Taplin (1993), 174.  
88 Cf. A. Ag. 16-9 (the watchman’s song), esp. 17 (ὕπνου τόδ’ ἀντίμολπον ἐντέμνων 
ἄκος); 1142 (Cassandra’s νόμον ἄνομον); 1186-7 (Cassandra’s vision of the Erinyes 
chanting ‘in unison but unmelodious’, ξύμφθογγος οὐκ εὔφωνος); 1473-4 (the daimon of 
the house which ‘glories in hymning tunelessly a hymn’, ἐκνόμως/ ὕμνον ὑμνεῖν 
ἐπεύχεται); Eu. 329-333: the binding song of the Erinyes (ὕμνος ἐξ Ἐρινύων/ δέσμιος, cf. 
306), ‘which brings madness and frenzy’(παρακοπά, παραφορά), ‘which destroys the 
mind’ (φρενοδαλής), ‘untuned to the lyre’ (ἀφόρμικτος), ‘withering the life of 
mortals’(αὐονὰ βροτοῖς). For a comment on this passages, see Wilson – Taplin (1993), 
169-174.  
89 MacLeod (1982), 133-8; Winnington-Ingram (1983), 167-8. MacLeod (ivi, n. 52) mentions 
one way in which the Erinyes might be believed to enforce human justice: ‘participants in 
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The integration of the Erinyes, with their contradictory powers of 
either bringing fear and grief or bestowing rewards and pleasure, might 
also be seen to represent symbolically the incorporation of tragedy itself 
within Athens.90 Just as the beneficial legacy of these ancient infernal 
goddesses derives from their accommodation into a cult which grants 
them proper τιμαί (804-7, 824-36, 848-899), so the frightening aspects of 
Greek tragedy are organized and contained within the City Dionysia in a 
form that will benefit the city of Athens: by enacting stories of dreadful 
sufferings at a safe symbolic distance, Greek tragedy exposes its audience 
to the beneficial effects of weeping.  
Similarly, only after the most powerful and frightening aspects of 
the Erinyes are contained within the Athenian cult of the Semnai Theai, is 
their positive function acknowledged: in their role as the source of a 
necessary and beneficial fear and as guarantors of the court of the 
Areopagus they are rightfully granted a place on earth. In the final 
procession escorting the deities to their new sanctuary in Athens the 
whole city is called upon to ‘raise a glad shout in echo to the songs’ 
(ὀλολύξατε νῦν ἐπὶ μολπαῖς, 1043 = 1047): harmony is finally restored 
both in the musical order and in the social order.91 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
trials on the Areopagus had to swear an oath sanctioned by a curse on themselves and 
their descendants, and a prosecutor can refer to the nether gods in pressing for a 
conviction (Antiphon. I. 31).’  
90 For textual evidence proving the analogies between the Erinyes and Greek tragedy, see 
Wilson – Taplin (1993), 175-6 (A. Eu. 990-1, Ar. Pl. 422-4, Aeschin. Against Timarchos 190-
1). 
91 Wilson – Taplin (1993), 169-80.  
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3.3 The Erinyes in the Orestes 
As the Oresteia progresses, the Erinyes are described more vividly 
and in greater detail until they take on a bodily reality in the last play of 
the trilogy: whereas in the Choephorae their existence as objective entities is 
still at issue, in the Eumenides all doubts dissipate as the deities appear in 
concrete form as members of the chorus. Nearly the same uncertainty 
surrounding the status of the Erinyes in the Choephorae is present in the 
Orestes, with the important difference that the Euripidean representation 
of the goddesses of vengeance accentuates the illusory nature of these 
divine appearances: the Erinyes are most of the time presented as merely a 
delusion, that is, as phantoms which are only visible to the protagonist’s 
frenzied eye. Yet at other times they are referred to in traditional terms as 
truly existing chthonic deities.  
In this section I will show how the confusion between the objective 
and subjective status of the Erinyes is enhanced by the playwright’s 
decision not to bring the goddesses on stage as characters, in contrast to 
the earlier Aeschylean version of the same myth. I will argue that this 
decision springs from his desire to represent the mythical world of Orestes 
as echoing Euripides’ contemporary world: the spectators who attended 
the performance lived at a crucial moment in history in which they were 
confronting challenges as they grappled with civil war, socio-political 
transformations, and cultural changes.92 Such a continuous oscillation 
between subjective and objective representations of the Erinyes 
                                                 
92 As it will be discussed later in this section, I am mainly referring to the two oligarchic 
coups in 411 BC, to the general crisis of Athenian democracy in the late fifth century, and 
to the changes in worldview brought about by advances in contemporary medical 
inquiry and philosophical investigation: both medical writers and the sophists tended to 
dismiss divine causality and to seek a more rational explanation of human actions, 
natural events, and biological and psychological phenomena.  
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throughout the play, together with their constant physical absence from 
the stage, powerfully illustrates how differently men can respond to the 
changes occurring in their society: some strive to make sense of the new 
worldview, whereas others tend to remain bound to the more reassuring 
old mythical view. Like his predecessor, Euripides resorts to stagecraft 
techniques to address important issues which are of concern to fifth-
century Athens.  
It is widely believed that in the Euripidean version of the Orestes 
myth the Erinyes are no longer objectively existing entities but are rather 
nothing more than the hallucinations of a sick and tormented mind. Just as 
in the Choephorae the chorus doubts the trustworthiness of Orestes’ visions, 
so in the Euripidean play Electra tries to calm her brother down by 
reassuring him that he does not actually see what he thinks he sees and 
that his disease is merely imaginary.93 Yet, whereas in the former play 
Orestes defends his position by maintaining that the grim women are not 
fantasies to him (1053) and by distinguishing what he sees from the partial 
sight of the χορευταί (1061-2), in the latter tragedy he does not even 
bother to convince Electra since his mind is so deranged that he mistakes 
his sister for an Erinys (264-5).  
The psychological interpretation of the Erinyes in the Orestes seems 
to be validated by Orestes’ answer to Menelaus’ question about the 
sickness afflicting him (395). Orestes replies that his disease is 
‘understanding, the awareness that I have done dreadful things’ (ἡ 
σύνεσις, ὅτι σύνοιδα δείν᾽ εἰργασμένος, 396). I shall now briefly pause 
on the analysis of this verse since it is crucial for a correct understanding 
                                                 
93 E. Or. 259 (ὁρᾷς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὧν δοκεῖς σάφ᾽ εἰδέναι); 314 (κἂν μὴ νοσῇς γάρ, ἀλλὰ 
δοξάζῃς νοσεῖν). 
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of Orestes’ visions. Scholarly opinion is divided as to the meaning of the 
word σύνεσις. Some scholars argue that σύνεσις is to be associated with 
the later word συνείδησις (‘conscience, awareness of right or wrong 
doing’) and thus suggest that it should here be translated as 
‘remorse/interior awareness’.94 According to this view, Orestes’ frenzy is 
not to be interpreted as divine punishment; rather, it springs from his 
distraught conscience.95  
Yet this argument has been challenged on the basis that the root-
meanings of the words συνείδησις and σύνεσις are different.96 The former 
belongs to the semantic field of knowledge (συνειδέναι) and indicates an 
intimate and private kind of knowledge which is kept to oneself. By 
contrast, the latter derives from a verb of motion (συνίημι), which 
expresses the ability to understand something on an intellectual level by 
connecting different elements with each other and by finding the common 
link between them: the term σύνεσις thus is more likely to indicate 
‘critical intelligence’ rather than ‘conscience/interior awareness’.  
If we accept this etymological interpretation of the word, we must 
conclude that the thesis that in this passage Orestes is depicted as raving 
                                                 
94 Di Benedetto (1965), 85-6; West (1987) n. ad loc.: ‘It has already been hinted that 
Orestes’ madness comes from within (314n.). Now he himself gives a sophisticated 
interpretation of it as arising from his sense of guilt. He uses a striking formulation in 
identifying his σύνεσις (normally an admirable thing) as his sickness. Greek did not have 
a word for conscience (συνείδησις is Hellenistic), but the concept was beginning to be 
familiar. See Dodds (1951), 36 f.; Rodgers (1969), 241-54; Dover (1974), 220-3; Parker 
(1990), 252-4. For the debilitating anguish caused by a bad conscience, see especially 
Andr. 802 ff., Antiphon. 5. 93. Note, however, that Menelaus finds Orestes’ answer 
obscure. 
95 Supporters of this thesis are Perrotta (1928), 90; Porter (1994), 300-1, Willink (1986), n. 
ad vv. 211-315, 259; Di Benedetto (1965), n. ad vv. 258-9. 
96 Cancrini (1970), 20-22 with references; Bosman (1993), 13 ff. Cf. also Willink (1986) n. ad. 
loc, who calls attention to the fact that neither the verb μεταγιγνώσκειν nor related 
words occur in this passage.  
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under the burden of remorse is untenable. Nevertheless, Orestes’ 
ambiguous answer can still be advanced as evidence in support of the 
thesis that in the Euripidean play the hero’s frenzy is not a god-sent 
disease but rather has an interior and subjective cause: for this passage 
indicates that it is his intellect, namely his renewed ability to look on his 
actions and situation with an objective eye, that makes him aware that he 
did dreadful things (σύνοιδα δείν’ εἰργασμένος, 396) and causes his 
mental illness (διαφθαρὲν φρενῶν, 297) to break out.97 
Euripides’ new way of exploring the themes of madness and 
disease may be influenced by a new concept of the human subject 
developed thanks to advances in contemporary medical inquiry. As we 
have discussed in the Introduction, from the fifth century onwards the 
magico-religious view of physical and mental illness gradually fades away 
thanks to the reconceptualization of the body concept in medical writing.98  
Instead of being conceived as a realm of daemons, the physical body 
begins to be understood as an object of knowledge and the natural forces 
operating inside it, even though they retain some of the sinister and alien 
nature of the daemonic, are thought to be subject to human agency. Both 
the physician and the patient are thus believed to be able to control and 
manipulate these internal processes intentionally thanks to the τέχνη and 
to practices of self-care.  
To quote Holmes’ words, ‘having incorporated much of an unseen 
world previously allied with the daemonic, the physical body becomes a 
site of inhuman otherness within the self.’99 The Euripidean Orestes is 
                                                 
97 For an analysis of Orestes’ madness, see Theodorou (1993), 32-46; Saїd (2013), 390-393.  
98 Holmes (2010).   
99 Holmes (2010), 275 ff.  
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precisely shown coping with his interior otherness. In the Oresteia the 
characters can claim that a daemonic agent is acting upon them and can 
objectify this alleged daemonic force as other. By contrast, Euripides’ 
Orestes must acknowledge that this otherness is inside him, is part of his 
self and is potentially dangerous. 
The Euripidean tragedy is characterized by the absence of the gods 
who, by contrast, are the major characters in the Eumenides. Why then are 
the gods absent for almost the whole plot and why does the status of the 
Erinyes continuously oscillate between subjective and objective? The 
reason might lie in the context of the play’s performance: the Orestes was 
produced in 408 BC against the backdrop of political turmoil and 
intellectual ferment of late fifth-century Athens and can be read as 
engaging with contemporary political, cultural and intellectual issues.100  
As I have discussed in the Introduction, advances in medical 
inquiry gradually removed divine agency from the explanation of 
disruptions to the integrity of the person. In addition to this, owing to the 
new revolutionary ideas formulated by the sophists, mythical and 
religious worldviews started being called into question.101 In his treatment 
of the Orestes myth Euripides engages in the contemporary debate by 
presenting Agamemnon’s son as a hero deprived of his own myth in an 
already secularized world.102 It is the prolonged absence of the gods that 
                                                 
100 For a brief overview of Euripides’ intellectual context, see Dunn (2016), 447- 67. 
101 Bosman (1993), 17.  
102 A famous passage in which it is possible to detect a sceptical attitude to myth is 
Electra’s prologue where the heroine ‘prefaces her accounts of family history with 
sceptical-sounding phrases such as “so they say” (Wright, 2008, 127). The scholar (ivi, 
127-8) argues that the sophists’ ideas about the disparity between language and reality 
are important to understand this technique used by the playwright to undermine the 
reality of myth. On the other hand, Wright (2016), 476-82, also warns against making the 
assumption that Euripides’ sceptical attitude to myth is heterodox and innovative and 
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casts doubt on the source of his past actions and on the reasons for the 
dreadful matricide he committed: for more than two thirds of the play the 
Erinyes and Apollo look like mere names which are used by mortals on 
stage to account for the dreadful matricide committed by Orestes and his 
subsequent frenzy. Divine justification seems to have become just an 
excuse.  
As much as Orestes would like to make external attributions for his 
misbehaviour by shifting the blame on the Delphic god (Or. 417, 595-6), in 
the absence of Apollo even the existence of his oracle is called into 
question (Or. 1668-9). As a consequence, innovative frameworks for 
interpreting the decision-making process which led Orestes to perpetrate 
murder are introduced in the play. An action is not always a conscious act 
of will but can also be motivated by unconscious desires.103 Before the fifth 
century the Greeks used to associate the realm of the unconscious and of 
emotions with daemonic agents: daemons were believed to act upon 
humans by taking control of the cavity inside the body, home to desires 
and impulses. In the Euripidean play, by contrast, Orestes, in the wake of 
the emergence of a new concept of the human subject thanks to advances 
in contemporary medical inquiry, is represented in the tragic moment 
when a terrible thought comes to his mind, which strikes him with a 
terrifying bloom of self-awareness: namely, the thought that the alien, 
unconscious, and inner force which prompted him to commit an awful 
crime is tragically part of his true self rather than coming from external 
divine entities. Once the murder of Clytaemnestra is decoupled from a 
                                                                                                                                     
points out that a certain scepticism towards myth is also present in the early Greek 
philosophical and poetic tradition: e.g. Stesichorus, Palinode; Pi. O. 1. 37; Xenoph. DK B 
11. Cf. also Allan (2005), 71-82.  
103 Gill (1996), 6-8, 34-43. 
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supernatural necessity and from divine agents, this violent action makes 
Orestes aware of a part of himself which was earlier unknown to him; this 
awareness causes a crisis in the hero because the image that Orestes has of 
himself does not correspond to that of a matricide.104  
It would be much easier and reassuring for the characters on stage 
to make sense of the events, if they could ascribe the matricide and 
Orestes’ subsequent fits of madness to supernatural forces. However, the 
very fact that the Erinyes do not appear in person to pursue Orestes and to 
claim their rights gives rise to doubts: Orestes’ frenzy, rather than being 
unleashed by external daemonic entities, might have simply been the 
result of the hero’s dreadful awareness of being responsible for an unholy 
crime. This is the reason why the depiction of the Erinyes oscillates 
between creatures with an objective status and figments of the 
imagination. When the characters speak about the Erinyes in traditional 
terms, they seem to resort to a reference code, which is no longer valid, 
because they do not know which other way to turn. They show 
themselves to remain bound to the old mythical view in spite of the lack of 
any evidence of the existence of these spirits of vengeance and of any part 
played by them in causing Orestes’ madness. Euripides’ choice not to 
represent the goddesses on stage allows opposing interpretations of 
Orestes’ frenzy to emerge and partly to overlap. In this way some of the 
most innovative ideas of Euripides’ time about the human subject and 
about the role of the divine in human life are introduced in the Euripidean 
treatment of the Orestes myth.  
                                                 
104 Culler (1997), 110-22 discusses how the issue of agency is strictly interwoven with that 
of identity.  
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Just as the Erinyes do not appear on stage to defend the claims of 
Clytaemnestra, so Apollo does not show up to protect his protégée and to 
take a stand against the old goddesses of vengeance until the end of the 
play. What is more, there is not a super partes divine judge, like Athena in 
the Eumenides, appointed for settling the dispute between the Olympians 
and the older generations. The trial of Orestes, which in the Aeschylean 
tragedy symbolized a cosmic conflict, seems now to be reduced to a 
human matter concealing a struggle for power between rival factions (esp. 
Or. 427-447). Several critics have detected numerous parallels between the 
political situation of the Argos of the play and the political life of 
contemporary Athens, which became more and more characterized by 
intense factional antagonism after the Sicilian defeat.105  
In 411 BC the Athenian democracy was overthrown by two 
oligarchic coups: the oligarchy known as the Four Hundred was after a 
few months replaced by the more moderate but equally short-lived regime 
of the Five Thousand. Even though the democracy was restored as early as 
410 BC, an atmosphere of fear, diffidence and uncertainty pervaded 
Athens: trust in the stability of Athenian democracy was profoundly 
shaken by threats of internal discord and factionalism.106 The 
                                                 
105 For a summary of all the allusions to contemporary events detected by critics, see 
Wright (2008), 102-3 with references. To give an example, Hall (1993), 267, has pointed 
out similarities between Orestes and Antiphon, the oligarchic extremist who took part in 
the uprisings of 411 BC and was later tried and executed. Wright (2008), 103, however, 
maintains that Euripides probably did not intend to make specific references to real-life 
personalities. As Pelling (2000), 164-66 argues, ‘tragedy explores contemporary issues in a 
more timeless register: the nature of democracy rather than the deficiencies of Cleon. […] 
It is not a commentary on individuals, but it does shed light on the stereotypes of 
politicians. Of course the recent prominence of particular figures will have given force 
and relevance to the stereotypes; but categories they remain, not individuals.’ 
106 Many of the leaders of the oligarchic party, such as Antiphon and Archeptolemus, 
were accused of treason and condemned to death: Th. 8. 96-8; Lys. 20. Cf. Wolff (1983), 
340-56; Wright (2008), 102; Hall (1993), 265 ff. 
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Peloponnesian War and the recent political upheavals also contributed to 
a progressive erosion of faith in human institutions and in the creative 
potential of human initiative. 
In the following sections, which are devoted to the role played by 
the Olympian deities in the Eumenides and in the Orestes, I will further 
analyse how Euripides shifts emphasis from the cosmic level to the human 
one in his treatment of the Orestes myth and how he represents the story 
of Agamemnon’s son in terms of contemporary political conceptual codes. 
By studying how the physical presence or absence of Apollo and Athena 
affects the characters’ attitudes and by comparing and contrasting the 
gods’ different modes of intervention in the two plays chosen for analysis, 
I will discuss how the playwrights avail themselves of stagecraft 
techniques to articulate different and at times competing views about 
human nature, the gods, and socio-political problems.  
 
3.4 Athena in the Eumenides and in the Orestes 
Athena is a pivotal character in the Eumenides since she provides the 
executive agent who simultaneously presides over the trial of Orestes and 
over the founding of a real institution, the Areopagus, the supreme court 
of Athens.  
From the beginning of the play, her presence is signalled by her old 
wooden image, upon which Orestes’ rescue hinges.107 Following Apollo’s 
advice that Orestes should take refuge at Athena’s ancient statue (80), the 
                                                 
107 For an analysis of the function of the old wooden image of Athena, see Taplin (1978), 
84 ff.  
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hero hurries off to the image and clings to it (259) while the Erinyes 
surround him singing their binding chant (326). The physical contact 
between the hero and the statue of Athena is already sufficient to reassure 
Orestes of the goddess’s protection, as is shown by an implicit stage 
direction: 
Χορός 
οὔτοι σ᾽ Ἀπόλλων οὐδ᾽ Ἀθηναίας σθένος 
ῥύσαιτ᾽ ἂν ὥστε μὴ οὐ παρημελημένον 
ἔρρειν, τὸ χαίρειν μὴ μαθόνθ᾽ ὅπου φρενῶν, 
ἀναίματον βόσκημα δαιμόνων, σκιάν. 
οὐδ᾽ ἀντιφωνεῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἀποπτύεις λόγους, 
ἐμοὶ τραφείς τε καὶ καθιερωμένος; 
καὶ ζῶν με δαίσεις οὐδὲ πρὸς βωμῷ σφαγείς· 
ὕμνον δ᾽ ἀκούσῃ τόνδε δέσμιον σέθεν. 
(A. Eu. 299-306) 
Chorus 
Neither Apollo, nor the power of Athena, can save you from having to 
wander as a neglected outcast, never learning where in the mind happiness lies, 
preyed on by us spirits until he is bloodless, a mere shadow. Do you not even 
answer? Do you treat my words with contempt, when you have been reared for 
me and consecrated to me? You will make a feast for me while you still live, 
without being slain at any altar; you will now hear this song sung to bind you. 
Orestes does not even bother to reply to the Erinyes’ threat that 
Athena will not be able to save him (299ff). The implicit stage direction 
that he does not answer but spits the Erinyes’ words back at them (οὐδ’ 
ἀντιφονεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἀποπτύεις λόγους, 303) signals that the actor has 
stopped speaking. This is the first remarkable silence of Orestes; the 
second time he chooses to remain silent he hands over to Apollo, who will 
speak in his defence in the trial (609 ff). Both silences have a dramatic 
significance since they express Orestes’ absolute trust in divine help.108 On 
                                                 
108 For an analysis of the function of silences in Greek tragedy, see Taplin (1972), 57-97 
and (1978), 101-21. 
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the one hand, he is confident that it is not necessary for him to speak up 
for himself given that Apollo’s defence speech will inevitably be much 
more convincing and effective than any speech Orestes himself could ever 
give. Likewise, it would be pointless to keep arguing with the Erinyes: it is 
much more advantageous for him to avoid confrontation and just wait for 
Athena’s help.  
Athena’s support is later confirmed by the arrival of the goddess 
herself (397): her physical presence replaces the statue, which is from then 
onwards disregarded. Athena’s entrance is an extraordinary event since 
this is the only place in all extant Greek plays where a deity grants a 
mortal’s prayer to come to his aid (287-9) by appearing in person on 
stage.109 The exceptional character of the goddess’s appearance on stage 
indicates that what is at stake is not merely a case of domestic violence but 
rather a cosmic matter, which is inextricably intertwined with a gender 
conflict. Apollo, as representative of male interests and patriarchal 
ideology, comes to Orestes’ aid to defend him against the wrath of the 
Erinyes, who, by contrast, champion the cause of women. Athena comes 
into play by assuming the difficult role of mediator between younger and 
older divinities, and between the male and the female. In mediating 
between the conflicting claims to justice of the two parties, Athena also 
serves another important purpose: she oversees and divinely sanctions the 
delicate passage from the primitive law of personal vendetta to 
institutionalized restitution. 
As opposed to the Eumenides, in the Orestes Athena is remarkably 
absent: she does not appear on stage nor is she invoked by the characters. 
                                                 
109 Taplin (1977), ad loc. For a discussion of the staging of Athena’s entrance, see ibidem.  
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What is the significance of her absence? It is an indication that the time in 
which the story takes place is different from the Aeschylean precedent. In 
the Eumenides Athena sets up the first courtroom trial; the Orestes, by 
contrast, seems to be set in a civilized context where the law of the courts 
is an already well-established practice, whereas personal blood-revenge is 
condemned as an illegal act.110 This is evident from the episode of the 
encounter between Orestes and Tyndareus.111 The Spartan king argues 
that the ancestors established a legal practice in cases of murder: instead of 
being killed in turn, the murderer must be banished (499 ff). It follows that 
Orestes is guilty of breaking the common law of the Greeks (τὸν κοινὸν 
Ἑλλήνων νόμον, 495). He chose the primitive personal vendetta over the 
legal action that he should have followed; as a consequence, he must be 
punished for his transgression.  
Tyndareus’ speech is anachronistic given that, according to the 
myth of Orestes, the legal action taken against Agamemnon’s son is the 
first trial for murder, that is, the new alternative to the lex talionis.112 The 
function of this anachronism, as well as of the absence of the gods, is to 
redirect attention from the cosmic level to the merely human one: as I will 
discuss in further detail in the following section, emphasis is laid on 
human responsibility, whereas Apollo and the Erinyes are gradually 
removed from the account of Clytaemnestra’s murder. Thanks to this shift 
in focus, the play raises questions about the efficacy of human justice and 
                                                 
110 In this regard, it is worth pointing out that it is not clear from the text whether the two 
siblings are on trial in front of an assembly or in front of a court of law. It first seems to be 
the same court as the one established in earlier times to judge the case of Danaus and his 
daughters (871-3) but is then described in language that recalls the procedures of the 
Athenian ἐκκλησία (46, 612, 885): see Pelling (2000), 165. For a discussion of assembly 
trials in the fifth century, see Naiden (2010), 61-76. 
111 Conacher (1967), 218 ff.  
112 Wolff (1983), 351.  
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invites the audience to reflect on changing religious beliefs and 
worldviews. As previously mentioned, the advent of law, which stresses 
the importance of intention in assessing criminal action, marked the 
emergence of the individual as a subject with a personal responsibility. 
The continuous oscillation between internal and external causality in the 
tragic representation of violent acts is thus likely to reflect the gradual 
evolution of the concepts of error and crime in ancient Greece.  
In the Eumenides the very fact that Apollo comes in person to 
defend his protégée signals that the matricide is not a purely human 
action but is rather part of a broader divine plan. A part of the 
responsibility for the matricide is thus cast off from the shoulders of the 
human agent: Orestes, who acted upon the command of Apollo, is finally 
acquitted. However, it is worth pointing out that it is thanks to the vote of 
the goddess Athena that Orestes is absolved, whereas from the point of 
view of the human jury he is not fully exculpated. The ending of the 
Oresteia is not completely reassuring. Orestes’ guilt remains unresolved: 
the hero’s acquittal does not prove Apollo right since he is acquitted on an 
exceptional basis only.113 Were it not for Athena’s vote, the jurors would 
have remained in deadlock.  
It has been pointed out that the resolution of the Oresteia is 
undermined not only by the ambivalence of the human voting but also by 
the gender ambivalence of Athena, the goddess who breaks the tie: she 
was born from the male only and supports the male, but she is also a 
virgin who rejects the role of wife and mother imposed by patriarchal 
                                                 
113 Harris - Leão – Rhodes (2010), 53. For an analysis of the anxieties that emerge from the 
description of Orestes’ trial in the Eumenides, see Pelling (2000), 167-77. 
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society on women.114 Yet it could also be argued that the tied vote and the 
lack of one-sidedness in the gender of the deity whose vote breaks the 
impasse are the necessary conditions for the peaceful integration of the 
ancient goddesses of vengeance since this means that they have not been 
defeated.115 As a consequence, they are more willing to accept the 
reconfiguration of their functions, which asserts the supremacy of the 
male over the female by putting the marital bond before the mother-child 
relationship: previously allied with γένος (that is, blood kinship), the 
Erinyes in their new role as Eumenides become the protectors of οἶκος, the 
guardians of marriage and childbirth.116  
The very fact that Athena’s vote is represented as essential raises 
questions about human ability to deal with complex cases without the 
help of the gods: can human justice really resolve the problem of Orestes’ 
responsibility? Might we not argue that it is in a sense positive, within the 
world of the play, that the human jurors need Athena’s vote to reach a 
verdict of acquittal? In this way the responsibility for acquitting the 
matricide does not ultimately lie with the human jurors but rather with a 
goddess, who intervenes in the trial with the main aim of solving a cosmic 
and gender conflict by reconciling the Erinyes to Zeus. The human jurors’ 
indecisiveness might thus indicate that a change in the understanding of 
crime is already in progress: the Oresteia is set at the turning point from 
the ancient religious conception of crime to the new concept endorsed by 
                                                 
114 Goldhill (1986), 30-1, 40 ff. Surprising similarities have been detected by the scholar 
between the virgin deity and Clytaemnestra: both transgress the boundaries of sexual 
definition and make use of the power of rhetoric to reach their goals. 
115 Seaford (2011), 216. Cf. A. Eu. 795-6, 824-5. 
116 Foley (1981), 157; Zeitlin (1996), 97-8.  
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law courts, according to which committing a criminal act is a personal 
choice.117  
The lack of closure in the ending of the Eumenides opens up a space 
for further exploration of the topics of human responsibility and human 
justice in the Orestes, where the issue of the reconceptualization of crime 
features prominently. The basic storyline of the Orestes myth remains the 
same: at the very end of the play, Apollo appears on stage to take 
responsibility for the matricide and to predict that Orestes will be fully 
acquitted in a second trial. Yet the delayed entrance of Apollo, together 
with the absence of the gods from the first trial of Orestes, allows different 
causal explanations for the matricide to emerge. For almost the whole play 
Orestes’ case is represented as a merely human matter, which is to be 
judged by a jury composed entirely of humans. Reaching a fair verdict is 
now the responsibility of the human jurors alone. Yet does the system of 
trial by jury actually work? Are men able to deal with difficult situations 
relying on their strengths, skills and code of justice only, without divine 
help? I will try to answer these questions in the remaining part of this 
chapter by comparing and contrasting Apollo’s various modes of 
intervention in the Eumenides and in the Orestes.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Vernant – Vidal-Naquet (1988), 81.  
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3.5 Apollo in the Eumenides and in the Orestes 
3.5.1 Human Hope of Divine Assistance: an Analysis of the Various 
Dramatic Techniques used in the Eumenides and in the Orestes to raise and 
frustrate expectations of Apollo’s arrival respectively. 
In the Oresteia the playwright brings Apollo in as a character only in 
the last play of the trilogy. Yet several dramatic techniques are used to 
build anticipation and prepare the audience for the major role played by 
the god in the Eumenides and for his physical appearance on stage.  
First of all, in the Choephorae Orestes and Electra often invoke the 
gods asking them to look graciously upon them (ἐποπτεύω), to be 
observers of the events.118 The idea conveyed is that there is a divine 
presence watching over despite being invisible to the human eye. The 
most significant invocation is the one addressed to Helios: after killing his 
mother and Aegisthus, Orestes invites the Sun to look at the net used by 
Clytemnestra to kill Agamemnon ‘so that I may have a witness in justice 
(μάρτυς ἐν δίκῃ) one day that I pursued this death justly’ (987-8). Helios, 
due to his daily transit from East to West across the sky, is regularly 
invoked to act as witness of oaths, but his invocation at this point of the 
trilogy acquires a special significance given that the Sun is sometimes 
identified with Apollo.119 This passage may be seen as hinting at the events 
staged in the Eumenides: Orestes’ request that Helios be his witness might 
prefigure the similar role assumed by Apollo in the upcoming murder 
                                                 
118 A. Ch. 1 (Hermes), 126 (spirits beneath the earth that keep watch over the house: 
ἐπισκόπους), 246-7 (Zeus), 489 (the spirit of Agamemnon), 583 (Hermes), 985 (Helios), 
1064 (a god). 
119 Appeals to Helios as witness: Hom. Il. 3. 277; A. Pr. 91; A. A. 632 ff. Identification of 
Helios with Apollo: Orph. Fr. 113, 172, 297.10 Kern; Empedocles and Parmenides (28 A20, 
31 A 23 D-K). See Garvie (1986), ad loc.  
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trial of Orestes in Athens. This passage can thus be interpreted as an 
anticipation of Apollo’s appearance on stage as a character in the last play 
of the trilogy.  
In the Eumenides Apollo comes in person to Orestes’ aid and takes a 
stand in favour of his protégé. In the previous tragedy Orestes more than 
once mentions the Delphic oracle and expresses the belief that Apollo’s 
benevolence and support are secured through his obedience to the god’s 
command: if he fulfils the divine will, the oracle of Loxias will not betray 
him (οὔτοι προδώσει, 269).120 By contrast, if Orestes disregards the gods’ 
words, he will pay with his own life (276 ff). The idea underlying his 
speech is that, even though his obedience to Apollo’s command inevitably 
provokes the furious reaction of the Furies of the mother, Loxias’ anger 
would be a much greater evil. The same thought is repeated by Pylades 
when Orestes has a moment’s hesitation before killing Clytaemnestra: he 
asks his friend not to scorn the Pythian oracle and to think of all men as 
his enemies rather than the gods (900-2). Apollo is thus described as the 
most dangerous enemy to be avoided at all costs.121 On the other hand, if 
he does not become an enemy, he is depicted as the most reliable friend. 
Apollo himself in the Eumenides confirms Orestes’ hopes by reassuring 
him that he will not betray his protégé (Eu. 64 οὔτοι προδώσω, cf. Cho. 
269), not even if he has to put his shrine at risk of pollution by welcoming 
a polluted man (Eu. 169-70) or if he has to go against the ancient laws of 
the gods established by the Moirai (παρὰ νόμον θεῶν, 171). Apollo 
honours Orestes (τίων, 171) because he is his suppliant, albeit a murderer. 
For this reason the matricide has confidence in divine support.  
                                                 
120 A. Ch. 259 ff; 558-9, 1026-33. 
121 Wohl (2012), 247.  
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This is made clear by the staging of the murder tableaux in the 
Choephorae (973 ff) which resembles, with a significant difference, that of 
the previous murder tableaux at the end of the Agamemnon (1372 ff).122 In 
both tragedies the murderer stands over two corpses (Agamemnon and 
Cassandra, and Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus respectively), which are 
revealed either inside or outside the palace.123 Yet, whereas Clytaemnestra 
merely prides herself on the act of vengeance she has accomplished, 
Orestes makes sure that the matricide is presented as an action dictated by 
Apollo: he ostentatiously shows the wreathed and leafy branch of the 
suppliant (1034-5),124 which he holds together with the murder weapon 
(the sword, Cho. 42), and expresses his firm belief that what the Pythian 
oracle promised him will come true: he will be without the evil of blame 
for the matricide given that he committed such a dreadful crime in 
compliance with the divine command (1030-1). This is a clear indication 
that Apollo gave him some assurance of security: his promise foreshadows 
the more concrete help the god will give Orestes during the trial by 
coming in person to his aid.  
However, the trial is not the first occasion when the god and the 
mortal are brought face to face. Another episode, which does not take 
place onstage, preceded and anticipated this encounter between Loxias 
and his devotee:  that is, Orestes’ purification by the liberating touch of 
Apollo. At the end of the Choephorae the chorus predicts that the liberating 
touch of Loxias (προσθιγών, 1059) will purify him and will set him free 
from the torments of the Erinyes. By the time Orestes arrives in Athens, 
                                                 
122 Taplin (1978), 122-7.  
123 Either the ἐκκύκλημα is used to show the bodies inside the palace or they are brought 
on by mute extras: Taplin (1977), ad loc.  
124 His insistent request to look at him (καὶ νῦν ὁρᾶτέ μ’, 1034) is worth noting.  
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the pollution of the matricide has been washed off at the hearth of Delphi, 
as the hero himself declares: ‘The blood-pollution was, when fresh, 
expelled back at the sacred hearth/ of Lord Apollo by purifying with a 
sacrificial pig’ (Eu. 282-3, cf. 445-52). This is evidence of a previous contact 
between Orestes and the deity, even though it is not possible to find in the 
text (cf. especially Eu. 64-93) any stage direction or sign indicating that 
Orestes’ purification by Apollo was performed on stage.  
Despite this lack of textual evidence, there are two South-Italian 
vase-paintings depicting Apollo with a piglet, Orestes as a refugee in 
Delphi and the Erinyes.125 In particular, an Apulian bell-krater, which is 
attributed to the Eumenides Painter, is believed to interact with 
Aeschylus’ Eumenides quite closely, even though it is not a mere 
duplication of the play.126 The images represented on the vase are: two 
Erinyes sleeping in a sitting position, picture that fits Eu. 46-7 (λόχος/ 
εὕδει γυναικῶν ἐν θρόνοισιν ἥμενος); a veiled female figure touching 
the deities asleep, who can be identified with the Aeschylean ghost of 
Clytaemnestra trying to arouse the deities of vengeance from their sleep 
(Eu. 94-139); a half-awake Erinys, who recalls Eu. 140-54.  
Since the scene of Orestes’ purification was most probably not 
represented on stage at the play’s first performance, its depiction on this 
vase-painting can be explained in two ways. It is possible to conjecture 
that the iconographic tradition of Apollo’s protection of Orestes 
sporadically added a purification scene drawing inspiration from Eu. 282-
8: as Taplin shows, ‘the vases are not […] “banal illustrations”, nor are 
                                                 
125 See references in Taplin (2007), 62 and notes 43, 45 p. 275.  
126 Apulian bell-krater, the Eumenides Painter: Paris, Musée de Louvre K 710. Cf. Taplin 
(2007), 62-4.  
263 
 
they dependent on or derived from the plays. They are informed by the 
plays; they mean more, and have more interest and depth, for someone 
who knows the play in question.’127 Or, more interestingly, we might 
consider this Apulian bell-krater as a document testifying to Aeschylean 
tragedy’s reception in the fourth century: it might offer us an insight into 
the play’s afterlife on stage and on its performative revision. As Lada-
Richards argues, it would be a mistake ‘to assume that theatrical 
performance is entirely contained by (and recoverable through) a text’;128 
on the contrary, ‘a play-text can be paradigmatically unstable, drifting and 
shifting in response to the exigencies and fortunes of theatrical 
production’.129 This vase-painting might thus be an indication that later 
Greek audiences considered the purification by Apollo a crucial event in 
the narrative of the Choephorae.  
Although the first production of Aeschylus’ Oresteia is likely not to 
have included the staging of Orestes’ ritual purification, the dramatic 
techniques hinting at Apollo’s protection, which I have so far described, 
are used to build suspense and anticipation of what is to come by 
implanting questions in the mind of the spectators. How will Apollo prove 
his support for Orestes? Will he himself purify Orestes from the pollution 
of the matricide? What part will he play in the trial of the murderer? All 
these questions must have created dramatic tension and high expectations 
for Apollo’s role in the last play of the trilogy. The dramatic technique of 
anticipation and the staging of the second murder tableaux must also have 
made the audience as confident as Orestes that Apollo was about to come 
                                                 
127 Taplin (2007), 25. For an evaluation of Taplin’s thesis that ‘those viewing the Western 
Greek mythological vases with tragedy in mind “enrich” them’ [Lada-Richards (2009), 
104], see the review of Taplin’s book written by Lada-Richards (2009), 99-166.  
128 Lada-Richards (2009), 126. 
129 Lada-Richards (2009), 126. 
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in person to protect and rescue his devotee: when Apollo finally appears 
as a witness in the trial of Orestes, the god testifies that he himself was 
Orestes’ purifier from bloodshed (Eu. 578: φόνου δὲ τῶιδ’ ἐγὼ 
καθάρσιος) and declares his intention to act as his advocate (ξυνδικήσων, 
579). 
As opposed to the Eumenides, an atmosphere of utter 
discouragement, doubt and distrust pervades Euripides’ Orestes. The hero, 
tormented by fits of madness, feels abandoned (ἔρημος, 306) by Apollo. 
Euripides replaces the promise not to give his devotee up that the god 
made in the Aeschylean version (Eu. 64) with Electra’s declaration that she 
will not let go of her brother (264). Human loyalty and comforting 
presence thus replace divine help. Orestes does not desist from invoking 
Apollo (260), but significantly he blames the god for persuading him to 
commit a dreadful crime encouraging him with words but not in deed 
(τοῖς μὲν λόγοις ηὔφρανε, τοῖς δ’ ἒργοισιν οὔ, 287).130 
Orestes demands action from Phoebus but, as opposed to the 
Oresteia where Apollo provides evidence of his intention to give his 
protégé concrete help, in the Euripidean version two implicit stage 
directions indicate that there has been no contact between the two and no 
tangible sign of the god’s support for Orestes.  
At vv. 39-42 Electra says that it has been six days since Orestes has 
killed his mother and since he has eaten or washed himself (οὐ λούτρ 
ἔδωκε χρωτί, 42). Later Menelaus asks Orestes: ‘Have not you cleansed 
your hands of bloodshed, according to custom?’ (429). From Electra’s 
                                                 
130 Cf. E. Or. 29 where Electra asserts that Apollo persuaded (πείθει) her brother to kill 
their mother.  
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assertion and from Menelaus’ negative question we are informed that 
Orestes has not been purified yet: the blood of his mother is probably still 
visible on his hands. Orestes’ reply to Menelaus’ question is also 
meaningful: ‘No, for wherever I go, the door is shut against me’ (430). His 
utterance implies that, as opposed to the Aeschylean Orestes, he did not 
benefit from physical purification through a formal rite performed at 
Delphi by Apollo. The only option left for him is to recur to a human 
purifier, namely, whoever is willing to welcome the polluted man as a 
guest at his/her hearth.131 Yet nobody has so far dared to welcome him 
since the city of Argos has decreed that no one can shelter the matricide 
(59 ff).  
The two siblings thus become the rejects of society, and can only 
rely upon each other. Apollo’s intervention is their last hope of salvation. 
At the beginning of the play Orestes still clings to the belief that the god 
will keep his word: struck with madness, he demands to be given ‘the 
horn-tipped bow, Apollo's gift, the weapon he told me would drive the 
goddesses away if they tried to terrorize me with their ravings’ (268-70). 
Many scholars have pointed out that this passage contains a reference to 
two earlier versions of the same myth: in Stesichorus’ Oresteia the god 
actually gives Orestes a bow for this purpose, whereas in the Eumenides it 
is Phoebus who uses the bow to ward off the Erinyes.132 In both these 
versions the bow stands for Apollo’s concrete help and protection. By 
contrast, in the Orestes it is not clear whether the bow is a real prop or 
whether it is illusory.133 If the bow were purely imaginary,134 Apollo’s 
                                                 
131 Hartigan (1991), 127-56.  
132 West (1987), ad loc with references.  
133 For a summary of the known evidence and principal positions taken by scholars on 
this issue, see Hartigan (1987), n. 26, p. 134; Greenberg (1962), 164.   
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support would also look like an empty promise, mere words that do not 
match deeds. The representation on stage of the hero shooting arrows at 
visionary goddesses would thus be a powerful illustration not only of 
Orestes’ derangement but also of his despair and loneliness caused by his 
frustrated hopes. Apollo has still not shown evidence of his intention to 
come to Orestes’ aid given that he has not come either to purify him or to 
give him the divine bow, that is, a concrete material instrument of self-
defence. By contrast, if the bow were real, it would mark the uselessness of 
this material object in Orestes’ fight against forces that are no longer real 
goddesses and cannot therefore be driven away simply with physical 
threats.135  
In both cases the problem is the missed presence of the god. Orestes 
finds himself coping on his own with the matricide’s terrible effects on his 
mental state. It would be much easier for Orestes to shift the blame for his 
fits of madness on real goddesses with specific claims and specific reasons 
for wanting to punish him. For against their claims he could counterpose 
his obedience to Apollo’s command: he could thus delegate his defence to 
the god and could reassuringly depict the problem of how to judge his 
criminal act as a matter of competing claims between two generations of 
gods and two different conceptions of justice. This is the reason why he is 
reluctant to give up on Apollo: he wearily repeats the trite saying that 
playing for time (μέλλει, 420) is a typically divine habit. In the Oresteia the 
maxim about the gods’ tendency to temporise is used by Orestes to 
demonstrate the righteousness of the crime he is about to commit: the 
divine punishment of Clytaemnestra has been delayed, but it will come in 
                                                                                                                                     
134 Di Benedetto (1965), ad loc; Willink (1986), ad loc; West (1987), ad loc.  
135 Zeitlin (1980), 54-5.  
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the end thanks to Orestes, who serves as the human instrument of divine 
will (Cho. 382-5).136 By contrast, in the Euripidean play Orestes’ confidence 
that Apollo will soon intervene alongside him is progressively eroded to 
the point that the mortal hero contemptuously defines Apollo’s delay as 
mere inaction (ἀπραξία, 426).137 Divine agency, which is traditionally 
depicted as slow but sure, becomes, in the eyes of Orestes, absence of 
action, namely a useless mode of intervention.  
Orestes’ downheartedness results from the very fact that his urgent 
need to find an external justification for the matricide and for the resulting 
madness has so far been frustrated by the huge disparity between the 
long-delayed intervention of Apollo and the speed with which he has been 
tormented by the Erinyes (423), that is, by his own mental tribulations 
springing from the consciousness of having committed an awful crime.138  
It can be argued that Orestes is feeling an uncomfortable inner 
tension, which comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the mind 
at the same time. On the one hand, Orestes’ self-image conforms to that of 
a righteous young man who justly takes charge of avenging his father. On 
the other hand, what he did to carry out his vengeance upon the killer of 
Agamemnon, is a hateful (ἐχθίστων, 160), monstrous (ἀπόφονον, 165, 
192) and most unholy (ἀνοσιώτατον, 286) deed.139 Whenever men do 
something that causes this sort of uncomfortable inner tension, it is a 
characteristic of their human nature to justify it by making, for instance, 
                                                 
136 Cf. A. Ch. 936, 1009: the longer the punishment is postponed the harsher it will be.  
137 Cf. E. Or. 794.  
138 Apollo’s slowness (βραδύς, 422) is also in contrast to the promptness of Orestes, who 
was swift (ταχὺν, 422) to obey Apollo’s command.  
139 Cf. also E. Or. 29-30; 194. 
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external attributions. This is precisely what Orestes tries to do in the 
dialogue with Menelaus after the murder: 
Μενέλαος 
οὐ δεινὰ πάσχειν δεινὰ τοὺς εἰργασμένους. 
Ὀρέστης 
ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἀναφορὰ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς. 
Μενέλαος 
μὴ θάνατον εἴπῃς· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ οὐ σοφόν. 
Ὀρέστης 
Φοῖβος, κελεύσας μητρὸς ἐκπρᾶξαι φόνον. 
Μενέλαος 
ἀμαθέστερός γ᾽ ὢν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς δίκης. 
Ὀρέστης 
δουλεύομεν θεοῖς, ὅτι ποτ᾽ εἰσὶν οἱ θεοί. 
Μενέλαος 
κᾆτ᾽ οὐκ ἀμύνει Λοξίας τοῖς σοῖς κακοῖς; 
Ὀρέστης 
μέλλει· τὸ θεῖον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον φύσει. 
(E. Or. 414-20) 
 
Menelaus 
It is not strange, if those who have done dreadful things should suffer 
them. 
Orestes 
But I have a way to recover from these troubles. 
Menelaus 
Do not speak of death; that is not wise. 
Orestes 
It is Phoebus, who commanded me to kill my mother. 
Menelaus 
Showing a strange ignorance of what is fair and right. 
Orestes 
We are slaves to the gods, whatever those gods are. 
Menelaus 
And does Loxias not help your affliction? 
Orestes  
He will in time; this is the nature of gods. 
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Orestes interestingly believes that blaming the matricide on 
something outside him is the way to recover from the pain (ἀναφορὰ τῆς 
συμφορᾶς, 414) resulting from the awareness of being the killer of his 
mother (392). He thus attributes his deed to Apollo who ordered 
(κελεύσας, 416) him to commit the murder. Orestes’ description of the 
Delphic oracle as a command modifies his earlier version of the event: 
when Orestes accuses the god of putting him up (ἐπάρας, 286) to an 
abominable crime, he uses the verb ‘to gladden/ to cheer somebody up’ 
(εὐφραίνω, 287), which clearly implies that Orestes is eager to kill his 
mother.140 Similarly, in Electra’s account the assertiveness of the Pythian 
oracle is underplayed: the god did not order but rather ‘persuaded’ 
(πείθει, 29) her brother to kill Clytaemnestra. Orestes’ modified report of 
Apollo’s oracle aims to reduce his responsibility by finding an external 
justification. Yet Menelaus points out that, if Orestes’ account is truthful, 
Apollo should show some support for him. Apollo’s prolonged absence is 
therefore highly problematic. 
Whereas the Oresteia sticks to the traditional version of the Orestes 
myth, which grounds Orestes’ criminal act in a divine directive, the 
Orestes, or at least the first part of it, challenges the old mythical and 
religious view. Even though the characters on stage would love to 
maintain the long-standing beliefs, doubts insinuate themselves into the 
minds of the characters, who start calling their own myth into question. 
As opposed to the Oresteia, which gradually raises hopes for Apollo’s 
arrival, the plot of the Orestes is constructed so as to give the impression 
that any hope in Apollo’s intervention is in vain. In the absence of the god, 
Orestes’ belief in a religious grounding for the matricide crumbles:  
                                                 
140 Theodorou (1993), 39.  
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καίτοι μ᾽ ἐσῄει δεῖμα, μή τινος κλύων 
ἀλαστόρων δόξαιμι σὴν κλύειν ὄπα. 
(E. Or. 1668-9) 
 
Yet at the time I was worried that I heard the voice of some avenging spirit 
and thought I was hearing yours. 
Doubting that he actually heard the voice of Loxias, Orestes goes so 
far as to question the existence of the oracle.141   
3.5.2 Apollo’s Role in the Trial of Orestes: the Eumenides and the Orestes 
Compared 
Apollo’s apparent absence and missed intervention in the 
Euripidean play deprive Orestes of his main point of reference. If there are 
no gods to appeal to, how can men cope with the consequences of their 
actions? In an increasingly secularized world, can men rely on human 
institutions, such as the family or the court? I will try to answer these 
questions by analysing an episode of the Orestes in which, in comparison 
to a similar scene in the Oresteia, the absence of the gods is especially 
glaring: that is, the trial of Orestes.  
I have already touched upon the significance of Orestes’ silences in 
the Eumenides. The hero twice refrains from speaking: the first time when 
he is surrounded by the Erinyes (299ff); the second, during the trial when 
he gives the floor to Apollo asking him to set out on his behalf whether he 
killed his mother justly or not (609-10). It has been argued that the 
Eumenides illustrates a progressive diminishment of human stature and 
initiative.142 This belief appears to be supported by the fact that the process 
                                                 
141 For a review of the different interpretations of Orestes’ utterance, see Porter (1994), 
280-9.  
142 Porter (2005), 305.  
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leading to the final resolution is conducted entirely by the gods, with the 
consequence that Orestes seems to be merely a pawn in a divine game.143 
A serious weakness with this argument, however, is that it fails to take 
into account that Apollo, despite coming to Orestes’ aid in person, is not 
able to save his protégé:  
Ἀπόλλων 
οὔτοι προδώσω· διὰ τέλους δέ σοι φύλαξ 
65 ἐγγὺς παρεστὼς καὶ πρόσωθ᾽ ἀποστατῶν 
ἐχθροῖσι τοῖς σοῖς οὐ γενήσομαι πέπων. 
[…] 
ὅμως δὲ φεῦγε, μηδὲ μαλθακὸς γένῃ· 
75 ἐλῶσι γάρ σε καὶ δι᾽ ἠπείρου μακρᾶς 
βιβῶντ᾽ ἀν᾽ αἰεὶ τὴν πλανοστιβῆ χθόνα 
ὑπέρ τε πόντον καὶ περιρρύτας πόλεις. 
καὶ μὴ πρόκαμνε τόνδε βουκολούμενος 
πόνον· μολὼν δὲ Παλλάδος ποτὶ πτόλιν 
80 ἵζου παλαιὸν ἄγκαθεν λαβὼν βρέτας. 
κἀκεῖ δικαστὰς τῶνδε καὶ θελκτηρίους 
μύθους ἔχοντες μηχανὰς εὑρήσομεν, 
ὥστ᾽ ἐς τὸ πᾶν σε τῶνδ᾽ ἀπαλλάξαι πόνων· 
καὶ γὰρ κτανεῖν σ᾽ ἔπεισα μητρῷον δέμας. 
 
I will not betray you: I will be your guardian to the end, whether standing 
close to you or a long way off, and I will not be soft towards your enemies. […] 
Nevertheless, you must flee, and not weaken; for they will drive you right through 
the length of the mainland, as you go ever forward over the land you tread in your 
wanderings, and over the water to sea-girt cities. And do not let these labours 
weigh on your mind to give up the struggle, until you come to the city of Pallas 
and sit clasping her ancient image in your arms. There we will have judges to 
judge these matters, and words that will charm, and we will find means to release 
you from this misery for good and all – for it was I who induced you to kill the 
woman who was your mother. 
The god promises to be there for Orestes. Nonetheless, Orestes 
must flee to Athens: to be completely released from his labours, he must 
                                                 
143 Porter (2005), ibidem.  
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be judged by human judges. This is an important detail which puts 
emphasis on the key role played by human agency in Orestes’ acquittal 
and in the process of his reintegration into society.144 It is true that the hero 
is ultimately acquitted thanks to Athena’s vote and that he himself gives 
the gods full credit for his salvation (754-61), but still his deliverance 
would not have been possible if a human trial had not taken place. It 
follows that the role of human agency is far from underplayed. The tie in 
the votes of the human jurors and the need for Athena’s intervention 
simply stress the difficulty of Orestes’ case, besides serving as the 
aetiology of the Athenian practice of taking equal votes to mean acquittal 
(741).145 To sum up, the divine intervention of Apollo is not sufficient to 
solve Orestes’ problem: for it is up to the human world to welcome back 
and reintegrate one of its citizens. Nonetheless, Apollo never abandons 
Orestes to his fate: Orestes’ silences are not meant to depict the hero as a 
pawn lacking initiative but are rather positive indications of his confident 
trust in divine help. This is further confirmed by the comparison between 
Orestes’ silence in the trial in the Eumenides and his behaviour in the 
Orestes by Euripides. 
Whereas the Aeschylean Orestes can confidently abandon himself 
to Apollo, in the Euripidean play he must defend himself in person. Due 
to the absence of the god, he is forced to speak up for himself but, 
significantly, his defence speeches turn out to be mere unbridled and 
                                                 
144 For a discussion of Apollo’s inability to save Orestes, see Taplin (1977) on v. 93; Bierl 
(1994), 81-96; Johnston (2009), 219-28. Johnston (224) points out that during the trial ‘the 
skills used by Apollo to save Orestes are not those of a god delivering an oracle but rather 
those of a fifth-century citizen speaking in public assembly about an oracle.’ The episode 
of the trial thus shows how Apollo’s oracular speech is displaced by civic speech.  
145 For the debate on whether Athena’s vote produces or breaks the tie, see Winnington-
Ingram (1983); Seaford (2011).  
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ineffective talk.146 Orestes seems to lack both the skills and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defence. Firstly, in the ἀγών with Tyndareus he 
puts forward the same physiological argument adduced by Apollo in the 
Eumenides: the father alone is the begetter, whereas the mother is only a 
nurse (Or. 552-56 ~ Eu. 657-66). Already in the Aeschylean play this 
argument does not carry the day since it only persuades half the jury.147 
Nonetheless, Apollo’s view is endorsed by Athena, the goddess born from 
the male head of Zeus. By contrast, in the Euripidean play it is as if the 
physiological argument, uttered by a mortal and lacking divine validation, 
was further deprived of its strength and effectiveness.148 In the absence of 
the gods, Orestes’ case can no longer be framed as part of a cosmic 
conflict; by contrast, it must be judged on a legal and exclusively human 
basis, as Tyndareus’ speech suggests (491-541).  
The other arguments put forward by Orestes during the dialogue 
with Tyndareus are an example of rhetorical exaggeration and sophistic 
argumentation, which is bound to fail.149 He first claims that his actions 
                                                 
146 Dunn (1996), 161-9 discusses the movement in the play from silence to unbridled 
speech. Cf. also Hartigan (1991), 127 ff; Barker (2011), 145-55.  
147 The dream that the male alone can give birth to a child is a recurrent motif in Greek 
myth, as is shown by the myth of autochthony (Loraux 1993; Saxonhouse 1986, 258) and 
by the births of Athena from the head of Zeus, of Dionysus from Zeus’ thigh and of 
Aphrodite from the sea foam produced by Uranus’ genitals. The belief in the primary 
procreative function of the male sperm over the secondary role of the female womb as 
mere receptacle finds its most famous formulation in Aristotle’s De Generatione Animalium 
1. 20. 729a, 2.4.738 b (cf. also Anaxag. DK A 107). There are, however, alternative voices in 
ancient Greek thought which challenged the denial of physiological motherhood: 
Presocratic philosophers, like Democritus, Alcmaeon and Empedocles (cf. Arist. GA. 722 
b6ff and 764 a6ff), and Hippocratic medical treatises of the fifth and fourth centuries (On 
the Seed, On the Nature of the Child, On Diseases IV) support the view that both men and 
women provide seed and thus play an equal role in reproduction: see Lloyd (1983), 86-8, 
94-105 with references. 
148 Di Benedetto (1965), ad loc; Willink (1986), ad loc; Medda (2001), ad loc. 
149 Willink (1986) on 595-9; Hartigan (1991), 127-40. For analysis of the rhetorical 
techniques used by Orestes in his defence speech, see Wright (2008), 130-3: to give an 
example, Orestes makes use of the argument from ἦθος when he criticizes the moral 
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make him Greece’s benefactor since, by stopping the unchaste and brazen 
behaviour of his mother, he prevented her from setting a bad example for 
other women (564 ff). He then even suggests that the Argives should 
consider the god himself as ‘impious’ (ἀνόσιον, 595) and ‘guilty’ (ἥμαρτ’, 
596) and, consequently, should put him to death (595).  
The former argument is used again by Orestes in his speech in front 
of the jury (Or. 931-42), whereas Apollo’s command is never mentioned 
again as part of his defence during the trial. Why does he not take 
advantage of the most convincing argument to prove that he acted 
piously, that is, in accordance with Apollo’s command? On the one hand, 
it might indicate Orestes’ disheartenment: he has now lost all hope in the 
god’s arrival and is well aware that this argument will lose credibility if 
Loxias himself does not come to corroborate it. On the other hand, 
Orestes’ neglect of his only valid defence might have something to do with 
the change in worldview coming about in Euripides’ times: whereas in the 
archaic age divine causality is the standard way to explain human and 
natural events, in the classical age it starts losing ground to other forms of 
rational explanation.150  
The Presocratics already sought to explain the world and natural 
phenomena in abstract and rational terms by ascribing the gods’ 
traditional powers to nature, and Hippocratic writers rebutted divine 
explanations for diseases.151 The scope of the search for non-supernatural 
                                                                                                                                     
character of Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus (557-63, 573-8), of the rhetorical device of 
ἀντικατηγορία (‘countercharge’) when he blames Tyndareus (585) and Apollo (591), and 
of many rhetorical questions (ὑποφορά) at vv. 551, 581-4, 596-9.  
150 Whitmarsh (2015), 75-86.  
151 To give an example, Anaximander proposed a natural explanation for phenomena, like 
thunder and lightning, which had been previously ascribed to divine agency: according 
to Anaximander, thunder and lightning are caused by compressed air, which is enclosed 
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explanations gradually broadened to include not only natural phenomena 
and the disruption of normal bodily functions but also human moral 
agency and political history.152 Whitmarsh, in his book on atheism in the 
ancient world, analyses the paradoxical defence of Helen’s actions written 
by the sophist Gorgias in the 420s: the scholar points out that the 
Encomium to Helen, which is legalistic in form, is defined as ‘a little game’ 
by the author himself at the end of the work. ‘The joke is’ – Whitmarsh 
comments – ‘that if you start diminishing the significance of personal 
responsibility by invoking external forces like gods, then the door is 
opened for all sorts of moral exculpations.’153  
This is in line with the new concept of personal culpability 
developed thanks to the advent of law, as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter: in Athenian legal speeches emphasis is laid on the human agents’ 
responsibility for their actions, whereas religious argumentation is almost 
completely limited to the description of the orators’ clients as pious people 
and of their opponents as impious or polluted criminals.154 Echoes of this 
new understanding of human agency and responsibility can be found in 
Greek literature as well: those who try to shift the blame for their criminal 
actions on the gods, especially when they are defending themselves in 
front of a jury in a law court, are often criticized and mocked by ancient 
                                                                                                                                     
in clouds and which bursts out violently and suddenly (Anaximand. DK 12 A 23). For a 
full account of the theories of the Presocratics and of the Hippocratic writings (especially 
On the Sacred Disease and On Airs, Waters, and Places), see Lloyd (1979), esp. 15-29, 32-49; 
Lloyd (1987), 11-29.  
152 Whitmarsh (2015), 77. As far as political history is concerned, Whitmarsh mentions the 
example of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, which, according to the scholar, 
is ‘the culmination of the fifth-century tendency toward the exclusion of divine 
explanation’ (ivi, 86).  
153 Whitmarsh (2015), 76. 
154 Whitmarsh (2015), 77 and n. 3 with references.  
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Greek authors, such as Euripides, Aristophanes, and Plato.155 Therefore, 
Orestes might avoid mentioning Apollo’s command in his defence speech 
at the trial because that argument may sound like a mere excuse. 
In conclusion, it is possible to argue that the Orestes, or at least the 
first two-thirds of the play, illustrates this change of perspective in 
assessing criminal acts and explores its consequences by raising the 
question of whether, in the absence of the gods, men can rely on human 
institutions, such as the family and the court, as we shall see in the next 
subsection.  
3.5.3 The Inadequacy of Human Institutions in Euripides’ Orestes and its 
Consequences 
Orestes lives in a world where the Erinyes are mythological figures 
perceived as belonging wholly to the past and where the old lex talionis 
has already been replaced by the more civilized practice of trials. In 
addition to this, Apollo’s command has become a memory so uncertain 
that the hero can no longer determine whether it sprang from reality or 
from a dream. Unable to trace the matricide back to some higher cause 
other than human will and deprived of any divine support, Orestes turns 
in vain to human institutions such as the family and the court. The aim of 
this subsection is to analyse how the playwright employs different 
stagecraft techniques to emphasize the inadequacy of human institutions 
and its consequences. 
                                                 
155 To give an example, in Euripides’ Trojan Women Helen shifts the blame for her 
adulterous relationship with Paris onto Aphrodite (E. Tr. 938-50) but Hecuba, making a 
pun on the name of the goddess which recalls the word ἀφροσύνη (‘senselessness’), 
answers back that it was rather Helen’s senseless mind that became Aphrodite as soon as 
the heroine saw the Trojan prince (E. Tr. 988-90). See also Ar. Nu. 85; Pl. R. 379c-380c. cf. 
Whitmarsh (2015), n. 3, p. 254.  
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We will see that an implicit stage direction is used to reveal that 
Menelaus’ indifference towards his nephew’s precarious condition stems 
from base motives. Moreover, the movements of the two siblings onstage 
and offstage stress their helplessness, which is brought about by the 
citizens’ hostility and which eventually leads them to conspiracy and to a 
brutal scheme of revenge. Finally, that Orestes’ recourse to further 
violence is just his last desperate attempt to cope with the lack of divine 
and human help by taking matters into his own hands is demonstrated by 
the distorted use of the famous dramatic technique of deus ex machina. 
According to human law, Orestes should have chosen banishment 
rather than death as the punishment for the killer of his father. According 
to Tyndareus, Orestes must be tried to put a stop to the endless chain of 
acts of revenge and to defend the common law (523-5). Yet few people 
with self-interested motives have steered the citizens into the decision to 
try Orestes: Oiax, who wants to avenge the death of his brother Palamedes 
(432-3), and the party of Aigisthos, who wants to take control of the city of 
Argos (435-8). That this decision is not motivated by a genuine desire to 
respect the law of the land is proved by the fact that the citizens do not 
intend to take into consideration the option of banishment as the penalty 
for the matricides but are rather to vote on capital punishment (440-2; 757-
9). On top of that, they have even blocked all possible exits so as to 
prevents the siblings from going into voluntary exile (443-6, 759-62).  
Though aware of the dangers awaiting him, Orestes still cherishes 
some hope that he can persuade the assembly of the righteousness of the 
matricide when he suggests that Pylades and he should opt to speak in 
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public (ἐς κοινὸν λέγειν χρή, 774).156 Resorting to the court is his last hope 
of salvation given that his previous attempt to turn to his family for 
support has failed. Orestes in suppliant posture calls on Menelaus (380-4), 
who owes a debt of gratitude to Agamemnon (χάριτας ἔχων πατρός, 
244).157 Menelaus acknowledges the obligation to take up a kinsman’s 
troubles (684-5) but turns down Orestes’ request for immediate protection 
by adducing pretexts such as his willingness to bide his time in order to 
watch for the right moment, and to use gentle persuasion in place of the 
force of arms in order to support his nephew’s case (686 ff). However, an 
implicit stage direction reveals what lies behind his decision not to help 
Orestes. After the promulgation of the death sentence, Orestes tells us that 
Helen, the hateful wife of Menelaus, is inside the royal palace of 
Agamemnon and is putting her seal on everything (ἀποσφραγίζεται, 
1108). This means that she is already taking possession of Orestes’ goods 
on behalf of Menelaus.158 A desire for power and wealth thus lies behind 
Menelaus’ lukewarm reaction to the misfortunes of his nephew and niece.  
In this play family is depicted as an institution whose role as a 
bulwark against external threats is vitiated by personal and political 
interests.159 It has been pointed out that Orestes is endowed with an 
excessive number of paternal figures, all of whom nonetheless turn out to 
                                                 
156 Pylades misinterprets Orestes’ suggestion and understands it as meaning ‘we must 
confer’. For a discussion of the ambiguous meaning of this sentence, see Willink (1986), ad 
loc.  
157 Cf. also E. Or. 453, 640 ff. 
158 Willink (1986), ad loc. 
159 In this regard, it must also be taken into account that Tyndareus threatens Menelaus to 
forbid him access to the Spartan land if he helps Orestes escape the death penalty (534-7; 
625-6). Consequently, if Menelaus intervened in favour of his nephew, he would lose an 
important political connection.  
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be his opponents.160 Tyndareus’ fierce enmity and Menelaus’ betrayal 
(προδέδομαι, 722) thus force Orestes to put his last remaining hope in 
human justice, which nonetheless is just as disappointing and inadequate.  
The episode of the assembly trial is an example of unreliable legal 
procedure and bad politics, debased by demagogues and politicians with 
personal agendas.161 Several linguistic parallels have been detected 
between the Argive assembly in the play and the Athenian ἐκκλησία of 
Euripides’ time: the Argive assembly is called ‘the mass of Argive people 
selected to arbitrate’ (ἔκκλητον Ἀργείων ὄχλον, 612), a periphrasis that 
recalls the Athenian term ἐκκλησία; in addition to this, to express what 
the city of Argos has decreed and to indicate the opening of the debate, 
Euripides uses formulas that recall Athenian official formulaic language.162  
Owing to the similarities detected between the mythical and the 
real world, it has been argued that the messenger’s entire account of the 
voting in Argos should be read as a critique of contemporary demagogical 
democracy.163 According to the messenger’s report, the debate in the 
assembly is manipulated by self-serving individuals: Talthybius, the 
                                                 
160 Zeitlin (1980), 64. Orestes’ paternal figures include Apollo, Menelaus, Tyndareus; even 
his biological father does not give him any support. Orestes believes that Agamemnon 
would have disapproved of his son’s revenge upon Clytaemnestra.  
161 For a detailed analysis of the speeches against, and in defence of, Orestes, see Di 
Benedetto (1965), Willink (1986), West (1987) ad loc with references, Barker (2011).  
162 E. Or. 46 (ἔδοξε δ’  Ἄργει), 885 (τίς χρῄζει λέγειν;). See Medda (2001), n. 123 p. 246; 
Wright (2008), n. 42 p. 148. Cf. also Pelling (2000), 165.  
163 The play ‘re-enacts the tensions of the failed oligarchic coup of 411, and pre-enacts and 
precipitates the civil war of 404’: Wohl (2015), 120. After the coup of 411 BC, a climate of 
suspicion and hostility surrounded not only the oligarchic party but also the democratic 
one and its main bodies of governance. Some sources, the trustworthiness of which may 
nonetheless be affected by their authors’ oligarchic bias, accuse democrats like Cleophon 
of reducing the political debates conducted in the assembly to mere demagogy (Ar. Ra. 
679-85, 1532; ?Arist. Ath. Pol. 28. 3-4): see further Hall (1993), 265 ff; Wright (2008), 102. 
For a political interpretation of the play, see also Lanza (1961), 58-72; Di Benedetto (1971), 
205 ff; Euben (1986), 222-51; Medda (2001), 246 n. 123, 251 n. 28. 
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opportunist politician, willing to change sides whenever it suits him, and 
an anonymous demagogue ‘with no check on his tongue’ 
(ἀθυρόγλωσσος, 903). Following the advice of such corrupt individuals, 
the crowd sentence Orestes and his sister to death (944-5).   
Yet in the play criticism is likely not to be restricted to democracy 
but rather to embrace aristocracy and oligarchic sympathizers as well:164 
the close friendship between Orestes, Electra and Pylades is negatively 
described in language that explicitly recalls the ἑταιρείαι, that is, the 
political factions of aristocratic young people that played a key role in the 
recent oligarchic coup and continued to pose a threat to the stability of 
Athens even after democracy was restored.165 Similarly, in the Orestes the 
camaraderie between the three friends is depicted as a threatening alliance 
which causes turmoil in the city: the helplessness and uncertainty of the 
two siblings induce them to close themselves off from the world and to 
put their faith in their in-group only, which includes their loyal friend 
Pylades. Pylades in particular is the one who takes over the role of Apollo 
by being a constant presence and by giving Orestes those concrete 
manifestations of support that should have been provided by the god.166 
                                                 
164 Wright (2008), 109-114.  
165 The relationship between Pylades and Orestes is explicitly called ἑταιρεία at vv. 1072, 
1079. What is more, just as the bond between members of the same ἑταιρεία was felt to 
be stronger than any blood relationship, so Orestes asserts that a comrade (ἐταίρος), ‘a 
non-relative whose character fuses with yours is a better friend to possess than countless 
relatives.’ (804-5). See Hall (1993), 269-71; Wright (2008), 103-6. Cf. also Pelling (2000), 
184-8, according to whom, the depiction of Orestes, Pylades and Electra as members of an 
oligarchic faction is not meant to be entirely negative but rather invites the audience to 
respond positively to self-protection and cunning. 
166 Theodorou (1993), 42 argues that Pylades serves as a parallel to Apollo: as the scholar 
interestingly points out, when Pylades enters the stage, Apollo is no longer mentioned; 
by contrast, when at the end of the play there is a divine epiphany of the god, Pylades 
resumes his traditional role as a mute character. Theodorou also hypothesises that the 
same actor played both the role of Pylades and that of Apollo. It must also be borne in 
mind that ‘one of the most important functions of the hetaireia-members was to help their 
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Yet this condition of isolation turns out to be dangerous. Closure within 
the group creates identification with insiders and hate for outsiders. As a 
result, the close friendship between Orestes, Electra and Pylades turns into 
a distorted form of φιλία, which looks more like a criminal association 
aimed at taking revenge on Menelaus by harming two innocent women 
(1105, 1191 ff).167 
Even though there are undoubtedly many parallels between the 
mythical world of Orestes and the political life of late fifth century Athens, 
the play does not express either support for, or criticism against, a specific 
party, whether it be the democratic or the oligarchic one. On the contrary, 
it is more likely to convey a broader political message: the Orestes might be 
interpreted as a comment on the inadequacy of human institutions, such 
as the family and the law court, inadequacy that pushes Orestes to the 
point where the hero sees no other way out but recourse to further 
violence.  
The movements of the characters onstage and offstage well 
represent their helpless situation and their feeling of suffocation, which 
eventually lead to conspiracy and further violence. Throughout the play a 
dramatic tension develops between the stage space, which represents the 
domestic world of Agamemnon’s royal palace, and the offstage space, 
which symbolizes the political world of the city.168 Once Orestes realizes 
that his family is of no avail given that both his uncle and his grandfather 
have betrayed him, a centrifugal tendency pushes the hero outwards. 
                                                                                                                                     
hetairoi in litigation (Th. 8. 54. 4)’, just as Pylades does at the trial of his friend Orestes: 
Hall (1993), 270.  
167 For a discussion of the transformation of φιλία into an alliance of conspirators, see 
Hartigan (1991), 127-56; Mc Hardy (2008), 111 ff. cf. also Wohl (2012), 244-69.  
168 Medda (1999), 36-56.  
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However, his impulse to run away from the city is straightforwardly 
frustrated since all the ways out have been blocked. He then contents 
himself with the only remaining option: he asks his friend Pylades to 
accompany him to the Pnyx, the hill where the assembly trial takes place 
(774-95). Yet this last attempt to find a way out also fails: Orestes, together 
with his sister and his friend, are driven back into the suffocating stage 
space where they will have to take their own lives (946-9). The offstage 
space has turned out to be as hostile to the siblings as the more familiar 
stage space. A centripetal tendency once again makes the royal palace the 
focus of attention, but by now the segregation of Orestes, Electra, and 
Pylades has metamorphosed a locus of wealth and power into a locus of 
horror: one by one both victims (Helen and Hermione, 1345) and 
persecutors (Orestes and Pylades, 1245; Electra, 1352) enter the royal 
palace. Three times the audience hears Helen crying (1296, 1298, 1301): 
Euripides purposefully uses the dramatic convention of off-stage cries to 
surprise and frustrate his audience by suggesting that Helen is being 
killed at that very moment.169 The playwright thus calls attention to the 
conventionality of traditional dramatic forms and, by changing the 
meaning usually attributed to them, stresses the play’s theatrical 
innovativeness.170  
A further instance of Euripides’ manipulation of dramatic 
conventions occurs when Orestes, accompanied by Electra and Pylades, 
appears on the roof of the palace with his sword at Hermione’s throat and 
confronts Menelaus. Many scholars have interpreted this scene as a 
                                                 
169 The Phrygian slave then reports that Helen has mysteriously disappeared. Arnott 
(1982), 41-3 and (1983), 23-28 compares and contrasts the use of off-stage cries in 
Aeschylus’ Oresteia and Euripides’ Orestes.  
170 For a discussion of the functions of Euripides’ meta-theatrical techniques, see Roselli 
(2016), 390 ff; Wright (2008), 119-26.  
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mockery of the dramatic technique of deus ex machina.171 Orestes seems to 
have taken over the divine role but there is a distortion of the function of 
this device: the technique of deus ex machina is usually used in Greek 
tragedy to resolve a seemingly insoluble problem. By contrast, Orestes’ 
appearance on the roof complicates matters and leads to further disaster: 
he threatens Menelaus not only to kill his daughter but also to set the royal 
palace on fire (1578, 1594-6). Only in this way can Orestes set himself free 
of the claustrophobic space in which he has been driven back.  
Such a self-conscious reference to the μηχανή, which is usually 
used for divine epiphanies only, is not merely a comment on theatrical 
conventions in general and on the originality of Euripidean drama. On the 
contrary, it serves an important dramatic purpose since it sheds light on 
some of Orestes’ inner traits and on his present mental state, which can be 
described as one of internal conflict and exasperation. The depiction of 
Orestes’ entrance as a distorted version of deus ex machina might symbolize 
the likely reaction of a man who has been left to himself in the aftermath 
of the crime: the hero resolves to replace the god and to take his situation 
in hand, unfortunately with disastrous results. Deprived of both human 
and divine support, Orestes fails to come to grips with his double self-
image as both the righteous avenger of his father and the abhorrent killer 
of his mother. Unable to explain away this conflict, he remains stuck in a 
state of uncomfortable inner tension. 
I have already mentioned that the Aeschylean Orestes makes up his 
mind to kill his mother only after Pylades reminds him that he will suffer 
divine punishment if he disobeys Apollo’s command: Apollo’s order and 
                                                 
171 Halleran (1985), 43; Mastronarde (1990), 262-3; Dunn (1996), 159-61. 
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threats of punishment provide justifications for Orestes’ behaviour and, as 
a result, help him bear what he is about to commit. By contrast, the 
Euripidean Orestes can no longer attribute his actions to an external agent 
since he is not even sure whether or not he actually heard Apollo’s voice. 
How can he reconcile his heroic self-image with the heinous crime 
committed? In his speeches of defence in front of Tyndareus and the 
Argive jury, he first looks for further advantages of Clytaemnestra’s 
murder in addition to the main purpose of the matricide in avenging 
Agamemnon’s death: the killing should also be given credit for ridding 
the Argives of a shamelessly lustful and dangerous woman (557-565; 932-
5). In addition to this, Orestes maintains that the gravity of the matricide is 
negligible compared with the risk posed by such a negative role model for 
women as Clytaemnestra had she continued living (566-71; 935-42).  
In Subsection 3.5.2 I categorized Orestes’ defence speeches as an 
example of sophistic argumentation aimed at circumventing his 
interlocutors’ accusations. However, another reading is possible, namely, 
that Orestes’ arguments are a desperate attempt not merely to convince 
the jurors that he does not deserve the death penalty but also to persuade 
himself that he is not a criminal after all. Both arguments may help Orestes 
release his inner tension, which has built up inside him as a result of the 
process of holding two diametrically opposite opinions about himself at 
the same time. On the one hand, he reduces the discomfort he feels by 
claiming that the crime committed was not so serious if compared to the 
threat posed by the victim. On the other hand, he reshapes the inner 
discomfort into the claim that the murder of his mother was not merely an 
act of just revenge but also a benefit for society.  
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Orestes wants to see himself, and to be seen by the whole 
community, as a hero who carried out an heroic undertaking. Zeitlin, in 
her famous study of the literariness of the Orestes, has shown that the play 
often makes references to the Odyssey and draws parallels between 
Orestes’ violent schemes and the plot engineered in defence of his father’s 
rights by another mythical hero, namely, Telemachus.  Both young men 
are threatened in their position as legitimate heirs to the kingdom, and 
both fight against usurpers (Aegisthus and the suitors) who try to seize 
the throne through either seduction of, or marriage with, the queen.172 Yet, 
as the scholar interestingly points out, the relationship between Orestes 
and Telemachus in the play is the opposite of the one depicted in the 
Odyssey: whereas in the Homeric poem references to Orestes’ revenge 
against Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra serve the purpose of providing 
Telemachus with an exemplary model for his future vengeance upon the 
suitors, in the play Orestes appears to be a discredited hero who looks to 
Ithaca and to Telemachus’ battle against the suitors to re-enact his original 
Odyssean role in Argos.173  
The problem here is that Orestes’ attempts to make sense of what 
he has done lead him to believe that the murder of other female members 
of the same debased family as Clytaemnestra should also be called 
righteous and heroic actions. He first justifies the murder of his mother by 
                                                 
172 Zeitlin (1980), 61-2 points out that Telemachus’ battle against the suitors is explicitly 
evoked by two moments of Orestes’ battle within the Argive palace: ‘by the locking up of 
servants to prevent their interference (E. Or. 1127, 1448-51) and then by the ensuing 
carnage (E. Or. 1482-9)’. Cf. Goldhill (1986), 147-53; Barker in McClure (2016), 270-83.   
173 Zeitlin (1980), 62. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that in the Odyssey it is 
Aegisthus who kills Agamemnon and that the righteousness of Orestes’ revenge against 
Aegisthus and his female accomplice is never called into question. What is more, the 
Homeric account of the Orestes myth interestingly veils what has really happened to 
Clytaemnestra: no mention is made of the matricide, and Clytaemnestra’s death at the 
hands of her son is never described. See Goldhill (1986), 147-53. 
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asserting that he had to castigate an adulteress, whereas Telemachus did 
not have to punish the faithful Penelope (588-90). He then plans to kill 
Helen because he intends to ‘revive his old emblematic self in a new guise, 
still more grandiose than the first.’174 He thinks that killing another 
unfaithful wife like Helen will be an act worthy of praise since it avenges 
the deaths of all the heroes fallen during the Trojan war and since it 
safeguards the institution of marriage. Orestes claims to act in defence of 
the most important institution of a patriarchal society but, in devising 
deceitful plans to carry out violent actions, he confounds gender roles by 
gradually merging with bloodthirsty female figures, like the Erinys, the 
Gorgon and Clytaemnestra herself.175 The hero thus contributes to creating 
the gender confusion that pervades the play: Orestes would like to be seen 
by society as a powerful male figure, as a defender of male rights and 
status, but ends up on the female side. In addition to this, his need to 
justify his behaviour induces him to hatch a plan to kill not only Helen but 
also Hermione, who is the only entirely positive character in the play. The 
only way for Orestes to escape from a hopeless situation is the recourse to 
further violence. Yet the siblings’ revenge recoils back on itself and drags 
the avengers into a cycle of ruin, which leads them to put their own house 
at risk of destruction.  
Nonetheless, the play is not over yet. There is still time for the 
deities to prove that ‘the end is always in a god’s hands’ (1545-6). At the 
end of the tragedy, Apollo appears on the μηχανή to cut the knot, as befits 
a true deus ex machina. In the following subsection I will delve into the 
                                                 
174 Zeitlin (1980), 62.  
175 For an analysis of the similarities drawn between Orestes and these negative female 
figures, see Zeitlin (1980), 58 ff. Other examples of gender confusions are the 
masculinized Electra, who takes over Apollo’s role and tries to defend Orestes from the 
attacks of the Erinyes, and the effeminate Phrygian slave.  
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meaning of Apollo’s abrupt and delayed entrance in the Orestes by 
contrasting it with the god’s sudden and unannounced disappearance in 
the Eumenides.  
3.5.4 The endings of the Eumenides and the Orestes: Apollo’s sudden 
entrance and exit. 
Apollo’s appearance as deus ex machina at the end of the Orestes is 
quite unexpected given that the god is remarkably absent for almost the 
whole play. Just as bizarre is Apollo’s sudden and unmarked departure in 
the exodus of the Eumenides (either at v. 753 or at v. 777).176 What is the 
significance of such peculiar and abrupt stage movements? 
Taplin argues that Apollo’s unnoticed exit in the Eumenides is 
something extraordinary, which must have drawn the attention of the 
audience, since ‘not even minor characters disappear without any 
indication.’177 The scholar even tries to explain this oddity away by 
conjecturing a lacuna after 777.178 On the other hand, among those who 
maintain that there is no lacuna in the text as it has come down to us, 
some hold the view that such a sudden departure merely indicates that the 
role of Apollo is at an end: from then onwards Athena and the Erinyes 
take the prominent parts. According to others, by contrast, it might even 
serve the purpose of diminishing Apollo’s stature and suggesting that his 
arguments in the trial of Orestes are unconvincing.179 However, the latter 
hypothesis clashes with the fact that earlier in the play Apollo is not 
                                                 
176 For an analysis of the arguments adduced in support of each hypothesis, see Taplin 
(1977), 403 ff. 
177 Taplin (1977), 403-6; Taplin (1978), 38-9.  
178 According to Taplin’s reconstruction (1977), 403 ff, the missing part of text contained a 
short speech of farewell by Apollo.  
179 Winnington-Ingram (1933), 97 ff; for a discussion of both hypotheses, see Taplin (1977), 
403-6 with references and (1978), 38-9.  
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portrayed in a distinctively negative light and with the fact that Athena 
herself ultimately supports the god’s argument that the male prevails over 
the female.  
Therefore, Apollo’s disappearance is more likely to signify that his 
role is at an end, not merely in the sense that he has already carried out the 
task of standing up for Orestes, but in the sense that, at this point in the 
cosmic conflict between younger and older divinities, it is high time that 
the partial views of both Apollo and the Erinyes were replaced by a more 
harmonious and balanced order under the aegis of Athena and Zeus. The 
way in which Apollo is quickly disposed of can thus be an indication that 
his partial vision of the Erinyes is no longer valid: the ancient goddesses of 
vengeance must be integrated into the new cosmic order. In order to be 
granted a place of honour in Athens, however, they too must not stick to 
their previous partial view of the cosmos but must rather find some 
middle ground: they metaphorically disappear in their role as Erinyes and 
reappear in their new divinely sanctioned role as Eumenides to remain 
forever as protectors of fertility (916 ff).180 In spite of this role reversal, it is 
significant that the Eumenides probably do not change either their masks 
or their costumes but simply wear purple-dyed garments over their black 
clothing (1028).181 The black attire worn by the Eumenides under the red 
                                                 
180 Taplin (1977), 407 rightly points out that ‘Aeschylus puts the issue of the Erinyes’ 
attitude to Athens in terms of whether or not they will stay: […] the Erinyes imply that, if 
they lose, they will prolong their visit just long enough to poison the land (711, 719, 732 
ff)’; by contrast, Athena tries to convince them to stay by offering them a place of honour 
and many benefits in Athens. Their decision to stay is therefore important because it 
signifies reconciliation.   
181 Taplin (1978), 88 ff lists the arguments adduced in favour of the hypothesis that there 
is no change of masks and costumes. The red robes signal the Eumenides’ new metic 
status in Athens: Goheen (1955), 122 ff and Sider (1978), 12-27 analyse the similarities 
between the procession of the Eumenides in purple-dyed garments and the red-robed 
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robes, serves as a reminder of that element of fear which was a prerogative 
of the ancient goddesses of vengeance and which is still needed in any 
community ruled by law.182 
It can thus be argued that Apollo’s sudden disappearance in the 
Eumenides responds to the need for a harmonious ending. A similar 
argument has also be advanced with regard to the god’s abrupt entrance 
on stage at the end of the Orestes, as I shall now discuss in further detail.183  
The god, together with Helen, appears in the sky over the royal 
palace.184 He takes full responsibility for the matricide, in that he 
persuaded Orestes to commit the crime, and promises that he will set 
things right (1664-5). It would seem that the ending of the play vindicates 
Apollo and reconfirms the traditional version of the Orestes’ myth: all 
previous doubts regarding the gods are dissipated, and Orestes is finally 
reassured that he will soon be acquitted.185 Some scholars have also 
claimed that the promised outcome in the Orestes is more positive than 
that of the Eumenides given that Apollo’s speech implies that his protégé 
will be acquitted by a clear majority.186  
                                                                                                                                     
procession of metics in the Panathenaia, similarities that were first noticed by Headlam 
(see Goheen, ibidem, with references).  
182 For a discussion of the role of fear, see Sommerstein’s comment on A. Eu. 690-2: 
(2010a), 143-63. For a review of the scholarly literature on the transformation of the 
Erinyes into Eumenides, see Easterling (2008), 219-36, esp. 230-4.  
183 For a summary of the different interpretations of Apollo’s epiphany proposed by 
scholars, see Wolff (1983), 354-6; Porter (1994), 251-89, esp. 280 ff; Papadimitropoulos 
(2011), n. 2 p. 501. Cf. also Greenberg (1962), 191-2; Arnott (1973), 49-64; Hartigan (1991), 
153 ff; Dunn (1996), 32 ff, 159-61; Lefkowitz (2016), 99-127.  
184 The actors either stand on the θεολογεῖον or are suspended from the μηχανή. The 
latter hypothesis is more likely: West (1987), ad loc; Mastronarde (1990), 262-3.  
185 West (1987), n. at v. 28. 
186 Willink (1986) on 1625 ff; Lefkowitz (2002), 50. 
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Yet the main weakness with Orestes’ eventual salvation is that it 
seems to have come too late. The most serious problem with the ending of 
the play is the very fact that Apollo’s intervention has been delayed so 
long that, when it finally comes, it creates further bewilderment and 
uneasiness rather than harmony and order. The happy ending looks 
implausible since Apollo predicts a marriage and a friendly relationship 
between people who were earlier fierce enemies: Orestes will  marry the 
woman he was about to kill and will rule over a city, the citizens of which 
condemned him to death.187 In the absence of the gods, events have gone 
too far: no harmonious solution seems possible any longer; Apollo can 
only impose the traditional version of the Orestes myth from above by 
dictating what roles the characters will have to assume from then 
onwards.188 The characters will have to stick to these new roles and to 
accept new marital and friendly relationships whether or not there has 
thus far been fierce enmity between them.  
Because of this baffling imposition of the traditional version of the 
story at the end of a play the plot of which has much diverged from the 
established myth, the view that the ending of the Orestes is reassuring is 
not convincing. Such a puzzling delayed epiphany is more likely to 
                                                 
187 Wohl (2012), 247 ff. argues that Apollo’s intervention further confuses the categories of 
enmity and friendship: it is such confusion, and especially the loss of the distinctive 
figure of the enemy, that cause political madness in Argos. According to Griffith (2011), 
206, by contrast, ‘the marriage may even mitigate the feud between Orestes and 
Tyndareus and return them to the earlier state of mutual affection’. The scholar points 
out that dynastic solutions to political problems had been typical of the archaic age but 
that networks of marriage were still important in fifth-century Athens.  
188 Apollo assumes the meta-theatrical role as the director of the theatrical representation: 
he directs the action of the play and shapes the destinies of its characters. In this regard, it 
is worth pointing out that this is a rare case where the deus ex machina alters the course of 
events, whereas in most occurrences divine intervention is merely formal: it only 
sanctions what has already been set in motion. For some examples, see Dunn (1996), 32-4, 
159-61. I will further discuss the meta-theatrical role of the gods on stage in the following 
final section.  
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highlight the fact that a divine solution to human problems, as much as it 
would be convenient and enticing, is felt to be unsatisfactory in the 
advanced contemporary world precisely because it is too artificial. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that stagecraft techniques are to be 
interpreted not simply as powerful ways of conveying aesthetic effect but 
also as forms of constructing meaning and of deepening the discussion of 
issues which were of major concern to the contemporary audience.  
My investigation has been mainly concerned with the function of 
the physical presence or absence of the gods on stage and has raised the 
following questions: how does the presence or absence of the gods on 
stage influence human agency? How is it interwoven into the thematic 
structure of the play? 
We have seen that the Eumenides is characterized by the remarkable 
presence of Apollo, Athena and the Erinyes as characters who truly belong 
to the action of the play. Their active involvement in Orestes’ trial is an 
indication that the story of the matricide is not merely a human matter but 
is rather to be understood within the broader context of a cosmic conflict 
between two generations of deities and between two competing claims of 
justice. As far as the Erinyes are concerned, their physical appearance on 
stage serves the purpose of articulating a discourse on the integration of 
these old goddesses of vengeance into a new and more civilized order 
under the aegis of the Olympian gods. Their integration is necessary to 
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enact the divinely sanctioned passage from the lex talionis to a new system 
of justice ruled by the high court of the Areopagus.  
Such a crucial transition also entails a fundamental change in the 
understanding of crime: the previous religious conception of human 
criminal acts as resulting from supernatural factors is gradually replaced 
by a new view endorsed by law courts, which stresses the role of the 
human agent. I have shown that the Eumenides, which is set at the turning 
point marking the transition from one view to the other, expresses 
anxieties about how Orestes’ matricide should be judged by the new 
system of human justice.  
On the one hand, Orestes is strenuously defended by Apollo. 
Aeschylus resorts to stagecraft techniques to build anticipation for the 
major role played by the god in the last play of the trilogy and to show 
Apollo’s constant support for his mortal protégé. I have discussed how the 
staging of the murder tableaux in the Choephorae illustrates Orestes’ faith 
in divine help. I have pointed out that Apollo’s support is later given a 
concrete manifestation in the purification of Orestes, which is carried out 
by the god himself. Last but not least, I have shown that Apollo’s presence 
alongside Orestes in the last play of the trilogy corroborates the hero’s 
trust in divine intervention: the god takes a stand in favour of Orestes by 
admitting freely that it was his oracle that ordered Orestes to kill his 
mother and by proclaiming that he has never prophesied anything that 
might be contrary to the will of Zeus (Eu. 614-21). In other words, Apollo 
is saying that the matricide should be interpreted as part of Zeus’ will and 
justice: he is thus placing emphasis on the supernatural causes of the 
matricide, which are presented as outweighing Orestes’ human 
motivations.  
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Apollo’s defence speeches, however, are not entirely convincing: 
Orestes is formally discharged but is not totally exculpated, as is shown by 
the tie in the votes of human jurors and by the key role played by the 
goddess Athena in deciding the issue. As I have discussed, Athena’s 
exceptional intervention in the voting can be interpreted in two ways. It 
may be either an indication that human justice still needs the help of the 
gods to solve complex cases or a way to praise the new system of human 
justice, which is gradually moving away from the ancient religious 
conception of crime.  
Whatever interpretation we follow, it is clear that in the Oresteia the 
gods are intimately involved in human affairs: the trilogy depicts a world 
where the gods watch over mortals and oversee major transitions in 
human society. Their physical presence in the last play of the trilogy also 
gives the impression that it is the gods that are pulling the strings in the 
Atreid saga.189   
By contrast, the characters in the Orestes for most of the 
performance apparently live in a world without gods. Euripides uses the 
traditional myth of Orestes but changes the dramatic structure and 
performance of his theatrical representation to suit some of the 
unconventional ideas of human life, society and religion that he is seeking 
to express. 
                                                 
189 The function of the presence of the gods on stage is usually associated with the power 
to shape the play and to create awareness of the medium itself, namely, the play as the 
play. The two most famous tragic scenes in which a deity acts as the director of the action 
of the play are the dressing of Pentheus in Euripides’ Bacchae and the episode of Ajax’s 
madness in the Sophoclean play: both Dionysus and Athena take upon themselves a 
directorial function and lead their unaware victims to their destruction. See Easterling 
(1993), 77-86; Dobrov (2001), 23-6; 70 ff. 
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From the beginning of the play, the juxtaposition of subjective and 
objective representations of the Erinyes, as well as their physical absence 
as characters from the stage, might be read as calling into question the 
mythical and religious worldview and might be meant to symbolize the 
confusion typical of Euripides’ contemporary world which was going 
through a period of political and cultural upheaval: owing to such an 
ambiguous depiction of the Erinyes and to the remarkable absence of 
Apollo, there emerges the possibility that the matricide committed by 
Orestes may be a mere case of domestic violence and that the alien force 
which prompted the hero to kill his mother, as well as his subsequent fits 
of madness, may have sprung from his inner self rather than coming from 
external deities.   
I have also shown that, by making use of the physical absence of the 
gods on stage, Euripides not only introduces innovative perspectives on 
human responsibility and on the relationship between human and divine 
agency; he also addresses political issues by raising questions about the 
role that human institutions should play in a world that, for almost the 
whole play, is imagined to be without gods. Euripides sets the ancient 
myth of Orestes in a new civilized context where the law of the court is a 
practice already in effect and where the justice system is entirely run by 
humans. Deprived of any concrete manifestation of divine support, 
Orestes is forced to rely on human φιλία and on human institutions, such 
as the family and the court, but in vain. 
As is well exemplified by the characters’ movements onstage and 
offstage and by the distorted use of the deus ex machina, the lack of divine 
and human help induce the siblings and Pylades to take matters into their 
own hands through violent means. Whereas in the Eumenides it is the gods 
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who hold the reins of the story, in the Orestes it is up to the mortal hero to 
make up his own story: the protagonist seems to be free to choose any 
course of action he wants, even though the actions he intends to perform 
are not included in his own myth.190 Orestes takes over the gods’ role as 
director of the story represented on stage and, by devising a new plot to 
escape the death penalty, creates a competing narrative, which sharply 
diverges from the myth he traditionally belongs to. The fact that the hero 
takes the position usually taken by the deus ex machina on the roof of the 
palace indicates that the hero, lacking both human and divine help, is 
determined to find a solution to his situation as quickly and easily as a 
god from the μηχανή usually sorts things out. Nonetheless, Orestes’ 
efforts to shape his own destiny only make the situation worse until 
Apollo finally appears from the μηχανή to reclaim his directorial function 
and to set things right by imposing the traditional version of the myth.  
Apollo’s solution inevitably appears to be rather artificial, though 
necessary. The artificiality of the ending of the play is not to be interpreted 
as a critique against Apollo, blamed for intervening too late and for 
imposing a puzzling solution to human problems. It is more likely to raise 
concerns about the inability of society to disentangle a problematic 
situation: the inefficacy of human institutions has rather contributed to 
making the situation so inextricable that, in the end, it turns out to be 
resolvable only by a divine solution, which is forcefully imposed from 
above and which ultimately denies men’s freedom to choose and shape 
their own destinies.  
                                                 
190 For instance, he plans to kill Helen even though, according to the myth, this cannot – 
and will not – happen. Zeitlin (1980), 52 argues that in this play ‘myth seems to generate 
fiction’.  
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4. Conclusions 
 
This research is intended to show how religious ideas in Greek 
tragedy are tied up with other competing discourses, from medicine, to 
philosophy and political theory. Three religious topics were selected for 
analysis based on the most pressing questions pertaining to the 
hierarchical god-man-beast relationship and to potential disruptions of 
world order: excessive intimacy between a male deity and a mortal girl; 
problems of knowledge and communication between gods and humans; 
ethical dilemmas (raised by human and divine interaction) that often leave 
questions of agency and responsibility unclear.  
It is my aim to make a contribution to the study of Greek tragedy 
and its relationship to the larger historical and cultural contexts in which it 
was produced: I hope to have shown that Greek tragedy participates in, 
and contributes to, the intellectual and socio-political advancements of the 
fifth century and that it also operates as an innovative framework for 
exploring contemporary religious experience.  
This work is also an attempt to adopt a broader perspective on the 
study of Greek drama; it brings together a variety of approaches, from 
literary criticism through the ‘stagecraft approach’ to New Historicism: 
each chapter follows a similar methodology of close reading of some 
paradigmatic plays and connects their themes to the wider context of 
religious exploration, political thought, philosophical inquiry and medical 
investigation.  
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In this concluding chapter I summarise my main findings in light of 
the research questions that guided my inquiry and outline possible areas 
for further research.  
4.1 Summary of Findings 
I began this research by exploring Greek tragedy’s depiction of the 
myths of sexual intercourse between male gods and female mortals. My 
analysis of Aeschylus’ Suppliants and Euripides’ Ion showed that Greek 
tragedy, as opposed to pre-tragic poetry, problematizes such an 
excessively close relationship by focusing on the dreadful misfortunes 
suffered by the heroines. I considered the counter-argument that, if we 
place the myths in a broader perspective, it becomes evident that the 
prestige of such unions is eventually restored because, in the long run, 
they give rise to new glorious royal lines. Yet my examination into the 
background of the plays revealed grounds to challenge this position. For 
instance, I discussed an important aspect of Athens’ socio-historical 
context after the Persian wars, namely a widespread feeling of identity-
related anxiety triggered by an increased influx of newcomers: building on 
this, I argued that Io’s union with Zeus in Aeschylus’ Suppliants is called 
into question on the ground that it jeopardizes the preservation of the 
Argives’ autochthonous bloodline. Similarly, in the Ion divine rape 
ultimately results in the social danger most feared by fifth-century 
Athenian society: an illegitimate child is passed off as the legitimate son 
and heir of the king of Athens.  
The analysis of both plays thus supported one of the major claims 
of this study, namely that we can understand the nature and scope of 
tragedy’s religious problematization more deeply if we analyse the ways 
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in which religious issues are interconnected with, and complicated by, 
social and political matters of public concern.  
Although the world of Greek tragedy remains the divinely 
governed world of heroic myth, this study also demonstrated that tragic 
plays composed in the late fifth century (such as the OT, the Orestes and 
the Bacchae) borrow from the latest advances in various fields of 
intellectual inquiry to suggest alternative, more rational, explanations of 
the universe and of human agency. In the second chapter I argued that 
how characters make sense of events is indicative of the developments of 
the mid and late fifth century in philosophy, in historical investigation and 
in medicine: early Greek medical writers, Presocratic philosophers and 
historians such as Herodotus transformed the meaning of such powerful 
and unforeseen events by transferring causal responsibility from divine 
agency to unseen natural forces operating in the world and inside the 
body. By representing Oedipus and Pentheus as disinclined to see a divine 
hand in the plague or in the earthquake, Sophocles’ OT and Euripides’ 
Bacchae refer to the cultural context of the performance and draw attention 
to how the cultural codes used to interpret such natural phenomena may 
change over time.  
The third chapter deepened the discussion of the changes in the 
interpretation of catastrophic events and bodily diseases by investigating 
how Greek tragedy represents the transformation in the conceptions of 
human agency and responsibility that occurred in the transition from a 
pre-legal society ruled by the lex talionis to the new civilized form of trial 
by jury, which stresses the importance of intention in assessing criminal 
action. In accordance with the new revolutionary ideas regarding divine 
and human nature formulated by the sophists and by Hippocratic writers, 
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the hypothesis arises that Clytaemnestra’s murder might be decoupled 
from a supernatural necessity. Likewise Orestes’ madness, rather than 
being brought about by external daemonic entities, might be simply the 
result of the hero’s dreadful awareness of being responsible for an 
impious crime. This hypothesis seems to be validated by significant 
differences in the stagecraft of the Aeschylean and Euripidean plays: to 
mention the most important one, in the Orestes, as opposed to the 
Eumenides, the Erinyes never appear on stage, thus reinforcing the idea 
that they are mere figments of imagination.   
Greek tragedy thus shows acute responsiveness to the compelling 
political, intellectual and religious issues of the day and provides the 
spectators with new perspectives to confront future challenges and to deal 
with processes of cultural change.  
As shown in the first chapter, Greek tragedy’s treatment of the 
myths of sexual intercourse between gods and mortals indicates a 
development in religious thought in the fifth century and an urgently felt 
need for a more rigid separation between gods and mortals. What this 
study has tried to show is that a discourse in favour of a much starker line 
of demarcation between the human and the divine is formulated in the 
plays in terms of the contemporary political tensions and intellectual 
trends: for instance, by anachronistically representing Apollo as in a way 
obliged to conform to fifth-century inheritance laws, the Ion deals a blow 
to the prestige of divine paternity, drawing on philosophical theories 
against divine anthropomorphism.191  
                                                 
191 Xenoph. DK 23-24, 26, A32; Heraclit. DK 5, 32, 78; Emp. DK 134.  
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Similarly, in the following chapters I demonstrated that the 
investigation into the limits of human knowledge and agency in the plays 
is interwoven with political discourse. For instance, the OT and the Bacchae 
show that, even when the epistemic gap between deities and humans 
seems to be bridged, as in the case of prophecy or the privileged 
knowledge of mystic initiates, human knowledge still remains condemned 
to uncertainty because it can always be manipulated for political reasons. 
Likewise, Euripides’ choice to shift emphasis from the cosmic level to the 
human level in his treatment of Orestes’ myth gives him the opportunity 
to raise political concerns about the efficacy of human institutions which 
are imagined to replace the gods in conducting justice.  
By representing on stage stories of good or bad government, and of 
positive or negative social behaviour, as well as examples of pious or 
impious attitudes, Greek tragedy challenges its audience to view the 
changes occurring in its society with an open-minded and critical attitude 
and provides the spectators with a civic understanding of their own good. 
Just as religion was embedded in every aspect of ancient Greek culture 
and society, so too it permeated Greek drama where it was inherently 
interwoven with political and cultural matters. In order to grasp the 
underlying meaning and function of Greek tragedy, it is important to 
delve into the ways in which discourses on all these different aspects of 
ancient Greek life and culture interact with, and cross-fertilize, each other.  
4.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
In summarising the main findings of my research, its limitations 
also need to be mentioned. One limitation lies in the number of tragedies 
analysed: in this study I presented an analysis of six plays, two for each 
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topic. This fact may have affected the findings by limiting them to 
demonstrating religious attitudes in specific plays rather than common 
trends. However, as each pair of tragedies was selected with the aim of 
investigating how the same religious theme is treated differently by the 
playwrights in different times, I suggest that the findings may indicate 
some general trends, developments and changes in fifth-century Athenian 
religious beliefs.  
Another limitation may lie in the criteria used to choose the plays 
for closer analysis: the process of selecting six tragedies from the whole 
corpus of extant Greek drama to address my research questions is an 
unavoidably risky enterprise, not least because the choice may appear to 
be arbitrary. Although the plays examined in my research were only a 
small sample, they were selected for their significance and interest and as 
illustrative of the three different religious topics treated in the individual 
chapters. In the Introduction I explained the reasons for my choice of these 
specific plays in greater detail and I also asserted that the research could 
easily be expanded to include analysis of other extant tragedies and 
fragmentary plays in order to have a more comprehensive view of Greek 
tragedy’s treatment of religious issues.192 However, the plays I have 
chosen are suitable samples for this exploratory stage of the research. 
Finally, my choice of religious topics is also inevitably selective and 
cannot pretend to be exhaustive: I focused my study on three main kinds 
of disruption threatening to affect the world order and the hierarchical 
god-man-beast relationship. Further study on religious exploration in 
Greek tragedy could be expanded to include other important religious 
                                                 
192 Cf. n. 80 in the Introduction.  
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topics, such as the opposition between purity and pollution, the problem 
of human sacrifice or the effects of oaths and curses on human agency. In 
addition to this, there are further lines along which future research on the 
main kinds of disruption of the world order that I chose to discuss in this 
work could fruitfully proceed. 
While my investigations were limited to the myths of sexual 
intercourse between male gods and female mortals, further studies could 
explore similar stories where a male mortal is the object of desire of either 
a god or a goddess: for instance, the erotic pursuits of Ganymede by Zeus 
and Tithonus by Eos might be analysed.193 This would deepen our 
understanding of gender issues. Myths of this kind hint at the danger of 
female dominance and evoke its appalling consequence: they violate the 
dominant gender schema, which assigns the active role (pursuit) to the 
male and the passive (flight) to the female. As a consequence, such unions 
leave the male debilitated and unmanned: for instance, Tithonus wastes 
away in a state of permanent senescence. Similarly, it might be fruitful to 
compare and contrast the consequences of such abductions in pre-tragic 
poetry and in Euripides’ Trojan Women, focusing on the way in which 
Trojan tragic characters make use of Ganymede’s and Tithonos’ sexual ties 
with Zeus and Eos respectively: the chorus blames the gods for 
abandoning the city of Troy, complains about the uselessness of the love 
stories between gods and Trojan mortals, and lays claim to special 
protection from the divine.  
                                                 
193 Ganymede’s myth: Hom. Il. 20. 233-235; Hymn to Aphrodite 5. 202-217; E. Tr. 820-39. 
Tithonus’ myth: Hes. Th. 984 ff; Sapph. fr. 58 Voigt; E. Tr. 840-59. Cf. Keuls (1985), 47-55; 
Zeitlin (1986), 144-145; Robson (1997), 80-89; Kilinski (1998), 34-35.  
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It would also be worth investigating the stories of mortal men 
trying to unite with goddesses (e.g. the myths of Peleus, Ixion, Tityos): all 
the heroes are harshly punished by the gods for their impious 
transgression of boundaries, with the notable exception of Peleus whose 
union with Thetis is divinely sanctioned by Zeus.194 The most interesting 
example of this kind of myth is Actaeon’s story since it is recounted in a 
fragmentary play by Aeschylus, the Toxotides: Actaeon is torn apart by his 
hounds when Artemis transforms him into a stag for an offence against 
her.195 The boy unwittingly comes upon the goddess Artemis bathing 
naked in the spring with her nymphs, thus trespassing boundaries 
between gods and mortals. The study of the fragments belonging to this 
play would enable us to investigate Greek tragedy’s treatment of this 
myth and its religious implications.  
All these and further questions could be fruitfully addressed in 
future research with the double aim of deepening our understanding of 
religious exploration in Greek tragedy and of testing the main argument of 
this study: that is, that the interrelation between religious issues, 
philosophical inquiry, and socio-political matters in Greek plays offers us 
a fruitful field of study for demonstrating how Greek tragedy, by 
capturing latent anxieties in contemporary society, informed the cultural 
assumptions and religious perspectives of its audience and paved the way 
for changes in worldviews.  
                                                 
194 Ixion’s myth: Pi. P. 2. 21-48. Tityos’ myth: Hom. Od. 11. 576-81. Peleus’ myth: Hom. Il. 
18. 55 ff; Pi. P. 3. 92 ff; E. IA. 1051 ff. Cf. Zeitlin (1986), 132; Stewart (1995), 81; Robson 
(1997), 80-89. 
195 A. frr. 241-244TrGF.  Cf. Zeitlin (1986), 147-148; Sommerstein (2013), 81-94.  
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